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E S S A Y
ON
GRAMMAR,

AS IT MAY BE APPLIED TO THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE.
In TWO TREATISES.

The one SPECULATIVE, being an Attempt to investigate proper Principles.

The other PRACTICAL, containing Definitions and Rules deduced from the Principles, and illustrated by a Variety of Examples from the most approved Writers.

A NEW EDITION.

Ne quis, tanquam parva, fastidiat Grammatices Elementa; non quia magnæ sit operæ Consonantes a Vocalibus discernere, ipsasque eas in Semivocalium Numerum, mutarumque partiri; sed quia interiora veluti saci hujus adeuntibus apparebit multa rerum subtilitas, quæ non modo acuere Ingenia Puerilia, sed exercere altissimam quoque Eruditionem ac Scientiam possit.

QUINCTIL.

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P R E F A C E.

TWO very different opinions concerning the subject of grammar have prevailed in the world, and those who entertain either of these opinions may be inclined to look upon any new treatise on the subject as quite unnecessary. Hence it is possible that those persons may not think the following performance worthy of a perusal; and on this account it is necessary, in this place, to consider both these opinions, and to shew how far the one or the other is authorized by reason.

The first opinion is, that grammar has been treated of already by so many writers in so many languages, that whatsoever can now be said upon the subject must be little more than a repetition of what has been said by former grammarians.

The other opinion is, that language having been formed at the first without regard to the principles of grammar, is not subject to them; but that use and custom are the only tests of what is right or wrong in

it, and the only certain directors for the application of it.

With regard to the first of these opinions, I can with truth assure my reader, that he will find the speculative treatise to be at least original. The old terms of grammar are indeed retained ; but the investigation of every part of the subject that is of any considerable moment, is altogether new. I am likewise in hopes, that some advances in the art will appear to be made, and some difficulties cleared up in almost every part of the subject. For having shewn in the first place (as I hope, with sufficient evidence) the true nature of the conceptions annexed to single nouns and verbs, I have accounted for the several modes of proceeding by which these conceptions are again united into conceptions more and more complex at pleasure. This is by much the most difficult part of grammar, and, as Mr. Locke complained long ago, has not been sufficiently attended to by the generality of those who have written on the subject.

In the second place ; as the nature of words themselves requires certain grammatic forms to be introduced into language for the sake of direction and precision, in joining the words of a series properly together, I have shewn what is the effect of each of these forms, and why some languages have a greater variety of them than others : and particularly why the Latin and Greek have a much greater variety of them than the English.

And

And in the third place ; because the act itself of applying words comes in aid on many occasions, so as to ascertain what the words themselves leave undetermined ; I have shewn how, and in what instances, this comes to pass.

I have consulted* several grammarians of note, who have written in such languages as I am acquainted with ; but have not received from them so much satisfaction as I hoped for, on any of the points above-mentioned. Indeed the two last points have been either quite overlooked, or at least touched upon very slightly : and yet no less depends upon them than the ascertainment of the particulars in which affirmation consists. Now surely the nature of affirmation ought to be fully cleared up in a treatise of rational grammar. For words are connected together with no other intention but to affirm or to deny ; and therefore the principal part of the business of a speculative grammarian is to shew how this intention is accomplished. Indeed all the particulars above-mentioned are of so great importance in the art of grammar, that, if any considerable degree of satisfaction can be given concerning them, it is surely worth the while to take some pains for the sake of such satisfaction. It is true, that some of these particulars are of an abstracted nature ; and when such are treated of, a steady attention is necessary to comprehend what is said concerning them. But those who acknowledge the necessity of being well versed in the principles of grammar, in order to arrive at a compleat knowledge of the nature of language, will

will not be unwilling to apply their attention steadily upon a treatise in which *an attempt is made to investigate the most general principles of the art* : and if my reader will favour me with such attention, I would gladly hope that he will find no great difficulty in following me through any part of the work.

But those who think that custom and precedent are the only principles on which the application of language proceeds, will be apt to say, that the attention which is bestowed upon *the investigation of rational principles of grammar*, is merely thrown away both by the writer and reader. Yet surely there are such principles ; for can it be imagined, that any consistent method of communicating the rational discursive operations of one man to another, can be the random effect of accident ? Or can it be denied that every language is such a method ? If then the plan of any language is not the effect of chance, it must be the effect of reason ; and surely whatsoever the reason of any man, or of any community of men, can establish, the reason of other men may account for. It has been long observed, that algebraic species, when used in connected series, form a kind of language applicable to quantity only ; and the reason why these artificial marks do so, is evidently because the letters express conceptions similar to those which are denoted by noun substantives, and the signs by which the letters are connected, denote discursive acts similar to those which are denoted by the signs of cases, whilst the mark of equality denotes affirmation. Hence it comes to pass, that all the species on the one
side

side of the equation are considered but as one quantity, and all the species on the other side also as one quantity, and the whole quantity on the one side is equal to the whole quantity on the other. But the actual operations of addition, subtraction, &c. by which the parts on either side are to be reduced all to one quantity, cannot be performed so long as the unknown quantity remains on that side: therefore it is clear, that the signs do not perform these operations, but are only marks invented to register the several kinds of discursive operations by which the mind proceeds in its investigation; and the signs of cases are exactly of the same nature with these signs, only less definite and precise. Now surely no man will say that there are no general principles on which the application of algebraic species proceeds, and if this cannot be said, neither can it be truly said, that there are no general principles on which the application of language proceeds. And if the former are clearly discovered, why may not the latter? But it is alledged, that every language at the first was rude and imperfect, the confused jargon of savage uncultivated men. Every art was at first in a rude and imperfect state; yet the natural reason of man gave birth to every art: and the same reason, assisted by trial and experience, continued to improve it: so that language, in this respect, is only on the same terms with other arts and sciences. Now it is allowed, that there are general principles which obtain in other arts and sciences; and why not so in language? The persons who would refer every thing in language to mere use and custom, seem to me to consider

sider *readiness of execution*, as the same thing with *propriety of execution* : and it must be granted, that, in all the practical arts, readiness of execution entirely proceeds from constancy of use and practice. But, in other practical arts, every one is sensible, that when readiness of execution is not regulated by some consistent plan, the result of such execution is usually faulty. It is true, that, in all the practical arts, much use may supply the practitioner with so many precedents, that some of them may be used as patterns by which to regulate almost any instance of execution that shall occur. But it should be considered, that the art of applying the patterns or precedents pertinently, is a kind of speculative plan by which the practice of each art is regulated ; that even this usually requires the instruction of a master ; and that the instruction of this master (though not reduced to a regular system written down) supplies, so far as it goes, the place of such a system. If the practitioner is ingenious and industrious, he will, by his own observation and reflexion, improve upon the instructions which are given him, and perhaps will, in many instances, carry on his reflexions till they become general principles of the art which he practises : and, if so, he arrives at science in these instances.

Those who propose use and precedent as the only rules of language, in effect, propose the proceeding above-mentioned ; for they only say, that every man's own reflexion may, from the custom of the language in which he speaks, form within his own mind what will

will be equivalent to a plan of grammar, and which, though not drawn up in exact method, will answer all the purposes of practice. I shall not undertake to determine what a man may do, but it is evident, that very able men have not done what is above supposed; for whosoever shall peruse the SHORT INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH GRAMMAR WITH CRITICAL NOTES, lately published by Mr. Doddsley, will find that our authors, of the highest reputation, have fallen into such inaccuracies as would not be pardoned in a school-boy, if they appeared in a Latin composition. And surely the worthy author of the above-mentioned book has done very great service to the language, by pointing out the inaccuracies, and by shewing, in his very judicious preface, the true source from whence they have sprung. This proves beyond all dispute the necessity of attending to practical grammar in our own language. It is farther urged, that mode and custom must be the only rule of speech, because every living language is perpetually changing by their sole influence: but so is the execution of every practical art whatsoever; for does not the stile of building, that of furniture and utensils of all kinds, vary continually by the same influence, as likewise the methods of cultivating the earth, of making war, of carrying on navigation, and of conducting the employment of almost every profession? Yet there are general principles by which men conduct themselves in all these instances, and such there are also by which the application of language is conducted, if men would take the pains to find them out.

But still it may be said, that practical grammar may be attended to, without troubling ourselves with deep speculation on the nature of language in general; and this must be allowed to be true. But even practical grammar cannot *be written*, so as to give satisfaction to a person of sagacity, without first considering the general nature of the several parts of speech; for as the application of language is exceedingly extensive, and as the signification of the words and signs made use of, is of a very complicated nature, much abstract consideration becomes necessary to distinguish the several particulars of the signification of the same part of speech one from another; and especially in the noun and verb. Every part of speech in some particulars of its signification approaches to the nature of some other part of speech, and if these particulars are not very carefully observed by a writer on grammar, his definitions will be inaccurate; for the definition of one part of speech will comprehend some other part: and if definitions are thus formed, they will be of little or no use. And on the other hand, if grammatic definitions are made as accurate as the subject admits of, they must be founded on properties of the conceptions of the mind which are somewhat remote from common observation. This creates an appearance of difficulty and abstruseness in these parts of grammar; and therefore it is not proper to trouble children with very exact definitions at their first entrance upon language. Yet surely it may not be amiss to tell a child, that a noun substantive denotes objects or things so conceived, that if several of them be taken together, they may be counted

counted by the numbers *one, two, three, &c.* : and that verbs denote states so conceived, that any of them may be considered as repeated *once, twice, thrice*, or any number of times at pleasure, which the objects denoted by substantives cannot be. The other parts of speech may likewise be distinguished to a child by marks which may be easily comprehended, and a list of several of them, as of the pronouns, conjunctions, and prepositions, may be actually given : which will enable the child to distinguish them readily from other parts of speech. This, and the care of a diligent teacher in resolving the language, will do a great deal towards giving the child a due apprehension of the use of grammatic rules and distinctions ; and as reason improves, and reflexion encreases, more perfect instructions may be given by the master, and will be understood by the child.

- But as many persons, who are arrived to maturity of judgment, may have occasion to learn a language, or to improve their knowledge of it ; the definitions in a grammar for the use of such persons must be as accurate as possible, and the rules as general as possible ; and if they should at first appear to be somewhat abstruse, the student must be told, that the nature of the subject makes this unavoidable ; and therefore that he must be content to attend closely to them till they are well understood ; and that, if they are once perfectly comprehended, the application of them will become obvious on any occasion. Thus far every learner is concerned to understand the grammar of any particular
a 2 language

language which he would write correctly. But those who profess to teach any language, would do well to carry their researches still farther concerning the nature of human speech ; because such researches, if prudently made, will enable them, in many instances, to give those whom they teach, general views of the reasons of construction, which is the only sure way of fixing the art of grammar in their minds, so as to enable them to know when they may safely depart from the ordinary rules, and how to do it with advantage. And as this proceeding is the duty of a teacher, it is likewise necessary for all who would be as skilful in language as teachers ought to be. I am far from thinking the following treatises are fully sufficient to answer the purposes above-mentioned ; but speculative or rational grammar has hitherto been little cultivated in England, and if this treatise shall contribute to turn the thoughts of men of reflexion to it, I shall think that I have done some service.

I have given the substance of the practical grammar in verse, for the ease of memory. In this I have undoubtedly subjected myself to much poetical criticism ; but if I have made the lists of irregular words more easy to be remembered, by putting them into rhyme, however harsh, or the rules more easy to be acquired and retained by the same means, I am very little solicitous for my reputation as a poet. We are all apt to censure the awkward measures of the rules for the genders of nouns and the preterperfect tenses of verbs in the common Latin grammar, and yet no method has hitherto
been

been discovered which answers the end so well as these rules do, although many very ingenious men have attempted other methods.

I have received some assistance in this work from a very learned and ingenious treatise, called *HERMES*; as likewise from the *Grammaire Raisonnée* of Messieurs de Port-Royal, with the Abbé Fromant's very useful and ingenious reflexions upon it; also from Father Buffier's *Grammar*: I have had some advantage from Sanctius's *Minerva*; some from Dr. Wallace's short piece of *English Grammar*, and more from the excellent *Introduction* mentioned above; I have also received some helps from Dr. Ward's four *Essays* on the *English language*, especially from the list of verbs published at the end of these *Essays*; I have likewise made some use of Mr. White's treatise of the *English verb*; but above all, Mr. Johnson's *Dictionary* has been of use to me. I could not have written several parts of the *Practical Grammar*, had not this most excellent performance supplied me with examples, and other helps. If I have not done injustice to the originals which I have followed, I shall hope that my practical treatise may be serviceable to learners of all kinds, which was my only view in writing it: there is much more in it than is necessary, or even convenient, to trouble a child with at the first; but not more than is necessary for grown up persons who may be desirous to learn the language, or the grammar of it. My design was to make a grammatical knowledge of the *English language* a step towards gaining the like knowledge in other languages,

guages, especially in the Greek and Latin : therefore I have followed the usual heads which are found in the grammars of these languages. To depart from these heads may perhaps seem more concise ; but, in reality, little advantage is gained by it ; at least no advantage, which is equivalent to the inconvenience of a new plan and new terms, to those who have been accustomed to the old. I have avoided all disputes with former writers on grammar : for my intention and inclination was not to censure, but to investigate, and to apply what I should investigate. I doubt not but I have been guilty of mistakes in so very abstruse a subject as that of speculative grammar, and of omissions in so extensive a subject as that of a practical grammar of a language so little reduced to rule as the English has hitherto been. But if any person shall be pleased to inform me of any defect in the work, I will endeavour to amend it, if my health and leisure shall permit me to do it.

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ERRATA in the SPECULATIVE GRAMMAR.

page	line	
13	18	for <i>far</i> read <i>for</i> .
49	28	read <i>and the circumstances</i> .
65	23	read <i>by a substantive</i> .
74	19	instead of <i>cannot only</i> r. <i>can not only</i> .
77	3	the word <i>by</i> should be in roman letters.
108	21	read <i>indefinite article; seeing every man, &c.</i>
136	3	r. <i>a noun adjective, or dependent, &c.</i>
163	28	for <i>definitive</i> read <i>objective</i> .
173	20	for <i>canor</i> read <i>cannot</i> .
174	22	dele <i>of</i> .
188	21	for <i>adjectively</i> read <i>objectively</i> .
192	20	insert <i>the</i> before <i>composition</i> .
199	14	the words (<i>but himself and I</i>) to be in a parenthesis.
204	12	insert <i>past</i> before <i>state</i> .
280	17	for <i>sancti</i> read <i>sanctii</i> .
283	11	for <i>scelus</i> read <i>scelus</i> .
287	21	for <i>response</i> read <i>responsa</i> .

ERRATA in the PRACTICAL GRAMMAR.

page	line	
305	18	for <i>treasurer</i> read <i>treasure</i> .
307	14	for <i>found</i> read <i>sound</i> .
308	11	for <i>word</i> read <i>words</i> .
334	29	for <i>concerning</i> read <i>concerning</i> . after page 360, page 369 follows by mistake.
383	21	for <i>potential</i> read <i>potential</i> .
404	22	for <i>second preterite</i> read <i>second indefinite</i> .
407	17	for <i>first preterite</i> read <i>first indefinite</i> .
421	8	for <i>to be about to be read to be about to see</i> .
432	25	before <i>references</i> insert <i>the</i> .
450	28	for <i>positive</i> read <i>possessive</i> .
492	20	for <i>article</i> read <i>particle</i> .
514	10	for <i>before</i> read <i>with</i> .
538	18	for <i>first</i> read <i>second</i> .
541	22	for <i>ability</i> read <i>ability</i> .

I N T R O.

INTRODUCTION.

SECTION I.

Of the method which will be observed in the following treatise.

ALTHOUGH the principal intent of this treatise is to explain the principles upon which the application of language proceeds, and especially of the English language; it is nevertheless necessary to give some account of the signs or symbols themselves, which are a kind of instruments to be applied in the use of language, as the marks of certain kinds of conceptions and operations of the mind of man. This account will therefore be given in the first place, so far as relates to language in general.

I shall proceed, after this account is given, to consider the nature of the conceptions which are annexed to the several sorts of words whereof language consists, and to account for the union of these conceptions into conceptions more and more complex at the pleasure of the mind of man, and to shew what is the reason that words must be reduced to the form of a complete sentence for the purpose of expressing truth or falsehood. This cannot be done till the nature of affirmation is explained, and the application of several sorts of words is shewn, which have the power of destroying affirmation. Hence the several sorts of words whereof language consists must be particularly considered

one after another, that the particular power of each sort may be discovered, and the effect of its application in any instance may be known. For till this is done, the connective part of the signification of words cannot be explained; which yet is the part of language that requires explanation the most. I shall have an eye to the English language principally throughout the whole enquiry. But as the properties observed in many sorts of words, and several of the properties of connected construction, equally obtain in all languages; these properties will be accounted for as they are found in different languages. And as the plan of construction of the Latin and Greek is very different from that of the English; the reason of this difference will be shewn. For this proceeding will enable us to form some judgment of the advantages and disadvantages of these languages when compared with our own.

In order to avoid confusion in this enquiry, it is necessary to give each sort of words a particular name. And as the sorts and names already established in grammar, are sufficiently exact to prevent confusion, it is unnecessary to make any alteration in them.

It has been observed long ago by the writers on the Latin and Greek grammar, that the sorts of words found in these languages may be conveniently reduced to eight or nine. These writers have called words, when thus considered, "*the parts of speech*," and have given them the names of "*Noun—Pronoun—Verb—Participle—Adverb—Conjunction—Preposition—Interjection*." This division suits the Latin; but in Greek and English there is another part of speech, called "*the Article*."

These parts of speech will be each of them considered particularly in the order in which they are here set down, except the article. For it will be proper to consider its particular nature, next in order after the noun substantive; because of the especial
relation

relation which it has to that of the substantive. But it will be necessary to consider the general nature of several of the parts of speech together on many occasions, for the sake of discovering the properties which those parts of speech have in common with each other, as likewise the properties in which they disagree.

S E C T I O N II.

Of language considered with regard to the sounds, letters, and other symbols, used in the expressions of which it consists.

THE word “*language*,” in its most extensive acceptation, may comprehend every method by which the knowledge of the perceptions, thoughts, and purposes, of one man can be conveyed to another. But as the application of certain sounds of the voice, and that of letters, used as marks of the positions of the organs of speech by which these sounds are formed, are by much the most general and effectual of all the methods of communicating our thoughts; these sounds of the voice, and letters applied to represent them for the sake of such communication, are generally conceived to constitute what is properly called “*language*.” And the art of grammar is “The art of applying these sounds and letters consistently for the purpose of communicating the thoughts of one man to another.”

The sounds of the voice which are applied in language are usually called “*articulate sounds*,” to distinguish them from the sounds which brute animals, or inanimate things, are capable of producing. For although the voice of man is capable of imitating these sounds, this is done by such positions of the organs of speech, as require more time or labour in adjusting them, than the production of articulate sounds in the intercourse of speech admits of.

It is found by experience, that the principal of the articulate sounds of the human voice, are formed by positions of the organs of speech, attended with manners of emitting the breath, which are reducible to a few kinds. The observation of this, produced the invention of letters. For what is called the force or power of a letter is, the direction which it gives to the reader to place his organs of speech in a certain position, and to emit his breath in a certain manner. If all the positions of the organs of speech, and all the manners of emitting the breath which each position admits of, could be exactly determined; an exact alphabet might be made which would suit the sounds of all languages whatsoever. But these positions, and manners of emitting the breath, are capable of a very great variety of degrees of approach towards each other; and hence the articulate sounds run into one another, as musical sounds do, by almost imperceptible degrees. When therefore the articulate sounds were first attempted to be registered by letters, only the principal and leading articulations had letters assigned to them, and the others were either left to be understood, or were supplied by two or more letters which denoted the two extreme articulations between which the articulation required was thought to exist.

When letters were once invented, almost every nation seems to have adopted those already found out, and to have adapted them, as far as could be done, to the articulations of its peculiar language. Now almost every language has articulations peculiar to itself, and therefore should have peculiar characters for such articulations. But almost all the European nations have adopted the Latin letters, although they have not assigned the same letter to the same articulation. For to mention no more; the French have assigned the letter (e) to the same articulation which the English have denoted by (a). And the Welch have evidently assigned several letters to articulations very different from those to which other nations assign the same letters. This application
of

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of the same alphabet to different languages, and not to the same articulations, is manifestly the principal reason which has occasioned both deficiencies and redundancies in the manner of expressing sounds by letters, at least in the English and French languages, and probably in most of the languages of Europe. For the Celtic and Runic and German words which remain in these languages, require articulations which were probably not used in the Latin; as the Latin words which are taken into these languages, had probably articulations which were not used either in the Celtic or Runic or German languages. Therefore in order to suit languages made up of a mixture of words taken from several languages, a more complex alphabet should have been formed than that which might have suited any one of the languages before they were mixed together. But this not being done, the simple articulations of the German, or Celtic, were frequently denoted by two or more letters of the Latin alphabet; and the Latin letters were frequently retained in Latin words, when use had affixed articulations to these letters different from those which the Romans affixed to them. Thus for instance; a simple articulation which the English received from the Saxons, is denoted by the two letters (th). This articulation is like that denoted by (s) except that the tip of the tongue rests against the inward edge of the upper teeth, whilst all or most of the breath is forced through the teeth, so as to make the sides of the tongue vibrate; and this occasions the sound which foreigners find so difficult to be pronounced. As a simple letter is wanting in English for the articulation above-mentioned; so, on the contrary, several articulations, which are exactly the same, are sometimes denoted in English by one letter, and sometimes by another. Thus the articulation usually denoted by (s) is denoted in the words, "nation, vex-
"ation," and many others, by a (t). And abundance of instances may be produced, both of defects and redundancies, in the letters which are applied to the English language. Many speculative men have proposed methods of rectifying these improprie-

proprieties ; and no doubt much may be done towards regulating the written marks of articulations, in any particular language. But whosoever considers attentively what Dr. Wallace and Dr. Holder have said on the articulations by which the sounds of language are formed, will be satisfied, that it is not possible to determine exactly the great variety of articulations which the organs of speech admit of : and if this cannot be done, all attempts to make an alphabet perfectly exact must be ineffectual. For although the principal articulations should be marked each by a distinct letter ; and although points or other marks should be applied to assist in what the letters themselves do not fully determine ; yet the intermediate articulations would partake of the principal ones in such various degrees, and in such nice combinations, as no marks could effectually ascertain. Hence much must be left to the ear, and to the imitation of sounds actually heard, when pronounced by those who are thought to speak any language well.

But although several of the articulations of speech are so difficult to be exactly ascertained ; it is obvious to perceive that some of them are altogether vocal, and others not so ; that is to say, that some of them produce sounds which may be continued as long as the speaker continues to impel his breath, without any change of the position of his organs of utterance ; but that other articulations either prevent all passage of the voice, and so produce no sound, or if they do admit the voice to pass, the sound produced is so indistinct, or so disagreeable, that such articulations are never used single in language.

The letters which denote the first kind of articulations are called "*vowels*," and those which denote the latter kind "*consonants*," because they must attend some vocal articulation in order to modify its sound, seeing of themselves they either produce no sound, or no distinct or agreeable one.

Such

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Such articulations as may either continue unchanged, or can be commodiously run one into another, during one impulse of the breath, form the sounds which are expressed by "*syllables*." Hence a single vowel may form a syllable; because the articulation denoted by it may continue unvaried during one impulse of the breath; but no single consonant can form a syllable; for if the articulation denoted by any consonant should continue unvaried during one impulse of the breath, either no sound would ensue, or one so indistinct or disagreeable, that it would not be considered as an articulate sound. The articulations denoted by two vowels may be run into each other during one impulse of the breath; and when this is done, those sounds are produced which are denoted by diphthongs. And the articulations denoted by two or more consonants may be run into the articulation denoted by a vowel, or even into the complex articulation denoted by a diphthong; and when this last proceeding is made use of, the syllable will be as complex as the organs of speech are capable of uttering with one impulse of the breath.

The "*words*" of language each of them consist of one or more syllables. For one vocal impulse, at least, of the breath must be made in forming every articulate sound; but any number of syllables which can be conveniently pronounced without taking breath, may be included in one word. The syllables included in every word consisting of more than one syllable, must be such as will easily succeed each other in speaking; for it will appear in the following work, that every single word in language denotes either some *one* conception, or some *one* mode of estimation of the mind, and therefore no single word admits of any discernible intermission in pronouncing the several parts of it.

It is apparent that the sound of any syllable may be pronounced with less or more force exerted in the emission of the breath, and this in several keys or pitches of the voice. For the

the voice may be kept at one certain pitch in pronouncing a series of words or syllables, and it may be kept at another pitch in pronouncing the same series over again (and almost every man's voice admits of continued speaking in three of these pitches at least) and a particular stress may be laid upon any syllable without altering the key or pitch which the speaker makes use of, and this stress is what we now call "*accent*," although the word properly denotes a modulation of the voice, and not merely a stress of utterance. When a series of several words is pronounced together, it contributes much both to the agreeableness of sound, and to the precision of sense, to use some degree of modulation in every clause. The Greeks seem to have modulated several single letters in their usual speech; which letters are the circumflexed vowels in this language; but this custom is not used in any language now spoken that has come to my knowledge. Yet it is probable that all nations in continued utterance use some modulation, by raising or depressing the voice in some syllables of a clause above or below the note in which the most of the syllables of the clause are spoke. This modulation is usually called "*emphasis*," and is very different in different languages, and even in different provinces where the same language is used, and that when words are spoke which express the very same meaning. Therefore the usual emphasis with which a particular sentence is spoke must be learned by actually hearing it spoke, or by setting it to a musical scale. But the syllable of a particular word which is to have a stress laid upon it, in whatsoever key or pitch the word is pronounced, may be ascertained by a mark; and, as some words have more syllables than one which require some additional stress of the voice, though not equally strong; two or more marks may be used to denote different degrees of the stress of voice. But this proceeding must be conducted by different rules in every different language, and therefore has little relation to universal grammar.

There

There are yet some marks to be considered, which are used at present in the written language of almost all nations. These are the points or stops, by which sentences and clauses of sentences are separated, in writing, from each other; we have four of them in English of the following forms “ —, —; —: —.” these are distinguished by the names of “ *comma—semicolon—colon—and full stop;*” and these, in English pronunciation, not only direct certain breaks or pauses to be made in continued speaking, and those pauses of different lengths; but likewise direct certain tones of the voice to be used in pronouncing the syllables which precede each of them. There is no possibility of giving any certain account of the tones which each of these “ *points*” requires, because they vary according to the remissness or eagerness with which the speaker delivers his thoughts. Nor can any certain directions be given where to use any of them, except the full stop; which is always placed at the end of a sentence. But if any one has a clear conception of the meaning of what is written, he will easily perceive where the points are to be placed; and if he has observed good speakers or readers, he will easily perceive what tones are to be used previous to each point. But all this must respect some one language, and not language in general, of which I am principally to treat at present. I therefore proceed to that which is the principal intention of rational or speculative grammar, viz. to explain the proceeding of the mind in forming the conceptions annexed to words, and in applying these conceptions by the means of words, so as to communicate the perceptions, thoughts, and purposes of one man to another.

A Speculative Grammar.

B O O K I.

S E C T I O N I.

Of the noun and verb in general.

THE slightest consideration of the nature of language, is sufficient to discover that the noun and verb are the principal parts of speech : for no single word, which is not a noun or a verb, expresses compleat sense ; nor does any series of words, which has not a noun or a verb, or both the one and the other, in it, express such sense. And upon a closer consideration it will appear, that the general nature of the one of these parts of speech, when determined, will contribute much to illustrate that of the other. I shall therefore proceed to give a general view of both of these parts of speech together, in order to account for some general properties in which the verb appears to agree with the noun, whilst yet the nature of a conception denoted by a verb in any of its forms (participles not excepted) is essentially different from a conception denoted by any sort of noun.

In order to this I shall use the word "*object*" in a sense somewhat more extensive than that in which it is commonly applied ; and that I may not be misunderstood, it is necessary to

give notice, that by the word "*object*" is meant, in the following treatise, not only whatsoever produces an image in the eye, whence the conception thereof is conveyed to the mind; but likewise whatsoever produces any sensation, or gives occasion to any internal conception, such as that the mind can employ its discursive powers upon that conception only.

DEFINITIONS.

" Nouns are the names of objects, as the conceptions thereof are distinguished in the mind by constant marks or characters, which are conceived to be evidences of a constant principle of existence peculiar to each object, whether such principle is to be taken notice of or not."

Two sorts of conceptions of objects, which are apprehended to be in themselves of the nature mentioned in this definition, have introduced two sorts of nouns into the use of language. These are the noun substantive, and the noun adjective.

In the conceptions annexed to substantives, notice is taken of the peculiar separate principle of existence of the object which each substantive denotes.

In the conceptions annexed to adjectives, no separate principle of existence is to be taken notice of. This is the reason why these words, "*whether such principle is to be taken notice of or not,*" are added to the definition.

" Verbs are expressions of states of being, as distinguished in the mind by marks or characters, which may be conceived as evidences of a principle of existence in the states. But not of a principle of such a nature as to be constantly in each state, or peculiar to each period into which the state may be distinguished."

As

As the conceptions denoted by nouns represent *objects* so exceedingly various; and the conceptions denoted by verbs likewise represent *states of being* so exceedingly various, it is difficult to discover any property which is not found in any verb, so general as to extend to all nouns; and to discover a property which is not found in any noun, so general as to extend to all verbs. Yet the constant and peculiar principle of existence, upon which the definition of the noun as given above is founded, and the inconstant and occasional principle of existence on which the definition of the verb is founded, are such properties as effectually distinguish the conception denoted by any noun, whether substantive or adjective, from the conception denoted by any verb in any of its forms (participles not excepted.) But as this may not appear at the first sight to my readers, it is necessary to consider the several parts of each of the definitions, in order to shew that the distinctions upon which they are founded are just.

Of the first definition, so far as the substantive is concerned in it.

As the conceptions denoted by noun substantives take notice of the principle of existence, which is apprehended to be constant in each object, and peculiar to it; these conceptions are made to represent the objects themselves, and of consequence become subject to number. Hence if several substantives are joined by the conjunction "*and*," the expression thus formed will be that of one complex conception: but the object which it represents will consist of more individuals than are comprehended in the signification of either substantive used alone. Thus "*a man and virtue*" is the expression of a plural conception; although the conception denoted by "*a man*" and that denoted by "*virtue*" are each of them singular. And the expression "*men and virtues*" denotes a greater number of objects than either "*men*" or "*virtues*" used alone.

Now

Now any two substantives may be united by the conjunction “*and*” into an expression of one complex conception; and as such conception always represents objects increased in number, it is evident that the objects denoted by substantives are considered as in themselves essentially separate. Hence the conceptions denoted by substantives are conceptions separately ascertained in the intellect, and laid up in the memory as so ascertained. For were they not so, they could not represent objects, as each of them is separately distinguished from other objects by a principle of existence peculiar to itself.

Very many objects denoted by substantives have really no separate principle of existence in themselves; as for instance, all the “*virtues—vices—arts—sciences*, and all *relations—qualities—attributes*,” and in general all objects, the conceptions whereof are usually called abstract ideas. But the mind considers these objects as if each of them had a peculiar constant principle of existence in itself; and this the mind does merely for its own convenience. Therefore the conceptions of these abstract objects are separately ascertained in the intellect, and laid up in the memory as so ascertained, in the very same manner as the conceptions of beings are, each whereof has a principle of existence peculiar to, and inherent in, itself, independent of any mode of conception of the mind of man.

Of the first definition, so far as the adjective is concerned in it.

The conception denoted by a noun adjective cannot be separately ascertained in the intellect, and laid up in the memory as so ascertained. For if it were considered under such ascertainment, it would become the conception of an abstract object, to which the mind gives a separate principle of existence; and such conception might be denoted by a substantive which corresponds with the adjective. As for instance, the conceptions denoted by the adjectives “*woody—fertile—extensive—desolate*,” if considered

dered as separately ascertained in the intellect, become the abstract conceptions which are denoted by the substantives "*woodiness—fertility—extent—desolation;*" and so of other instances. Hence it is clear, that every adjective expresses a conception, which in itself is capable of representing an abstract object. But the grammatic form of the adjective gives notice, that the conception is never to be so considered, when it is expressed by its adjective name. All adjectives express abstract conceptions: even such adjectives as are derived from substantives which are the names of real beings. As for instance, the conceptions denoted by "*manly—brutish—earthly*" are not the same with those denoted by the substantives, "*man—brute—earth,*" but with those denoted by "*manliness—brutishness—earthiness;*" and so of other instances. It is true, that many adjectives have no abstract substantives corresponding with them, because such have not been found necessary in language. But the conceptions denoted by such adjectives are abstract conceptions, notwithstanding they have no abstract substantive names. Thus the adjectives "*Trojan—Sicilian—Miltonic*" do not denote the same conceptions which the substantives "*Troy—Sicily—Milton*" denote; but abstract conceptions formed from the objects denoted by "*Troy—Sicily—Milton,*" although these conceptions have no substantive names. Now abstract objects (such as those denoted by "*manliness—brutishness,*" above mentioned) have no principle of separate existence, but such as the mind of man gives them for its own convenience; and as such principle is given to them merely for the convenience of the mind of man, it may be taken away from them whensoever the like convenience requires it. And whensoever this separate principle is to be considered as taken away from an abstract object, the conception of it is denoted by an adjective. Hence an adjective unites with a substantive, so as to form a kind of name of the object represented by the expression. For the principle by which the object exists is taken notice of in the conception which the substantive denotes, and the conception denoted by the adjective takes no notice of any principle

principle of existence, but unites with the conception which does take notice of such principle. So that the principle remains such as the substantive denotes it, whether an adjective be added to the substantive or not.

Hence it is manifest, that what is denoted by an adjective cannot be the object of number, because it is never attended to separately by the mind of man; seeing it is to be considered as destitute of all principle of separate existence.

The definition of the verb considered particularly.

The conceptions denoted by verbs must have some of the properties of the conceptions which are denoted by substantives, and some of the properties of those denoted by adjectives. For as the state denoted by a verb may be considered as having a principle of existence in it, the state under such consideration will be represented to the mind by a conception that is separately ascertained in the intellect, as the conception denoted by a substantive is; and such conception must of consequence become the object of number. The forms of the infinitive mood of verbs denote verbal states under this kind of conception, as in the expressions "*to think and to speak—to have laboured and to labour.*" For each of these expressions denotes a plural conception. But these verbal states exist by a principle, which is not constant, nor peculiar, to each individual portion of the state which may be denoted by one and the same form of one and the same verb. Therefore this principle may be communicated to the state and then withheld; and then communicated, and then withheld; and so on: and this proceeding will distinguish the parts or periods of a verbal state one from another, although each part or period is conceived to exist by one and the same principle. Hence verbal states become subject to a kind of number, to which the objects denoted by substantives are not subject. This number expresses the several times that a state denoted
by

by one and the same verbal form is repeated, as in the expressions “*to speak once—twice—thrice—many times,*” &c. The participles in English are used in this construction, as well as the forms of the infinitive mood of verbs; as in the expression “*speaking once—twice—thrice—many times,*” &c. So that the conceptions denoted by participles thus used, represent states, as each has a separate existence; but as that existence depends upon a principle which may be communicated to the states occasionally, and with-held occasionally. Hence the participles in English are continually used in construction like substantives; for they may denote states, as having in them a principle of existence, although not constantly. If this principle is conceived to be with-held from any period of a verbal state, such period becomes the object of memory only, for its existence is over. If the principle is conceived to be continued, such period is an object of actual perception, for its existence continues. If it is only foreseen that a principle of existence will be communicated to a verbal state; the period of such state, to which the principle will be communicated, is an object of foresight only, for its existence is unbegun. It is this manner of conceiving the existence of verbal states, which gives occasion to the three English forms of the infinitive mood of verbs. As “*to be—to have been—to be about to be;*” and likewise to the three participles, “*being—having been—about to be,*” whereof the two forms, “*to be—being,*” express a state of being, as it is the object of actual perception: the two forms, “*to have been—having been,*” express it as an object of memory: and the two forms, “*to be about to be—being about to be,*” express it as an object of foresight.

The verb in the infinitive mood is used, in all languages that I am acquainted with, on many occasions, as if it were a noun substantive. But the participles are used in this manner in no language which I am acquainted with, but the English only. It is by means of participles used as substantives, that we perform in English, what in Latin is performed by those verbal

forms which are called gerunds and supines; and what in Greek is performed by the article placed in different cases before the infinitive forms of the verb. Thus what is expressed in English by "*of speaking—in speaking,*" may be expressed in Latin by "*loquendi—loquendo,*" and in Greek by *τὸ λεγεῖν—τῷ λεγεῖν*, &c. For as verbal states must be considered, on many occasions, as objects existing by a principle of being which is in them; whenever they are so considered, the expressions of these states must be used in the same kinds of construction in which substantives are used. For the verbal states under this consideration become separate abstract objects; only the principle by which each state exists is not conceived to be peculiar to it only, nor to be constantly in it. The conceptions of verbal states thus formed, are of consequence to be applied on the same principles, on which the conceptions of abstract states are applied, when these conceptions are denoted by substantives. Or, in other words, they must be denoted by expressions which admit the signs of cases to be united with them. And hence it comes to pass, that the infinitive mood of the Latin verb is declined by cases; as "*dicere—dicendi—dicendo—dicendum—dictum—dictu:*" and that the infinitive mood of the Greek verb is declined by the case of the article prefixed to it; as, *τὸ λεγεῖν—τῷ λεγεῖν—τῶ λεγεῖν*.

But although the conceptions of verbal states may be separately ascertained in the intellect, and laid up in the memory as so ascertained; in the same manner as the conceptions denoted by substantives: yet verbal conceptions must be made to unite with the conceptions denoted by substantives, or by any words used as substantives; and this in order to answer the principal purpose of connected language. For when the conception of any object is raised in the mind of the hearer by mentioning its name, or by using a series of words equivalent to a name; such object must be represented in some state of being, which it either might or might not have been in, for any thing the hearer knew before the speaker told him. Because, if this is not done, the

speaker

speaker conveys no new information to the hearer. Therefore, in order to accomplish this most necessary point, some verb is placed in immediate dependance on the name or expression of the object which is to be represented as in the state of being which the verb denotes ; and this state is considered as having an occasional existence given to it, for the purpose of representing the object as in the state. Now the occasion may require that this state shall be considered as existing before the time, or at the time, or after the time, in which the words are spoke. And this way of considering the existence of a verbal state has introduced these forms of the verb which constitute the tenses of the indicative mood. Or the occasion may require that the existence of the state shall be considered as the effect of some command or entreaty ; and this has introduced the forms of the imperative mood. Or it may be requisite to consider the existence of the state as attended with no impossibility, contradiction, or absurdity. This has produced the English forms of the verb which have “ *may* ” and “ *might* ” before them. Or it may be requisite to consider the existence of the state as the effect of power, capacity, or of inevitable necessity ; and this has produced the forms of the English verb which have “ *can—could—must* ” before them. I shall shew at large, when the verb is treated of in particular, wherein those definitive forms differ in signification from the infinitive forms, and the participles. But it is clear that a verbal state, as expressed by any of the tenses of any of the moods, is apprehended to have a principle of existence which may be conceived as with-held from it at the pleasure of the mind. If this principle is conceived to be always with-held from any part or period of a verbal state, such part or period can have no existence. Hence the negative particle “ *not*,” when united with a verb, expresses a state which is without actual existence, sometimes considered as an abstract state, and sometimes as in conjunction with some particular object ; because the principle by which it should exist is never communicated to it. Now the occasions of connected language continually require us to consider

states of being which are prevented from existing, and that by various means, and this at any time past, present, or to come; and hence the negative particle is so frequently found in construction with verbs in all their forms.

It is evident, that the states denoted by verbs are all of them abstract states; for if they had any real existence separate from that of other objects, the principle of such existence must be in the states themselves. And of consequence such principle could not be considered as with-held from, and much less as never communicated at all to, the states, at the pleasure of the mind of man. Therefore no object, which is conceived to have a principle of being inherent in itself, can be denoted by a verb. As for instance, no such object as is expressed by "*mind—body*" "*—a man—a beast—a tree—a mineral,*" &c. can be denoted by any verb. But states, the conceptions whereof are formed by abstraction from the objects above mentioned, may be denoted by verbs, if these states are conceived to exist by a principle which may be communicated to them, or with-held from them, at the pleasure of such objects as have a real principle of existence in themselves, or of any object to which the mind assigns such principle for its own convenience.

Therefore the same conceptions which are denoted by verbs, may be denoted by adjectives, if the occasional principle by which verbal states are conceived to exist is not attended to. Hence the conceptions denoted by verbs may unite with those denoted by substantives, much in the same manner that adjective conceptions unite with substantive conceptions; except that the verbal conception will carry along with it the notion of the inconsistency of the principle by which it exists. But the adjective conception will carry no such notion along with it. For it directs, that no notice is to be taken of any principle of existence as in it, but as in some object, with the existence whereof it unites. Hence the adjective conception is to be adjusted properly

perly to coalesce with that existence, so as *to continue* united with it. If then the notion of the inconstant principle, by which the state exists, be quite abstracted from the conception denoted by a verbal form, such form will become of the nature of an adjective. Therefore, when verbal forms are used to denote constant or habitual states, they appear to differ in no respect from real adjectives; as is manifest in the English expressions, “*a labouring man—a running horse—the singing psalms—an accomplished gentleman—a determined resolution,*” and innumerable other instances.

The definitive forms of verbs coalesce with the objective names, or expressions on which they depend, as participles do: but these forms have part of their signification, such as no other forms of verbs, nor any other sorts of words, have. This part of their signification shews, that the expression on which any of them depends is sufficiently compounded for the speaker’s present occasion (as I shall shew at large when the verb is treated of in particular.) But this part of the signification of a definitive verb makes no alteration in the nature of the state denoted by the verb itself. For this is still conceived to depend for its existence on a principle which is occasionally given to it, or taken from it, or never given to it at all, according as it suits the speaker’s purpose to represent the state. And therefore the verb in its definitive forms does not depart from the essential property of a verb in its infinitive and participial forms, viz. that of expressing a state which has a principle of existence that is neither constantly in it, nor peculiar to it.

In order to avoid a superfluous repetition of words, I shall call a constant principle of existence peculiar to a particular object, and to it only “*an incommunicable principle of existence.*”

And

And a principle of existence which is not constantly in, nor peculiar to, a verbal state, although it is occasionally in it, “*a communicable principle of existence.*”

SECTION II.

Of noun substantives in particular.

NOUN substantives are the names of objects, as the conceptions thereof are separately compleated in the intellect, and distinguished by marks, or characters, conceived to be evidences of a principle of existence which is constant and peculiar to each object; or, in other words, which is incommunicable to any other object.

The consideration of the proceeding by which the mind of man acquires the conceptions, whereof noun substantives are the names, will explain the signification of any substantive, so far as such signification is different from that of any other sort of word, except that of a verb in the infinitive mood (the English participles being considered as included in this mood.) And the consideration of the principle of existence, which is conceived to be shewn by the characters that distinguish the objects denoted by substantives, will explain the difference of signification between a noun substantive, and a verb in the infinitive mood.

The power of the mind is not merely passive in acquiring the conceptions above mentioned, as it is in receiving the perceptions which are conveyed to it by the senses. But the attention is confined to some particulars of what may be before the mind at once, so that the rest are disregarded, till the particulars which are intended to be taken into the signification of one substantive, or verbal name, are fixed in the intellect. We acquire

acquire in our earliest infancy the custom of exerting this power of confining or checking the attention. For this is constantly done, when particular things (and these most commonly the objects of sight) are pointed out, or presented to us, in such a manner, that we fix our attention on them, whilst their names are mentioned to us. When any set of particulars has been so attended to by the mind, as that it forms a conception from them separately considered, and denoted by a substantive, or verbal name; the event is, that whensoever the conception recurs to the mind, the name recurs with it by mere recollection. And conversely, whensoever the name is mentioned to a person, who has not the conception which it denotes, actually in his mind, but who has previously formed it, and annexed it to the name; this conception recurs by mere recollection to such person. Hence when what we call the sense of a noun substantive, or of an infinitive verb, is raised in the mind of a person to whom such substantive or verb is mentioned, that person is not obliged to exert any new discursive act in order to form such sense, but the whole of it recurs to the intellect at once by simple recollection.

The definitions which have been given of noun substantives by almost all the writers upon grammar, are founded solely on this single property of the conception denoted by a substantive. Thus the definition in Lilly's Grammar is,

“ A noun substantive is that which standeth by itself, and requireth not another word to be joined with it, to shew its signification.”

This definition is evidently true, so far as it extends. For as noun substantives denote conceptions which are separately completed in the intellect, any one of them may be mentioned singly, and the meaning of it will instantly recur to the mind: so that there can be no occasion for other words to shew its signification. But the difference between a conception denoted by a
substantive,

substantive, and a conception denoted by a verb in the infinitive mood, is not hereby ascertained. For the verbs, “*to act—to speak—to be acted—to be spoke—acting—speaking—being acted—being spoke,*” &c. require no words to be joined with them to shew their signification, any more than the substantives, “*action—speech,*” do.

The definition of a noun substantive given by Johnson in his grammatical commentaries (from which those of Father Buffier, Ruddiman, and many others, are not materially different) is to the following purpose.

“A noun substantive denotes the conception of an object, which conception so subsists in the understanding, that it may be the subject of affirmation.”

These authors purposely intend to include the verb in the infinitive mood, amongst noun substantives, and give notice of their intention to do so. They have manifestly adopted the principle first published (as I think) about a hundred years ago in the *Grammaire Generale et Raisonnée*, said to be written according to the notions of M. Arnaud, of the Society of Port Royal. In this grammar, no form of the verb which has not the power of affirmation is allowed to be a verb. And as the infinitive forms of verbs have not this power of affirmation, they are of course considered as belonging to other parts of speech. This proceeding is only shifting off the difficulty of shewing a reason why it is exceedingly convenient in language, that some forms of every verb should have the power of affirmation, whilst other forms should not; as likewise of determining precisely in what affirmation consists.

Now the infinitive forms of verbs denote “*states of being,*” as the conceptions of them are completed in the intellect. Consequently, one of these states is as perfect in the apprehension of the

the mind of man, as any object denoted by a noun substantive. Hence a single verbal state, denoted by one of these infinitive forms, may be the single object of the mind's especial attention, and of consequence may alone be the subject of a sentence ; for farther composition is not absolutely required to compleat the expression into that of a conception, to which the mind can confine its attention. But part of the signification of a noun adjective, of a verb (in all its forms but those of the infinitive mood, and of the participles in English) of an adverb, of a conjunction, and of a preposition, relates to what must be denoted by some one or more other words. If therefore such other words are not found, the composition is incomplete; and no definitive verb can depend on any expression till the composition is completed. This will fully appear when the verb is treated of in particular. Now the definitive verb determines the subject of a sentence ; and hence it comes to pass that a single word of any of the last mentioned parts of speech is seldom made alone the subject of a sentence ; unless it be in a treatise of grammar, or in a dictionary, in which it is required to shew the signification of single words of every part of speech. But when single words are thus applied ; they only represent the sound, or visible appearance of each ; and not the conceptions, which are annexed to each of them.

But notwithstanding that the signification of the infinitive forms of verbs is completed in the intellect, as well as the signification of noun substantives ; it is manifest, that the objects denoted by substantives are apprehended in the mind, under a different mode of conception from that under which the states denoted by verbs are apprehended. For, as I have already observed, no verb can denote an external object which has its principle of existence incommunicably in itself ; such as *an animal*—*a plant*—*a mineral*," &c. the names of these must all be noun substantives ; and the conceptions annexed to all other substantives have been formed in imitation of the conceptions

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which

which are annexed to the substantives above mentioned. For the objects denoted by these are the first which require to be expressed by names; as being the first which strike the attention, and occasion it to be confined to one object only. Men are soon led by reflection to give substantive names to objects, which have no separate principle in themselves by which they exist: as to the several virtues and vices (for instance) and to all the sorts of objects, whereof the conceptions are usually called abstract ideas. But the mind, for its own convenience, considers each of these objects, when denoted by a substantive name, as having a principle of existence incommunicable to any other object; as animals, vegetables, and other external material objects are observed to have. Hence these abstract objects are frequently represented, not only as real, but also as rational beings, speaking and spoken to, especially in poetry and oratory; but the states denoted by verbs are never represented in this manner: for they are not conceived to have each of them an incommunicable principle of existence, such as is supposed in every object that is capable of speaking, and of being spoken to: and therefore this different mode of conception constitutes the essential difference between the substantive and verbal name of an abstract state. As for instance, between "*action—contemplation—confidence,*" and "*to act—to contemplate—to confide,*" or "*acting—contemplating—confiding,*" &c.

The forms of the verb "*to be*" are intended to communicate with every substantive, and with every other word, or series of words, which expresses a compleat object of the intellect; and that in such a manner, as not only to express the object itself as "*being,*" but likewise the conception of it, as in the several modes of being which such conception may have in the mind of man. Thus the communicable nature of "*being,*" as expressed by verbs, gives opportunity to a speaker, not only to represent objects as they are in themselves, but as the conceptions of them are in his mind; which is manifestly the principal intent of language.

Now.

Now the conception annexed to almost any single substantive may be merely in the memory of the speaker; or it may be impressed on his mind by the presence of the object which occasions it; or it may be barely presented to his mind by its power of foresight. It would be very inconvenient to vary the forms of substantives themselves, so as to express this "*diversity of being*" in the mind of man, which may attend the conceptions denoted by them. But it is very convenient to express "*communicable being*" as an object of memory, as an object of actual perception, and as an object of foresight, by different forms of the verb itself. For by uniting one of these forms with the name or expression of any object, the conception of such object is represented, in effect, as relating to time past, present, or to come; and this is continually required in the use of language. On this account almost all languages have forms of the verb substantive (*i. e.* of the verb which answers to the English verb "*to be*") some of which relate to time past, some to time present, and some to time to come, as these distinctions are determined by the time of speaking: whereas these distinctions are included in the signification of very few substantives; but are added occasionally, by uniting some temporary form with them. All verbs include in their signification the power of the verb "*to be*;" for they all denote states of communicable being. This will appear fully, when we consider in particular the nature of the conceptions which are denoted by verbs. Hence all verbs, in almost all languages, have grammatic forms, some of which relate to time past, others to time present, and others to time to come. But noun adjectives have not these forms, for they denote abstract conceptions, which are not to be considered at any time as taking notice of any principle of existence, except such as is denoted by some other word: so that what is denoted by adjectives, "*remains in coalescence*" with such principle as is in the object or state denoted by the word on which the adjective depends. Consequently, if the word be a substantive on which an adjective depends, the adjective conception unites with

the constant principle of existence of the object denoted by the substantive. But if the word be a verb on which the adjective depends, the adjective conception unites with the inconstant principle of existence of the state denoted by the verb. And hence it comes to pass that adjectives have not those forms which verbs have, to denote the principle by which they exist, as communicated to them, or with-held from them, occasionally.

These observations are here made, in order to account for Aristotle's definition of a noun, including both the substantive and the adjective. This definition is to the following purpose :

“ A noun is a significant word, not including time.”

That is to say, not including time as estimated from a present point thereof, that is continually shifting : or not from a present, which is to be considered as always that point of time in which the noun is spoke. And in consequence of this way of apprehending the conception denoted by a noun, Aristotle was naturally led to define a verb to be “ *a significant word including time,*” i. e. as estimated from a present point, which is always to be considered as that in which the verb is spoke. These definitions do not (any more than the two quoted before) effectually distinguish the conception denoted by a noun, from that denoted by a verb. For the substantives “ *yesterday—to-day—to-morrow,*” include time in their meaning, as estimated in the manner above mentioned ; and so the adjectives “ *last—this—next,*” united with the substantives “ *moment—year—month,*” &c. form the expressions “ *this moment—the next moment—last year—this year—next year—last month—this month—next month,*” which likewise include time in their meaning, and that time estimated as before.

All the definitions above mentioned are useful, though not exact. Indeed there seems to be no other distinction which extends

extends to the conceptions denoted by all substantives and all verbs, but that upon which the definitions are founded that were given in the former chapter.

It may be said, that the objects denoted by the substantives "*attribute—quality—capacity*," and others of a like nature, none of them suppose a principle of existence that is peculiar to each : because the existence of these objects is conceived to depend on the existence of other objects. But if the name of any object, as "*a man*," and the substantive name of any quality, as "*goodness—vice—labour*," &c. be united by the conjunction "*and*," the expressions "*a man and goodness—a man and vice*," &c. will denote plural objects ; which effectually shews, that "*goodness*" and "*vice*" and "*a man*," when denoted by substantive names, are considered as objects existing separately in the apprehension of the mind of man.

Nouns themselves are easily distinguished from verbs, by the difference of their grammatic forms. But, in a treatise of rational grammar, it is necessary to shew why nouns bear grammatic forms different from those of verbs. And this reason manifestly is, that the principle of existence which objects denoted by nouns are conceived to have, is of a nature different from the principle of existence, which is conceived in the states denoted by verbs.

SECTION III.

Of the different kinds of noun substantives.

NOUN substantives are usually distinguished into two sorts, the proper, and the common or appellative.

Noun substantives proper, are more usually called proper names, and are made use of to distinguish particular objects with which

which men are much conversant. Such as men, women, countries, rivers, cities, streets, palaces, &c.

As objects denoted by proper names are, for the most part, individual objects of the sight, the mentioning of the name of one of them to a person who has actually seen the object, may place a kind of picture of such object before the mind of the hearer. But if the hearer has never seen the object, he cannot, upon the mentioning of its name, place such picture before his mind: nevertheless, he can talk as intelligibly concerning such object, as he could do if he had seen it, and could place a picturesque representation of it in his mind. Only he cannot know himself, or describe to others, every particular of the shape, size, colour, &c. of such object. This observation will be of use towards explaining the nature of the conceptions which are annexed to appellative names.

SECTION IV.

Of noun substantives, common or appellative.

BECAUSE the giving a name to every particular thing, as to every leaf, for instance, or to every grain of sand, would multiply names to such a degree, that the mind of man could neither remember nor apply them: therefore things are considered as they agree in certain properties, whether natural or acquired; and in consequence of such agreement, they are reduced to classes or sorts, and these classes are each of them distinguished by a particular name. This name, with an article placed before it for the most part in English, is the common or appellative substantive, by which every object of its class (or species, as it is usually called) is denoted. And the name is thus called, from its being an appellation common to all the individual objects of which the species consists. The infinitive

forms of verbs, and the participles in English, are likewise names of species of states of communicable being, and therefore are a kind of appellative names. But the species of states denoted by them are not conceived to be made up of separate individual single states, which can be distinguished one from another, as particular “*men—horses—houses*,” &c. may be. The whole plan of the application of language takes its immediate original from the nature of the conceptions which the mind of man forms and affixes to substantives and verbs; and not from the nature of the objects whence the conceptions are formed: And for this reason it is necessary to consider the proceeding of the mind in forming these conceptions, before a clear account can be given of the application of words.

S E C T I O N V.

Of the nature and formation of the conceptions which are annexed to names of species.

IF we suppose any particular object to be present to the mind of a man; whether the object be conveyed to it by the means of the outward senses, or by the operations of the mind itself; the man is under no necessity to attend to the whole of such object. But he may confine his attention to any set of powers, properties, or qualities, which he perceives in it; and yet he can conceive the whole object to be distinguished by such set of powers, properties, and qualities, from every other object which has not the like set in it. The object, conceived as thus distinguished, may be denoted by a name: and the consequence will be, that whensoever “*any object*,” which has the like set of powers in it, presents itself to the mind of the man, the name will recur of course. And conversely, if the name be mentioned, the conception of an object which has the like set of powers, &c. will recur of course to the mind of any person who

who knows the meaning of the name. Indeed the other particulars of such object, which are not included in the set of powers, &c. above mentioned, will not be included in the conception that is raised by the mention of the name; but it is nevertheless taken for granted as a thing known, and remembered, that such conception is that of an object which the mind can contemplate singly.

Thus if a certain mark should be set upon a great number of things very different in themselves from each other, and the same name should be given to every one of the things which had the mark upon it: and if "*any one*" of these things should be presented to a person who knew the meaning of the name, that name would immediately occur to the person. But if the name were mentioned to him, nothing would occur but the remembrance that a thing, with the mark upon it, is what is meant by the name. This remembrance does not enable the person, to whom such a name is mentioned, to form an actual image of the thing in his mind; but it enables him to distinguish the thing mentioned from whatsoever is called by a different name, as not having the mark upon it. The mark itself, which is supposed to be set upon the objects called by the same name, may not perhaps be exactly alike upon them all; and yet the mark, as it is upon any one object, may be more nearly alike to it, as it is upon any other object, than any different mark is.

The proceeding of the man who first applied the same name, in any language, to several different objects, was much like the above-mentioned proceeding. For he perceived, that all the objects agreed nearly in some respects, and he only attended particularly to the objects in these respects, when he applied the name. Only he kept this in remembrance; that whatsoever the name was applied to, was, all of it taken together, what the mind could make the separate object of its contemplation.

The respects, or particulars, in which objects shall agree, so as to entitle them all to be called by some one particular name, are manifestly at the pleasure of him who first gives that name to them; as likewise how near they shall approach to perfect sameness in those instances in which they do agree. For any two objects which the mind can contemplate separately, may be called by one and the same name, be they ever so different from each other in every other respect, but the single one, "*of being capable of becoming separately that which the mind confines its attention to.*" The agreement in this single respect, is that which entitles whatsoever the mind does confine its attention to, in the manner already described, to be called in English "*a thing*;" so that, of consequence, whatsoever can be denoted by any noun substantive, or any infinitive verb used substantively, may be called "*a thing.*" More and more particulars may be added at pleasure to this circumstance, of "*being the object of the attention in single, separate, or especial contemplation*;" and as more and more particulars are added, the names given to the objects which agree in them, will become names of fewer and fewer objects.

For the more conditions, or circumstances, are taken into the set wherein objects must agree, in order to be all of them called by one name, the fewer objects will be found agreeing in such set.

The particular objects, all of which so agree, that they are any of them called by one and the same name, are, when considered together, called a species (as has been before observed) and I think, that the set of particulars in which the agreement is attended to in the individuals of any species, may be called the characteristic of that species.

It is not easy to describe the characteristics of many species, on account of the multiplicity of particularities which are com-
prehended

prehended in them. Thus the characteristic of the species "*man*" contains in it all the particularities, both of mind and body, which are equally perceived in every man; but in no other species of objects. And many of these are very imperfectly known, notwithstanding the most laborious researches of metaphysicians and anatomists: and the same obtains, in some degree, with regard to the particularities of every species of natural objects. On the contrary, the characteristics of several species of abstract objects are not capable of being described, on account of their simplicity. Thus the several species denoted by "*space—time—power—motion—rest*," &c. are so very simple in themselves, that to attempt to shew in words what is peculiar to each, would be impertinent. But on the other hand, the characteristics of many species are easily shewn, especially when these characteristics happen to be states denoted by verbs. Thus the characteristics of the several species, "*speaker—bearer—deliverer*," &c. are the states "*speaking—bearing—delivering*," &c.

It will appear in the following treatise, that the characteristics of the species denoted by the pronouns personal may easily be determined; and that the explanation of the nature and properties of these pronouns depends on the determination of these characteristics.

There is no species of external, and very few of intellectual objects, in which the individuals are all conceived to be exactly alike; whilst yet the particulars, which entitle them all to be called by the same name, are conceived to be the same, or, at least, to approach to sameness in them all. Therefore the mind always remembers, that when an individual is expressed by the name of some species, to which such individual is observed to belong; the individual has other properties, powers, &c. besides those which form the characteristic of the species by the name whereof it is called. Hence a liberty is reserved of adding
other

other expressions to every name of species, as occasion may require, in order to distinguish the object under consideration, from other objects which any of them may be equally called by the same name.

There is constant occasion, in the use of language, for the adding of expressions to names of species, in order to ascertain the object denoted by such name with more and more precision. And it will appear in what follows, that the dependent cases of substantives, together with adjectives, and relative clauses of sentences, are principally introduced into language for this purpose. And, indeed, the persons and tenses of verbs are evidently introduced for the purpose of enabling the hearer to distinguish the verbal state spoke of, from other parts or periods of the state which may be expressed by the same verb applied to different persons or times. An object ascertained by making some of these expressions dependent on its name, may, together with the circumstances denoted by these dependent expressions, be made the single, separate, or especial object of the mind's contemplation. But in order to this, an act of discursive judgment must be exerted, upon the addition of every dependent word, in order to form what is signified by each part of the complex expression into a consistent whole. So that mere memory or recollection will not serve the purpose of conveying the sense of such complex expression to the mind.

It will appear, when we consider the signs of cases, and the other connective parts of speech in particular, how the mind proceeds in forming the connexions denoted by each of them. But it is necessary, in the first place, to explain the procedure of the mind in forming the conceptions annexed to different kinds of names of species; and thence to shew particularly how the conceptions denoted by verbs unite with the conceptions denoted by substantives; whether the verbs depend upon the substantives, or the substantives upon the verbs. This will oblige us to con-

sider the nature of verbs farther than has been already done, and that before we come to treat of the verb in particular, in the order wherein it is now, by established custom, set down amongst the parts of speech. But there is a necessity of giving an account of the communicable nature of the conception denoted by a verb, before the nature of the connexions shewn by the signs of cases of substantives can be explained.

SECTION VI.

Of the proceeding of the mind in forming the conceptions of species which are denoted by noun substantives.

AS objects are reduced to species denoted by different names, principally for the ready conveyance of the conceptions which one man proposes to raise in the mind of another; the convenience of conveying in the quickest manner such conceptions, as were of the most constant occurrence, has occasioned different communities of people to range objects into classes according to such distinctions as those several communities have had the most frequent occasion to take notice of. All communities, of all ages and countries, have occasion to take notice of the different forms which many sorts of animals, plants, minerals, and other parts of nature, present to the sight, as likewise of the different effects which they have upon the other senses. And therefore, perhaps, there are no nations which have not classed these objects by the distinctions above mentioned. Consequently, the names of species of objects thus classed, are found to agree with one another in all languages. But the names of objects thus distinguished, make up the least part of the names of species in any civilized community. For the ordinances of man concerning very many individual things are what principally occasion these things to be distinguished into sorts denoted by different names.

Thus

Thus most of the utensils, and instruments, which are applied in the various arts and professions of life, are ranged into classes or sorts, from some similarity of use observed in each one of a sort. And as to the distinctions by which men are ranged into classes; it is manifest that far the greatest part of them proceeds from particular ranks, offices, professions, trades, and other circumstances, which are altogether of the ordinance of man, so as to differ in different ages and communities. Hence, in the languages of distant ages and nations, and in the languages of any nations which live under very different forms of religion, laws, and government, it comes to pass that there is little agreement amongst the conceptions annexed to names of species, which take their characteristics from institutions peculiar to each nation. And this is one principal reason why these languages cannot be exactly translated one into another; as likewise why none of the antient languages can be made to answer effectually the purposes of a language proper to be generally used at this time.

The terms of art which are found in particular sciences, as likewise the names of many instruments, tools, and operations, which are peculiar to particular professions and trades, are formed upon distinctions little known, or attended to, by any who are not actually engaged in the study of these sciences, or in the exercise of these trades and professions. Yet these names are all of them convenient, and many of them of absolute necessity to those who are conversant about the subjects to which they relate. And this is the only reason why the mind of man has particularly attended to the distinctions on which the conceptions denoted by these names are founded, and has classed the objects, denoted by them, according to these distinctions.

As the mind so naturally finds the distinguishing characters of species upon circumstances which are the result of use and application; it is natural to infer, that the use and application of
language

language itself, must give occasion to some distinctions of species. The grammatical names of the several sorts of words whereof language consists, are formed upon such distinctions. And farther, the personal, relative, and demonstrative pronouns, are names of species; the individuals of each whereof are distinguished from those of other species, solely by the different situations in which they appear in the act of applying language itself. This will be fully shewn in the account of these pronouns in particular.

SECTION VII.

Of aggregate species.

THE species hitherto considered, are conceived to be made up of objects, in each of which the character is observed to be, by which the class is formed that constitutes the species. But the mind can take several individual objects together, and can consider them all as one object. It frequently happens, that the individuals, of which one aggregate object is made up, are of very different kinds; and when things, in themselves different, come to be considered all together as one object, it is natural to attend principally to the mode of aggregation by which they are united into one object. And it is as natural to consider any other object consisting of several individuals united by the like mode of aggregation, as an object of the same species with the former. Hence the characteristics of those species which are denoted by what grammarians call nouns of multitude, are usually some of the principal circumstances by which the union is formed amongst the things or persons, or both, which constitute what is considered as a single object of some aggregate species. "*Community—company—regiment—troop—bundle—collection—set,*" are the names of aggregate species, the characteristics of which are formed in the manner above mentioned.

And

And the species "*whole*" may be considered as of the same order. For when any object is considered as "*a whole*," it is taken for granted, that it may be distinguished into many objects, by parting it either actually, or in the mind only. But all the objects into which it is capable of being parted, are considered as one; and this entitles the object, so considered, to be called "*a whole*," that is, to be an object of the species "*whole*."

SECTION VIII.

Of dividual species.

THESE take their characteristics from some mere mode, by which the individuals whereof they consist are separated from other objects. "*Part—portion—fragment—chip—paring*," and many others, are the names of species, the characteristics whereof are thus determined; and the proceeding by which they are determined, as likewise that by which the characteristics of aggregate species are determined, evidently supposes that there are objects of other species, whence the objects are formed which are denoted by these names of species.

SECTION IX.

Of correlative species.

THESE are species so constituted in pairs, that an individual of any one pair is conceived to be connected with some one or more individuals of the other species of the same pair, by means of the active and correspondent passive state of some one and the same verb. "*Creator—creature*," "*parent—offspring*," "*subject—attribute*," "*whole—part*," are pairs of correlative species. For the state "*creating*" is the characteristic

of the species, "*creator*," and the state, "*created*;" that of the species, "*creature*;" so "*a parent*" is, "*an object generating*," and "*offspring*" is, "*an object generated*;" likewise "*a subject*" is, "*an object having attributes*," and "*an attribute*" is, "*an object had by a subject*;" and "*a whole*" is, "*an object containing parts*," and "*a part*" is, "*an object contained by a whole*." Hence it is clear, that the conception of either species of any correlative pair, supposes the conception of the other species of the same pair. And it will appear, when we speak of the corresponding active and passive states of any one and the same transitive verb, that either of them supposes the other; so that if the verb which expresses either of the states be mentioned, there is no need to mention that which expresses the other; but any certain mark, or sign, appropriated for the purpose, is sufficient to direct the hearer to supply in his own mind the verbal state, either passive or active, which is the correlative to that which is actually mentioned.

SECTION X.

Of abstract species.

THE individuals which compose the several kinds of species hitherto mentioned, are usually such as are conceived to have an existence in themselves, independent of any mode in which the mind of man contemplates them. But the powers, properties, qualities, &c. of the individuals above mentioned, have no existence separate from these individuals. Yet these powers, &c. must be reduced to species, as well as material, and spiritual beings, which are conceived to have each of them a principle of existence peculiar to one individual, and to no other whatsoever. The conceptions of these powers, &c. when attended to separately from the objects in which they exist, are usually called abstract ideas. And whatsoever powers, relations,

tions, &c. give occasion to these conceptions; these powers, relations, &c. are the individuals whereof abstract species consist. The mind itself gives to these objects a separate existence, which they have not in their nature, merely for its own convenience. For not being able to attend to objects which are very complex, it is able by this method of proceeding to consider all objects by particulars; first attending to one single particular, or to one set of particulars, and then to another.

Every species of abstract objects has its distinguishing characteristic; by which every individual of the species is known from an individual of another species. And this characteristic is conceived to be an evidence of a principle of existence, in each object, which is incommunicable to any other object. Whole sets of powers, properties, &c. are included in the characteristics of species of external beings: but the characteristics of these powers and properties themselves become more simple. So that after a few abstractions from abstract objects, the mind arrives at conceptions so simple, that it can proceed no farther. Thus the characteristics of the abstract species, "*extension—solidity—duration—power,*" and of many others, are so simple, that the mind cannot form other conceptions out of them by a still farther abstraction; but is obliged to stop in its proceeding of making species more and more general of any of these orders.

Many abstract species are of such a nature, that the conceptions of them must be gained by abstraction from several objects at once. All relations which are denoted by names, must be first conceived in consequence of this kind of abstraction; such as "*equality—superiority—inferiority—resemblance—concomitance,*" and many others; for none of these can exist but between two objects at the least.

The more any community attends to arts and sciences, the more names of abstract species must be introduced into the

language of such community. For all arts and sciences absolutely require abstract conceptions to be formed, and to be reduced to species denoted by different names, before the principles of these arts can be taught.

There is no necessity to dwell on abstract species, as they are denoted by substantives, in a treatise of grammar; seeing the conceptions of them are formed on the same principles with those on which the conceptions of species of external material objects are formed. Only the reflexion of the mind itself seems to be more immediately assistant in the formation of the conceptions of abstract objects, than in that of material external objects. But the attention is equally checked or confined in the conception of each sort. The incommunicable principle of existence is equally supposed; the character of distinction of either sort equally occurs to the mind on the mention of the name of the species; and the mind equally remembers that the whole object, denoted by such name, is what it can make singly the especial object of its contemplation. Hence the substantive names of abstract objects are applied in language, on the very same principles with the names of those objects which are observed to have a separate principle of existence in themselves, independent of any mode of conception of the mind of man.

SECTION XI.

Of the proceeding of the mind in forming the conceptions denoted by verbs.

WHEN the conceptions, denoted by noun substantives, are formed in the mind, it is easy to perceive that the objects themselves, from whence the conceptions are gained, are all of them in a certain state, which may be made the characteristic

characteristic of a species, of which all these objects are individuals. This state is that of separate intellectual "*being*," and this "*being*" is the characteristic of the species denoted by the substantive, "*thing*," in English. For every conception which the mind of man can consider separately, has the state of "*being*" in the intellect. Whereas, every conception which is not so far compleated, as that the mind can consider it separately, has not yet gained its "*being*" in the intellect. And all the objects which occasion conceptions of the former kind, may be called "*things*," if this word be taken in its largest acceptation. But the circumstances which produce the latter kind of conceptions, cannot be so called. As for instance, that which is denoted by the adjective "*good* or *great*," or by the preposition "*of* or *to*," or by the conjunction "*and* or *but*," cannot be called a "*thing*."

The state of "*being*," above described, may be considered in a twofold view. For it may be looked upon as an abstract object, and as such, may be separately considered in the mind, and be denoted by the word "*being*," taken as a substantive. Or it may be considered as communicating with every object whatsoever which occasions a compleat conception of the intellect, whether such object be denoted by one word, or by a series of words. For it is the characteristic of a species, whereof every such object, as is above mentioned, is an individual. When this state is considered as communicable; expressions of a particular form must be introduced into language to denote it under this consideration; and this gives occasion to the verbal forms "*to be—being*," &c.

These forms themselves express compleat conceptions of the intellect, as noun substantives do. And therefore these conceptions have a compleat intellectual "*being*," but this "*being*" is considered as communicable with that of any object whatsoever, to which the mind can confine its attention.

Hence these forms may be applied for a double purpose in the use of language. For the states denoted by them, may either be considered as so many separate objects of the intellect; or as coalescing with any other compleat object of the intellect, and shewing the state of "*being*" in which such object is observed, or supposed. Now whatsoever modification can be perceived, or made in any object itself, may very naturally be conceived as a modification of the state of "*being*" of such object; and hence every modification, which is perceived or made in any object whatsoever, is applicable to "*verbal being*:" hence it comes to pass, that the forms of the verb "*to be*" take into themselves the characteristics of all species. For every individual object is included in some species, and consequently has the characteristic of the species in it; and therefore the verbal communicable "*being*" of such object may be considered as taking the same characteristic into it.

Now we observed, when we treated of the nature of species, that the characteristics of many of them are very difficult to be determined. When this happens, and it is required to unite the characteristic of such a species with the verbal state of "*being*," we place the name of species itself (usually with an article before it) in dependence upon some form of the verb "*to be*," and such an expression denotes communicable being modified by the characteristic of the species taken into it. Hence the expressions "*to be a man—a judge*," "*being a man—a judge*," are real verbs. As likewise all other expressions of like construction. For nothing more than the characteristics of the two species, "*man*" and "*judge*," are here considered as modifying verbal "*being*," without any regard to the incommunicable principle of existence which is in any man, or in any judge. This will fully appear, if we place the words "*being a man—being a judge*," in dependence upon any proper name; as in the expression "*Mr. N—being a man—being a judge*." For although there are two distinct objects concerned in each of the expressions, viz.

" *Mr.*

"*Mr. N—— and a man—Mr. N—— and a judge,*" yet the sense or result of either expression is not a plural conception; which yet must have been the consequence, if the incommunicable principle of existence in the objects, "*a man*" and "*a judge,*" had been attended to.

But we have farther observed, in treating of species, that the characteristics of many of them are states easily ascertainable. As for instance, in the species "*haver—speaker—reader,*" the states "*having—speaking—reading,*" are the characteristics; and if these states be considered as taken into "*communicable being,*" the expressions thereof become of that kind of words which in grammar are called verbs; as "*to have—having,*" "*to speak—speaking,*" "*to read—reading,*" &c. i. e. "*to be having—to be speaking,*" &c. "*being having—being speaking,*" &c.

The states "*having—speaking—reading*" may be considered as states of "*exertion,*" in the most extensive acceptation of the word. But there are many states which are the characteristics of species, and which may be considered as states of "*reception of the effect of some exertion.*" As for instance, whatsoever is called "*a possession*" must be "*something possessed;*" so "*a speech*" must be "*something spoke,*" and "*a lecture*" must be "*something read.*" Of consequence the receptive states, "*possessed—spoke—read,*" may be united with "*verbal being,*" as well as the exertive states, "*having—speaking—reading;*" and they are thus expressed in the verbal forms, "*to be possessed—spoke—read,*" "*being possessed—spoke—read.*" Hence the distinctions of verbs active and passive appear in language. And as there are few states of exertion which can exist without a correspondent state of reception existing at the same time, much the greatest number of verbs have both active and passive forms corresponding with each other, as the states denoted by these forms are themselves conceived to do.

Verbs are all of them expressions of species of abstract states, which the mind may conceive at its pleasure, either as communicating, or not communicating, in their principle of existence, with other objects; and this is the essential property which distinguishes a verb from every other kind of word in language.

Having thus explained the nature of those conceptions which are denoted by substantives, and by verbs which are frequently applied in some of their forms as substantives; I proceed to consider the different forms under which substantives appear in language, and to shew the reason why these different forms have been introduced into the use of speech.

These different forms appear in what is called in grammar, the declension of nouns; which shews them as of different numbers, and as of different cases in each number.

SECTION XII.

Of the numbers of noun substantives.

THESE are in English only two, the singular and the plural; and this diversity of number is only observed in names of species. For if a name is so peculiarly appropriated to one certain object, as to be applicable to that object only, there can be no reason to give such name a plural form. Yet the mind may unite such an object with some other; so as to form a plural object out of both. But when this is done, two different names are joined by the conjunction "*and*," as in the expression "*Greece and Italy*."

But when several individuals of one and the same species are considered as forming a complex object, it would be very inconvenient

nient to repeat the same name as many times as there are single objects included in the complex one. And to prevent this inconvenience, the formers of all languages which have come to my knowledge, have introduced the plural forms of substantives. These express more than one individual of the species whereof any particular substantive is the name, as united into a complex object. When the mind unites several objects of a species into a complex object, notice is usually given of it, in English, by adding an "s" to the name of the species, and sometimes by adding the syllable "es;" and in some few substantives by other variations, which will be taken notice of at Section IV. of the practical part of this work.

This property of plurality in substantives, confirms the truth of the definition of a substantive, as given in this book. For although several individual objects, which are each of them denoted by the same, or by different substantives, may be formed into one complex object; yet the object will be a plural object, *i. e.* the being of the several individuals will not unite into one.

But if several verbs, used as substantives, express a complex state, such state is usually considered as singular; as in the expression "*to think and speak requires time*," *i. e.* the states "*thinking*" and "*speaking*" are considered as uniting their being into one. But these states may be considered as separate individuals united into a plural object, if the mind pleases so to consider them; as in the expression, "*to think and to speak are proofs of observation.*"

SECTION XIII.

Of the cases of nouns in general.

I HAVE hitherto considered noun substantives, both proper and common, as also the names of verbal species, as they denote conceptions, which the mind can make the separate objects of its contemplation. But the applying them for this purpose only, would not answer the intent of language. This intent requires, that the conception annexed to any noun substantive, or to any verb, should be modified innumerable ways; and this can only be done by applying one conception, so as to modify, or give an additional ascertainment to another. All the connective parts of speech are used for this purpose; and the Greeks and Romans have varied their nouns by alterations of the last syllables, in order to make these forms of the substantives themselves connective parts of speech. The noun, whether altered in its final syllables, or not, is considered as the same noun; and the several forms of it are, by established custom, called the cases of the noun.

Now although the English nouns have little of that variation, which, in the Latin and Greek grammars, is called a case; it is by no means unnecessary for the understanding of the scientific, or speculative principles, on which language is founded, to explain what the cases of nouns are in these languages; and to shew by what means the English, or any language of like construction with it, supplies the want of cases in its nouns. For whatsoever expressions correspond with the cases of nouns, in the languages abovementioned, must of necessity recur continually in the use of any language: seeing the cases, in such languages as have them, are introduced for no other purpose but to answer the occasions which most frequently occur in the nature
of

of things, for the application of nouns in dependence upon one another, or upon other words.

The same reason which has directed all nations to distinguish the plural number in their nouns by an addition to, or alteration of, the singular, carried on the Greeks and Romans to give notice, by farther variations of the substantive in both the numbers, when such substantive was applied, not merely to raise a conception of a singular or plural object, but to be united with some other word, so as to form with it a compound expression of a conception farther circumstantiated than it is, when expressed only by the word with which the dependent case of the substantive is united in construction. The mind finds its proceeding on different circumstances, in uniting the conceptions denoted by substantives, so as to particularize by them the conceptions denoted by the words on which the substantives depend. This diversity of proceeding requires diversity of notices in connected language; and the variations of the cases are used, in Greek and Latin, as notices that the mind is proceeding on different circumstances, in forming the connection between the object denoted by the noun, first in one dependent case, and then in another, and that contained in the signification of the word on which the different cases depend.

Thus in the expression, “ *the motion of a man,*” “ *from a man,*” “ *to a man,*” “ *with a man,*” “ *for a man,*” the five objects denoted by the same name of species, “ *a man,*” are united with the object, “ *motion,*” by several modes of estimation, founded on different circumstances; and the different modes of estimation, and of the circumstances on which they are founded, give occasion to different acts of the mind in apprehending and applying them. The variation of the substantive must be made, according to some regular plan, to answer the end purposed by it; for otherwise the sorts of signification, which it is intended the different cases shall bear, would be confounded one with another.

Yet as it was found, in the languages above mentioned, that all nouns could not be varied conveniently according to one and the same form, or pattern; the Latins are observed to have five forms for the variation of their nouns, and the Greeks three principal or capital forms for the variation of theirs, which are farther subdistinguished; so that the whole number of them is usually reckoned to be ten. These forms of variation are called declensions, and some substantives are varied according to one form of declension, and others according to another. In all the declensions, the difference both of number, and case, is denoted by the variation of the last syllables; so that there is a necessity, in order to avoid the confusion of number, that the plural termination of a case shall be different from the singular termination of the same case.

The cases of every declension in the Latin are considered as six in the singular, and as many in the plural number; and are called, the nominative, the genitive, the dative, the accusative, the vocative, and the ablative: but no declension has six different endings of case in either number: for the nominative and the vocative are the same with each other; as likewise the dative and ablative with each other; in the plural number of all the declensions. And in the singular, either the nominative and vocative, or the genitive and dative, or the dative and ablative, are the same in some one declension. But as this likeness happens to be between different cases in different declensions; the grammarians, for the sake of regularity, have established six cases of each number, in every declension; and have founded their rules for the construction of the language on this establishment.

There are but five cases in the Greek: the ablative being either wanting, or always the same with the dative. But there are three numbers; a peculiar termination being appropriated to two cases of the noun, when it signifies an object consisting of only two individuals of a species. This number is called
the

the dual number, and the first of its cases supplies, in construction, the office of the nominative, the accusative, and of the vocative; whilst the second supplies that of the genitive and dative.

The method which is taken in English of forming expressions correspondent to the cases of substantives in the languages above mentioned (except in one form of the genitive case, and in the declension of some of the pronouns) is, by retaining the terminations of the nominatives singular and plural, invariable; and by prefixing different particles to these nominatives; so that the same particle by this means contributes to the forming of two expressions, which answer to the same case singular and plural of the Latin noun: as appears by the declension of the substantive, “*dominus*,” with the English expressions, “*a lord—of a lord*,” &c. as set down in this section; and in a different manner, under the declension of nouns, in the practical part of this book.

The method of the English, and of other languages of like construction, in forming the kind of expressions here treated of, is more natural than that of the Latin and Greek; as it is evidently more simple and regular. But the cases in these languages have a variety of cadence, which their correspondent English expressions will not admit of.

The names of case and declension do not appear to have any obvious relation to their grammatical meaning: for the word “*casus*,” from whence the English word, “*case*,” is derived, signifies “*a fall*” in Latin. But it appears, that it was a custom of the antient grammarians to place the noun, with its variations, in some such manner as the following.

<i>Singular.</i> <i>Domini</i> <i>Gen. Domini</i> <i>Accus. Dominum</i> <i>Voca. Domine</i> <i>Abbl. Domino</i>	<i>Singular.</i> <i>Domini</i> <i>Gen. Domini</i> <i>Accus. Dominum</i> <i>Voca. Domine</i> <i>Abbl. Domino</i>
<i>Singular.</i> <i>Domini</i> <i>Gen. Domini</i> <i>Accus. Dominum</i> <i>Voca. Domine</i> <i>Abbl. Domino</i>	<i>Singular.</i> <i>Domini</i> <i>Gen. Domini</i> <i>Accus. Dominum</i> <i>Voca. Domine</i> <i>Abbl. Domino</i>

To place the variations of the noun in this manner, was of consequence to consider it as *declining* both ways by five several falls from the nominative of each number. And hence it is that the nominative case is frequently called the right, or upright case, and the others oblique cases; as being placed on lines oblique to the upright lines on which the nominatives stood*.

* See a very ingenious book, called *Hermes*, p. 277.

The vocative is indeed to be excepted out of the number of oblique cases; as being in itself a nominative of the second person. This will appear, when we come to speak of the case in particular.

S E C T I O N XIV.

Of the signs of the cases of substantives.

NOUN substantives have been hitherto considered, as the conceptions annexed to them represent objects, each whereof is conceived to exist by a principle which is constant and peculiar to it; and, of consequence, as each object may be what the mind contemplates singly. But there is a necessity of applying conceptions derived from the same objects, to represent the mere circumstances which attend other objects, or which attend verbal states. For it is not possible to form single conceptions denoted by single names, which shall suit every sort of object, or every sort of state, which we may have occasion to consider; and therefore the conceptions which are readily formed, and laid up in the mind as denoted by separate names, must be made use of to circumstantiate each other, and likewise to circumstantiate verbal states, as occasion may require.

Now the conceptions of all separate objects, and states, are formed by confining or checking the attention; and any two, or more of them, may be taken into one complex conception, merely by extending the attention to them all, and then checking it. But this conception must necessarily be attended with the increase of number. For when the conceptions of objects and states are thus united, none of them will represent mere circumstances coalescing with some other object, but each of them will represent an object, or state, as the conception thereof

is

is separately laid up in the memory ; although such conceptions are several of them taken together, and made to represent a complex plural object to suit a present occasion. When the mind unites in this manner, the conceptions denoted by different substantives, the conjunction “ *and* ” is interposed in English between the substantives ; as in the expression, “ *a man and a woman.* ” And the infinitive forms of verbs, and the English participles, may be used in the same kind of construction, as “ *to read and to think—reading and thinking,* ” which are expressions that denote conceptions equivalent to those of plural objects.

This kind of construction therefore is of no use to shew the conception denoted by a substantive, or by a verb, as representing a mere circumstance to be united with some other conception representing some object, or some state of being. But if a substantive be used in dependence upon a verb ; whether the substantive be in an oblique case or not, notice is then given, that the conception, denoted by the substantive, is to be made use of merely to circumstantiate the state denoted by the verb, on which the substantive depends, in whatsoever case it be used. If a substantive be used in dependence upon another substantive, or upon an adjective ; the sign of an oblique case, or some preposition, must be made use of to shew the nature of the dependence ; unless when two substantives are joined together, which are both names of the same object. But in all the manners in which substantives are applied merely to express circumstances attending states, or objects, or other circumstances, expressed by verbs, or substantives, or adjectives, no increase of number ensues upon the application of the dependent substantives. Thus, “ *to be officers,* ” is the expression of a single state ; “ *an habitation of men,* ” is the expression of a single object ; and “ *men in arms,* ” is an expression of no more objects, than are denoted by the substantive, “ *men ;* ” and in the expression, “ *ambitious of honours,* ” no plurality is implied. Therefore it is
manifest,

manifest, that the separate principle of existence of objects, denoted by dependent substantives, is not attended to, when the complex conception, which these substantives contribute to the expression of, is formed in the mind; because, if such principle were attended to, the notion of plurality of objects would be included in every conception, which is expressed by any series of words, in which several substantives are concerned; as likewise by every series in which a dependent substantive in the plural number is concerned. It follows from hence, that in every conception, denoted by a series of connected words, there must be some capital object concerned, to which all the circumstances are referred, which are expressed by each of the dependent words in the series. For the principle, by which this object exists, is the only one which is attended to; and therefore all the circumstances which can be consistently united in the expression, must be such as are capable of being considered as mere modifications, uniting in the existence of such capital object.

Therefore, what is principally required to illustrate this most abstruse part of grammar, is to determine the several manners in which objects expressed by nouns, or states expressed by verbs, are capable of being modified by what is denoted by dependent substantives.

Now it appears, from the nature of the conceptions which are annexed to names of species, that one and the same object may be included in several different species; and that the object may have as many different names given to it, as there are different species in which it is included. As "*a man*," for instance, may be called "*a creature—an animal—a son*," or perhaps "*a father—a master—a subject—a magistrate*," or by many other names, if he has the properties, or characters, which are the marks of distinction of the several species which these names express. Therefore one and the same object may be expressed as in several different circumstances, if such object have different substantives.

substantive names applied to it. The same obtains with regard to verbal states. For one and the same state may be denoted by several verbs. As for instance, all the active states denoted by verbs, may be considered as included in the state "*to act*," or "*to be acting*;" and all the passive states denoted by verbs, may be considered as included in the state "*to be suffering*." If therefore the conception of the principal or capital object, which is concerned in a series of words, be raised in the mind of a hearer or reader, by mentioning some name of such object; several circumstances of this object may be expressed, by mentioning other names of the same object, if notice be given that such names express circumstances, and not capital objects. This notice is given in all languages, by interposing some form of the verb substantive (*i. e.* of the verb which answers to the English verb "*to be*") between two names of the same object; as in the expression, "*a man being—having been a judge*," or "*a man who is—was—will be—may be—must be—might be—should be—would be a judge*." For as the substantive, "*a judge*," is made dependent upon a verb, it expresses nothing more than a circumstance which modifies the verbal state of "*being*" in which the man is represented, and therefore no conception of plurality of objects is contained in any of the above-mentioned expressions, although the two conceptions, denoted by "*a man*" and "*a judge*," are concerned in each. This manner of circumstantiating objects may be called "*the descriptive mode*," if any one pleases; for this mode of construction is constantly used in describing objects, more particularly than they are expressed by the names by which they are first mentioned. Several passive verbs admit of substantives in dependence upon them by the same mode; such as the verbs, "*to be called—named—made—appointed—esteemed*;" as in the expressions, "*Mr. N—— being called—named—made—appointed—esteemed—a judge*." I shall go on to shew the reason why active verbs do not admit of this kind of construction: but it is necessary to observe, before I proceed farther, that this mode of circumstantiating an object

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by interposing a verb between two of its names, never requires the dependent substantive to be used in a different case from that of the substantive, on which the verb depends. If we examine into the reason of this, it will quickly appear, that the object denoted by the first substantive, and that denoted by the substantive which depends on the verb, are represented in one and the same state of being; for in the examples above, "*Mr. N——*" is "*the object called—named,*" &c. and "*a judge*" is likewise "*the object called—named,*" &c. consequently the conceptions annexed to "*Mr. N——,*" and "*a judge,*" are equally conceptions of that which "*is called—named,*" &c. and therefore are no more than different conceptions of one and the same object.

If we now take the active verbs "*to call—to name,*" &c. which correspond with the passive verbs above mentioned, and form the expressions, "*to call—name,*" &c. "*Mr. N—— a judge,*" "*Mr. N—— and a judge,*" will each represent the "*object called—named,*" as before; and therefore are only names of one and the same object under different conceptions. But the state of being, in which the object under different conceptions is represented, is not now directly expressed; for the states, "*to call—name,*" are only mentioned, and not the states, "*called —named.*" Therefore these states are to be supplied in the mind by deduction from the states, "*to call—to name,*" which are mentioned; and the object denoted by the substantives, "*Mr. N——, a judge,*" is to be considered as in the deduced states, and not in the states which are directly mentioned.

The substantives, "*Mr. N——, a judge,*" are therefore in an oblique case, when thus applied. And the reason why they are so is manifestly this, viz. the mind is under a necessity of supplying, by its own operation, something which is not directly mentioned, in order to determine how the conception, expressed by either of the dependent substantives, represents a mere circumstance of the verbal state, "*to call.*" Therefore the essential

property of an oblique case is, “ *a direction to supply in the mind somewhat not directly mentioned, in order to turn the conception of an object into that of a dependent circumstance.*” That which is to be supplied in this instance, is a state corresponding to the verbal state which is mentioned, in which state the object denoted by each of the dependent substantives, must be placed. If only one substantive is made to depend on one of the verbs above mentioned, as in the expression, “ *to call—name—Mr. N——;*” Mr. N—— is the object “ *called—named;*” *i. e.* he is in a state which is not directly mentioned, but which is to be supplied in the mind; and therefore the substantive, “ *Mr. N——,*” is in an oblique case. This case is called the accusative, in Greek and Latin; and the noun in these languages, when in this case, is shewn to be so by its termination; but the English language has no particular sign or termination for this case (except in some of the pronouns:) mere position of the substantive after the verb, usually supplying the place of a sign. There is little or no occasion for any particular sign of this case besides mere position; because the word, which the noun in this case depends upon, must always be a verb, and that verb of a particular kind.

The grammarians have called the kind of verb, on which a substantive in the accusative case may depend, a verb transitive. The explanation of the nature of this verb will contribute much to explain the nature of all the oblique cases of substantives, as likewise of all the prepositions; and therefore this kind of verb must here be particularly considered.

Now every transitive verb has two sets of forms, which the grammarians have called the two voices of the verb. One of these voices is considered as expressing states of action; the other states of suffering; and this way of considering the nature of these voices, is proper enough for conveying to learners a general conception of the nature of each. But a verb in the active voice very frequently denotes a state which implies no real action;

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as for instance, "*to suffer—to resemble—to exceed*," and many others. And so a verb, in the passive voice, frequently denotes a state which implies no real suffering; as, "*to be got—to be lost—to be found*," and many others. The true nature of these states is, that those of each pair (that is, the active and passive states, which are denoted by the correspondent forms, or tenses, of one and the same verb) are conceived to derive their existence from one and the same principle; so that if this principle of existence is communicated to, or with-held from, either state of a pair, it is communicated to, or with-held from, the other state of the same pair. Thus the states, "*to see—to be seen*," "*to speak—to be spoke*," "*to love—to be loved*," exist each pair of them by the same principle: and in general, if either state of any of the pairs of any mood is, "*past—present—or to come*," the other state of the same pair is, "*past—present—or to come*;" or if the existence of either state depends upon "*command—power—freedom from contradiction—duty—or necessity*," the existence of the other state of the same pair depends on the same principle. Hence the same signs of tense and mood are used with each state of the same pair; as, "*to love—to be loved*," "*to have loved—to have been loved*," "*to be about to love—to be about to be loved*," "*I love—I am loved*," "*I loved—I was loved*," "*I have loved—I have been loved*," "*I had loved—I had been loved*," "*I shall love—I shall be loved*," "*love thou—be thou loved*," "*I can—may—should—would love*," "*I can—may—should—would—be loved*," &c.; and so of the corresponding states of any one and the same transitive verb. But although these corresponding pairs of verbal states are conceived as each pair owing its existence to the same principle; yet the same object is not usually in both the states of some certain pair at one and the same time; but much more frequently one object is in one of the states, and another object in the corresponding state. And almost all kind of relations may be expressed by considering one object as in one of these states, and another in the corresponding state. As for instance, the relation

of equality may be expressed between two objects, by considering the one object as in the state "*equalling*," and the other as in the state "*equalled*." The relation of "*greater*" to "*less*" between two objects, may be expressed by considering the one as in the state "*exceeding*," and the other in the state "*exceeded*." The relation of "*less*" to "*greater*" may be expressed by considering one object in the state "*exceeded*," and another in the state "*exceeding*;" and so of a great variety of other instances. Now if an object is represented in one of these verbal states, and another object in the same relation to the first object, as it would be if the corresponding state were mentioned and this other object represented in that state; there is no occasion actually to mention such corresponding state, but to give notice by some sign that it is to be supplied in the mind, and it will be supplied of course; because the one of these corresponding states always supposes the other. If an object is mentioned as in the state denoted by the active form of any transitive verb, and another object is related to the first object by being in the corresponding passive state; the name of such corresponding object is placed in English immediately after the active verb, and this position is of the same effect as a particular sign would be, of the relation which exists between the two objects. Thus in the expression, "*John seeing—equalling—excelling—James*;" James is in the same relation to John, as he would be if he were represented in the states, "*seen—equalled—excelled*;" and so of other instances of the use of the active transitive verb, with a substantive in the accusative case depending upon it. Therefore the sign of the accusative case is not the mark of any one certain relation, but of a certain kind of operation of the mind itself, which can be performed upon the sort of conception that is denoted by the active form of a transitive verb; but not upon the conception that is denoted by any other sort of word.

If an object be represented in the passive state of a transitive verb, and a substantive be made immediately dependent upon

the verb, such substantive is conceived to express an object, which is in the passive state itself that is mentioned, and not in the corresponding active state; as in the expression, "*a child named John*," "*John*," as well as "*the child*," is "*the object named*;" and so of other instances.

Yet it is frequently necessary to represent an object in the state denoted by the passive form of a transitive verb, and likewise to represent an object in the active state which corresponds with the passive state that is mentioned, as merely circumstantiating the object in the passive state. When this is to be done, there is no occasion directly to mention the active state; but any certain sign, or mark, used with the name of the object, which is to be considered as if it were in such state, will be sufficient to direct the mind so to consider it. For as the corresponding passive state is actually mentioned, the active state is easily supplied in the mind whenever there is an occasion for it. The sign "*by*" is prefixed in English before the substantive which follows the passive verb, when the mind proceeds to connect its conceptions in this manner, *i. e.* by the means of passive states actually mentioned; and by understanding, or supplying within itself, the corresponding active states, as in the expressions, "*James seen—equalled—excelled by John*," where John is "*the object seeing—equalling—excelling*;" *i. e.* he is in the active states, which correspond with the states, "*seen—equalled—excelled*," that are actually mentioned in the expression. Hence it appears, that the sign "*by*," after a passive verb, is not the mark of any one certain relation; but of a certain kind of operation of the mind itself, which can be performed upon the conception denoted by a passive verb. It is conceived in English, that the same kind of operation, which is denoted by the sign "*by*," may be performed upon other sorts of words, besides passive verbs; and therefore this sign does not always refer to *the agent*, as it does in the examples given above; and the various uses of this sign will be considered particularly in a following chapter. But it is manifest that the expressions, "*John—seeing—equalling—*
excelling"

"*excelling—James,*" (which were produced as examples of construction, by the active forms of verbs with the accusative case) are exactly equivalent to "*James seen—equalled —excell'd by—John;*" inasmuch, that if the conceptions, denoted by either of the expressions, could be painted, the very same picture would be formed. This will be very evident, if we take the verbal name of a visible state of being, and apply it in both these modes of construction; as for instance, the verb "*to hold.*" For the appearance which is expressed by "*John holding James,*" is the very same with that which is expressed by "*James held by John;*" and consequently the very same picture would represent that which is denoted by either of the expressions. This diversity of expression of one and the same appearance, arises from hence; that we are at liberty to consider either John or James as the capital object concerned in the appearance; and that if we consider John as such object, the state, "*holding James,*" is a dependent circumstance of the complex object, expressed by "*John holding James;*" but if we consider James as the capital object, the state, "*held by John,*" is a dependent circumstance of the complex object, expressed by "*James held by John;*" so that the conceptions of the two complex objects differ in nothing but in the modes of operation, by which the parts, whereof they consist, are put together in the mind itself; and painting can take no notice of these modes of operation.

Now it is manifest that the objects, between which every particular kind of relation can exist, are each of them in a certain state of being, in consequence of such relation; so that to consider two objects as the terms between which a certain relation exists, is, in effect, to consider one of the objects as in a state of being, with which the state of being, in which the other object is, has the same kind of correspondence as that is which occasions the relation. And this is manifestly the reason, why so many kinds of relations may be expressed in language, by representing one object as in the active or passive state, which is denoted by

some transitive verb; and another object as in the correspondent passive or active state of the same verb.

If verbal states could be mentioned with convenience, as intervening between every two objects, which are considered as in some certain relation to each other, there would manifestly be no occasion in language, for the sign of any case, except that of the accusative, and that of the corresponding ablative, which is the sign "*by*," in English, as we have shewn above. But on some occasions, it is utterly unnecessary to mention the particular states of being, in which objects are, that are considered as related to each other; because the nature of the objects themselves sufficiently shews how they are related; and therefore any mark, or notice, to direct to the name, which is to be considered as denoting a mere circumstance, and not a capital object, is direction enough to enable the mind to unite the conceptions denoted by two substantives, into the conception of a capital object farther ascertained by the circumstance which is denoted by the dependent substantive. The sign "*of*" is used in English between two substantives for this purpose, and is prefixed to the substantive, which is to be considered as the name of a mere circumstance. Thus in the expressions, "*a man of learning—a horse of strength*," notice is given that the substantives, "*learning*" and "*strength*," express mere circumstances. So that the learning is not to be considered as having any principle of existence, other than that by which the man exists; nor the strength as having any principle of existence, other than that by which the horse exists. Hence it comes to pass, that the dependent substantives, "*of learning—of strength*," are, in this application of them, exactly equivalent to the adjectives, "*learned*" and "*strong*;" so that the expressions above are of the very same import with "*a learned man—a strong horse*." But the expressions may be reversed, so that the word in each which represented the capital object, may be made to represent a dependent circumstance; and that which represented

represented a mere circumstance, may be made to represent the capital object, and this merely by turning the substantives, "*a man—a horse,*" into "*of a man—of a horse;*" and considering the substantives, "*learning*" and "*strength,*" as expressing objects circumstantiated respectively, by what is signified by "*of a man—of a horse;*" as in the expressions, "*the learning of a man—the strength of a horse.*" Adjectives might be made to express what is here denoted by "*of a man—of a horse;*" but it is not convenient to make adjectives from the names of real objects, and to give these adjectives this kind of signification. For every adjective (as has been already shewn) directs, that no notice is to be taken of any principle of existence in what is denoted by it. And it is somewhat difficult for the mind to lay aside the consideration of the principle by which a real object exists. But it is easy to consider a capital object as in some certain state of being, and any other object by which the capital object is circumstantiated, as in a state of being correspondent with the former state. Hence the kind of relation that is given notice of by the sign "*of,*" placed in English between two substantives, may be more exactly expressed, by substituting some transitive verb instead of the sign; as, "*a man of learning—a horse of strength,*" are expressions equivalent to "*a man having learning—a horse having strength;*" and these expressions may be reversed, if the corresponding passive state, "*had,*" be substituted instead of "*having:*" if they are thus reversed, they will become "*the learning had by a man—the strength had by a horse;*" and both the former and the latter expressions may be easily turned into equivalent expressions, in which a relative pronoun is concerned; as, "*a man who has learning—a horse which has strength,*" "*the learning which a man has—the strength which a horse has.*" The reason why a relative pronoun has this property, will be made fully appear, when that kind of pronoun is treated of in particular. It will appear that some verb transitive, either in an active or passive form, may be substituted for the English sign, "*of,*" on every occasion when the sign connects

connects two substantives; as for instance, "*the parts of a whole*" is equivalent to "*the parts constituting, or which constitute a whole;*" "*a whole of so many parts,*" to "*a whole constituted by so many parts, or which so many parts constitute;*" "*a field of corn,*" to "*a field producing, or which produces corn;*" "*the corn of a field,*" to "*the corn produced by a field, or which a field produces;*" and so of other instances of two substantives connected by this sign "*of.*" It is manifest therefore, that this mode of construction is only a kind of substitute for the transitive, and correspondent passive modes, above described; and that it takes place when the states in which the objects denoted by the substantives are to be considered, are so obvious, that there is no occasion to mention either state particularly. This sign, "*of,*" is therefore neither the mark of relation in general, nor of one particular sort of relation; but is the mark of a certain sort of operation of the mind itself, which always requires two conceptions of a certain sort, in order to perform it, viz. two conceptions which are denoted by two substantives. A conception which is denoted by an expression that is formed by the operation above mentioned, may be easily turned into an adjective conception; for nothing more is required, than to omit considering the principle by which the capital object exists, and of consequence to denote such object not by substantive, but by an adjective name. Thus, "*desire of praise*" becomes "*desirous of praise,*" "*consciousness of guilt*" becomes "*conscious of guilt;*" and so of other instances. Here it is manifest, that "*desirous of praise—conscious of guilt,*" are only a kind of complex adjectives; and this may serve, as one example, to shew how the mind compounds words, so that a whole series of them taken together, becomes of the nature of a simple word of a particular part of speech.

The sign "*of,*" in English, has yet another use, besides that which requires two substantives when it is applied. In this use of it, the substantives to which it is prefixed are placed, not in

dependence upon other substantives, but upon verbs. The substantive, thus applied, answers to a Latin substantive in the ablative case, sometimes without any preposition before it, and sometimes with, "*a—ab—de—e—ex*;" as, "*descended of an ancient family*," may in Latin be expressed by "*ortus antiqua stirpe*," or "*ortus ab antiqua stirpe*." But the sign "*of*," when used with two substantives, answers to the genitive case in Latin. This double use of the same sign in English occasions no ambiguity; because, in the latter use of it, the sign, with its substantive, must depend upon a different sort of word from that, upon which it depends when it answers to the genitive case of Latin nouns. There is another English sign, which always requires a certain sort of word to be made dependent upon. This sign is "*than*," which always depends upon some word that requires the act of comparison in order to apply it, whilst it directs to the name of the object which has in it a degree of some quality, which degree is made the standard of comparison. Thus in the expressions, "*John is taller than James—John proceeds less cautiously than James*;" the degree of tallness, and the degree of cautiousness of proceeding, observed in James, are made the standards of comparison; and it is inferred, that the degree of tallness, observed in John, exceeds the degree observed in James; but that the degree of cautiousness of proceeding, observed in John, comes short of the degree observed in James. The sign "*than*" is therefore a mere mark, or notice, which supposes a certain mode of estimation of the mind of man, and directs to the name of some object, upon some quality whereof this mode of estimation is applied. Now to estimate a relation by mentioning both the terms between which it exists, and by shewing how these terms are connected, is in effect to compare these terms together in some certain respect; and if this respect be the possession, or exertion of some quality which has an adjective or adverbial name of the comparative degree, this mode of estimation may be used to express the relation. Thus the expressions, "*to stand above—below—before—behind a man*," may be turned
into

into the equivalent expressions, “ *to stand higher than—lower than—more forward than—less forward than a man* ;” and the force of several other prepositions may be expressed by the comparative mode of construction on many occasions ; as, “ *to advance beyond the wood*,” is “ *to advance farther than the wood*,” &c.

Having thus considered the several cases of substantives which require words of particular sorts for their application, I proceed to consider the signs by which a substantive may be made dependent upon either a noun or a verb.

Now it is manifest, that the verb transitive requires no affixed sign in English to shew the substantive which denotes an object that is related to the state, by being in the passive state which corresponds with the state that is mentioned. But if more objects are required to circumstantiate a transitive state, different signs must be used, to shew the different manners in which the conceptions of these objects are applied to signify mere circumstances of such state. One of the principal of these signs is “ *for*,” in English. This sign shews that the object, to the name of which it is prefixed, is so considered as to be “ *the cause —motive—reason—or occasion why*” some state exists, or some object exists in some certain state ; as in the expressions, “ *to work for hire—a mast for a ship*,” &c. This kind of relation arises altogether from a certain mode of estimation of some rational agent ; for where there is no reason, there can be no final causes ; and where nothing is proposed or executed, there can be no motive of intention. It is therefore most evident, that the sign “ *for*” shews the object to the name of which it is prefixed, as under a certain mode of contemplation of the mind of man, and that this mode of contemplation makes such object not a capital object, but a dependent circumstance on something proposed or executed. Hence this sign is the mark of a certain mode of contemplation of the mind of man itself. But this

mode of contemplation is made the characteristic of the species, "*final cause*," and of consequence what object soever is under this mode of contemplation, such object becomes of that species, and may be called "*a final cause*." So that the kind of relation in which the object stands, to which the sign "*for*" directs, is ascertained in a good measure by the nature of the species into which such object passes when it has this sign before its name.

The other English prepositions, which may be considered as the signs of cases of substantives, are "*to—from—with—in*." Each of these are notices of particular modes of contemplation, by which the mind of man reduces the conceptions of objects to those of mere circumstances dependent on some capital object, or on some verbal state. The mode of contemplation denoted by "*to*" is, in its general nature, similar to that by which the mind attends a moving object, or any state of motion, till it closes with some fixed object. That denoted by "*from*" is, in its general nature, similar to the proceeding of the mind when it considers a moving object, or any state of motion, as forsaking some object whence it recedes; "*with*" directs to some object which may be considered of the species "*concomitant*," or "*adjunct*," with regard to some object or state; "*in*" gives notice of a mode of attention similar to that by which the mind specifies an object, or state, by something which surrounds, or contains it. This way of reducing connections to sorts by the several modes of attention which the mind exerts in apprehending and applying each sort, is manifestly the utmost effort of the abstractive power of the mind. For when we denote conceptions as of different sorts, merely by the diversities of proceeding by which we form these conceptions from premises set before us; it is clear, that no distinctions can be conceived of a more simple nature; seeing we are now arrived at the mere internal consciousness which the mind has of the several kinds of its own discursive acts. These diversities of proceeding of the mind itself, in apprehending and applying the kinds of connexions and relations

tions which are denoted by the signs of cases and prepositions, are a kind of characteristics by which these connexions and relations are reduced to classes or sorts. For every connexion, or relation, is denoted by the same sign, when the same kind of proceeding of the mind itself is used in applying such connexion, or relation. Now I have shewed, in what is said of the nature of species, that one and the same object may be expressed by different names of species, if such object have the characters of different species in it. In like manner, the same connexion or relation may be denoted by different signs, if such connexion or relation can be apprehended and applied by different modes of proceeding of the mind itself. But every kind of connexion or relation may be apprehended and applied by different modes of proceeding, if the premises or *data* are changed, by which such connexion or relation is to be estimated.

Hence the situations of objects, when they require these particular modes of contemplation in order to turn the conceptions of them into those of mere circumstances, may usually be considered as particular *states of being* in which the objects are, when the conceptions of them are to be turned into those of mere circumstances; and if these states are expressed by either the active or passive forms of transitive verbs, and the object which is to be considered as a mere circumstance, is represented as in the state of being which corresponds with that which is expressed, it is evident that the verb itself will direct the mind to apply the object denoted by the substantive which depends upon it, so as to understand and circumstantiate the correspondent state by the object: and the state, when so understood and circumstantiated, will have a correspondence with the verbal state which is expressed, of the same kind with that which constitutes the relation that is between the objects that are now represented in these verbal states. Hence, "*we reached such a place,*" is of the same import in English with "*we came to such a place;*" "*we forsook such a place,*" with "*we*"

" *we went from it*;" " *John accompanying James*," is equivalent to " *John being with James*;" " *a house which is surrounded by a wood*," to " *a house which is in a wood*;" " *contests for preferment*," to " *contests occasioned by desire of preferment*;" " *a number exceeding another*," to " *a number bigger than another*;" and so of innumerable other instances, in which a transitive verb may be substituted instead of a preposition, or sign of a case. This shews clearly, that the same relation between objects may be expressed in language by different modes of estimation, if the premises are changed, by the help whereof the relations are to be estimated.

These observations evidently prove, that although the signs of cases and other prepositions are the notices of relations existing between objects and objects, or between verbal states and objects; yet that each sign or preposition only directs the hearer to apply his attention in a certain manner upon premises or *data* of certain kinds, in order to apprehend the relation exactly which is intended to be expressed; for if the premises are changed, the mode of operation must be changed, in order to estimate exactly the nature of the relation in question: and when the mode of operation is to be changed, a different sign or preposition must be used. Hence it comes to pass, that one and the same complex object may frequently be expressed by applying the same prepositions to different words, or different prepositions to the same words. As for instance, " *the distance of London from York*—" " *of York from London*—" *from London to York*—" *from York to London*—" *between London and York*—" *between York and London*," are all expressions of one and the same distance, under different modes of estimation, which modes the prepositions give notice of, by changing with each different use of the premises upon which the mind applies its attention in carrying on the estimation.

Thus it appears that the signs of cases and other prepositions are indeed the marks of relation, but that these relations are reduced

duced to sorts in language, by considering each relation as of the same sort which requires the same sort of attention of the mind itself, to apprehend and apply it with the same sort of premises. Hence it comes to pass, that signs of cases and prepositions bear in themselves a less determinate signification than nouns and verbs do; for even noun adjectives include a conception in each, which may be denoted by a substantive, and which of consequence may be separately attended to in the mind; but the kind of relation which is given notice of by a sign, cannot be so attended to; for some premises must be given, and the mind must exercise its discursive judgment upon them, before such a conception of the relation denoted by a particular sign will arise, as can be distinguished from the conception of some other relation. It is the business of grammar to determine, as precisely as possible, the kinds of premises which admit of being circumstantiated by substantives in each particular case. And I have attempted this in the following section, with regard to the English language in particular; for, with regard to language in general, little can be done in this part of grammar. The reason of this is, that different communities have not applied the same mode of estimation to the same kind of premises, in order to express the same relations amongst objects and states themselves. For, even in the use of the genitive case of one substantive in order to circumstantiate another; in Hebrew (as I am told) it is not "*the circumstance*" that is expressed by the genitive case, but "*the object which is circumstantiated*," which proceeding is the very contrary to that of the Greek, Latin, English, and, as I believe, of all the languages of Europe. Yet if the matter is closely attended to, the proceeding of the Hebrews will appear at least as reasonable as that of other nations; for in the English expressions, "*the head of a man—the shape of a triangle*;" the conceptions denoted by "*head*" and "*shape*," are really altered in the mind, in consequence of the substantive which is made dependent upon each; whereas, the conceptions denoted by "*a man—a triangle*" remain unaltered. When therefore the altered

tered conception is expressed by an alteration in the substantive, such proceeding is by no means unreasonable, although directly the reverse of the proceeding made use of in the western languages.

It appears from the foregoing account of the signs of cases and prepositions, why mere arbitrary custom has so much influence in the application of them in all languages. For a mere mode of attention of the mind itself is not easily distinguished, or indeed is not easy to be distinguished from every other mode; nor is it easy to ascertain what premises are all of a sort, so as all to require the same sign to give notice of a certain relation as existing among such premises. Hence the application of the oblique cases and prepositions is so various in the Greek, as scarce to admit of being reduced to rule; and in Latin, the rules admit of very many exceptions more than are specified in the grammars of that language. And the same defect must, in some degree, attend any set of rules for the construction of the oblique cases of substantives and of prepositions, in every language. Yet such rules are of considerable use, especially to children and foreigners, because they not only bring a subject, in itself very extensive and intricate, under a few general heads, but likewise enable the learner more easily to observe and remember the deviations from the more general modes of construction. For this reason I have drawn up the following chapter concerning the construction of English substantives, with those signs before them, which answer nearly to the oblique cases of the Latin substantives; and shall, in the practical grammar, insert a series of short practical rules for the same purpose. If any one pleases to teach a child to apply these rules to the English, much in the same manner as the rules are applied to the Latin and Greek, such child will not only write English more correctly than without the help of such rules, but will likewise be brought much sooner to apprehend and apply the rules of Latin and Greek, or of any other language, than by any other means.

SECTION

SECTION XV.

*Of the cases of substantives in particular.**Of the nominative case.*

THE meaning of this case has been shewn in the account already given of substantives proper and appellative. For the noun in this case is considered as barely raising a conception of some object, singular or plural, in the mind of the hearer, and that by mere recollection. This is upon a supposition that the hearer knows the meaning of the substantive, before it is mentioned to him; for if he is not supposed to know it, the mentioning of the noun, only raises the conception of a particular sound in his mind, or, if the noun be written or printed, of a certain visible form, to which a conception is to be annexed, which shall recur to his mind by mere recollection, when he has once gained it, and fixed it in his mind. Hence the mentioning a noun in this case singly, conveys no information to the hearer; for he either knows the meaning of it, or he does not: if he does know it, the conception of the object which is annexed to the substantive, recurs to his mind by mere recollection: if he does not know the meaning of it, more words must be added, or pointing to, or shewing the object intended to be expressed, must be made use of, to convey the meaning of the noun to him. On this account, the mentioning of a single substantive in this case, is never conceived to express the whole intention of the speaker; but something must be declared concerning it, either by words or signs, before that intention is conceived to be signified to the hearer.

SECTION XVI.

Of the genitive case.

THE particle “*of*” is considered as the sign of this case in English, when it is used to connect substantives of all kinds together, which have no verb between them. There is also another form of the genitive case of English substantives, in which an “*s*,” with the mark of elision, is placed after the substantive. This form of the case is placed before the substantive on which it depends in construction; but the form by “*of*” is placed after the substantive on which it depends; as, “*a man’s house*,” or, “*the house of a man*.”

It has been fully shewn, in the preceding chapter, that the sign “*of*,” when used to join substantives, supplies the place of a pair of corresponding states of some one and the same transitive verb, and carries on the mind to join the two objects connected by it, in the same manner as these objects would be joined, if one of the participial corresponding states were expressed, and the other supplied in the mind; and one of the objects denoted by these substantives were in the one state, and the other object in the other. But when this sign is applied, the verbal states which form the connexion between the objects denoted by the substantives, must be so obvious, that the mind cannot only supply the states themselves, but likewise determine which object is in the active, and which in the corresponding passive state.

As the connective states themselves are so exceeding various, the existence of which between objects are nevertheless any of them denoted by one and the same sign, it may be thought difficult to conceive how the sign can direct the mind what particular state to supply in each particular instance of substantives

united by it. Now it is manifest, that the mind does this in consequence of the same power of judgment by which it can unite the same two substantives, whensoever there is occasion so to do, by expressing the participle that is understood, if the sign only be used. Thus, instead of saying “*a whole of so many parts,*” a man may, if he pleases, say, “*a whole containing so many parts;*” and instead of saying, “*the ship of such a man,*” or “*such a man’s ship,*” he may say, “*the ship possessed by such a man;*” and so of other instances. But, in reality, the mind does not stop to attend very particularly to the precise state that forms the connexion referred to by the sign. It is sufficient for the purposes of language, that the mind perceives a connexion between two objects, similar to that which is formed between some pair of verbal corresponding states; for when that is perceived, the sign may be consistently applied. Seeing the referring the one substantive to the other by it, is not to ascertain the intermediate verbal state; but to ascertain the object denoted by the substantive on which the sign depends, and this by means of the other substantive that depends upon the sign. In consequence of this ascertainment, the object denoted by the first substantive may be distinguished from other objects equally capable of being denoted by the same substantive; and when this is effected, the purpose of applying the sign with the substantive that depends upon it, is accomplished.

Thus, “*the foot of a man*” is the expression of one sort of foot; and “*the foot of a horse*” is the expression of another sort of foot; “*the flock of such a man*” is an expression which distinguishes the flock spoke of from other objects, any of which may equally be called “*a flock.*” “*Mr. N—— of such a place*” is, in like manner, an expression which distinguishes the person spoke of, from any other who may happen to be called Mr. N——, and who does not live at the same place; and so of other instances.

It is true, the connecting states may be precisely attended to; as the foot, for instance, may be considered as "*a part constituting*," and the man and the horse, as "*wholes constituted*;" the flock may be also considered as "*the object possessed*," and the particular man as "*the object possessing*;" and Mr. N—— may be considered as "*an object inhabiting*," and the place as "*the object inhabited*;" and the speaker may actually mention these verbal states, if he pleases, and not use the sign; but the mentioning of these states will no ways promote the specification of the object which the first substantive denotes, by means of the object denoted by the second or dependent substantive, more than the use of the sign does. And therefore it is to no purpose to mention the particular connective state, when a mark or sign of the general mode of reference, which the mind is making use of, will answer the same end.

There are indeed some instances of reference by this sign, that bear an ambiguous meaning; and therefore in such instances, it may be proper to use some verbal form, and not the sign "*of*." This ambiguity arises from the sign "*of*" being used to refer either an object which has an active state in it, to an object which has in it the corresponding passive state; or an object which has a passive state in it, to an object which has in it the corresponding active state; and from the nature of the conceptions annexed to many substantive names. For several of these may be considered as containing in them either active or passive states; as, "*love—hate—fear—conquest—loss*," and many more. Now if it happen, that these conceptions may be considered either as active or passive states of objects of some one and the same species, the referring the substantive names of these conceptions to such names of species by the sign "*of*," will produce ambiguous expressions.

Thus, "*a man may love—hate—fear a man*;" and therefore the expressions, "*the love—hate—fear of a man*," are ambiguous;

guous; because it cannot be determined whether "*the man*" is "*the object loving—bating—fearing*," or "*the object loved—hated—feared*." So a king may conquer a king; and therefore "*the conquest of a king*" is an ambiguous expression, seeing it cannot be determined whether the king mentioned is "*the object conquering*," or "*the object conquered*." In like manner a woman may lose a woman; and therefore "*the loss of a woman*" is an ambiguous expression: and so of very many other instances.

We have observed, that there are two forms of the genitive case in English; the one of which may be called the preceding, and this by "*of*," the succeeding form. The use of the preceding form, prevents the ambiguity, above spoke of, in many instances; thus, "*a man's love—hate—fear*" are most commonly expressions of these passions considered in the person "*loving—bating—fearing*." Nevertheless there are several instances in which the expression by either form of the case is equally ambiguous; thus, "*such a man's deliverance*," usually means the state of the man who is delivered; but sometimes also the state of the man who delivers; so "*a man's pardon*," or "*the pardon of a man*," may either of them equally mean the pardon of the man who gives, or of the man who receives it. As the sign "*of*" is used, either to refer an object, which has an active state in it, to that which has in it the passive corresponding state, or an object which has a passive state in it, to that which has the active corresponding state in it; the substantives referred to each other by this sign must, in very many instances, be convertible. For when we say "*a field of corn*," for instance, the field is considered as "*the object producing*," and the corn as "*the object produced*;" and when we say "*the corn of a field*," the corn and the field are still in the same states; and the reference "*by—of*" proceeds upon the correlation formed by these states, whether the object in the active or passive state is first considered. But it frequently happens, that two substantives are conceived as in one kind of correlation, when they are taken in one order; and in another kind, when

when they are taken in the contrary order. Thus in the expression, "*the builder of a house*," "*the builder*" is "*the object building*," and "*the house*" is "*the object built*;" but in the expression, "*the house of a builder*," "*the house*" is considered as "*the object possessed*," and "*builder*" as "*the object possessing*;" and so of many other instances.

In order to determine when the substantives, connected by this sign, are convertible, and when not, the intent of the reference must be attended to. For if either substantive denote an object which is not observed to attend every object that may be denoted by the other, then either substantive will contract the extent of the signification of the other, by being made to depend upon each other by the sign of this case; but if the one object is observed to attend every other object denoted by the other substantive, it will answer no purpose to make the name of the former object depend upon that of the latter, either by the means of the sign "*of*," or by any other sign. Thus we may say "*a house of stone*," or "*the stone of a house*;" for a particular kind of house will be denoted by the first expression, and a particular sort or parcel of stone by the second. We may also say "*the door or windows of a house*," which will distinguish the door or windows spoke of from the door and windows of a ship's cabin, and from other sorts of doors and windows. But it is to no purpose to say "*a house of a door*," or "*of windows*;" because every house is supposed to have a door and windows in it.

It is usually laid down as a rule for the construction of substantives by this case, that they must signify different things or objects, which are united by the means of the genitive case; and it is true, that the substantives, joined by either form of the case, are much the most frequently the names of different objects. This comes to pass from the nature of the pairs of corresponding states, denoted by the correspondent active and passive forms of the same verb; for one of these states is much the most frequently observed

served in one object, and the other state in another object. But they may be both in one object, and frequently are so; and when this happens (as in the use of reciprocals) two names of the same object may be joined by the means of the genitive case. This appears in the expressions, "*an injurer—an extoller—a server*" "*—of himself:*" for in these instances, the same person is at once "*the object injuring—extolling—serving,*" and "*the object injured—extolled—served.*"

Hence, in some few instances, we find a name of species and a proper name, which are on many occasions either of them applied to denote one and the same object, united by the sign of this case; as, "*the city of London—of York,*" "*the town of Hull*" "*—of Newcastle,*" "*the palace of Whitehall,*" &c.; but in this mode of conception, "*the city*" is conceived to be the whole limit, within which the buildings and streets, called "*London*" and "*York,*" are comprehended, as "*the town*" is conceived to be the limit comprehending the building and streets of "*Hull*" and "*Newcastle;*" and "*the palace*" is conceived to comprehend the courts, gardens, &c. belonging to the building called "*Whitehall:*" and in this mode of conception, "*the object comprehending*" is referred to "*the object comprehended*" by the sign "*of,*" according to the general rule, although on other occasions the words "*London—York—Hull—Newcastle,*" or other proper names, may be respectively applied to denote the whole limits of London, York, or any other city; or of Hull, Newcastle, or any other town; or of Whitehall, or any other palace. Custom is divided, as to the application of the proper names of rivers by the sign "*of,*" for we sometimes say, "*the river of Thames*" "*—of Severn,*" and sometimes, "*the river Thames—Severn,*" &c.: in the first manner of expression, the river has been conceived to denote the bed or channel, and the proper names only the water or stream; so that the river is "*the object containing,*" and the Thames, Severn, &c. "*the object contained;*" and under this mode of conception, the sign "*of*" is

is applied according to the general rule: but in the second manner of expression, both the word river, and the proper names, "*Thames—Severn*," are conceived to denote the whole of one and the same object, without any pair of correlative states intervening, and consequently the names are joined by mere apposition, without the mediation of any sign.

The other instances in which two names of one and the same object appear in construction by the sign "*of*," occur only in the ludicrous, or familiar style: thus Mr. Pope says, "*allow him but his play-thing of a pen.*" *i. e.* which is made of a pen; and so the expressions, "*a jewel of a man*," "*a brute of a fellow.*"

I have hitherto considered the sign "*of*" as it is used in construction with two substantives: but it is likewise used to connect substantives in dependence upon adjectives.

This application of the sign depends upon the same principles, as the application of it depends, when used to connect substantives; for the reference by the sign is occasioned by a substantive contained in the adjective; thus, "*tall of stature—studious of elegance—fond of power*," are only "*tallness of stature —study of elegance—fondness of power*" made adjectives; and so of many other instances of like construction.

There are a kind of adjectives, called nouns partitive, to which the names of aggregate species, above spoke of, or the names of any species, or of individuals of species, if they are conceived to contain in them several portions, or subdivisions, are referred, on many occasions, by the sign "*of*:" "*all—some—both—either —neither—much—many—any—little—a little—few—a few*," &c. as likewise adjectives of the comparative and superlative degree, are used with substantives in this kind of construction. The relative pronouns, "*whosoever—whichever—whatsoever*;" and the interrogative pronouns, "*who*" and "*which*," with
 "whether"

“*whether*” and “*such*,” and several other words, which are usually called indefinites in grammar, take this sign before a substantive in dependence upon them.

As, “*all—some—any of this company,*” “*fewer—more—the most of this company,*” “*whosoever of this company,*” “*such of this company as can do so or so,*” “*who of this company can do so or so?*” &c.

This kind of construction is only an expeditious manner of expression, which takes for granted, that both the speaker and hearer knows of what objects the aggregate is composed, that is mentioned by a noun depending on the sign “*of*,” and which leaves the mind to supply a substantive name of one of these objects. Thus, the first instance above is equivalent to “*all the persons—some persons—any persons of this company;*” and so of other instances.

The reason why these adjectives and pronouns can be thus applied, and not others, is that they express certain circumstances which may attend the individuals of any object that consists of several individuals; and therefore the mind is left to supply the individuals, so as to suit any aggregate object that is mentioned with the sign “*of*” before the name of it; for of whatsoever kind these individuals may be, the circumstances denoted by the adjectives, or indefinites, above mentioned, may be applied to such individuals. This comes to pass from the nature of names of species, and of that of nouns of multitude; for were not one and the same name applicable to many individual objects, there could be no such words as “*any—every—many—some,*” &c. in language.

SECTION XVII.

Of the application of the sign "of" in construction with verbs.

AS every verb whatsoever denotes a state which may communicate immediately with some object denoted by a substantive, and this by mere position of the verb in dependence upon the substantive; there is no occasion to use any sign or preposition to particularize the mode of attention or operation, by which the mind carries any verbal state, either active or passive, into the name of an object with which either the active or passive verb immediately communicates. In like manner, when a verb transitive is expressed, there is no occasion for any sign or preposition in the English to direct the mind to understand the passive state corresponding with that of the transitive verb, and to place an object denoted by a substantive in that state; for the mere position of the substantive after the transitive verb is a direction to the mind to perform this operation, by the established custom of this language. But when this is done, the connexion can be carried no farther by the means of the corresponding pairs of states contained in the signification of the verb itself; for these pairs of states are already applied; the one being considered as in the object on the name of which the verb immediately depends, and the corresponding state in the object the name of which depends immediately upon the verb. If the passive form of a verb transitive is used, and a noun substantive is placed in dependence on it by the sign "by," the active corresponding state is applied to the object denoted by such substantive, and the connexion can be carried no farther by means of such corresponding active state. As for verbs neuter, they cannot be carried on to any object, by supplying a corresponding state, and placing such object in it; because these pairs of states
which

which are conceived to belong to verbs transitive, are not conceived to belong to verbs neuter.

Yet verbs transitive must be carried on in the application of language, to other objects besides those which have states in them immediately corresponding with these verbs; and likewise verbs neuter must be carried on to objects in dependence upon them; because the states denoted by verbs neuter may be considered as affecting other objects besides those in which the states themselves are observed to have their existence.

In order therefore to continue the connective power of the transitive verb beyond the object which immediately depends upon it, and likewise to add such connective power to the verb neuter, it is manifest that additional connective circumstances must be conveyed into such verbs, and these of different sorts, according as the nature or situation of the objects depending upon the same verb, are under different circumstances of connexion with either of the corresponding states of such verb. Thus in the expression, "*John borrowing money of James,*" John is "*the object borrowing,*" and money is "*the object borrowed;*" and this connexion between "*John*" and "*the money*" is determined by the two simple corresponding states, "*borrowing*" and "*borrowed.*" But if the connexion between "*the money*" and "*James*" be considered; as likewise the connexion between "*James*" and "*John;*" the money is "*the object borrowed of James,*" and James is "*the object borrowed of by John;*" which is to say, that the state, "*borrowed,*" is considered as a state of remotion or forsaking, and that James is the object whence this state is estimated.

Almost all the verbs neuter in English admit of passive forms, when additional connective circumstances are taken into them; as, "*to think of—to be thought of,*" "*to stand in—to be stood in,*" &c.

The connective circumstances which are to be thus united with verbs, are all given notice of by prepositions, and the preposition "*of*" is used in English to give notice of the existence of certain sorts of these circumstances along with certain sorts of verbal states. There is no danger of ambiguity in applying the same sign, which is used to connect substantives when under any kind of correlation, as a notice of the existence of certain sorts of connective states only, when this sign is placed in dependence upon verbs; for the different sorts of construction determine the different meaning of the sign in the two different applications of it, in the same manner as several verbs and substantives, which are the very same words both as to spelling and sound, have yet very different meanings, which can only be determined by the difference of construction in which they are placed on different occasions.

The mode of contemplation, or estimation, which is made the characteristic, attending upon all the connexions denoted by the sign "*of*," when in construction with verbs; is conceived to be that by which the mind carries on its attention from a verbal state to an object *out of which* something is deduced by that state. Hence the following sorts of verbs are found in construction with substantives depending on them by this sign.

1. Verbs of "*making—framing—composing*," and such like, require the sign "*of*" before the name of the material, out of which "*the making—framing*," &c. is conceived to deduce some other thing; as, "*made—framed—composed of timber—of clay*," &c.

2. Verbs denoting the exertion of the intellectual or discursive powers of the mind, such as "*to think—to speak—to bear—to tell*," &c. require the sign "*of*" before the name of the subject, out of which that which is "*thought—spoken*," &c. is deduced; as, "*to think so or so of such an affair—to bear or tell*
" *such*

"*such a story of such a man.*" This sense of the sign may be expressed by the word "*concerning.*"

3. Verbs of "*accusing—condemning—convicting—convincing,*" &c. require this sign before the name of the "*crime—fault—error,*" &c. whence the "*accusation—conviction,*" &c. is to be deduced.

4. Verbs of "*receiving—buying—borrowing—begging,*" or of any kind of getting which is not attended with compulsion or fraud, require the sign "*of*" before the name of the object whence any thing is got by the means of these verbal states; as, "*to take—win—earn—procure—such a thing of such a man.*"

5. But verbs of "*robbing—cheating,*" or of any kind of getting attended with compulsion or fraud, require the sign "*of*" before the name of that which is got from the object which is robbed or defrauded; as, "*to rob—plunder—deprive—trick—a person of such a thing.*"

Only the verbs, "*to steal—to pilfer,*" and some few others, require the sign "*from*" before the object whence any thing is got by stealing; as, "*to steal such a thing from such a person or place.*"

6. Verbs of lineal descent require the sign "*of*" before the name of the "*family, stock, house or lineage,*" whence, or out of which, the descent is considered as proceeding; as, "*to come—to be derived of such kindred—parents—race,*" &c.

The reciprocal pronouns, "*himself—herself—itself,*" frequently depend upon a verb by the sign "*of.*" This construction is used, when the power which occasions the verbal state is conceived to proceed from the object, on the name of which the verb depends, whilst the effect or consequence of the state appears

pears in the same object; as, "*such a man did or said this or that of himself,*" *i. e.* of his own motion; "*the glass broke of itself,*" *i. e.* without the intervention of any other agent.

The states, "*choice—necessity,*" and some others, are placed after verbs by the sign "*of,*" to denote that the verbal state is deduced from or out of these states denoted by substantives; as, "*he does it of choice—of necessity,*" &c.

The sign "*of*" was much used formerly to refer the state denoted by a verb passive, to the source or agent whence the state proceeds; as, "*lest a more honourable man than thou be bidden of him,*" New Testament. But the sign "*by*" is now constantly used for this reference; so that the clause above in modern English would be, "*lest a more honourable man than thou be bidden by him;*" and so of other instances.

SECTION XVIII.

Of the dative case.

THE noun substantive, with the sign "*to*" before it, is considered as of this case; and the general mode of conception denoted by the sign, whether placed in dependence upon a substantive, adjective, or verb, is similar to that by which the mind unites a moving object with the place, or other object whither the motion tends, and at which the moving object arrives.

States of approach, either of "*local motion,*" or of "*the attention,*" or of "*direction,*" are of consequence the most general states that require this sign in dependence upon them. The states of "*adding—giving—inclining—addressing—applying*"
"*—appro-*

"—*appropriating—comparing—proportioning,*" &c. which are usually called acquisitive states in grammar, are manifestly included in the former, and of consequence are capable of being referred by the sign "*to,*" so as to be connected with the name of the object, which they oblige the attention to close with in consequence of applying them; as, "*to add to a store—addition to a store,*" "*to apply to such a study—application to such a study*" "*—applicable to such a study,*" &c.

The expressions of such states as are mentioned above, whether by verbal, substantive, or adjective forms, equally admit of the sign "*to*" after them; but the verbs, "*to advantage—to harm*" "*or hurt—to injure—to benefit—to profit,*" and some others, are considered as transitive states of exertion, and consequently these verbal forms take an accusative case after them.

The substantives, "*advantage—disadvantage—benefit—profit*" "*—harm,*" &c. may be used in construction with a substantive, either in the genitive or dative case depending upon them; as, "*an advantage*" or "*disadvantage of or to such a man;*" but the adjectives which contain such substantives in their signification, require a substantive in the dative case only; as, "*advantageous—disadvantageous to such a man,*" or "*to such a cause.*"

A kind of adverbial expressions are frequently formed by means of the preposition "*to;*" as, "*foot to foot—face to face,*" "*an allowance to such a sum,*" "*it must be owed to the honour—disgrace, &c. of such a man,*" "*a man knows—sees, &c. to his cost—to the contrary, &c. there were to the number of so many,*" &c. These are elliptical expressions, in which a verbal state is understood which requires a reference by this sign; as, "*foot opposed to foot,*" "*an allowance amounting or extending to such a sum,*" "*tending or directing to the contrary;*" and so "*two—or ten—to one,*" meaning "*two or ten*" opposed in a wager or comparison to "*one.*"

SECTION XIX.

Of the accusative case.

THE noun in this case is of the same grammatic form in English with the nominative; but the personal pronouns, "*I—thou—he*," &c. and the relative pronoun, "*who*," have particular forms for this case different from the nominative; as "*me—thee—him—who*."

The noun in this case is distinguished by this certain mark, viz. that the object denoted by it has always in it the participial state that corresponds with the participial state in "*ing*" of some verb transitive, on which the noun depends. This has been fully shewn already in what is said of the nature of the signs of the cases of nouns in general.

The Latin and Greek languages have particular grammatic forms for almost all nouns in this case; which forms give notice that the object denoted by the noun has the passive state in it corresponding with the active state of some verb transitive that is mentioned in the sentence. This notice obliges the mind to look for such verb, in order to take the state corresponding with that contained in its signification, and to place the object denoted by the noun in this case, in such corresponding state.

The grammatic form of the case gives an opportunity, in these languages, of placing the noun under such form, in any part of the sentence; so that the noun in this case is often mentioned first, and the verb on which it depends concludes the period. But so long as such verb remains unmen-

tioned,

tioned, so long the operation which the sign of the case directs, remains unperformed, and of consequence the precise sense of the sign continues so long suspended. It is therefore a defect of perspicuity in these languages, that the noun in the accusative case does not follow the verb, on which it depends, as close as possible ; for the very people who spoke the languages must have been obliged to put them in this order in their own minds, before they could comprehend any sentence which was not very commonly and constantly used.

The same may likewise be observed concerning the placing the noun in the nominative case otherwise than before the verb that depends upon it ; for till such case is mentioned, the connective part of the signification of the verb which depends upon it, remains in suspense.

Now surely it may justly be questioned, whether any accession of harmony, or gracefulness of cadence, can make up for the defect of perspicuity occasioned in these languages, by placing the words, so far out of the order in which they must be placed in the mind in order to comprehend the meaning of them, as the words are placed in the most approved authors who have written in these languages.

Dr. Wallace will not allow that there are diversity of cases in English substantives. But this is only disputing about the name : for the force of the cases of the Greek and Latin substantives is, and must be, in every language whatsoever ; and the proceedings of the mind, when it applies a substantive in different kinds of connexions, must be distinguished into different sorts for the purposes of teaching. Now although the sign of the accusative case in English is usually mere position after a transitive verb, yet this position is a sign to direct the mind to proceed in a particular manner with the words connected in such position ;

and the termination of this case in Latin and Greek is no more than a direction to the same effect.

SECTIÓ N XX.

Of the vocative case.

A NOUN, with the particle “O!” before it, is considered as of this case; or without the particle, if what is said to be addressed to the object denoted by the noun. The demonstrative circumstance therefore attending the addressing of what is said, being added to any name, proper or appellative, makes the object denoted by that name, capable of being expressed by the noun in this case.

The object thus distinguished, is of itself a compleat object of the intellect; for the mind of the hearer can place it in the circumstance of “*being spoken to*,” by actually perceiving the demonstrative act of the speaker, and without any word being used on which the noun in this case must depend; and therefore an object, when expressed by a noun in this case, may alone be the subject of a sentence; and is frequently so in commands and entreaties; as in the instances, “*John, go to such a place—O! Sir, do me this favour*,” &c. Hence this case is in effect only a nominative case of the second person, and is therefore usually excluded out of the number of oblique cases, which must be used in dependence on some noun or verb.

SECTION XXI.

Of the ablative case.

THE six prepositions, "*from—by—with—in—for* and "*than*," are usually considered as signs of this case; nevertheless, "*than*" is a redditive conjunction rather than a preposition, as will appear when it is considered in particular.

"FROM."

This sign denotes a mode of estimation, which in its general nature is similar to that by which the mind refers a moving object to the place, or other object, whence the motion is directed.

The mode of attention denoted by this sign is of consequence the reverse of that denoted by the sign "*to*;" and therefore all kinds of states which the mind can consider, as forsaking one object and approaching another, may be referred to the object forsaken by the sign "*from*," and to the object approached by the sign "*to*;" and this, whether the states be denoted by nouns or verbs; as, "*a journey from such a place to such a place*;" "*a continuance from such a time to such a time*," "*to continue from such a time to such a time*."

Such states, as "*freedom—deliverance—exemption—abstinence—restraint*," &c. are usually referred by this sign to the objects whence these states are conceived to remove or withhold the objects in which the states are observed; as, "*freedom from labour—exemption from tribute*," &c. "*free from labour—exempt from tribute*," "*to free men from labour—to exempt them from tribute*," &c.

By an elliptical construction, this sign is placed before several adverbs and prepositions, which relate chiefly to place and time;

as, "*from above—from afar—from beneath—from below—from behind—from before—from far—from high—from on high—from without—from within—from amidst—from among—from beyond—from forth—from off—from out of—from under,*" and some others. That is to say, "*from some place above—from some time or place before.*" &c.

"BY."

The principal use of this sign has been already explained, viz. when placed after a verb of the passive form, to direct the mind to supply the active state corresponding with the state of the passive verb, and to place the object denoted by the substantive, which depends upon the sign, in such active corresponding state.

Thus in the expressions, "*John struck—injured—bated—by James—by the multitude—by himself;*" "*James—the multitude—or John himself*" is "*the object striking—injuring—bating,*" or "*the striker—injurer—bater,*" whilst John is "*the object struck—injured—bated.*"

The sign "*by*" is likewise used to refer verbal states, either of the active or passive form, to the names of objects which are made use of in regulating or conducting the states; as, "*to live—act—proceed by such a direction;*" "*to build by a plan—to judge by circumstances.*"

Hence many sorts of nouns expressing the order, course, or method, used in regulating or conducting continued action, take this sign before them; as, "*to advance by companies—by pairs—by dozens;*" "*to sell or buy by the ell—by the ounce;*" "*to travel by sea—by land—by night—by day;*" "*to fit by one's self.*"

The same noun is frequently twice repeated for this purpose, and the sign "*by*" placed between the two nouns; as, "*to examine an object limb by limb—point by point;*" "*to consider a book*"
"page

"*page by page—chapter by chapter;*" "*to search a place house by house;*" "*to pay sums year by year,*" &c. These are a kind of adverbial expressions of order.

In ~~like manner~~ the expressions, "*by such a time—by the time that such a thing is done—by this,*" without the word "*time;*" and others of like construction, are a kind of adverbs of time, denoting that the coming of the time spoken of, is when something else happens that is mentioned in the sentence.

The sign "*by*" is also used in solemn forms of adjuration or earnest entreaty, and is prefixed to the name of some object for which the person adjured or entreated is conceived to entertain the greatest regard; as, "*I adjure thee by the living God;*" "*I beseech you by all that is dear to you,*" &c.

" W I T H ."

This sign implies "*concomitancy;*" but, like all the other signs, leaves the mind to specify what it implies in general, by attending to the nature of the states and objects denoted by the verbs and nouns, with which it is placed in construction.

All verbs active denoting such states as admit of an instrument, being used in effecting what is produced or accomplished by the state, as likewise the passive forms correspondent to such verbs active, take the name of the instrument in dependence upon them by the sign "*with;*" as, "*to work—to be wrought with a tool,*" "*to write—to be written with a pen.*"

Some verbs neuter take the sign "*with*" in the like construction; as, "*to point with a rod—to look at an object with a telescope:*" but much the greatest number of verbs neuter, take the sign "*by*" after them in this reference; as, "*to fall by the sword—to perish by the hand of an enemy,*" &c.

States of "*contending—striving—vying*," and such like, whether expressed by nouns or verbs, are referred to the object which is the opposite, or antagonist, in the state, by the sign "*with*;" as, "*a struggle—contest with such a man*," "*to struggle*" "*—to contend with such a man*," &c.

The state of concomitancy which attends all situations of mutual intercourse, is given notice of by this sign after any expression, whether noun or verb, of such situation; as, "*conversation with such a man*," "*to converse—live—eat—drink with such people*."

The states of "*sharing—partaking—dividing—mixing—compounding*," and others of a like nature, take this sign to connect the state with one of the objects that is equally concerned with others in such states; as, "*to share—partake of—mix such a thing with others*," &c.

Some particular quality or circumstance considered as a concomitant of another state, is frequently united with such state by the sign "*with*;" as, "*to go with speed—to labour with diligence*."

The English adverbs which end in "*ly*," usually express the quality or circumstance contained in their signification under the same connexion as that which is denoted by this sign; thus, "*to go with speed*" is of the same import with "*to go speedily*," "*to labour with diligence*" with "*to labour diligently*;" and so of other instances.

The states of "*being satisfied—dissatisfied—pleased—displeased—wearied—refreshed—loaded—beset*," and several others, are referred by the sign "*with*" to the name of the object which is conceived to be a kind of adjunct to the state; as, "*tired with labour—pleased with trifles—beset with danger*."

"*With*"

"*With*" has also a signification denoting the objects upon or amongst which some other object has an influence; as, "*to have interest—credit—authority, &c. with such a man—with such a company.*"

"*But interest is her name with men below.*" Dryden.
i. e. amongst men below.

As "*with*" in all its senses implies some kind of concomitancy, it is sometimes used to express such a state estimated by the life or duration of some particular object; as,

"*With her they flourish'd, and with her they die.*" Pope.
Sometimes "*with*" is used to give notice, that as soon as one thing came to pass, another also was done; as,

"*With this he pointed to his face.*" Dryden.
i. e. as soon as this came to pass he pointed, &c.

" I N."

The general mode of attention given notice of by this sign, is similar to that which is used when the situation of one object is determined by another that extends either on all sides, or on several sides of it.

As, "*a man in a house—a horse in a field—this happened in such a month—year,*" &c.

But we commonly say, "*on such a day—and at such a time.*"

All sorts of states which can be supposed to continue for a time, may be united by this sign with the object which is conceived to have passed the beginning of such time, and not to have come to the end of it at the time referred to, under the influence of these states; as, "*to be in joy—sorrow—prosperity—adversity,*" &c. "*to have been in pain—sickness—transport—in arms—in a confederacy—in a conspiracy,*" &c.

Any "*object contained*" may be referred to "*the object containing*" by this sign, as well as by the sign "*of;*" for the state of "*being contained*" may be considered as one sort of "*being encompassed*." Hence the part is frequently referred to its whole, and the accident to its subject, by this sign, as well as by "*of;*" as "*chapter of or in such a book;*" "*the spirit—virtue—sense of or in such a man.*"

This sign is frequently used in expressions of some rate or proportion, when that rate is considered as analogous to some two numbers or quantities, the less of which is contained in the bigger; as, "*five in the hundred—sixpence in the pound.*"

Some expressions equivalent to adverbs are also formed by this sign; as, "*in all likelihood—in reason—in all reason—in justice.*"

In solemn forms of denunciation, the name of the object on the power or influence whereof the effect of what is denounced is conceived to depend, has this sign prefixed to it; as, "*in the name of God let us do so or so.*"

" ———In the power of us, the tribunes,

" We banish him."

Shakesp. *Coriolanus.*

" F O R."

This sign directs to "*the final cause,*" that is to say, to the object which rational agents consider in such a mode of estimation, that they are influenced to put themselves or others into particular states on account thereof. The same sign likewise directs to any object, "*on account of which,*" some object or state appears to be suitable or unsuitable, ready or unready, &c. The name of any quality, state, or circumstance, on account of which objects become regarded or disregarded, approved or censured, &c. likewise appears with the sign "*for*" before it; and in general, whatsoever is considered as "*the reason why*" things are so or so, may

may be placed in dependence upon this sign. Instances of the sign applied in the first of the significations above mentioned, ~~are~~ in such phrases as the following; “*to work for hire—to fight for honour—to serve for another—to go for such a person*” or *thing—to stand for a price.*” &c.

In the second signification, in such phrases as “*convenient—inconvenient for the summer—for the winter—for the sea,*” “*advantageous—disadvantageous for such a purpose—prepared—unprepared for such an event,*” &c.

In the third signification, in the phrases, “*praised—admired for goodness—gracefulness,*” &c.; “*contemned—detested for cruelty,*” &c.; “*remembered—remarked for singularity,*” &c.

The fourth signification may be considered as including all the foregoing, and extending to many other instances. Thus the price of a thing may be considered as “*the reason why*” the thing is parted with, and the thing may be considered as “*the reason why*” the price is given. Hence the expressions, “*to buy or sell such a thing for so much—to pay so much for such a thing,*” &c. Any thing laid by way of wager may also be considered as “*the reason why*” that is insisted upon to be so or so, on which the wager is laid. Hence come the expressions, “*such a thing is or will be so and so for such a sum;*” as likewise expressions of the following form; “*for all his cunning he has been outwitted—I cannot do it for my life.*”

“A paltry ring, whose poetry was

“For all the world like Cutler’s poetry.” *Shakespeare.*

i. e. though all his cunning has been at stake; though my life were at stake; as like as if all the world were at stake on the exactness of the likeness.

An object is frequently considered as of a particular species, and proceeded with in a particular manner, on account of its
O being

being of such a species. The sign "*for*" is prefixed to the name of the species, or sometimes to the proper name of an object, having properties in it, "*on account of which*" an object ~~is~~ by another name is conceived or treated in a particular manner; as, "*I took you for such a person—let him go for a rogue—he dies for a deserter.*"

The adverbial expressions, "*for me—as for you—as for such a person or thing;*" as likewise, "*for certain—for sure—for dead,*" &c. are formed on a mode of conception similar to that on which the expressions last mentioned above are formed. For the person denoted by "*me—you,*" or the person or thing denoted by any other name, is considered in some particular respect when such name is placed in this kind of construction; and this respect is considered as the reason why the person or thing is proceeding, or treated in some particular manner. The state, "*on account of which,*" some object is affected or regarded in a particular manner, is frequently understood, whilst some noun substantive, with the sign "*for*" before it, corresponds with what is understood; as, "*I am for you,*" *i. e.* ready or prepared for you; "*it is for kings—for ministers to consult the public good,*" *i. e.* to consult the public good is "*fit—proper—right, for kings,*" &c.; "*Jove was for Venus—Aristotle is for poetic justice—he is all for such a thing,*" *i. e.* disposed in favour towards it.

An object which is the end or purpose of whatsoever is entered upon, may take the sign "*for*" before it under such consideration. Hence the name of a place whither it is proposed to go, frequently depends upon this sign; as, "*we sailed for Genoa——,*" Addison; "*whither are you for?*" &c. The sign "*for,*" when placed with names of time, bears a meaning different from that which it bears when placed with other kinds of nouns, seeing it has the signification of "*during, or quite through,*" the period of time that is mentioned;

25, " *hired for life—or for the term of life—engaged for a year*
 " *—borrowed for a month,*" &c.

" THAN."

~~This~~ particle is only used in expressions of comparison in which there are two parts : being prefixed to that part of the expression which contains in it the object or state, with respect to which the excess or diminution is estimated ; as, " *John is more or less skilful than James—I never was more or less pleased than at such a time or place—he is wiser than to do or say so.*"

In the first of these expressions it is manifest, that there are three affirmations ; for it is asserted, that James has some degree of skill as well as John ; and upon comparing the degrees of skill which each of them have, it is then asserted, that John's degree exceeds James's.

And so in the second expression it is asserted, that the person denoted by " *I*" was pleased in some degree at the particular time referred to ; it is also asserted, that the same person has been pleased in other degrees at other times ; and then it is asserted that none of these degrees were greater or less than the degree specified by the particular time in which it was perceived.

There are three assertions also implied in the third instance. For it is supposed, that " *to do so*" shews want of wisdom in a certain degree in any one who " *does so* ;" then it is asserted, that the person denoted by " *he*" has wisdom in a certain degree ; and from these two degrees compared together, it is inferred, in the last place, that the degree of wisdom which the person has, places him beyond the want of the degree first supposed.

There are several verbs which denote states that are first conveyed to the mind in consequence of a comparison made between

two objects; some excess or defect of the one with regard to the other, considered as possessed or some way shewn, constituting the verbal state. This appears in the verbs, "*to outstrip—to overtop—to undersell,*" and several others. These verbs may of consequence connect two objects, so as to supply the place of the sign "*than*" by the nature of the states which they respectively denote; for the two objects, joined by such a verbal state, are, by such junction, shewn each of them as in the state, but in different degrees of it. Thus in the expression, "*virtue excels riches,*" the excess of the degree of worth observed in virtue above the degree of worth observed in riches, is attended to; and the state of possessing such excess, is denoted by a verb, and virtue is considered as in that verbal state. And hence the expression, "*virtue excels riches,*" is equivalent to "*virtue is more excellent than riches;*" i. e. to the expression, "*virtue has more excellence in it than riches have.*" Any other expression, formed by one of the above-mentioned verbs, or by other verbs of a like signification, may be resolved in the same manner.

When any clause, or sentence, is expressed at large, in which the sign "*than*" is concerned, there are always two verbal states concerned; for it is the possession or the exertion, of some power or quality by each of the objects compared, that gives occasion to the comparison; and this state of possession, or exertion, must always be denoted by a verb.

If one and the same form of the same verb (supposing it to be repeated in each of the members of the clause which are joined by "*than*") will express the state of each of the objects which are compared, there is no absolute occasion to mention the verb twice. But if one and the same form of the same verb will not express the state of each of the objects compared; either two different forms of the same verb must be mentioned, or two different verbs must be used in the comparison. Thus the expressions, "*John*
"*is*

" *is wiser—taller—richer than James: or less wise—less tall*
 " *—less rich than James;*" if set down at large, amount to the
 same as, "*John is wiser or less wise, &c. than James is.*" But
 there is not an absolute necessity that the latter verb "*is*" should
 be set down, because it is taken for granted, that "*the present*
 "*state of being,*" both of James and John, is intended to be
 compared, and that with regard to the degree of wisdom, &c.
 which each of them possesses. But if the state of John is to be
 compared as it is at one time, with his state as it is at another,
 or with the state of any object as it is at another time, although
 it be with regard to the possession or the exertion of some power
 or quality, which may be denoted by the same name as at diffe-
 rent times in each of the objects; either two different forms of
 the same verb, or two different verbs must be used; as in the
 instances, "*John is more or less rich than he has been—than James*
 "*will be;*" "*John has done more good than you imagine.*"

For in these instances, the states compared are conceived to
 exist at different times, and this difference of time must be
 expressed by different forms, either of the same or of diffe-
 rent verbs.

If some circumstance, attending two different verbal states,
 is compared, it is manifest that two different verbs must be men-
 tioned to denote these states; as in the expressions, "*John reads*
 "*more than he understands—James writes more than John will*
 "*read,*" &c.

Now in the first instance, where it is not absolutely necessary
 that the verb should be repeated, the Latins frequently place the
 name of the second object in the comparison in the ablative case,
 and the Greeks in the genitive; as, "*Johannes sapientior est*
 "*Jacobo—Iωάννης φρονιμώτερος ἐστὶν Ἰακώβῳ.*" As therefore the
 English particle "*than*" supplies the power of the reference by
 the ablative case in Latin, in this one instance, after words of the
 comparative

comparative degree, it has been also considered as the sign of the ablative case.

But it is plain, that “*than*” is in its nature a redditive conjunction, giving notice of some second sentence expressing that, with which something contained in a former sentence is compared; and if both the sentences are not expressed at length, directing the mind to supply them.

This shews, that the nature of the sign of a case has been properly ascertained in what has been said of the signs of cases in general; for it is the particular mode of estimation, in which the object “*James*” is to be taken, that is given notice of by the sign of the ablative case in Latin, and by that of the genitive in Greek. But the circumstance which is to be supplied by this mode of estimation, cannot be ascertained, unless some quality, which may be expressed by an adjective, unites with some other object besides *James*, and that in a different degree, and at the same time; and therefore it is to no purpose to use the mode of estimation where there are not materials given, proper to apply it upon.

When both the sentences are expressed at length, containing two expressions of the two conceptions which are compared together, the Latins used “*quam*,” and the Greeks “*η*,” to denote the reference of the one sentence to the other: or if the names of the objects to be compared are both in the same case, and one of the sentences is left to be supplied, the words “*quam*,” and “*η*,” are also used to denote the reference; as,

“*Johannes est sapientior quam Jacobus est, or quam Jacobus.*—
“*Ιωαννης εστι φρονιμωτερος η Ιακωβος εστι, or η Ιακωβος.*”

I proceed to treat of the articles which are usually treated of in the practical grammars of most languages before noun substantives; because examples of the declensions of substantives cannot

cannot conveniently be given without them. But as their nature and use cannot be understood, without some knowledge of the ~~of~~ species, and of appellative substantives, to which they properly belong, I have reserved them for this place.

S E C T I O N XXII.

Of the article.

AS every appellative substantive is a name applicable to all the individuals of a whole species, considered as one complex object; as also to each single individual of the species; it has been found expedient in many languages to give notice when the appellative is applied in its less extensive significations; and this, by prefixing certain particles to it, denoting that its general signification is to be limited in a less or greater degree.

The particles which are used for this purpose in the English language are, “*a*” or “*an*” and “*the*,” which, by the writers on grammar, are called articles.

“*A*” or “*an*” is called the indefinite article. They are both of the same signification, only differing in this, that “*a*” is prefixed to such substantives as begin with a consonant, “*an*” to such as begin with a vowel, or an “*h*” sounded softly; as, “*a man—a horse—an angel—an hour.*” “*The*” is called the definite article, and is equally applicable to appellatives that begin with a vowel or a consonant; as, “*the man—the horse—the angel—the hour.*”

As both the articles imply, that the speaker intends to use the appellative substantive to which they are prefixed, with some degree of limitation: whensoever such substantive is used in its most extensive signification, it is usually applied without
any

any article, either indefinite or definite, prefixed to it; as,
 "Man, when considered in himself, is a very wretched being."

Addison, *Spectator*. 44.

i. e. mankind in general, when &c.

But it is to be observed, that the most extensive signification of the names of many species, when these names are used without an article, is, by the established custom of this language, given notice of by placing the name of the species in the plural number.

The names of the several species of brute animals are thus used; as, "*horses, oxen, sheep are useful creatures.*" Also of trees, when not spoken of as cut for timber; as, "*oaks, elms, basses, &c. grow here.*" Also of plants which are named from their flowers; as, "*violets, primroses, lilies, are here planted together,*" *i. e.* the plants on which those flowers grow. And of the plants which produce the several kinds of pulse; as, "*beans, pease, vetches, grow in this field.*"

Also the names of the works of art, if the names of their species have the plural number; as, "*towns, houses, instruments, and utensils are great conveniencies of life.*"

On the contrary, proper names, when applied as such, *i. e.* so as to denote particular individuals, admit of no farther limitation, and consequently take no article before them.

Of the indefinite article in particular.

THE indefinite article gives notice that the substantive to which it is prefixed, denotes one object of its species considered as in some state, situation, or circumstance, in which other objects of the species are or may be equally concerned; as, "*a son of James*" denotes that the speaker means "*one son of James,*" but

but is sensible that there are, or may be, more sons than one who stand in the same relation to James. So "*a man who came to-day*," denotes only one man who came to-day; but gives notice, that there may be also other men who came to-day, besides the man that is spoken of.

There are two principal cases which occur in the use of this article,

For either the species may be ascertained, to which the individual object belongs, to the name of which this article is prefixed, whilst the object itself is not ascertained.

Or an individual may be ascertained, or some species in which it is found may be known, and the name of some other species, to which it equally belongs, not ascertained.

1. In the first case the article may bear the sense of "*every one*," or "*any one*," or "*some one*," or of "*one not particularly known or observed*," according as the nature of the state or condition is, in which the indefinite individual of the known species is considered.

If the state or condition in which the indefinite individual is considered be such as is common to all the individuals of the known species, they are of consequence all of them in the same state at the same time with any one individual of the species. Therefore in such a case, any one may represent all or every one of the species; as in the following instance,

"Why should a dog, a horse, a rat, have life,

"And thou no breath at all?"

Shakeſp. Lear.

i. e. every dog, every horse, &c. or all dogs, all horses, &c.

If the state or condition in which the indefinite individual is, be such as every individual of the species is capable of being in, but is not always or habitually in, then the indefinite individual may be "*any one*" object of the known species; as,

" ——— That a brother should

" Be so perfidious!"

Shakesp. Tempest.

i. e. that any brother &c.

As every individual of the known species is supposed to be capable of being in the state mentioned in this instance, whilst no more than one is conceived to be actually in it: if we substitute in its place a state of such a nature as every individual is capable of being in, and more than one may actually be in, but either all of them or not: in this case, "*every*," or "*any*," may either of them be substituted for the indefinite article; as,

" A reader, who knows the strength of the English tongue, will
" be amazed," &c.

Addison, Spectat. No. 357.

i. e. every reader, or any reader.

For in this case, the mind is at liberty either to make the indefinite object stand for every object that is in the state, or for any one that shall happen to be in it.

In this case, the definite article may be substituted for the indefinite; as, "*the reader who knows*," &c. The reason of this will be given in what is said of the definite article.

If the state is conceived to depend on some contingency, or on some determination which is not made, but is to be made, the indefinite individual is "*some one*" of the known species; as,
" Diogenes being in quest of an honest man, sought for him,
" when it was broad day, with a lanthorn and candle."

Spectat. No. 354.

i. e. in quest of some one honest man.

If the indefinite individual is supposed to be determined, but the determinate object to be unknown to, or unobserved by, those who are conversing about it, any farther than to distinguish that it is one individual of the known species; no other word can be substituted instead of the indefinite article. But the sense of it may be expressed by "*one of that species, each of which is called a ———,*" and then mentioning the name of the species; as, "He had ordered one of his servants, who was placed behind a screen, to write down their table-talk." *Spectat. i. e.* behind one of that species of things, each of which is called a screen. So "*you sent a man to me to-day,*" *i. e.* one of that species, each one of which is called a man.

After the words, "*not—scarce—hardly,*" and other diminutives, this article has the signification of "*one;*" as,

"When the butt is out, we will drink water.

"Not a drop before."

Shakeſp. Tempeſt.

i. e. not one drop.

As also in all other expressions which shew that some other number of objects is equally capable, or equally likely to be in some state, as only one and no more; as,

"We gave the children an apple or two a-piece."

i. e. one apple or two a-piece."

In all the uses of the indefinite article which have been mentioned hitherto, the species of the indefinite object is ascertained, but the individual object is not so.

2. On the contrary, it frequently happens that an individual object is known, whilst some species, to which it belongs, is

not so to the hearer. The indefinite article is used in this case also, being placed before the name of the species to which the known individual is referred by the speaker, to shew that it is one individual among others of that species; as when one person shews a thing to another and says, "*this is a grammar*," (for instance) *i. e.* this is one of the things which have in them that set of properties which constitute the characteristic of the species grammar.

When an indefinite individual is known to belong to one species, and is discovered by the speaker to have likewise in it the set of properties which constitute the characteristic of another species; the speaker mentions the object by the name of the known species first, and then refers it to the other species to which he perceives it belongs; prefixing this article to the name of both the species; as, "*a man is a reasonable animal*." Now the state denoted by "*reasonable animal*" being common to all the individuals of the species "*man*," all the individuals of the species are in the state at the same time. Therefore, by the first instance of the former case, "*every*" may be here substituted for the indefinite article seeing. Every man is a reasonable animal; that is, every man is one individual of that species, each one of which is called "*a reasonable animal*."

As this article, in all its acceptations, denotes that the mind considers one individual object, but considers it as someways equally concerned with others of the same species, it is manifest that it cannot be applied to names of the plural number.

Of the definite article in particular.

THE definite article is used to give notice that the appellative to which it is prefixed, denotes an object considered as in some state, situation, or circumstance, by which it is, or may be distinguished

distinguished from every other object that is denoted by the name of the same species.

An object may be distinguished on several accounts, so as to require that this article shall be prefixed to the appellative by which it is denoted,

For the distinction may arise from the manner in which the speaker conceives the object, and chuses to express it.

Or from some fixed relation which it bears to some certain object, or to some species of objects.

Or from some previous knowledge which the hearer is known, or supposed, to have of it.

As the mind is at liberty to consider a whole species as one complex object, this article is often applied to give notice that the name of the species denotes such complex object; as,

“The woman is the glory of the man.”

i. e. the species, “*woman is the glory of the species—man.*”

“The horse is a noble animal.”

i. e. the species, “*horse,*” is one of the sorts contained in the species, “*noble animal.*”

Seeing “*the glory of the man*” denotes a state common to all women; and “*noble animal*” denotes a state common to all horses: the indefinite article may be substituted for the definite article thus applied, by the first instance given above of the use of the indefinite article; as,

“A woman is the glory of a man.”

“A horse is a noble animal.”

Or the appellative, in its most general signification, may be substituted instead of the definite expression; as,

“Woman

" Woman is the glory of man."

Or,

" Women are the glory of men."

" Horses are noble animals."

If the state is not such as is common to all the individuals of the known species, but is yet such a state as is, or may be, common to many of them: the mind may consider all to whom it is common as one definite object, and express it accordingly; as,

" The man who says the world was made by chance, is void of observation and judgment."

But in this case, either the indefinite article, or the words "*every*" or "*any*," may be substituted instead of the definite article; for this is the same case with that of the second instance of the second case of the use of the indefinite article; as,

" A man, or any, or every man who says" &c.

When the distinction of the definite object arises from some fixed relation which it bears to some certain object, or sort of objects; if the definite object is of the singular number, the whole expression will be of the nature of a proper name; as,

" The statue at Charing-Cross."

" The doctrine of the apostles."

If the definite object is of the plural number, it will be one certain set contained in the species, to the name of which the definitive article is prefixed; as,

" The monuments in Westminster abbey."

" The sayings of the seven wise men."

When the object is defined by some previous knowledge, which the hearer is known, or supposed, to have of it; this knowledge may arise from various circumstances.

For

For the object may have been present to the speaker's senses, or may have been particularly described to him at some particular time, or in some particular place. Or some known intention may be entertained concerning it; as,

“ The horse which you saw in Smithfield—were told of yesterday—intend to go to see to-morrow.”

Or it may be such, that the hearer may be supposed to know it to be the only one, or the only set, of its kind; as,

“ The king—the duke—the prophets—the apostles,” meaning “ the present king of England—the Duke of Cumberland—the prophets of the Old Testament—the apostles of the New,” &c.

Or it may be an object of the superlative degree, of which there can be but one individual, or one set, in a species; as,

“ He is the greatest king in Europe—they were the best men of the age.”

The superlative by “*most*” is often used with the indefinite article; as, “*a most excellent judge*,” &c. When the superlative is thus used, it means only a very great degree of excess, and not the greatest degree of all. The object may also have been mentioned before in the discourse (as is the case of the words, “*the object*,” in this sentence) which may give the previous knowledge.

Or, lastly, the custom of the language may prefix this article to words of certain grammatical forms, to give notice of a particular kind of conception which the words of those forms do not so fully denote, when used without the article.

This is the use which this article is put to, when it stands before participles, to distinguish their objective from their contributive capacity; as, “ *the going—the having flood,*” &c. For an account of these capacities of the participles, consult the account which is given of the verb.

A Speculative Grammar.

B O O K II.

S E C T I O N I.

Of the noun adjective.

NOUN adjectives are the names of abstract conceptions, similar to those which are denoted by substantives; only these adjective names give express notice, that no principle of separate existence is to be attended to, in whatsoever is denoted by any of them.

As the nature of this part of speech has been explained, in a great measure, in what is said of the noun and verb in general, little more remains to be done concerning it, except to shew how the mind proceeds in applying an adjective conception, so as to incorporate it with some other conception, on the name, or expression whereof the adjective depends.

Now it is evident that an adjective never requires the sign of an oblique case, or other preposition, to shew the nature of its dependence on the word, or expression, with which it unites. The reason of this is, that an adjective always expresses the conception of a mere circumstance considered as incapable of existing
Q otherwise

otherwise than in union with the being of some object, or state; which must be expressed by some objective word different from the adjective. There is therefore no occasion to give notice, by any sign, when an adjective denotes a mere circumstance of some capital object, or verbal state; because, when used in its adjective capacity, it never denotes any thing but such a circumstance.

Hence it comes to pass, that an adjective may, on very many occasions, be substituted for some oblique case of a substantive, which substantive contains in its signification the object from which the adjective conception is taken, or into which the adjective conception may be resolved. Thus for instance,

"*A horse of speed—strength—spirit,*" is equivalent to

"*A speedy—strong—spirited horse.*"

"*A disposition to goodness,*" to "*a good disposition.*"

"*The æra from Christ,*" to "*the Christian æra.*"

"*Revels by night,*" to "*nightly revels.*"

"*Operation with an instrument,*" to "*instrumental operation.*"

"*A man in drink,*" to "*a drunken man.*"

"*A horse for service,*" to "*a serviceable horse,*" &c. &c.

If therefore a noun substantive in an oblique case may be properly called a noun; an adjective may be called a noun with equal propriety. And it has been doubtless from considering adjectives in some such manner as this above, that the antient grammarians have conceived them to be a kind of nouns, and have included them and substantives in the same part of speech.

Many grammarians seem to have entertained an opinion, that an adjective and a participle might be properly considered as of one and the same part of speech. But the participle is as properly a verb, as any other verbal form is; for it expresses a state which depends on an inconstant principle of existence. Whereas,

an adjective gives express notice, that no principle of existence is to be attended to in that which is denoted by it. The participle also unites with the object, or state, on which it depends, without requiring any intermediate state or circumstance to be supplied in the mind; as for instance, if the object, "*a man*," or any "*other object*," have the participles, "*seeing—moving—resting*," &c. made dependent on its name; such man, or other object, becomes of the species, "*seer—mover—rester*," &c. that is to say; the participial states coalesce so intimately with the object which is in the states, that the mind of man cannot conceive any intermediate state, or circumstance, as the means of coalescence: and therefore substantive names of species are formed directly from the verbal states, and every object which is in one of these states passes into a corresponding species, and may be called by the name of such species, if such name be in the language; as, "*seer—mover—rester*," in the examples above. But nothing of this kind ensues when an adjective, or the oblique case of a substantive, is made dependent on another substantive, or on a verb. For when this is done, some connective state or circumstance is always to be supplied in the mind as the means of coalescence. Thus,

"*A horse of speed*," or "*a speedy horse*," are expressions equivalent to "*a horse having speed*;" "*a disposition to goodness*," to "*a disposition inclining to goodness*;" "*the æra from Christ*," to "*the æra computed from Christ*;" "*revels by night*," to "*revels carried on by night*;" "*instrumental operation*," to "*operation performed with an instrument*;" "*a drunken man*," to "*a man often disordered by being in drink*;" "*a horse for service*," to "*a horse proper for service*;" and so of all other instances of construction by adjectives, or by the oblique cases of substantives.

It follows from these observations, that the kind of connexion which is between an object, and the state denoted by a participle depending upon the name of such object, cannot be expressed

by an adjective; but that many of the connexions denoted by a substantive in some oblique case, may be expressed by an adjective; so that adjectives and participles are essentially different from each other, although they have so near a resemblance in their grammatic forms, especially in the Latin and Greek; for in these languages they are varied in grammatic gender, number, and case, as adjectives are varied.

It is manifest that the judgment must be exerted before any adjective can be joined consistently with the word on which it depends; for every adjective cannot coalesce with every substantive; nor can any rules be given to shew what substantives, or verbs, a particular adjective may depend upon.

The reason or judgment, therefore, of the speaker must solely determine this; as indeed it must determine, on every addition which is made to a connected series of words, whether such addition is consistent, or not consistent, with the rest. But this one direction may be given concerning the use of adjectives, viz. that no adjective can be placed consistently in dependence upon a substantive, which takes its characteristic from the quality which the adjective denotes: nor with a substantive which takes its characteristic from the very contrary of such quality. Thus the expressions, "*good goodness—wicked wickedness,*" are absurd; because the object, "*goodness,*" takes its character of distinction from the quality, "*good,*" and *wickedness,*" from the quality, "*wicked;*" so that it is mere waste of words to represent the former as "*good,*" and the latter as "*wicked.*" And on the other hand, "*wicked goodness—good wickedness,*" are absurd expressions; because the quality "*wicked*" cannot unite with its contrary, nor the quality "*good*" with its contrary.

This shews that the conception denoted by one and the same adjective is modified in the mind, so as to suit the nature of every different object, or state, upon the name of which such adjective

tive is made to depend. Thus in the expressions, "*a good man—
a good horse—a good house—a good voyage—a good dish of meat,*" the quality denoted by "*good*" is as different as the nature of the objects to which the same adjective is applied. But every adjective may depend consistently upon the substantive, "*thing*," because this substantive may be applied as a name to any object whatsoever, and some object or other will admit of any conceivable quality to be united with it. This clearly shews why the conception, denoted by an adjective, cannot be of itself the object of the mind's contemplation. For as such conception represents nothing which is conceived to have any principle of existence in it, the conception denoted by the same adjective must be varied, upon every application of it, so as to represent a quality that is capable of uniting with each object, or state, on the name of which the adjective depends, agreeably to the nature of such object, or state.

Adjectives are seldom (if ever) used in immediate dependence upon transitive verbs; because adjectives express qualities which unite in the "*being*" of objects, as the characters of inferior sorts of a species; (as, "*good man—tall man—lame man,*" are a kind of names of so many inferior sorts of the species, "*man*;") and such qualities cannot be considered as the modifications of transitive states, but of the same "*being*," by which these states themselves exist. Hence the forms of the verb "*to be*" take all sorts of adjectives in dependence upon them; as, "*to be good—to have been great—being prudent—having been prudent,*" &c.

I have hitherto considered the word on which an adjective depends, without any regard to the dependence which such word may have upon other words; nevertheless, the word on which an adjective depends, may itself, together with its adjective, have every kind of dependence upon some other words, which it might have had if the adjective had not been joined with it. For the quality denoted by an adjective, when united with a
substantive,

substantive, must be such as the nature of the object denoted by the substantive admits of being united in its existence. So that the complex object, denoted by the substantive and adjective taken together, becomes of the nature of an object denoted by a single substantive as its name. Therefore every complex conception so denoted, may be considered as that of a mere circumstance of some other object, or verbal state; just as it might be if it were denoted by one noun substantive: and therefore the same signs which give notice when single substantives are to be considered as denoting mere circumstances, may also give notice when a substantive, with an adjective depending upon it, denotes a mere circumstance. If an adjective depends upon a verb, the adjective conception still adapts itself to the nature of the state with which the quality unites that is denoted by the adjective; and therefore the state denoted by a verb with an adjective depending upon it, retains its communicable nature: and of consequence unites with objects in the same manner as it would have done if it could have been expressed by a single verb.

Hence it evidently follows, that grammatic distinctions of case, gender, and number, in adjectives, are no ways necessary to ascertain the nature of the qualities which adjectives denote. For no object or state can be conceived to admit of qualities that are inconsistent with its nature: so that of whatsoever number or gender any object is in itself, of the same it must continue, whatsoever other qualities are ascribed to it that are consistent with its nature. Such expressions as "*a female male—a single men,*" may indeed be put together, but the contradictory nature of the parts of these expressions appears at first sight. And those objects, from whence the abstract conceptions denoted by adjectives are usually derived, continue in themselves of the same gender and number, whatsoever be the gender or number of the object to which the adjective conceptions are applied. Thus in the expressions, "*a British king—a British queen—the British empire,*" the object, "*Britain,*" from whence
"*British*"

“*British*” is derived, continues always of the neuter gender : and in the expressions, “*British kings—British queens*,” the object, “*Britain*,” is still of the singular number. As to Case, I have shewn above, that whatsoever unites with the nature and being itself of any object, makes the whole one complex object ; so that one part thereof cannot stand in one kind of connexion, and another part in another, with any third object, or with any verbal state. And therefore there is no need for a particular direction added to an adjective, to shew that it stands in the same relation to some word, as the substantive or verb does, on which the adjective depends. Therefore the grammatic variations of case, gender, and number, add nothing to the signification of adjectives ; and for this reason, the English adjectives have no such grammatic variations.

This want of variation in the adjectives of this language makes it necessary to place every adjective as close as possible, either before, or behind the substantive on which it depends, or, if it depends upon a verb, as close behind such verb as possible. For were it otherwise, when more substantives than one are in a sentence, or more verbs than one, it might not be easy, or perhaps not possible, to determine which substantive or verb the adjective should be immediately joined with ; and, if several adjectives and several substantives are in a sentence, the ambiguity would be still greater. Whereas, in the Latin and Greek, the termination of an adjective compared with the terminations of the substantives in the sentence, usually shews with which it is to be united. This gives an opportunity in these languages for a greater diversity of order in placing words in series, than the English will admit of. But when all is done, the mind must consider the adjective and its substantive in one view, before it can apprehend the complex object which is denoted by them both together ; and therefore it may justly be questioned, whether placing the one so far from the other, as they are frequently placed in Latin and Greek, does not sometimes occasion obscurity.

As

As to retaining diversity of termination in adjectives, and yet not using that diversity to promote variety in placing them in sentences ; it is as great an imperfection in language as can well be imagined. For the variety of termination of gender in adjectives, gives occasion to consider all objects which are of no sex in themselves, as denoted by substantive names of some grammatic gender. And as this gender has nothing answerable to it in objects of no sex, nothing but arbitrary custom can be referred to, in order to determine of what grammatic gender each substantive is which denotes objects of no sex. Had custom been regulated by reason, the names of all objects of no sex would have been of the neuter gender. But in all languages which have marks of grammatic gender in their nouns : some nouns are masculine, and others feminine, which yet equally denote objects of no sex. And this creates great perplexity to learners, in adjusting the grammatic terminations of adjectives properly to the terminations of the substantives on which these adjectives depend. Yet these grammatic genders of substantives and adjectives, are retained in almost every language of Europe, except the English, whilst the adjectives in each language are placed as near to their substantives as they are in English ; and this proceeding is evidently a very great blemish in every language which makes use of it ; because it occasions much trouble, and is attended with no real advantage.

SECTION II.

Of the degrees of comparison in adjectives.

AS the objects contained in the signification of adjectives (*i. e.* of the substantive names into which adjectives may be resolved) are only used to place the qualities, and properties of these objects in whole sets before the mind ; whilst the grammatic form of an adjective gives notice to the mind to apply its judgment so upon an object which contains these qualities, and properties,

properties, as by the means of it, and some other object, to form the conception of an object more particularly ascertained by the means of these qualities and properties; it is manifest, that there is a necessity of giving notice of the quantity or degree in which these qualities are considered as united in the object intended to be ascertained. For the same sorts of objects, which are observed to contain the properties or qualities that are denoted by abstract names, are observed to contain these properties and qualities in different proportions or degrees. The grammatic forms, which are usually called the degrees of comparison of adjectives, are introduced into language, to give notice when qualities, expressed by adjectives, are observed to be united with another object in greater or less proportions.

These proportions are determined by comparison with other objects; the usual proportion in which the qualities are observed to be united with the objects of the sort or species mentioned by a substantive, being made the standard of comparison.

This usual proportion is conceived to be expressed, when the adjective is united with a substantive, without any change in the grammatic form.

When a greater proportion or degree of the qualities contained in the signification of an adjective is conceived to be united with another object; the termination of the adjective is altered into "*er*," or "*more*" is prefixed to it. Thus, "*fair*" becomes "*fairer*," or "*more fair*."

When a still greater degree of the qualities, above mentioned, is conceived to be united with another object, the termination of the adjective is altered into "*est*," or "*most*" is prefixed to it; as, "*fairest*," or "*most fair*."

The effect of the comparative, or superlative, form of an adjective (for so the grammarians have called the forms last mentioned) may be a comparison of diminution, as well as of increase.

But this is determined by the signification of the adjective itself, and not by the grammatical forms of comparison. Thus we may equally vary the adjective "*great*," or the adjective "*small*," by these forms; as, "*great—greater—greatest*," "*small—smaller—smallest*," "*abundant—more abundant—most abundant*," "*scarce—more scarce—most scarce*." If the usual proportion or degree in which the qualities are observed in the objects of a species, is not made the standard of comparison; a particular object must be fixed upon, and the degree, in which that object has the qualities in question united with it, must be made the standard. The particle "*than*" denotes the object which has in it the degree whence the proportion denoted by an adjective in the comparative degree is estimated; as, "*a man taller—shorter—thinner, &c. than James*," i. e. who exceeds James in the degree of tallness—shortness—thinness, observed in him.

If the superlative degree is not estimated from the usual degree in which the qualities are observed in another object, two or more objects must be used by way of standard in the comparison. For the proportion intended to be expressed must, at the least, be bigger than either of some two proportions, or less than either of some two proportions, before it can be determined to go beyond, or come short of, the first degree of excess or diminution; because that first degree is one degree above or below the degree which is made the standard of this comparison. The particle "*of*" denotes the objects, some of which have the degrees whence the superlative is estimated; as, "*the tallest—shortest—thinnest man of the three*," or "*of the company*," &c.

In this manner of expression, all the objects compared together are considered as constituting an aggregate object ; as, "*the three—the company,*" in the instances here given. And then one of the constituent objects is considered as distinguished from the rest, by having a greater degree of some quality than any other of them. Two objects may be considered as constituting an aggregate object, as well as more than two ; and one of these objects may be distinguished from the other, by having a greater degree of some quality than the other has. Therefore the adjective, in the comparative degree, may be used in construction with "*of,*" when the two objects compared are considered in the manner above mentioned ; as, "*the taller—shorter—thinner man of the two,*" "*the larger of the pair,*" &c.

The grammarians have included the adjective itself, without any variation of its final syllable, or any particle prefixed, in the degrees of comparison ; and have considered it as of a degree which they call the positive. In this view, therefore, there are three degrees of comparison in adjectives ; the positive, the comparative, and the superlative.

There are a few adjectives in the English language which do not form the degrees of comparison by changing the last syllable of the positive into "*er*" and "*est* ;" as, "*good—better—best,*" "*bad—worse—worst.*"

These will be particularly set down in the practical part of this book.

A Speculative Grammar.

B O O K III.

S E C T I O N I.

Of the pronoun.

THE pronouns are all of them either the substantive or adjective names of objects of certain species, distinguished by characteristics of so extensive a nature, as to comprehend all objects whatsoever as individuals thereof; and these characteristics are principally certain circumstances which arise in the use of language itself.

Pronouns are usually divided into the five following classes: personal—possessive—relative—interrogative—and demonstrative.

Of the pronouns personal.

THESE are the substantive names of objects of three different species, called by the grammarians the first, second, and third person.

The circumstance of “a speaker mentioning himself in what he says, as distinguished by the act of speaking,” is the characteristic of

of the first personal species. And every singular object of this species is denoted by the name "*I*;" every plural object by "*we*."

The circumstance of "*an object being mentioned as distinguished by words addressed to that object*," is the characteristic of the second personal species. And every singular object of this species is named "*thou*;" every plural object; and every object considered as a plural object, "*ye*" or "*you*."

All objects which are neither considered as speaking and mentioning themselves in what they say, nor as distinguished by being mentioned in words particularly addressed to them, are of the third personal species.

The objects of this species are distinguished into three subordinate sorts, from the additional consideration of sex. But this distinction only extends, in the English language, to objects of this species which are of the singular number. Every single male object of this species, is named "*he*;" every single female object "*she*;" and every single object of no sex, or of which the sex is not considered, is named "*it*." But plural objects of this species are equally named "*they*," in English, without any regard to distinction of sex.

These pronouns have not usually been considered in the light in which they are here placed. And the reason seems to be; that the pronouns of the first, and second person, have not been attended to, abstractedly from the demonstrative circumstances which usually accompany them. For when words are actually spoke, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, usually see the speaker; and by that means know more of that speaker, than the pronoun "*I*" expresses. And the speaker, by seeing those whom he speaks to, and frequently by being acquainted personally with them, knows more of them than the pronoun "*ye*" or "*you*" expresses. But let books or writings be published

lished without the authors names, or without being addressed to some particular person ; and it will easily appear, that the pronouns "*I*" and "*you*," if used in the books, are names of species ; seeing the one may denote any person who can be supposed to have written any part of what is published, and the other any one who is supposed to read it. As to the pronouns of the third person ; they are so manifestly the names of three sorts of objects of one and the same species, that it is not necessary to add any thing as a proof that they are so.

Indeed all the pronouns are names of objects belonging to species so very extensive, that when some demonstrative circumstance does not attend the use of them, it must be supplied, in order to ascertain more particularly the nature and properties of the object denoted by one of them. It is manifest, that one principal reason why a man signs his name to a letter, is to supply this circumstance to the pronoun "*I*," when used in the letter.

The direction of the letter supplies the same circumstance to the pronoun "*you*," when used in the letter : and with regard to the pronouns of the third person ; they are constantly referred to another name, or expression, of the object denoted by one of them, in order to ascertain that object more particularly than they themselves do ascertain it. This name, or expression, is called the antecedent to the pronoun ; because it usually goes before the pronoun, in connected discourse.

Whenever the object addressing, and the object addressed, in any discourse, are not actually present with each other when the discourse is made ; or if the speaker is not conceived to deliver his thoughts in his own words, but to repeat the very words of another person ; or if the conversation is supposed to be carried on by way of dialogue, and is written down in order to be conveyed to those who were not actually present at the dialogue : in all these cases, the antecedents to the pronouns of the first and second

second person must be supplied, by mentioning the names of the person addressing, and of the person addressed, somewhere in the discourse, or at the beginning of what each speaker says. And hence it is manifest, that these pronouns are referred to particular antecedents, either by our actually seeing these antecedents, or by being told who they are, when we are not conceived to be actually present at the discourse when the original speaker made and addressed it. I dwell the longer on these particulars, because the personal pronouns of the first and second person, have usually been considered (at least by the writers of Latin grammar) as not requiring to be referred to antecedents. And as the personal pronoun of the third person always requires to be referred to an antecedent, and the relative pronoun does the same; these grammarians have placed the personal pronouns of the third person, in the same class with the relative pronoun. Hence they have called the pronouns, which answer to "*he—she*" and "*it*," relative pronouns, and have classed them with the pronouns which answer to "*who—which*" and "*that*," and have considered the whole class as pronouns of a like nature so far as regards the antecedent. This is a very considerable oversight; for the connexion of a personal pronoun with its antecedent, is very different from that of a relative pronoun, as will fully appear in the account of each in this book.

Although the circumstance, of the speaker and hearer being present with each other, when the words are spoke in which the one calls himself "*I*," whilst he calls the other "*thou*" or "*you*," is thought sufficient to ascertain the individual objects denoted by them in all common instances: this ascertainment has not been thought sufficient on occasions where the utmost precision is required. Hence in solemn contracts, oaths, &c. it has been judged expedient to direct that the name of the person speaking, and that of the person spoken to, when the contract is made with a person present, shall be added to the pronouns of the persons which they respectively support. Thus the form
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of contract in the office of matrimony, is, "*I, N——, take thee, M——,*" although both the contracting parties are present, and see, and hear each other speak. And the prescribed forms of oaths usually begin with, "*I, such a one, do swear.*" In like manner, on all common occasions, it is thought sufficient to mention the object intended to be denoted by a pronoun of the third person, by another name, before it is mentioned by its pronominal name, and to leave the mind of the hearer, or reader, to refer the personal pronoun to its antecedent already mentioned; and thence to determine the particular object, or sort of object, of which the pronoun is the name. Thus in the following sentences.

"The English grammar ought to be attended to; it is necessary to a perfect understanding of the language." "*English grammar*" is the name of the same object which "*it*" is the name of; only "*English grammar*" expresses it as it is one sort of the species grammar, and "*it*" expresses it as it is an object of the third personal species, and of that sort of the species which is distinguished by containing objects of no sex: and the mind, by custom, readily refers the pronoun to its antecedent. But in affairs of consequence, such as deeds for the conveyance of property; after the principal persons and things concerned, are specified by names, or descriptions, or both; it is usual, upon mentioning them again, to add their names after the pronouns personal which denote them; as, "*I, the said N——, —you, the said A. B.—him, the said C. D.—part of them, the said lands and tenements,*" &c. This proceeding is manifestly made use of, to prevent the ambiguity which might arise from the indefinite signification of the personal pronouns: when considered in themselves. For the signification of one of these pronouns, if the pronoun is considered in itself, is far from being precise, on two accounts. First, because all sorts of objects may be in the situation represented by the pronoun; seeing even beasts and inanimate things are frequently represented as speaking
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and spoken to, in all works of genius, such as fables; poetry, and oratory: and when thus represented, these objects become of the first and second persons. But secondly, the states which are the characteristics of the personal species, are not such as the same individual objects are constantly or habitually in. Therefore the same objects are continually shifting from one of these species to another, according to the different situations in which they happen to be when words are actually spoke. For the same object which was of the first person in one sentence, or period, may become of the second, or third, in another sentence, or period, if the speaker be changed. Hence it becomes necessary to date letters and writings, which are to be read, perhaps, a long time after the point of time when they were written. For the date determines the point of time when each object bears the personage in which it is represented by the personal pronoun that is applied to it as a name. There are other reasons which require a date to be put to many kinds of writings; and these reasons will be given when the definitive verb is treated of in particular.

It may not be improper to observe, on this occasion, how inconvenient it would be, to make such marks of distinction as are not constant and habitual, the characters of species. For such a proceeding would make it necessary to refer every name of species to an antecedent, as a pronoun is referred; and would require the time to be ascertained, when every object is of the species by the name of which such object is called.

I have hitherto considered the speaker as delivering his own sense, in his own words. But the speaker may express the sense of another: and this is usually done to some persons to whom the original speaker did not express what another speaker delivers to them. When this case happens (as it always does in verbal messages) the second speaker may either consider himself as of the first person, and the person to whom he carries the message as of the second, and adapt the sense of the original speaker to these persons, as is usually

usually done in the languages of Europe: or he may retain the very words of the original speaker; as was done in the antient languages of the East; and as perhaps is done in the Eastern nations to this day. Thus, for instance, if a person says to his servant, "*Go tell Mr. N—— I should be glad to see him to-day,*" the servant will naturally go to Mr. N—— and say, "*I am sent to tell you, that my master would be glad to see you to-day.*" In which expression, the servant, who was of the second person when the message was given him, becomes of the first; Mr. N——, who was of the third, becomes of the second; and the master, who was of the first, becomes of the third person: and yet the sense of the message remains the same, because the circumstances of delivering it are altered. But in the Eastern way, the servant would say, "*My master sendeth me to say, that he saith thus of Mr. N——, I should be glad to see him to-day.*" There are many instances of this manner of delivering the sense of others in the Scriptures: and this is one reason, among others, of the different cast which the English has, into which the Scriptures are translated, from the English which is spoke or written upon other occasions.

The pronouns personal are noun substantives; for they are the names of objects themselves of three different species, and do not give notice that the objects denoted by them are considered as mere circumstances to be united with some other object, or state, in order to ascertain such object, or state. Yet they may be applied to the names or expressions of other objects, or states, for this purpose; and consequently they take the same signs of cases in order to effect it, which other noun substantives do.

But the form of their declension differs in English from that of the usual noun substantive. For all of them, except "*it,*" have an accusative case different from the nominative: and the accusative form is used with the signs "*of—to,*" &c. to form the oblique cases; as, "*I—of me—to me—me—O me—from me,*" &c.

The form of declension of the personal pronouns is set down at Section VIII. of the practical part of this book.

It may not be improper to observe, before we dismiss this subject, that the *persons* take their name from a Latin word, signifying the masks which actors anciently wore upon the stage. One of these masks was painted for each character, and whosoever performed the character, took the mask, and the name of the character, together: so that the same man had as many names as he had masks. And, in like manner, one and the same man bears the names of "*I—thou—he*," according to the different character, or person, which he bears in any sentence.

SECTION II.

Of the pronouns possessive.

THESE are adjective names derived from the personal pronouns; and consequently contain in their signification abstract conceptions, derived from the same objects which the personal pronoun denotes, from whence each possessive pronoun is derived. Hence these must be referred to antecedents, to ascertain the particular object denoted by the objective, or substantive part, of the signification of each, in the same manner that the personal pronouns are.

These pronouns, being adjectives, are not declined; but several of them have a double form; as, "*my—mine*," "*thy—thine*," "*our—ours*," "*your—yours*," "*her—hers*," "*their—theirs*." The first of these forms is used, when the substantive, with which one of them is connected, is mentioned in the member of the sentence, in which the pronoun stands; as, "*this is my book*." The second form is used, when the name of the object, with which the pronoun is to be connected, does not stand in

in the same member of the sentence with it, but is to be understood in that member; as, "*this book is mine,*" i. e. "*my book.*"

These pronouns have been considered by some writers on English grammar, not as adjectives derived from the pronouns personal, but as other forms of the genitive case of these pronouns. But they are adjectives for the same reason that "*meus*" "*—tuus—suus—noſter* and *veſter*" are adjectives in Latin. It is true, the English pronouns have no variation of what is called gender and number in the Latin; but this variation of gender and number in the Latin pronouns, makes no alteration in the sex, or number of the object, which is represented by one of them. Thus, when a man ſays "*mea uxor,*" the object represented by "*mea,*" is himſelf, and conſequently is of the maſculine gender; and if any one ſays to a woman, "*tuus maritus,*" the object represented by "*tuus*" is herſelf, and therefore is of the feminine gender. Or if a man ſays, "*oves meæ,*" the object represented by "*meæ*" is himſelf, and conſequently is of the ſingular number, and maſculine gender; although the ſheep, expreſſed by "*oves,*" are of the feminine gender, and plural number; and ſo of other inſtances.

This is another proof that the termination of adjectives being made to vary, according to the different gender and number of the ſubſtantive with which they are connected, adds nothing to the ſignification of the adjective; but is made uſe of merely to aſcertain the particular ſubſtantive with which the adjective is to be connected, when placed at a diſtance from it. And the ſame may be ſaid of the variation of caſe in adjectives. Theſe variations of gender, number, and caſe, in the Latin and Greek, are, of conſequence, notices or declarations concerning words themſelves, merely to aſſiſt the mind to diſtinguiſh the order in which the words are to be taken. But the English, by obſerving a certain order in placing dependent words in ſeries, is delivered from the neceſſity of other grammatical marks, or notices, to ſupply the want of obſerving a certain order.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Of the relative pronoun.

THE simple pronouns of this class are "*who—which* and "*that*." The compound pronouns which partake of the nature of relatives, are "*what—whosoever—whichsoever—whatsoever*."

There are also several words, usually ranked amongst adverbs, which include the power of a relative pronoun in their signification; as, "*when—why—wherefore—how—where—whither—whence—while—whether—till, or untill*,"

For "*when*" is equivalent to "*some point of time at which*;" "*why* or "*wherefore*," to "*some reason for which*;" "*how*," to "*some manner in which*;" "*where*," to "*some place at which*;" "*whither*," to "*some place to which*;" "*whence*," to "*some place from which*;" "*while*," to "*some time during which*;" "*whether*," to "*which of two*;" "*till* or "*untill*," to "*during some time, at the end of which*."

The relative pronoun is the name of an object, as a personal pronoun is: but when an object is named by a relative pronoun, notice is given, "that the pronoun both expresses the object, and likewise shews, that the clause in which such object is concerned, is not to be considered either as expressing compleat truth or falsehood, or a compleat conception of the intellect; but as an expression of imperfect sense, till it is united with some name or expression of the same object which the relative represents."

It is the grammatic form of the clause in which a relative is concerned, that requires pronouns of a particular kind to give notice when the clause is applied in the manner above mentioned : for the form of this clause is that of a compleat sentence. Now the form of a compleat sentence is necessary in language to express truth or falshood ; but is not necessary to express either a conception which is merely that of a compleat object of the intellect, or a conception which must be made dependent on some other conception, and united with it, in order to become that of a compleat object of the intellect.

Yet the conception denoted by words in the form of a compleat sentence may be considered merely as that of an object denoted by a noun substantive ; and it is frequently convenient to consider the conception, as that of such an object. But when this is done, some notice must be given of it ; for without such notice, the grammatic form in which the words are drawn up, would lead the hearer or reader to consider them, as a separate expression, of compleat truth or falshood. This notice is usually given in English by prefixing the particle "*that*" to a sentence, when the meaning of it is to be considered as of the same nature, or order, with the conception denoted by a noun substantive in some case.

Thus, in the expression "*that a peace is concluded is now past doubt,*" "*a peace is concluded*" is a compleat sentence ; but here it is used as a noun substantive in the nominative case, on which the verb "*is*" depends. Notice of this is given by the particle "*that,*" prefixed to the sentence "*a peace is concluded,*" and it will appear, when we treat of this particle as a conjunction, that any sentence may be made to supply what is equivalent to a noun substantive in almost any case, by prefixing this particle to the sentence. Thus a sentence of compleat truth or falshood is reduced one degree lower, viz. to a level with the expression of a mere object of the intellect, as denoted by a noun substantive.

tive. But it is of the utmost convenience in language to reduce a compleat sentence lower still, viz. to a level with the expression of a conception denoted by a noun adjective: or dependent participle; and the relative pronouns are introduced into language to give notice when a speaker or writer is proceeding in this manner.

The grammatic form of a compleat sentence is therefore seen in every relative clause: but the conception denoted by such clause cannot be considered in itself; but must be united with some name or expression of the object which the relative represents. This name, or expression, may either be a single substantive, or a single verb of the infinitive mood, or a single participle used as a substantive, or it may be any series of words which express compleat sense; and this name, or expression, is called in grammar, the antecedent to the relative; because it most commonly goes before a relative clause in the connected construction of language.

If this antecedent is an object considered as endowed with the powers of speech and intelligence, it is represented by the relative "*who*."

If it is an object not considered as endowed with such powers, it is represented by the relative "*which*."

Either sort of objects may be represented by the relative "*that*."

The objects represented by "*who*," are usually called "*persons*;" and those by "*which*," "*things*." But in all the English writers, which flourished above a hundred years ago, "*which*" is applied both to persons and things.

If a relative clause were contained all in one word, as an adjective and a participle is, the judgment would be exercised in the application of such a clause, in the very same manner in which it is exercised in the application of an adjective, or participle. For the same relative clause may be applied consistently to some antecedents, but not to others; and the verbal state, with all that depends upon it, must be considered as of different kinds, in order to suit different antecedents. Thus the relative clause "*which runs*," may be consistently applied to any object that is capable of running, but not to other objects. And if it be applied to objects which are capable of running, but in different manners; the manner or kind of running which is to be understood upon each application of the clause, must be determined so as to suit the nature of each antecedent object: as in the expressions, "*a horse which runs—water which runs—time which runs*," three different kinds of running must be understood.

But as relative clauses do not consist each of one single word; they are conceived to be formed by the speaker, so as to suit each particular antecedent to which they are at any time applied. This cannot be done, unless the antecedent itself be in the mind of a speaker who forms a relative clause concerning it: and if this antecedent be placed in a clause instead of a relative, such clause becomes a complete sentence of truth or falsehood. Thus, if the antecedents, "*a horse—water—time*," be placed in the clause "*which runs*" instead of the relative "*which*," the three sentences, "*a horse runs—water runs—time runs*," will be formed.

As by this substitution, any relative clause will become a complete sentence; so, on the contrary, any complete sentence may be turned into a relative clause, by substituting a relative instead of some substantive, or verb in the infinitive mood, or some series of connected words which are found in the sentence, and which denote a complete conception of the intellect. Such sub-

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stantive,

stantive, verb, or series of words, may stand in various connexions with other words in the sentence; and if the relative is substituted, it must stand in the same connexion as the object does which is denoted by the words for which the relative is substituted. These connexions are denoted by signs of cases and other prepositions; and therefore a relative pronoun takes all sorts of signs of cases and prepositions with it. But when a sentence is turned into a relative clause, it is necessary to give immediate notice that it is so; and therefore the relative is placed either the first word of its clause, or as near the first as may be. Yet the word, or expression, in the original sentence which the relative represents, often stands in the middle, or in the last part of the sentence; and when this happens, although the relative retains the case of the word, or expression, which it represents, it does not retain the place of such word.

This may be exemplified by the following sentence; "*a lady sitting on a seat in the garden, views the flowers with attention.*"

This sentence may be turned into five different relative clauses. For "*who*" may be substituted instead of "*a lady*," "*on which*" instead of "*on a seat*," "*in which*" instead of "*in the garden*," "*which*" instead of "*the flowers*," and "*with which*" instead of "*with attention*." If the noun instead of which any of these substitutions is made, be taken as the antecedent to the relative, and the clause be made dependent upon the noun, and if we form five different expressions by proceeding in this manner; all the expressions will be consistent sense, and will stand as follows.

"*A lady—who, sitting on a seat in the garden, views the flowers with attention.*"

"*A seat—on which a lady sitting in the garden, views the flowers with attention.*"

"*The garden—in which a lady sitting on a seat, views the flowers with attention.*"

“ *The flowers—which a lady, sitting on the seat in a garden, views with attention.*”

“ *The attention—with which a lady, sitting on a seat in the garden, views the flowers.*”

These examples fully shew, how the relatives remove from the place of the word of the original sentence, in order to stand as close as possible to that word considered as the antecedent to the relative, when the sentence is turned into a relative clause depending on such antecedent.

In the construction of the English language, the sign or preposition which goes before the word that is represented by a relative, is not constantly prefixed to the relative; but is often left in the place where it should have stood, if the word itself had been used, and the sentence had not been turned into a relative clause.

Thus the second instance above may be thus expressed; “ *a seat—which a lady sitting on in the garden,*” &c. instead of “ *a seat on which.*” For the original words were “ *a lady sitting on a seat,*” &c. So the last instance may be placed thus:

“ *The attention—which a lady, sitting on a seat in the garden, views the flowers with.*” For the original words were——
“ *views the flowers with attention.*”

The construction of the relative is a most difficult part of the syntax of all languages. But the difficulty may be in a great measure removed, by shewing sentences reduced to relative clauses, and that by a different reduction of the same sentence in the manner exemplified above.

I have hitherto considered the antecedent to the relative, as a word detached from all other words, except the relative clause

which depends on it; but it is never so in connected speech: for such a clause, united with its antecedent, only expresses consistent sense, and not compleat truth or falshood. Nevertheless, the expression of truth or falshood is the only purpose of connected speech; and every compleat sentence is such an expression. The antecedent therefore of every relative is concerned with other words besides the relative clause; which words are required to form a sentence, into which the antecedent, together with its dependent clause, is taken.

Now whatsoever connexion the antecedent has with these other words; that connexion the relative clause partakes of by the means of its antecedent. This connexion may happen to be that of any case, or that denoted by any preposition. Therefore any relative clause, which on some occasion unites with its antecedent when in one such connexion, may on another occasion unite with it when in another. So that if the clause "*who is good*" (for instance) can be consistently united with "*a man*," it may be so united with "*of a man—to a man—above a man*," &c.; as therefore "*a man who is good*" is a consistent expression, "*of a man who is good—to a man who is good—above a man who is good*" are consistent expressions; being much of the same import with "*a good man—of a good man—to a good man—above a good man*." Hence a relative clause unites with the sentence into which it is taken as a constituent part thereof, in the same manner that an adjective or participle does. But a sentence in which a pronoun personal is concerned does not unite with the sentence in which the antecedent appears. For the pronoun personal has no regard to the connexions which its antecedent has in that antecedent's own sentence, and is therefore no part of that sentence. To shew this by examples; let the sentence, "*I am writing this book*," be turned into a relative clause, by substituting "*which*" instead of "*this book*;" then, by the observations already made concerning the position of the relative, the form of the clause will be "*which I am writing*." Let this

clause

clause be made dependent on the antecedent, "*this book*," in the following sentences. "*Grammar is the subject of this book—a title is put to this book—a friend shall peruse this book—a practical grammar may be deduced from this book.*" Then the compound sentences will be, "*grammar is the subject of this book which I am writing—a title is put to this book which I am writing—a friend shall peruse this book which I am writing—a practical grammar may be deduced from this book which I am writing.*" It is now apparent, that "*of this book which I am writing—to this book which I am writing—this book which I am writing—from this book which I am writing,*" are in effect expressions of one and the same object in different connexions denoted by "*of—to,*" &c.

Let now the sentence, "*I am writing this book,*" be turned into the sentence, "*I am writing it,*" by substituting the personal pronoun "*it*," instead of "*this book*;" and let this sentence be shewn as related to each of the former, by referring the pronoun "*it*" to the antecedent, "*this book*," in each of them. Then the sentences will stand as follows. "*Grammar is the subject of this book. I am writing it—a title is put to this book. I am writing it—a friend shall peruse this book. I am writing it—a practical grammar may be deduced from this book. I am writing it.*"

Here it is apparent that the signs of "*of—to,*" &c. which affect the antecedent, "*this book*," no ways affect the pronoun "*it*," nor the clause in which this pronoun stands; but that if the antecedent itself be known, the full import of the sentence, "*I am writing it,*" is also known. As therefore the pronoun "*it*" is not affected by the connexions of the antecedent with the words of that antecedent's sentence, the pronoun's sentence is no constituent part of the antecedent's sentence.

But pronouns possessive unite with the substantives on which they depend, so as to partake of all the connexions of these substantives; and therefore they are frequently equivalent to some whole relative clause. Thus, "*the horse which belongs to you*," is equivalent to "*your horse*;" "*the religion which they profess*," is equivalent to "*their religion*;" "*the picture which is drawn to resemble him*," to "*his picture*;" and so of many other instances. And in like manner, "*of—to—with the horse which belongs to you*," are equivalent to "*of—to—with your horse*."

But the pronoun possessive can never depend upon its substantive, as a relative depends upon its antecedent: because the substantive, to which a pronoun possessive is applied, is never another name of the same object with that which the pronoun contains in its signification; whereas the relative pronoun and its antecedent are always two names of the same object. Now the personal pronouns, "*you—they—him*," in the relative clauses, "*which belongs to you—which they profess—which is drawn to resemble him*," are the names of the same objects with those which the possessive pronouns, "*your—their—his*," contain in their signification, whilst the object represented by "*which*" is not contained in their signification; and yet the relative clauses, when applied to their antecedents, are equivalent in sense to the possessive pronouns applied to the same antecedents. Therefore it is clear, that a relative pronoun represents the object denoted by it, only till its clause is formed, and the object is ascertained, with which the conception expressed by the clause is to coalesce: but that when the mind forms the coalescence, the object with which that coalescence is made is not conceived to be denoted twice over, *i. e.* once by the antecedent, and once by the relative: but by the antecedent only. So that such object as it is denoted by the relative vanishes out of the conception which is expressed by a relative clause in actual union with its antecedent.

Hence

Hence it evidently follows, that the relative represents an object as supported by a principle of existence, which the mind can destroy, or transfer, at its pleasure. And hence it comes to pass, that every clause in which such an object is concerned, does not express a conception which can be contemplated in itself, when the principle by which the relative object exists is conceived to be destroyed or transferred: but that the conception may be contemplated in itself, if the relative object be represented in the clause, either by a substantive name, or by an expression equivalent to such name, *i. e.* by an infinitive verb, or a pronoun personal. For then the principle by which the object exists, is neither destroyed, nor transferred.

If the principle by which a relative object exists is conceived to be destroyed, the relative clause becomes of the nature of a noun adjective. If this principle be conceived as only transferred, the clause becomes of the nature of a dependent participle.

Thus, “*a man who is good—a horse which is swift,*” are expressions nearly equivalent to “*a good man—a swift horse;*” and “*a man who speaks—a horse which runs,*” are nearly equivalent to “*a man speaking—a horse running.*”

The coincidence of the power of a relative clause with that of a noun adjective, shews evidently, that the nature of an adjective is rightly determined in what has been laid down concerning it. And the coincidence of such a clause with a dependent participle, will confirm the account which has been given of the manner in which a verb unites, both with an object on which it immediately depends, and with an object which immediately depends upon it.

For this purpose let the sentence, “*scholars write books,*” be turned into a relative clause, by substituting “*who*” instead
of

of "*scholars*," and let this clause be referred to "*scholars*" as its antecedent. The expression will then become, "*scholars who write books*," and this expression is nearly equivalent to "*scholars writing books*." Therefore the relative only represents its object till "*writing*," the participial state of the verb "*writes*," is taken into that object, and by the means thereof is transferred into the antecedent, "*scholars*;" that is to say, till the scholars are represented as of the species, "*writers*." If therefore the participial state be itself mentioned, there is no occasion for the relative.

Let the same sentence now be turned into a relative clause, by substituting "*which*" instead of "*books*," and let this clause be referred to the antecedent, "*books*." The expression will then become "*books which scholars write*," and this is nearly equivalent to "*books written by scholars*:" this shews that the state, "*written*," which corresponds with the state, "*writing*," was in the books as represented in the original sentence, "*scholars write books*;" and that the relative, "*which*," only represents the books till the passive state is received into it, and transferred to the antecedent. But if the passive participial state, "*written*," be directly mentioned, there is no occasion for the relative.

If we now take the sentences, "*scholars write in books*—"*scholars write quite through books*," and turn them into relative clauses, by substituting "*which*" instead of "*books*," and refer these clauses to the antecedent, "*books*;" the expressions will become "*books which scholars write in—books which scholars write quite through*;" and these are nearly equivalent to "*books written in by scholars—books written quite through by scholars*." It is therefore manifest, that the passive states, "*written in—written quite through*," are the states in which the object, "*books*," are represented in the sentences, "*scholars write in books—scholars write books quite through*." If therefore the states are directly mentioned, there is no occasion for the relative. If

If a passive verb appears in a sentence having a substantive depending upon it by the means of the preposition "*by*," and such sentence be turned into a relative clause, by a relative substituted instead of the substantive, and made to depend upon the substantive as its antecedent; the active participle corresponding with the passive verb may be substituted in the clause, and the relative quite removed. Thus the sentence, "*books are written by scholars*," by the substitution and proceeding above mentioned, will become, "*scholars by whom books are written*;" and this expression is nearly equivalent to "*scholars who write books*," and this to "*scholars writing books*."

If the expression which is to be represented by the relative (when a sentence is to be turned into a relative clause) is neither that on which the verb immediately depends, nor is dependent on the verb merely by the sign of some case, or some preposition, the relative and its verb cannot be changed into a participle: for neither the active nor passive participial state of the verb is now in the object denoted by the relative, but in some other object which must come between the relative and the verb. If therefore the antecedent should take the place of the relative (as it does when the verb is turned into a participle and the relative is removed) the participle would not be considered as united with the antecedent, but with the object named between the antecedent and it; and therefore the expression would not partake of all the connexions of such antecedent, which nevertheless every expression must do, which can be equivalent to a relative clause.

Thus if the sentence, "*scholars write books for posterity*," be changed into a relative clause, and united with the antecedent, "*posterity*," the expression will become, "*posterity for which scholars write books*;" and here the relative cannot be removed by changing the verb "*write*" into the passive participle "*written*;" and the nominative, "*scholars*," into the ablative, "*by scholars*." But the sentence, "*scholars write for posterity*,"

may be changed into "*posterity for which scholars write,*" and this into "*posterity written for by scholars;*" because in the original sentence, "*posterity*" depends immediately on the compound verb "*write for,*" and therefore has the passive state "*written for*" in it. And "*scholars*" have the active state "*writing for*" in them, either when placed before the verb "*write for,*" or after the passive participle "*written for,*" with the sign "*by.*"

Therefore when the object represented by a relative, is neither that on which the verb of its clause immediately depends, nor that immediately depending on the verb by the sign of some case, or by the means of a preposition, such relative clause is equivalent to an adjective. But if the object represented by the relative is, either that on which the verb of its clause immediately depends, or that depending upon the verb by the means of a sign of a case, or other preposition; such relative clause is equivalent to a participle.

The particular object denoted by a pronoun of the first or second person, is frequently ascertained by the demonstrative act of speaking, or being spoke to; as has been already observed. And if a visible or sensible object be present when it is mentioned by a pronoun of the third person, such object may be ascertained by the demonstrative action of pointing to it, or presenting it, or by looking stedfastly at it, or by some other demonstrative sign. But although the object itself, which is the antecedent to a relative pronoun, may on some occasions be ascertained by a demonstrative action, the connexion in which such object stands with what is denoted by other words in its own sentence, cannot be ascertained by any such action. We have shewn, that the relative pronoun extends its signification, so as to partake of these connexions of its antecedent; and therefore it is seldom considered singly and in itself, as the name of any object. Hence Father Buffier has called the relative an incomplete pronoun, and the personal and demonstrative pronouns complete ones; because,

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says he, these frequently stand alone for the names of objects, which the relative pronouns do not. Buffier gives no reason why this happens in language, which reason is manifestly that given above.

Nevertheless, the relative is frequently so situated in an expression, that its antecedent is understood of course. For the verb, and other words connected with it, may bear such a signification, as can only be applied to some one object, or sort of objects. Thus, "*I know who has been here,*" is of the same import as "*I know him or her who has been here :*" "*who reasons wisely*" is of the same import as "*he or she who reasons wisely,*" &c. Therefore the relative, in such applications of it, may be considered as equivalent to a relative and personal pronoun both in one, and the relative clause may be considered as containing compleat sense in itself.

"*What*" is equivalent to "*this which,*" or "*that which,*" and therefore the clause depending on it, is very frequently an expression of sense in itself; the demonstrative pronouns "*this*" and "*that*" supplying the place of an antecedent to the relative: as in the expressions, "*what you say is right—I hear what you say—they approve of what you propose—he is averse to what his friends advise,*" &c.

It is plain from these instances, that "*what*" usually contains the demonstrative pronoun "*that*" in one case, and the relative "*which*" in another. Thus, "*that which you say is right,*" is equivalent to "*what you say is right,*" and "*that*" is the nominative, and "*which*" the accusative case. So, "*he is averse to that which his friends advise,*" is equivalent to, "*he is averse to what his friends advise;*" and "*to that*" is of the dative, and "*which*" is of the accusative case; and so of other instances. If "*what*" is used, and the case of "*which*" included in its meaning is neither the nominative nor the accusative, the sign of such case follows the verb in the clause like an adverb; as,

"*what you heard of*" is equivalent to "*that of which you heard;*" and so of other instances, in which the sign of any other oblique case or other preposition is used with "*what.*"

SECTION IV.

Of the interrogative pronoun.

THE pronouns, "*who—which and what,*" which have been considered as relatives, are also used in asking questions; and when so used, the writers on grammar have distinguished them by the name of interrogative pronouns.

Every question that is asked by the help of one of these pronouns consists in effect of two compleat sentences, in each of which one and the same object is concerned. The one of these sentences shews what the question is about; and the other signifies the desire, or intention of the speaker, to receive information concerning that which the question is about; that is to say, one of the sentences is merely demonstrative, and the other is merely interrogative.

Whatsoever the question is about, must be so made known to the person of whom the question is asked, as that such person can distinguish it from all other conceptions. For otherwise the person, of whom the question is asked, could not know what the thing is, concerning which an answer is expected from him. The determination of this must of consequence make the most considerable part of every question; and therefore the substance of the sentence which ascertains it, actually appears in every question; but the sentence which expresses the speaker's intention to receive information concerning that which is the object of the question, is partly or intirely supplied by the particular form of construction in which the words of the question are placed.

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The simplest kind of question is concerning an object that is actually present, and perceived both by the speaker and hearer, when the question is asked. Suppose that such object is a particular man pointed to by the person who asks the question; and the words of the question will be, "*who is that man?*" The sense of these words, if set down at length, amounts to that of the two following compleat sentences: "*I would receive information concerning a particular man—the particular man is that man.*"

If these sentences are reduced to the first, by substituting the relative "*who*" in the second sentence, instead of "*the particular man*" concerned in both the sentences; the compound sentence will be, "*I would receive information concerning a particular man; who is that man?*" So that the words of the question itself, "*who is that man?*" are only the sentence which determines what the question is about reduced to a relative clause depending upon the antecedent, "*a particular man,*" in the interrogative sentence which is understood of course, as a sentence of the same nature is concerned in every question.

When the object that the question is about is not a person, but a thing, "*what*" is used to represent it in the question; as, "*what stands there?*" which is equivalent to "*that which stands there;*" and being compleated, amounts to, "*I would receive information concerning that which stands there.*" So that in this kind of question, "*that*" is part of the predicate of the interrogative sentence; and the other words of the question, are the demonstrative sentence turned into a relative clause, and made to depend upon "*that,*" which itself depends on in the other words of the interrogative sentence.

If the object that the question is about, is known by the speaker to be amongst some certain number, company, or other aggregate, of objects; but is not distinguished from the other

objects of such number, &c. "*which*" is used to represent it in the question, whether it be a person or thing; as, "*which of this company can do so or so?*" that is at length, "*I would learn to distinguish some certain person or persons of this company — the certain person can do so or so;*" which two sentences being reduced to the first, by the substitution of the relative pronoun in the second sentence, will form the following complex sentence, "*I would learn to distinguish which person of this company can do so or so.*" Here again it appears, that part of the predicate of the interrogative sentence is taken into the words of the question.

The object that is common to the interrogative and demonstrative sentence, which is the object that the question is about; is in the subject of the demonstrative sentence in all the examples given above. But it is very frequently in the predicate of that sentence; and when it is so, an alteration ensues in the placing of the words of the question: whereas, no alteration ensues when the common object is the subject of the demonstrative sentence.

Thus, "*I would know what you are doing,*" if reduced to the ordinary form of a question, becomes "*what are you doing?*" for here the interrogative sentence is, "*I would know a certain thing;*" and the demonstrative sentence is, "*you are doing the thing,*" in which sentence the common object, "*the thing,*" makes part of the predicate. Substitute "*that*" for "*a certain thing*" in the interrogative sentence, and "*which*" for the same thing in the demonstrative sentence; and compound them into one; and the compound sentence will be, "*I would know that which you are doing;*" but "*that which you are doing,*" or "*what you are doing,*" may be considered as a clause of absolute sense in itself; as has been observed in what is said of "*what,*" considered as a relative pronoun. Whereas, if it be used as a question, "*that*" must depend upon the verb "*would know,*"

or

or on some other word of the interrogative sentence. And therefore to shew that some word of the question has such dependence, the order of position is changed in the words in which it is made; by placing the nominative case after the verb, whensoever the object which the question is about, is in the predicate of the demonstrative sentence; as, "*when will you come?*" is equivalent to, "*I would know the time at which you will come;*" and this sentence is composed of the two sentences, "*I would know a certain time—you will come at that certain time,*" and the common object; "*the certain time*" is in the predicate of the demonstrative sentence.

The interrogative clause is prevented from bearing an ambiguous meaning by this transposition of the nominative case and the verb. And in the instances where this transposition does not take place, the ambiguity is prevented, partly by the tone of voice in which the question is asked, and partly by the clause which is sometimes used interrogatively, being connected with other words when it is not so used, in such a manner, as to shew that it does not depend on some such sentence understood, as interrogative clauses formed by these pronouns always depend upon. Thus, "*who does so?*" is a question; but "*who does so is unknown to me,* or *I know not who does so,*" are neither of them questions, but compleat sentences, in which the pronoun "*who*" is used merely as a relative pronoun, with its antecedent understood.

To dispatch the subject of questions in language all in one place, it is only necessary to observe, that when a question is not asked by the means of an interrogative pronoun, or an interrogative adverb; such as "*where—how—when,*" &c. a supposition is made by the speaker concerning that which the question is about, and the speaker signifies his desire to be informed, whether that supposition is right or not; which signification is made by placing the nominative case after the verb. Thus, "*is Mr. N—*"

"*here?*" is equivalent to the expression, "*I would know whether the supposition expressed in the words, Mr. N—— is here, be true or not?*" and so of any other instance of a question which is not asked by an interrogative pronoun, or by some adverb which has the force of such a pronoun in it; such as, "*when—where—how—why,*" &c. above mentioned.

When a question is asked in the latter manner, that is to say, by way of supposition: the answer may be given to it by "*yes*" or "*no*."

"*Yes*" shews that the affirmative of the supposition is true; "*no*" that the negative is true.

When a question is asked by one of the interrogative pronouns, "*yes*" and "*no*" are neither of them sufficient to give an answer to it. For he who asks a question by one of these pronouns, would know the name of the object about which the question is asked, which is the antecedent to the pronoun; or such circumstances as, being taken together, may supply the place of such antecedent. The name therefore, or the circumstances, which are to supply the place of the antecedent, must be mentioned by the person who gives the answer; and that in such a case or mood, or other form of construction, that being placed in the words of the question instead of the interrogative pronoun, the whole shall become a compleat sentence. Thus,

If the question be, "*who is that man?*" the answer will be "*Mr. N——;*" which being substituted instead of "*who*" in the question, the expression will be, "*Mr. N—— is that man.*" If the question be asked again, "*who is Mr. N——?*" the answer may be, "*a gentleman of such a place;*" substitute this expression instead of "*who*" in the predicate of the sentence formed by the words of the question together with it, and the result will be, "*Mr. N—— is a gentleman of such a place.*" Again, Let

Let the question be, "*what are you doing?*" the answer may be, "*writing.*" This word being substituted instead of "*what*" in the question, and the words being reduced to proper order; the expression will be, "*you are doing writing,*" or simply "*you are writing;*" for writing is only a name for a particular kind of "*doing.*"

The like method may be taken with any other question which is asked by an interrogative pronoun; and the result will always be, the reducing the words of the question to a complete sentence containing a declaration of that, which if the person who asked the question had known, the question needed not have been asked.

SECTION V.

Of the demonstrative pronouns.

THESE are, "*this—that—other—another—the same.*" As it is not possible to form names for every kind of object which may present itself, so as to distinguish such object by its peculiar properties, these pronouns are introduced into language to be used by way of ascertainment of any object, viz. "*this*" and "*that*" to be applied to any object which can be pointed out or presented to particular observation; as likewise to any object which has been already mentioned in the discourse, or which is farther intended to be specified, so as to be distinguished from all other objects: "*other*" to be applied to any object which is perceived to be different from some object already mentioned, or intended to be mentioned by a name of the same species: "*the same*" to give notice, that the object continues unvaried that is mentioned more than once by a name, or by a relative pronoun.

These pronouns are frequently applied without the substantive name of the object to which they relate; some demonstrative circumstance supplying what is equivalent to a substantive name. And therefore they are considered as substantives, and are declined as such; "*this—that—other*," through both the numbers; "*another*," through the singular; and "*the same*" is applied to represent either singular or plural objects.

But notwithstanding this, they are all of them the adjective names of species; and as such, may be applied in coalescence with all kinds of substantives.

Every single object distinguished by being pointed to, and being near the person pointing; may have "*this*" united with its name. Or it may be called "*this*," and the name may be left to be understood. Also any single object, which has been mentioned not long before in what is said, may be distinguished in like manner by "*this*," when it is mentioned again. Or something which the speaker is going to speak of immediately, may be introduced by "*this*;" as, "*this which I am going to say*."

"*That*" is applied to single objects somewhat distant when pointed out; or to those which have been mentioned at some distance from the place, in the discourse where they are mentioned again; or to what the speaker proposes to mention at some distance from his present words. And in such application, it may be united with some name, or the name may be left to be understood.

The application of "*other*" supposes that an object capable of being called by the same name of species, is concerned in the expression in which it is used; but gives notice at the same time, that although such object is capable of being denoted by the same general name or expression with that which "*other*" represents, or with the name or expression of which it is connected, the objects are nevertheless different from each other in themselves,
having

having a separate being, either within or without the mind, or both.

“ *Another* ” is only the singular of “ *others* .”

“ *The same* ” is the converse of “ *others* ,” and shews, that although several different objects may be expressed by the name which expresses the object that it denotes, yet that difference is not perceived in the object in question, but the individuals referred to are no way different from those denoted again by the same name or expression in what is said. If names could be found expressive of every individual object and state, there would be no occasion for these pronouns in language. For proper names do not admit of them in connexion, unless it be supposed that several objects are called by the same proper name.

It is therefore the nature of names of species, and not that of the individual objects signified by these names, which requires these pronouns to be introduced into language. And the same observation may be made concerning the words, “ *all—many—every—any—some—such* ,” and several others.

The form of declension of the demonstrative pronouns appears at Section XII. of the practical part of this book

A Speculative Grammar.

B O O K IV.

S E C T I O N I.

Of the verb.

VERBS denote states of being* as distinguished in the mind by marks or characters, which may be conceived as evidences of a principle of existence: but not of such a principle as is constantly in each state, or peculiar to each period, into which the state may be distinguished.

In the account which has been already given of the general nature of the conceptions denoted by nouns and verbs, I have shewed, that the capital property in which the conception denoted by a verb differs from that denoted by a noun, either substantive or adjective, is the occasional or communicable principle of existence which is taken notice of in every verbal state. I have likewise shewed why this property gives occasion to the several grammatic forms, in which the verbs of the English language differ from the forms of nouns. The power and use of each of these grammatic forms must now be particularly accounted for, and therefore I shall proceed to consider what,

I think,

I think, may be called the different characters or capacities of the verb: and shall explain the import of the grammatic forms; under which it appears in each character.

These characters or offices may be reduced to three, which I shall call "THE OBJECTIVE—THE COALESCENT" and "THE DEFINITIVE," and shall give an account of in their order.

SECTION II.

Of the verb objective.

THE verb appears in this character, when it is used as a name of species expressing the state denoted by it, merely as that state is a compleat object of the intellect. In this use of the verb, the conception denoted by it is applied in the same manner, as a conception denoted by a noun substantive. And therefore such conception may either be the object on which some other verb immediately depends, or that immediately depending on some other verb: or it may be taken, in any mode of estimation, along with another object, in which an object denoted by a noun substantive can be taken.

Hence the verb in this character may be either used as a nominative case, on which a definite verb depends; or as the accusative, depending on a verb transitive; or with the signs of any of the oblique cases; or with other prepositions, to shew the mode of estimation, in which the mind is applying the state denoted by it.

The forms of the verb, as they appear in the infinitive mood, express the verbal state under this objective mode of conception. But the English forms of this mood cannot conveniently take the signs of oblique cases, and other prepositions, before them;

because the particle "to" is the sign of the infinitive mood of a verb, as well as of the dative case of a substantive in English. And therefore, although Spencer uses the expression, "*Could save the son of Thetis from to die,*" meaning "*from death,*" or "*from dying;*" yet the expression, "*to to die,*" instead of "*to death,*" or "*to dying,*" would manifestly be neither clear in its meaning, nor agreeable to pronounce. And so, "*of to die*" "*—in to die—with to die,*" would be inconvenient forms of expression.

Hence the participles are used objectively in English, and admit of the sign of any case before them, or take any other preposition before them, as noun substantives do: as, "*deceiving*" "*—of—to—in—by deceiving,*" "*having deceived—of—to—in*" "*—by having deceived,*" &c. So that these participial names of states may either appear as a substantive in the nominative case on which a definitive verb depends; or in any oblique case depending upon a substantive, adjective, or verb. Indeed these participial names seldom appear in the vocative case; because the state denoted by a verb is seldom or never the object to which a speaker addresses his discourse. Nor do these participial names usually appear in the plural number; because the species of objects denoted by them, are seldom conceived as consisting of whole classes of separate individuals, as the species of external and sensible objects usually are. The verb in this character represents the state denoted by it, by three forms which have relation to three modes, in which the mind conceives periods of time, viz. "*as remembered—as actually perceived*" and "*as barely foreseen.*" For time past is the object of memory only, time present of actual perception only, and time to come of foresight only. Hence, according to this way of estimation, one of the three forms of the infinitive mood represents a state, so far as it is past and over, another as in continuance, and another as unbegun. Thus, "*to have been,*" represents the state of being denoted by it, so far as it is merely remembered;

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"*to be*" represents the state as it is the object of actual perception, and "*to be about to be*" represents it as foreseen; and the three participles, "*having been—being—about to be*," express "*being*" under the same distinctions. Now a verbal state may be in any one of these situations at any individual point of time. For such state may be considered as "*partly or intirely over*," or "*as actually in being*," or "*as unbegun*" yesterday, or to-morrow, or at any period of time which the mind pitches upon. Because the principle by which a verbal state exists, may be considered as communicated to a period which is only remembered, or to a period which is actually perceived, or to a period which is only proposed, or foreseen, at any point of time. And it is frequently necessary in language to represent verbal states as objects merely remembered, or actually perceived, or merely foreseen, without regard to the precise point of time, when a particular state is in one of these situations. And hence the objective forms of verbs take no notice of any precise point of time, when the state expressed by one of them is to be considered as in the situation in which the verbal form represents it.

SECTION III.

Of the verb coalescent.

WHEN the verb is applied in this character or capacity, it is conceived that the state denoted by it forms the characteristic of some species of objects; and that the name, or at least some part of the expression on which the verb in this capacity immediately depends, denotes an object which, for a time, is of the species whereof the verbal state is the characteristic. The grammatic forms of the verb in this capacity, are the participles above mentioned. But when they express a verbal state thus applied, they are placed in immediate apposition

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tion after the expression of the objective conception, which they so affect as to convey their characteristic state into it. Thus, "*a man speaking—thinking—approving*," denotes the man to be considered as of the species "*speaker—thinker—approver*;" "*a thing contained—achieved—performed*," is of the species "*content—achievement—performance*;" and so of any other instance of the application of a coalescent participle, when names can be found in the language expressing species by verbal characters.

The objective conception, which is represented as of some species whereof a state denoted by a participle is the characteristic, may, when considered as of such species, be used to circumstantiate some other objective conception, which is not considered as of the verbal species, whereof the characteristic is denoted by the coalescent participle. When the objective conception is thus applied, the verbal characteristic does not so affect the whole expression, as that the conception denoted by it becomes an object of the verbal species; but it affects some objective conception only, which is contained in a part of the expression on which the coalescent participle immediately depends. Thus in the expressions, "*the eye of a man shooting—an expence to a man travelling*," only "*the man*" is of the species "*shooter*" and "*traveller*." And being considered as first of one of these species, and then of another; he is used to circumstantiate the objects "*eye*" and "*expence*." The object therefore, which a participle coalescent represents as of a certain verbal species, may be applied in any mode of estimation to circumstantiate other objects. And, of consequence, the name of the object on which such participle depends, may be of any oblique case, or may take any preposition before it, to denote the mode of estimation in which it is applied to circumstantiate the object on the expression of which it depends, by the means of the sign of the oblique case or other preposition.

An adjective may, in like manner, be joined with a substantive which is in any oblique case, or in dependence upon any preposition; and this agreement has occasioned the participle coalescent to be considered as an adjective differing in nothing from the adjectives derived from substantives, except its reference to time. But, as has been already observed, the mode of coalescence by which a participle unites with the object, on the expression of which it depends, is more simple than that by which an adjective unites with the object on the expression of which it depends. In the union of a participle coalescent, there is no intervening state to be understood: but in the union of an adjective, some state must be understood, in order to form the coalescence. For the substantive contained in the signification of an adjective, can seldom or never be considered as the characteristic of a species, as a participial state may be; and therefore the mind is under a necessity of having recourse to some mode of estimation similar to some of those which are denoted by prepositions, to form the connexion between an adjective and the substantive on which it depends: and usually other intervening states must be understood. Thus, "*a deceitful man*" is equivalent to "*a man of deceit*," and either of the expressions is equivalent to "*a man practising, or who practises deceit*;" so that "*the man*" is "*the practitioner*," and "*deceit*" is "*that which is practised*." That is to say, a pair of correlative participial states must be understood, or a mode of estimation must be applied, which is equivalent to the understanding of such pair of states, before the connexion between "*deceit*" and "*the man*," as it is expressed by the adjective, can be apprehended. Whereas, when a coalescent participle depends upon a substantive, nothing is to be understood: but the verbal state so communicates its essential principle, as to be taken immediately along with the object denoted by the substantive; that object being considered as of a species of which the state is the characteristic.

The participles in Greek and Latin are always coalescent, and are conceived to communicate with the gender, number, and case, of the object with which they coalesce: and therefore, in these languages, they are declined with variety of terminations, to express the circumstances of gender, number, and case, as taken into them from the objects on which they depend. But as participles are used objectively in English, they are of consequence all of the neuter gender, seeing the states denoted by them are neither male nor female. And, as these states are seldom considered as consisting of several individuals, the English participles have seldom a plural number. As to case, the English objective participle may take the sign of any case before it, as any substantive may do. But the coalescent participle never takes the sign of any case before it: seeing it unites with the object on which it depends, so as to form one complex object, and of course it is conceived to partake of all the connexions of the object on which it depends.

When a coalescent participle depends upon the name, or expression of an object; the whole conception of the object in the participial state, becomes that of an object "*of memory, of actual perception, or of foresight,*" according as the participle is of the past, present, or future tense. Thus, "*a man having spoke,*" expresses an object of memory; "*a man speaking,*" an object of actual perception; "*a man about to speak,*" an object of foresight; and so of other instances. Now a man may be considered as in any of these situations yesterday, or to-morrow, or at any particular point of time; and therefore the coalescent verb, like the definitive, may be referred, in any of its forms, to any point of time, past, present, or to come.

SECTION IV.

Of the verb definitive.

THE verb appears in its definitive capacity in all the forms of its inflexion, except those of the infinitive mood, and the participles; which have been already shewn to contain it in its objective and coalescent capacities. When the verb appears in this character, it shews "that the expression of the objective conception on which it depends is stopped, as to any farther composition; and that the object denoted by the whole of such expression, becomes an object of the species whereof the participial state contained in the signification of the verb, is the characteristic." Thus in the expressions, "*a man sees—hears—thinks,*" "*the man*" is of the species "*seer—bearer—thinker*;" and the participial states, "*seeing—hearing—thinking,*" contained in the several verbs, make him so. In these expressions, the object on which the verbs depend is expressed by the single name, "*a man*;" and the definitive forms of the verbs, "*sees—hears—thinks,*" give notice that all farther composition of the expression of that object is stopped. But in the expression, "*a man of quick perception sees—hears—thinks,*" "*the man of quick perception*" is "*the seer—bearer—thinker*;" and the definitive forms of the verbs give notice that the expression of the object on which they depend, is not intended to be compounded farther. The series of words, by which an objective conception is expressed, may be extended to any length, and varied innumerable ways before a definitive verb is made to depend upon the expression of such conception: but as soon as such a verb is applied to the series, the composition of it can be carried no farther; and the whole object is so affected by the verbal state, as to become an object of the species of which that state is the characteristic or distinguishing property.

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The giving notice "that the composition of the expression is closed, on which the verb depends; and that the whole conception, denoted by the expression, is so affected by the state contained in the signification of the verb, as to become a singular or plural object of the species whereof that state is the characteristic," is peculiar to the definitive form of the verb: no other kind of word in language giving the like notice.

The act of affirmation consists in giving this notice; and where it is not given, there can be no compleat sentence. For a sentence, as has been already observed, consists of two parts, called by the logicians the subject, and the predicate. The subject is always the expression of a conception which the mind can make the single or especial object of its contemplation: and therefore any single substantive, or any single objective verb, may be the subject of a sentence. But any series of words containing compleat sense, may likewise be considered as a compound name of what the mind makes the especial object of its contemplation: and therefore any such series of words may likewise be the subject of a sentence. Hence it never can be known whether the speaker proposes to use a single objective name, or a series of words forming an expression equivalent to a single objective name, to express the subject about which he proposes to speak; till himself gives notice of his intention: and if he uses a series of words to express such subject; it is impossible to know how far he will carry such series, till himself gives notice that he has stopped the composition of it.

It is manifest, that the predicate of every sentence begins at the definitive verb itself. For the grammatic form of the verb, considered independently of the rest of its signification, amounts to a declaration concerning the expression of the subject of the sentence, that the farther composition of such expression is stopped, and that the participial state contained in the signification of the verb, affects the whole object which is the subject of the sentence;

tence; whether that object be expressed by one word, or by a series of words.

I have already shewed, that a verb may have other words made to depend upon it by various modes of proceeding. The definitive verb, and all that depends upon it, so as to affect the state denoted by it, is the predicate of every sentence. There is no kind of grammatical form annexed to any sort of words, in order to give notice how far the composition of the predicate of a sentence is carried. Such predicate may consist of a definitive verb only: but it more frequently consists of a series of words, which taken together, shew the state contained in the definitive verb, as circumstantiated in some certain manner. The judgment alone determines when the series ceases to circumstantiate the state of the verb on which it depends; and when it does so cease, the sentence is at an end. A new sentence may then begin, and notice may be given by another definitive verb of that which is the subject of this sentence; and the judgment again determines how far the expression is carried, which is attributed to this latter subject as the predicate thereof.

This proceeding manifestly takes its rise from the limited powers of the mind of man. For the mind not being able to comprehend any very complex object all at once, by making it the subject of its contemplation; has recourse to the expedient of attending to such object by piece-meal; first making one part of it the subject of its especial contemplation, and then another part; and declaring as it goes on what are the powers, properties, and situations, of so much of the object under consideration, as it makes the subject of its especial attention in each particular sentence.

It is the nature of words, and not that of the things signified by them, which occasions the use of the grammatic definitive forms of verbs. For if every conception which the mind makes
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the subject of its especial contemplation, could be denoted by a single name; there would be no necessity to use a whole series of words on any occasion, as the subject of a sentence. And if no composition were ever used in the expressing of objective conceptions, there would be no need to shew, by any grammatical form, that the composition is stopped. The grammatical definitive forms of the verb, therefore, only shew the intention of the speaker with regard to the composition of his expression; and if that can be shewn by any other means than the use of such forms, the infinitive mood of verbs, or the participles, may be made to answer all the purposes of a verb. This will appear most evidently, if we take any series of words in which there are several participles affecting all that part of the series which goes before each of them: for any of these participles may be turned into its corresponding definitive verb, and the sense of all the sentences, so formed, will be the same. Thus the following series, "*a lady sitting in the garden viewing the flowers,*" may be turned into the two sentences, "*a lady is sitting in the garden viewing the flowers—a lady sitting in the garden is viewing the flowers,*" which are exactly equivalent to each other. For indeed the whole conception is in the mind of the speaker at once as the first series expresses it. But for the convenience of the hearer, the speaker may direct the part preceding either of the participles to be made the especial object of his attention, and subjoin the rest to such part, when made such especial object. And this is done by using first the definitive verb which corresponds to one of the participles, and then that which corresponds to the other. But several participles cannot conveniently be used so as to affect every part of long serieses of words immediately; and therefore every series of words in which several participles appear, cannot be changed into several equivalent sentences in the manner shewn above. Thus, "*a lady sitting in the garden viewing the flowers presenting various colours,*" cannot be turned into the sentence, "*a lady sitting, &c. is presenting various colours.*" For the flowers only, are "*the presenters,*" and not "*the lady sitting,*" &c. , .

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It has been laid down as a principle in grammar, of late years, that the essence of the verb consists in affirmation, and that affirmation is a particular act of the judgment, which the mind passes upon the object which is the subject of such act of judgment. In consequence of this principle, the verb in its definitive capacity only, has been considered and called a verb; whilst in its objective capacity, it has been ranked amongst noun substantives; and in its coalescent capacity, amongst noun adjectives. This proceeding is a short way of getting quit of the difficulty of shewing explicitly wherein the signification of a verb definitive differs from the signification of the verb objective, and coalescent; and that of all of them from the signification of a noun substantive, or of a noun adjective.

But in the act of connecting speech, so as to express consistent sense, the mind passes a judgment on every objective conception, whether it be denoted by a single substantive, or contained in the signification of an adjective, or of a verb. It is by repeated acts of judgment, that the mind is enabled to pitch upon the proper modes of estimation by which these objective conceptions may be united, so as to form together some more complex conception without inconsistency. Hence no greater exertion of the judgment is required in uniting a definite verb consistently with the expression of an object, than there is in uniting a coalescent participle with the same expression of the same object. This fully appears from the example given above. It is not indeed absolutely necessary that "*the hearer*" should exert his judgment on what is said in a sentence, until a definitive verb is applied; because the expression of the object of especial attention, about which the sentence is spoke, is not compleated, and may be varied innumerable ways; if the speaker does not give notice, that he will make no farther additions to it. But "*the speaker*" must necessarily exercise his judgment at the addition of every new appendage to the expression of the object about which he proposes to speak, if he intends that the sense of the expression

expression shall be comprehended by the hearer. Indeed, if he proposes that the sound, or visible appearance only, of one and more words, shall be the object which he makes the subject of a sentence; such a proceeding does not require the judgment to be exercised as it is in forming expressions of sense. Yet one word, or a series of words, thus considered, may be the subject of truth or falsehood: for it may be said of such a subject, that it is "*an expression*." But if the verb "*is*," or any other definitive verb, be placed after a subject consisting of one or more words, the sound or visible appearance whereof is only attended to; such a subject cannot be farther compounded. And it is manifestly the notice of this circumstance, which constitutes the affirmation, and not the act of judgment of the speaker considered as beginning to be applied when the verb is pronounced. For if the verb "*being*" were applied instead of "*is*," or a participle of some other verb instead of the definitive form; the judgment must be equally exerted. As if we were to say, "*such or such words being an expression*," only the composition of the series is not now stopped; and therefore the series does not contain an affirmation.

The use of the verbs called impersonals, may seem not to agree with this account of the power of the definitive verb: for impersonal verbs are supposed not to depend on any subject. Thus the Latin verbs, "*pluit—tonat*," which we express by, "*it rains—it thunders*," are used without any subject expressed in words. But the subject, to which they are applied, is conceived always to be the same, and known both to the speaker and hearer: whether it be "*the heaven*" or "*the air*," or whatsoever object it be, which is considered as, "*raining*" or "*thundering*;" and this previous knowledge is equivalent to some demonstrative circumstance which might supply the object that is represented by "*it*," in English; or by the forms of the third person in the verbs, "*pluit—tonat*," in Latin. For if the verb, "*currit*," for instance, (which may be translated, "*he runs—she runs*" or "*it runs*," in the present use of the Latin language) had

never been applied but to one certain object ; there would be no occasion to mention the name of the object that is represented, as running by the verb "*currit*." But as it is now applied, if a speaker should say, "*he runs*," in English, or "*currit*," in Latin, and add no more words, the hearer would not conceive the speaker's meaning, unless he actually pointed to some "*horse*," or other object in the act of "*running*."

The use of the relative pronoun confirms the account which is given above of the nature of affirmation : for this pronoun does not destroy the connective or coalescent power of the verb ; but its definitive power only. That is to say, a relative clause does not give notice that the composition of the expression in which it is concerned, is stopped : and therefore a relative clause taken together with its antecedent, or frequently with the clause in which the antecedent stands, contains no affirmation ; although it contains a definitive verb. Yet the same judgment is passed when a definitive verb is used in dependence upon an object denoted by a relative pronoun, as would be if the object were denoted by any other name.

This may be still farther confirmed by making any compleat sentence dependent on a relative adverb, such as, "*when—why—how—where*:" for the sense of the sentence so depending, may be expressed by words which have no definitive verb in them. Thus let the sentence, "*he comes*," be made to depend on the words, "*to know when—why—how—where*," and the expressions arising from this proceeding, will be "*to know when—how—why—where he comes*;" and these expressions are equivalent to the following, "*to know the time—the reason—the manner—the place of his coming*." Hence it is clear, that these adverbs reduce the force of the compleat sentence, "*he comes*," to that of a noun substantive in the genitive case, with a pronoun possessive, or adjective, depending upon it. So that relative adverbs, as well as relative pronouns, in effect, destroy the definitive power of the verb, in
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the clause that depends upon them. And the reason why they do so manifestly is, because they give notice, that the clause in which one of them is concerned, is not stopped as to farther composition, and that the participial state of the definitive verb does not affect all the words on which the verb depends. Hence such a clause is not an affirmation, although it may contain an affirmation in it.

From all these observations laid down together, the precise difference of signification may be determined, between a coalescent participle, and a definitive verb, viz. the participle may depend upon the expression of an object which may be employed to circumstantiate another object, whilst yet that other object is not so affected by the participial state, as to become an object of the species whereof that state is the characteristic; as in the expression, "*an attention to a man reading*," only the man is of the species "*reader*;" and so of other instances of the like construction. Or the participle may depend upon a complex object, and may be circumstantiated by other words, that do not convey their signification through the participial state, into the whole object on which the participle depends; as in the expression, "*a taste for pleasures procured by expence of time and money thrown away upon them*;" "*pleasures*" only are "*the object procured*," and "*the expence of time and money*" is "*that which is thrown away*," whilst "*taste*" is neither "*the object procured*," nor "*that thrown away*." But when a verb definitive is applied; the participial state contained in it, and the words that modify it, affects the whole subject on the expression of which it depends; and so fixes it in that state, that it cannot be farther compounded, or varied, but by varying the definitive verb into its correspondent participle, or by removing the verb out of the sentence.

What is here said of the participle may be equally applied to the relative clause, in every instance in which a participle can be substituted instead of a relative clause. And I have already shewn the instances in which such substitution can be made.

It follows, from the account which is given above of the power and use of the definitive grammatic forms of verbs, that no verb of such forms can be consistently applied in dependence upon any word which must itself be made dependent on some other word that is not mentioned. For the definitive form of a verb gives notice, that the composition of the expression on which it depends is compleat; and the word on which the verb is supposed to depend in this instance, gives notice by its grammatic form, that it must be taken in dependence upon some other word, which by the supposition is not mentioned. The declaration or notice of the definitive form of the verb would therefore, in such an application of it, be of a meaning inconsistent with that of the dependent grammatic form of the word, on which it would depend, and of consequence the whole expression would be absurd.

What is said of a single word of a dependent form, may equally be applied to a series of words dependent on such a word. For the composition of the expression is incomplete till the word is known, on which the series must depend; and therefore till such word is known, no definitive verbal form can be consistently applied to the series.

Hence single substantives of oblique cases, adjectives, relative pronouns, adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions, can none of them alone be the subject of a sentence; nor can any series of words depending on any of them be such subject, if the word or expression is not added, on which these parts of speech must depend. And hence there must be a nominative case of a noun substantive, or an objective verb, or some expression which is equivalent to one of these, in the subject of every sentence; for otherwise the composition cannot be compleat.

I except in what is said above, that instance in which words are applied merely to represent the sound annexed to them, or the visible form presented to the eye by them; for in this application

cation of words, any single word, or any series of words, may be the subject of a sentence, and the sense of such series may be either consistent or not.

The definitive verb has relation to time, as distinguished into past, present, and to come, and this present time is always the time of speaking. For the manner of estimating the distinctions of time to which the definitive forms of verbs relate, supposes the present to be determined by the act of speaking, and the past, and future, to be estimated from the present so determined. Hence this "*present*" is continually shifting. For no two words can be spoke by one speaker in the same instant of time. Yet the present forms or tenses of any definitive verb, equally relate to *any time in which these tenses are actually spoke*, and the past tenses equally relate to *time preceding*, and the future tenses to *time succeeding any time in which these tenses are actually spoke*. So that the act of pronouncing a definitive verb is a demonstrative circumstance, which ascertains the period of time to which the state denoted by the verb is to be referred. If therefore the person to whom a sentence is addressed does not actually hear the sentence spoke, he cannot know the time to which the definitive verb relates that is used in such sentence, till he is told the point of time when the sentence was delivered. Hence it becomes necessary to date letters, and deeds, and many other writings, in order to let the reader know the point of time that is the present, by which the past and future is estimated in each letter, deed, or other writing. For if this is not done, the periods cannot be determined, to which the present, past, and future forms of the definitive verbs refer, which are used in such letter, deed, &c. yet till these periods are known, it may not be possible to apprehend the full import of many of the sentences; because the same objects which were in certain states of being, when a letter, or other writing, was written concerning them, may not be in these verbal states when the letter, or writing, is read. But the date enables the reader to consider

the letter, or writing, as words actually spoke at the time which the date expresses; and therefore such date supplies the place of a demonstrative circumstance with regard to time, just as the name at the bottom of a letter supplies the place of a demonstrative circumstance, ascertaining the meaning of the pronoun of the first person; and as the direction of the letter supplies another demonstrative circumstance, ascertaining the meaning of the pronoun of the second person; if these pronouns are used in the letter. For the present tenses of definitive verbs (if considered in themselves) express the states denoted by them, as existing at any time in which these tenses are actually spoke; and the past tenses as before, and the future tenses as after, any time in which these tenses are actually spoke. But the act of speaking, or the date, fixes the general meaning of the tenses; by shewing what point, or part, of time is to be considered as the individual present point, or part, by which the present, past, and future, is estimated, to which the tenses of the definitive verbs relate in the sentence in question. That is to say, the act of speaking determines this point of time in words actually spoke, and the date determines it in the letter, or other writing, to which the date is put; for the date is the present time written down. And so the pronoun "*I*" is the name of "*of any person who speaks and names himself;*" and "*thou,*" or "*you,*" is "*the name of any person spoken to.*" But if words are actually spoken by persons who are present with each other; the act of speaking, and addressing what is spoke, fixes the general meaning of these pronouns to a particular speaker and hearer. And if this meaning is not thus fixed, it must be fixed by other means, *i. e.* by writing down the name of the person speaking, and of the person spoken to. I should proceed to consider what the grammarians call the voices of the verb; but in order to explain these voices, it is necessary to consider the nature of those states which admit of verbs of different voices, and to shew why some sorts of verbs do not admit thereof.

SECTION V.

Of the different sorts of verbs.

IT is necessary for the purposes of teaching, that verbs should be distinguished into sorts, denoted by different names; and that the distinctions of these sorts should be taken, both from the manner in which they are placed in construction, and from the manner in which their grammatic forms are composed.

Of verbs as distinguished into sorts by the manner in which they are placed in construction.

VERBS distinguished by this manner of considering them, are reduced to two sorts, *the transitive*, and *the intransitive*, or *neuter*, as they are sometimes called.

Verbs transitive denote such states as are easily distinguishable in their source, from another state, derived from the same source, in such a manner, that either state supposes the other, and corresponds with it. These states I have called correspondent states in a former part of this treatise, and have shewn that the expressions of them are the correspondent active and passive forms of the same verb. One of these states is usually observed in one object, and its corresponding state in another object; and if the verbal name of either of the states is mentioned, the conception of the state correspondent to it readily occurs to the mind; because both the states are most constantly observed to exist together, although the one of them most commonly has its existence in one object, and the other in another. Or if both the states happen to be observed in one and the same object, such object appears in two capacities, being at once the source of the one state; and the object in which the corresponding state is observed.

served. Much the greatest number of verbs denote these transitive states; as they are the principal means by which the mind is enabled to pass on from an object, the conception of which is completely formed and expressed, to some other object, the conception whereof is also completely formed, and is to be expressed. Those states which are the result of some spontaneous exertion of power, are usually expressed by what are called the active forms of some transitive verb. The states, which are the correspondents to the former, are expressed by what are called the passive forms of the same verb. And these states are conceived to be the result of the reception of some effect produced by their corresponding active states. Thus, "*to see—to hear—to read—to make,*" are active forms of so many transitive verbs. "*To be seen—to be heard—to be read—to be made,*" are the correspondent passive forms of the same verbs; and so of other instances.

But there are many verbs in which it is not easy to distinguish the state as it is in exertion, from the state as it is in the reception of the effect produced by such exertion; as the states, "*to grow—to wither—to rest—to exist,*" &c. These verbs, therefore, are not resolvable into correspondent expressions of pairs of correspondent states, the one of which may be considered in one object, and the other in another; or the one of which may be first applied to an object, and the other to the same object. Whereas, both these proceedings may take place in the application of the pairs of correspondent states, denoted by the correspondent active and passive forms of a verb transitive. For as "*a man,*" for instance, may see or hear some other object, so he may see or hear himself; that is to say, he may both be the object seeing and hearing, and the object seen and heard.

The verbs which are not easily resolvable, or which are not usually resolved into pairs of expressions of correspondent states, are verbs intransitive, or verbs neuter; being considered, when
denoted

denoted by the latter name, as verbs which denote neither action nor suffering, or states which are intermediate between both.

The verb "*to be*" is manifestly a verb neuter; but it differs from all other verbs in this very considerable circumstance, viz. that it admits of every noun substantive to depend upon it in immediate apposition: whilst by such apposition, a connexion is denoted between the state signified by it, and the object signified by the substantive on which it depends; yet no new state is considered as in the substantive; so that the object denoted by such substantive, becomes of no verbal species, except that of "*a being*," by any of the forms of this verb depending immediately on it; and it is known, that every object is of the species "*being*," whether a verb is made dependent on its name, or not. It is the nature of substantive names, and chiefly of the names of species, which gives occasion to this kind of construction. For although no species is the same with any other species, nor any individual the same with any other individual; yet one and the same object may so communicate with several species, as to have the properties in it, at one and the same time, which constitute the characteristics of the several species. And how many soever the characteristics are, which one and the same object has in it, by so many names of species that object may be called. An individual object may be first named by a proper name, or by any name of species by which it can be called, if that name of species be properly circumstantiated (and there are words in language which may be so applied, as to circumstantiate a name of species to any degree of precision:) and if the speaker intends to shew what other name of species, or what proper name, is equally applicable to the object which he has mentioned by some name, so as to have raised the conception of it in the mind of the hearer; he interposes some form of the verb "*to be*" between the names; as, "*such a man is a merchant—being a merchant—who is a merchant.*" This verb therefore does not carry on the mind from the substantive name of one object to the substantive name

of another, as the verb transitive most commonly does; but from one name of an object to another name of the same object. Now every object in language is considered as "*being*" that which is denoted by every name that the speaker has occasion to give the object; and therefore its *verbal being* is considered as occasionally taking into it the characteristic of every species, by the name of which the object can be denoted.

This "*being*" is therefore occasional and communicable, and is so expressed by the verb "*to be*:" of consequence it must be considered with respect to time past, present, or to come: for an object may have the characteristics of several species in it at one time, and not at another. Hence the temporary forms of the verb "*to be*" refer to the time when the characteristic of the species, the name of which depends upon the verb, is observed in the object, the name of which the verb depends upon; as in the expressions, "*such a man is—was—will be—who is—who was—who will be—being—having been—going to be a merchant.*"

The name by which an object is first mentioned, is always supposed to be a name applicable to it at the time of speaking: and if both the names by which an object is expressed be such as are always applicable to it, the forms of the verb which relate to the present time are used, in connecting the names; and the mind is left to determine from the nature of the species denoted by the name depending on the verb, that the connexion denoted by it is not temporary, but perpetual. Thus the expression, "*a horse is an animal,*" shews that the characteristic of the species "*animal,*" is observed in any or every horse at all times, although the form of the verb "*is,*" if taken in its strictest sense, only relates to the time of speaking.

All general truths are expressed in like manner by verbs which relate to the present time, that is, to the time of speaking, if taken in their strictest sense. But the nature of the objects
joined

joined by the verbs, shew when they are intended to signify perpetuity of state.

This mode of communication amongst objects may be called the descriptive mode, as has already been observed; for it serves to shew what objects are: and is the original verbal mode to which all the others are referred; and therefore all adjectives, participles, and prepositions, may be placed as well as substantives in dependence upon the verb "*to be*," and when so placed, the connective part of their signification unites with, and gives farther modifications to this descriptive mode of communication.

The states denoted by the several forms of the verb "*to be*," frequently take names of parts of time, or names of measures, and sometimes names of other kinds after them in immediate apposition; and connect these names with other names on which the verbal forms depend; although these other names are not the names of the same parts of time, or of the same measures, &c. But in this kind of construction, the names which follow the verb are used as so many adverbs: for a particular mode of estimation must be used in applying the time, or the measure, &c. to the object on which the verb depends; and not the general, or descriptive mode, by which two names of the same object are united by the forms of the verb. Thus,

When it is said, "*such a thing was last year*," the meaning is, "*during last year*," or "*in the last year*;" or "*such a measure is three feet*," the meaning is, "*containing three feet*," or "*of three feet*;" and so of other instances. For the meaning of the two names united by the verb, prevents ambiguity; although no mark is set down of the complex mode of estimation, by which the latter is applied to the verbal state; and through that to the object on which the verb depends.

The verb "*to exist*," although nearly of the same signification with the verb "*to be*," when the two verbs are considered in themselves ; is not used to carry on the mind from an object expressed by one name, to the same object as expressed by another name. For this verb is appropriated to signify such "*being*," as those objects are possessed of, which have the principle by which they exist within themselves, independent of any mode of conception of the mind of man. The verb "*to be*" is sometimes applied in the same sense in which the verb "*to exist*" is applied ; as when it is said, "*God is*."

The effect of a state denoted by a verb neuter is frequently found to have a substantive name ; and such a substantive may usually be placed after its correspondent verb in a transitive construction, although other substantives cannot be so placed. Thus, "*to live—to die—to fly—to sleep*," are verbs neuter ; and the substantives, "*a life—a death—a flight—a sleep*," are the names of states which are the effects or consequences of their respective verbal states, above mentioned. And therefore, "*to live a life—to die a death—to fly a flight—to sleep a sleep*," are expressions commonly used, although other substantives cannot be used in dependence upon these verbs by the same mode of estimation.

SECTION VI.

Of verbs as distinguished into sorts by the different manners in which their grammatic forms are composed.

THIS method of distinguishing verbs into sorts, has produced the several sets of forms which the grammarians call "*the voices*" of the verb ; which voices are considered but as two in the Latin, and are called "*the active*" and the "*passive*" voice ;

"voice;" but in the Greek they are considered as three, and are called "*the active—the passive, and the middle voice.*"

It has been observed by other writers on the English grammar, that this threefold distinction of voice agrees very well with the grammatic forms of the English verb: and this distinction has been followed, in a grammatic treatise, published not long ago, concerning this part of speech, as it appears in the English language. I shall therefore observe this distinction in what follows: for it is less troublesome to learners, to consider the verb as of a middle voice, than to consider every tense of the active voice under a double form, which yet must be done, if a middle voice is not admitted. When this voice is admitted, the present tense, and first preterite of the indicative mood, must still be considered under a double form.

Of the active voice of verbs.

THE set of forms which compose this voice are called "*active*;" because it is observed, that far the greatest number of verbal states expressed by any of them, are the result of the exertion of some effort, which may be considered as action, if the word be taken in its most extensive sense. The verb "*to call*" appears in the forms of this voice, at Section XXI. of the practical part of this book.

Of the passive voice.

THE greatest number of verbs, when varied according to the forms of this voice, express states which are not conceived to be the result of any effort exerted; but of the reception of the effect of some exertion of effort; and these states may be considered as so many states of "*passion*" or "*suffering*" in the largest acceptance of these words. The verb "*to call*" appears in this voice, at the section above mentioned.

Of

Of the middle voice.

VERBS of the forms of this voice most commonly denote states of the same nature with those which the active forms of the same verbs denote; but on some occasions also the same states, which the passive forms of the same verbs denote, though less frequently; as in the expressions, "*the house is building—the deeds were drawing*," &c. The grammatic forms of the voice are also composed by means of the several forms of the verb "*to be*," as the passive voice is; but instead of the passive, or past participle, which is used in composing the forms of the passive voice; the active or present participle (which in English always ends in "*ing*") is used in composing the forms of the middle voice. So that the verb in this voice, whether considered in its signification, or in its grammatic forms, partakes of the nature, both of the active, and passive verb. The verb "*to call*" appears in this voice, at the section above mentioned.

SECTION VII.

Of the conjugation of verbs.

THE series of stated forms, by which one and the same verb is varied through the several voices, in order to express, first, and principally, the verbal state under the threefold distinction of being the object of actual perception, or of memory, or of foresight, and then to express the state in each of these circumstances as also under other modifications by forms of the verb itself, is called the conjugation of the verb.

The forms of every such series are distinguished into several classes, each whereof is called a mood, and each of these moods

is again subdistinguished into classes of forms, called tenses; which tenses are each of them distinguished into forms, called the persons of the verb; and these persons are of two numbers; except the tenses of the infinitive mood, and the participles, which have not the distinction of person and number. *

The moods, tenses, numbers, and persons, are called by the same names in each of the voices; and if the method is well observed in a few verbs, by which the tenses of each mood, and the numbers, and persons of each tense, are formed; it will not be difficult to vary other verbs through the same moods and tenses of each of the voices, by using some verb, the variations of which are known, as a pattern to vary other verbs by. Several of these patterns (or paradigms, as they are called in grammar) are set down at length, in what is said of the conjugation of the verb in the practical part of this book.

The variation of the forms of the English verb consists partly in the alteration of the syllables of the verb itself; and partly in prefixing certain signs to several of the tenses; which signs are many of them also the names of verbal states, and when not used with a verbal expression depending on them, have the compleat signification of so many verbs.

The nature of these signs will be considered, when we come to speak of the tenses in particular: but as to the placing them properly in the moods and tenses to which they respectively belong, there is no difficulty; for they are placed alike in the same moods, tenses, and persons, of all verbs in the same voices; so that if they are duly observed and remembered, through the several voices of any one verb, they may be readily applied through the voices of any other verb.

But the variation of the syllables of several English verbs is not easily reducible to any certain patterns.

There are but three forms of the English verb, together with the participle in "*ing*," necessary to be attended to, in order to compose all the other forms properly, of any of the voices. These forms have been called, the roots of the verb; and they appear in the first persons of the three first tenses of the indicative mood active, if considered without the pronoun personal and the sign of the third tense. Thus the three forms, "*I name—I named*" "*—I have named*," if considered without the pronoun "*I*," and the last of them also without the sign "*have*," become "*name—named—named*," which are the roots of the verb, from one or other of which all the other forms may be composed, by placing the signs properly with them.

There are about four thousand five hundred verbs in the English language; and of these, four thousand three hundred, at the least, are observed to form these roots after one and the same manner, viz. by the addition of the syllable "*ed*" to the first root: for in all these verbs, the second and third roots are alike. But of the remaining two hundred verbs, some are observed to have all the three roots alike, and some few the first and third, others the second and third alike, but not ending in "*ed*," whilst the rest have all the three roots different from each other.

Now although two hundred verbs are but a very small number in comparison of the rest, which form their roots in a manner so very easy and regular: yet it is observed, that many of these two hundred are of the most frequent use in the language; so that it is of as much consequence to reduce the formation of their roots to some rules, as it is to shew the rule by which the roots of all the rest of the verbs are formed.

It has been proposed, that four conjugations shall be established in the English; and that all the verbs, in which the three roots are the same, shall be considered as of the first conjugation: those in which the first and third root is the same, as of the second conjugation: those in which the second and third are the same, as of the third conjugation: those in which all the three roots are different, as of the fourth conjugation *. But the distinctions above mentioned do not seem to be of sufficient consequence to establish different conjugations upon. For the principal use of a distinction of conjugation is, to direct the learner how to deduce all the forms of the verb from one or two principal forms, which are supposed to be known: yet although it is known, that an English verb is of one of the classes which are considered as of the second, or third, or fourth conjugation; and the first root of the verb is also known: the learner will not, from such knowledge, be able to form the other two roots. And besides, several verbs, whereof the second and third roots do not end in “*ed*,” although they are both alike, will be reduced to the third conjugation, along with the great number of verbs of which the second and third roots always end in “*ed*.”

Thus, the verb “*to stand*” will be of the same conjugation with the verb “*to call*,” or with the verb “*to labour*,” although the first verb makes “*I stand—I stood—I have stood*,” in its three capital tenses, whilst the others make, “*I call—I called—I have called*,” “*I labour—I laboured—I have laboured*,” in the same three tenses. And it is manifest, that the formation of these tenses of the first verb, is made by a different rule from that which is observed in the formation of the same tenses in the two last verbs.

It appears therefore the most suitable to the English language, to establish but one regular conjugation for its verbs; in which conjugation, the second and third root of the verb always ends in “*ed*,” or, what is to the same effect, the first and second pre-

* See Dr. Ward's Four Essays on the English language.

terites of the indicative mood, always end in “*ed*,” in the first person singular ; and to consider all the verbs which do not agree with this conjugation as irregular.

The irregular verbs may be reduced to classes, each class consisting of such verbs as derive their second and third roots from the first, or their third roots from the first or second, nearly by the same kind of variation ; and this proceeding will reduce the English verbs to rule, so far as they are capable of such reduction. This will be much more for the benefit of learners, especially of foreigners, who have principally an occasion for such a help to the memory ; and therefore this proceeding will be made use of in the practical part of this book.

SECTION VIII.

Of the moods of verbs in general.

THESE are different manners of forming expressions of a verbal state considered under its three capital distinctions, of being the object of actual perception, or of memory, or of foresight, for the sake of adding other circumstances to each of these distinctions, by forms of the verb itself.

The simplest of all the moods is the infinitive, in which I also comprehend the participles. For the forms of this mood represent a verbal state under the threefold distinction above mentioned, and no other. The first, or present tense of the mood, and the participle present, either of them expresses a verbal state, as it is, or may be, the object of actual perception ; the second, or preter-tense, and the participle past, express a state as it is, or may be, the object of memory ; and the future tense, as well as the future participle, express a state as it is, or may be, the object of foresight.

The

The other moods (which I shall call the definitive moods) may conveniently enough be reduced to four; the established names of which are, the indicative, the imperative, the potential, and the subjunctive.

I include in the potential mood, those forms of the verb which have been considered as forming certain moods, called the elective, the determinative, the obligative, and the compulsive moods; that is to say, those tenses of the verb which have the signs "*may—might—would—should and must*," as well as those which have the signs "*can and could* *." For the states denoted by the former signs, have a relation to power considered either as permissive, spontaneous, or obligative. And as the distinction of moods in verbs is chiefly established for the convenience of reducing the several forms of verbs to certain classes in teaching, in order to assist the learner's memory; these classes should be reduced to as few as may be consistent with perspicuity; lest instead of assisting the memory, the too great number, and the too great subtlety of the distinctions, should perplex it.

SECTION IX.

Of the moods of verbs in particular.

I BEGIN what I propose to say of each mood in particular, with an account of the infinitive mood, as it is the most simple of them all.

The forms of this mood are called tenses, as the forms of all the other moods are. But these forms do not relate to time estimated by the time of speaking, as the tenses of the other moods do. There is a definitive verb in every sentence, which determines whether the time, to which the sentence relates, is the time of speaking, or some point, or period, preceding, or succeed-

* See Mr. White's Essay on the English verb.

ing the time of speaking. And the situation of the verbal state may be that denoted by any of the tenses of the infinitive mood, at the time, or before the time, or after the time of speaking. For a state may be considered as in continuance, or as capable of being the object of actual perception, or so far as it is over, and consequently a mere object of the memory, or as proposed or foreseen, and consequently as a mere object of future existence, at any time, past, present, or to come. And the being in one of these circumstances, without determining the time when, is the situation under which verbal states are represented by the forms of the infinitive mood, and by the participles; as has been already observed.

Thus, "*to propose such a thing—to have proposed it—to be about to propose it—is—was—or will be—considered as a proof of discernment,*" are all sentences which may be used on some occasions with propriety. So that either the past, present, or future tense of the infinitive mood may be referred to the time of speaking, or to time preceding, or succeeding that time, as it is here referred to the forms "*is—was,* and *will be,*" or as it may be, to the forms of any other definitive verb.

The participles, whether used adjectively, or in coalescence, express verbal states under the same distinctions, not referring to one time more than another.

SECTION X.

Of the definitive moods of verbs in general.

THE verb in every form of each of these moods, gives notice that the composition of the expression of the object, or subject, to which any of these forms is applied, is stopped; and that the whole object, the composition of the expression whereof

whereof is so stopped, is of a certain verbal species, the characteristic of which is the state contained in the signification of the verb.

Every verb in these moods, of consequence, contains in it a declaration concerning some subject; and therefore no verb in any of these moods can be used, without having relation to such subject, either expressed, or understood. So that no definitive verb is complete sense in itself; but requires a subject to be applied to, in order to make it such sense. There are three instances in which this subject is almost constantly understood; as the subject is always the speaker himself. These instances are, "*a question—a command, and a wish.*"

We have shewn already, that a question always depends upon the words, "*I would know, or I would be told,*" or upon some sentence of the same import. And it is equally manifest, that a command always depends upon the words, "*I direct—I ordain —I command,*" or on some sentence of the like import; for if the expression, "*do this,*" be completed, it will amount to the following sentence, "*I direct that you do this;*" and so of any other command. As to a wish, it is a declaration that the coming to pass of such or such things would give the person who wishes pleasure. Hence a wish expressed by "*may or might,*" is nothing more than a declaration, that the person who speaks would receive pleasure, if what he represents as capable of being, actually were. Thus, "*may you succeed,*" is equivalent to the sentence, "*I am desirous, or I am anxious that this representation of you as succeeding should not be attended with any contradiction or hindrance;*" and so of any other wish.

Therefore all the forms of all the definitive moods are declarations made concerning subjects, the composition of the expressions whereof is completely ascertained. But as in every question, command, or wish, the subject is always the speaker himself,

self, it is understood of course; and nothing is actually expressed, but what the question, or command, or wish, is about; only notice is given to understand the sentence which immediately relates to the speaker; by placing the nominative case after the verb, or sign of the verb, in that part of the sentence which is expressed, and which shews that which the question, or command, or wish, is about.

SECTION XI.

Of the definitive moods in particular, and first of the indicative mood.

THIS mood consists of six forms, or tenses, so established, that two of them relate to time present, two to time past, and two to time to come, the present time, by which the time past, and to come, is estimated, being considered as the time of speaking, unless notice is given to the contrary. One of each of these pairs of tenses, in the active voice, represents the verbal state as not compleated, and the other tense of each pair, as compleated in some degree, or as intirely compleated and over.

In the middle, and passive voice, the verbal word which is added to the several forms or tenses of the verb "*to be*," always represents the verbal state denoted by it as the object of actual perception; but two of the tenses of the verb "*to be*" in this mood, relate to time present, two to time past, and two to time to come: and one tense of each pair expresses "*being*," so far as it is past and over at the time to which it relates; and by this means the verbal state expressed by the participial forms as the object of perception, is shewn to have its "*being*" past or over, in time past, present, or to come; which way of representing its "*being*" as past, is of the same effect with representing it as over by another different verbal word; as is done in the second preterite,

preterite, the pluperfect, and second future of the active voice. Thus, "*I have given—I had given—I shall have given,*" are expressions nearly equivalent to, "*I have been giving—I had been giving—I shall have been giving.*" This will be more particularly shewn, when we come to speak of the tenses separately.

Of the imperative mood.

THIS mood, as is already shewn, is only a set of forms established to express what the speaker enjoins, or directs, in an expeditious manner; by giving notice to the hearer to understand the sentence which should express the speaker's intention to direct or enjoin, whilst he only declares what the direction or injunction is about.

An entreaty, or prayer, is expressed by the forms of this mood, as well as a command. For an entreaty agrees with a command in this, that both equally signify what the speaker would have to be, or to be done, or to be granted. But the persons to whom commands are given, are supposed to be such as the speaker can compel, or oblige to fulfill his injunctions; whereas, the persons to whom entreaties are used, are supposed to be such as the speaker cannot compel, or oblige "*to be*" or "*do,*" what he signifies he would have "*to be*" or "*to be done.*"

A mere question may be put into the form of this mood; as in the expression, "*tell me who that gentleman is;*" for indeed a question is, in its nature, either a command, or an entreaty, to give an answer to it.

Of the potential mood.

THE import of the signs of this mood will confirm the account which is given above of the nature of verbal states; for it is apparent, that the signs "*shall—will*" (from which "*should*" and "*would*"

"*would*" are derived) "*can—may*" and "*must*," each of them denotes a state which may be expressed by words that have no verb in them. As for instance, "*shall*" denotes any state which is analogous to a state of compulsion; "*will*," any state analogous to a state of volition; "*can*," any state analogous to a state of ability; "*may*," any state analogous to a state of freedom from contradiction; "*must*," any state analogous to a state of inevitable necessity. But when these states are expressed by substantives alone, or by substantives with other words depending on them, the principle by which the states exist cannot be communicated to them occasionally, and with-held occasionally. Whereas, the principle by which they exist, when they are expressed by these verbal forms, "*shall—will—can—may*" and "*must*," may be destroyed at pleasure by the negative "*not*;" as, "*shall not—will not—cannot—may not—must not*;" and likewise may be restored at pleasure; as, "*you shall not, you shall—you will not, you will*;" and so of other instances. The states denoted by these signs are likewise characteristics of species. For any object with "*shall*" depending upon its name, is in a situation analogous to that of "*an object compelled*;" any object with "*will*," to that of "*an object willing*," or "*intending*;" any object with "*can*," to that of "*an object enabled*;" any object with "*may*," to that of "*an object freed from contradiction*;" any object with "*must*," to that of "*an object necessitated*." The states denoted by these signs, as likewise by "*could—might—should—would*," are all definitive, *i. e.* they all give notice, that composition of the expression on which any of them depends is compleated, and that the state denoted by the sign, affects the whole object that is denoted by the expression, which is compleated as to its composition, and on which the sign depends. These signs are therefore real definitive verbs, but are considered only as signs, because they are seldom used alone, but with another verbal form depending on them. The verbal forms which depend upon these signs, are the present and past tenses of the infinitive mood, without the sign "*to*;" and when these forms are used in dependence

dence on the signs "*can—may*," &c. they denote states merely as imagined, or foreseen, or remembered, or some way collected by induction from the states which are denoted by the signs, or from other circumstances. Thus in the expression, "*I can read*," the state of ability denoted by "*can*," is a state actually existing at the time in which the words are spoke; but the state of "*reading*" is not in actual existence, although it may be brought into immediate existence, if the person denoted by "*I*" exerts his ability, by performing the act of reading. And in the expression, "*the letters may be come*," "*the letters being come*," is only an imagined present state. And "*may*" shews, that nothing is perceived which contradicts the reality of what is only imagined. In the expression, "*you may go*," it is manifest that "*your going*" is a consequence of the state of freedom from contradiction that is granted to "*you*" by the word "*may*;" so that the state "*go*" is a kind of future state, or a consequence foreseen, of the state of freedom from contradiction that is granted. But as this consequence will most probably immediately ensue upon the leave granted, it is considered as an object of actual perception, as much as the state denoted by "*may*," on which it depends. If a state, considered as past, depends upon "*may*," it is usually an imagined state, and not one actually remembered; as when it is said, "*such a thing may have been*," the thing is imagined as existing in time past, and it is asserted that what is imagined, is not attended with any contradictory circumstance. So if a verb of the present form of the infinitive mood depends upon "*must*," the state denoted by it is either imagined, and such circumstances are perceived to attend it, as induce a necessity of looking upon what is imagined as a certainty: or the state is a consequence inevitable of some reason given, or to be given; or of something understood, though not mentioned. Thus in the expression, "*they must be at their journey's end by this time*." Their state of being is only imaginary in the speaker; but he has such reasons for what he only imagines, that the imagined consequence appears to him as necessarily true. So in the expression,

"*you must go*," "*your going*," is represented as unavoidable, but as a state foreseen, and not actually present. If a verb of the past form depends upon "*must*," the state denoted by it is imagined as having existed in time past; and some reasons expressed, or understood, make what is only imagined, appear necessarily true; as in the expression, "*things must have miscarried*."

The states, "*should—would—could—might*," in some applications of them, express the states denoted by "*shall—will—can—may*," as merely remembered; and in other applications they express imagined states which depend upon them as less certain, or less probable than those states are represented, when they depend upon the signs, "*shall—will—can—may*." The signs, "*should—would*," &c. are used in the former sense in such expressions as the following; "*he said that he should—would—could—might do this or that*." For the words which he really spoke were, "*I shall—will—can—may do this or that*." But as what is said, is considered as merely remembered some time after he said it, the states which he denoted by the present forms, "*shall—will—can—may*," are now considered as past, and therefore are now denoted by "*should—would—could—might*." So in the expressions, "*this might be done formerly*," "*but must not be done now—I could do this yesterday, but cannot now—they would do thus in spite of what I could say*." The states denoted by "*might—could*," and "*would*," are the states "*may—can—will*," considered as past, or as merely remembered at the time of speaking. These signs are used in the latter sense in such expressions as, "*they should—would—could—might be at such a place*;" for "*their being at such a place*," is only an imagined state, considered as less certain, or probable than it would be, if it were said, "*they shall—will—can—may be at at such a place*." When the past form of the infinitive mood depends on these signs, the state expressed is usually altogether imaginary, and never has an actual existence; for if I say, "*he could—might—would—should have done this or that*," I

in effect say that it is not really done. Thus much may be sufficient to shew the general nature of this mood : I have said more of it than of the other moods, because the imaginary nature of the dependent states concerned in it, and the very extensive nature of the states denoted by its signs, occasion the forms of which it consists, to be applied in a great variety of meanings, and oftentimes in a very indefinite meaning.

Of the subjunctive mood.

THIS mood has little or no variation of person ; and the forms of the first persons of its tenses are not much different from the correspondent tenses of the indicative mood, except in the verb “ *to be*,” which has in its present tense “ *I be*,” and in its first preterite “ *I were*.” This mood is now little used, the indicative being substituted in its place : yet the best English writers have usually subjoined the forms of it to expressions depending on the words, “ *before—ere—* (used as a kind of conjunctions) *except—howsoever or however—if—lest—so—though or* “ *although—till or until—unless—whether—whosoever or whoever* “ *—whatsoever or whatever ;*” so that the mood must be retained in the form of conjugation, though its tenses are no way different in signification from the corresponding tenses of the indicative mood.

S E C T I O N XII.

Of the tenses of verbs.

THESE have been explained, in a great measure, in what is said of the nature of the verb in general, and of the several moods in particular to which the tenses belong. Indeed nothing more remains to be said concerning the tenses of the infinitive mood, and the participles.

The tenses of the other moods may be much illustrated, by resolving the tenses of the indicative mood of any simple verb (such as the verb "*to have*") by the tenses of the verb "*to be*," in the manner following.

The first person of the tenses themselves. The tenses resolved:

Present	<i>I have</i>	<i>I am having</i>
First preterite	<i>I had</i>	<i>I was having</i>
First future	<i>I shall have</i>	<i>I shall be having</i>
Second preterite	<i>I have had</i>	<i>I am having had</i>
Pluperfect	<i>I had had</i>	<i>I was having had</i>
Second future	<i>I shall have had</i>	<i>I shall be having had</i>

The three last tenses may likewise be resolved in the following manner.

Second preterite	<i>I have had</i>	<i>I have been having</i>
Pluperfect	<i>I had had</i>	<i>I had been having</i>
Second future	<i>I shall have had</i>	<i>I shall have been having</i>

By observing these tenses thus resolved, it appears that the present represents the state "*having*" as an object of actual perception, or as in continuance, at the present time (*i. e.* at the time in which the words "*I have*" are spoke) and that the power of the definitive verb "*am*," included in "*have*," represents the speaker as in being at that time.

The first preterite as resolved into "*I was having*," represents the state of "*having*" as an object of actual perception in time past, which time is denoted by the definitive verb "*was*," representing the speaker as in being at that time. But the word "*had*" may be likewise considered as denoting the state of "*having*" as a mere object not of actual perception at the time of speaking. Hence this tense has an indefinite meaning. For it may either denote a state as in continuance at some

some time past, or as finished and over at the time present, or as not actually perceived at any time.

The first future represents the state of "*having*," as an object of actual perception at some time not come when the words of the tense are spoke.

The other three tenses may each of them be resolved two ways; that is to say, by considering either the state "*having had*" as an object of mere memory, *i. e.* as past and over, and by referring this state to time present by "*I am*," to time past by "*I was*," and to time to come by "*I shall be*:" or by considering the state "*having*" as in continuance, and referring it to time ended at present by "*I have been*," or to time ended at some time past by "*I had been*," or to time considered as ended at some future period, by "*I shall have been*."

Which way soever these three tenses are resolved, the first of them, or preterperfect tense, or second preterite (for it is called by both these names) has relation to present time: and therefore it is never used to refer a state to any period of time that is quite over when the tense is spoke; as for instance, we do not say "*they have had success last year—a month ago—yesterday*," &c. because "*last year—a month ago—yesterday*," are periods of time quite ended when the words are spoke. But the first preterite, as being an indefinite tense, is used on such occasions; as in the expressions, "*they had success last year—a month ago—yesterday*," &c. and we say, "*they have had success—this year—this month—to-day*," &c. because these periods of time are present when the words are spoke.

There are two forms of each of the English future tenses; the one form by "*will*," and the other by "*shall*."

"Will"

"*Will*" denotes a future state, which some person determines concerning himself; but a state which he only foresees, believes, hopes, fears, supposes, or is told concerning other persons or objects.

"*Shall*" denotes a future state which some person only foresees, believes, hopes, fears, supposes, or is told, concerning himself; but a state which he determines concerning other persons or objects.

In sentences used on common occasions, if no mention is made of the person who determines the future state, or of him who foresees, believes, &c. such state; this person is understood to be the same who speaks each sentence, and who of consequence himself, singly, or united with others, bears the first person. Therefore the sentences, "*I—we will go*," "*you—he—they shall stay*," are equivalent to, "*I—we who speak determine to go*," "*I—we who speak determine that you—he—they stay*."

But the sentences, "*I—we shall go*," "*you—he—they will stay*," are equivalent to, "*I—we who speak foresee, hope, fear, &c. our going*," and "*your—his—their staying*."

In poetic or sublime language, the words, "*it is irrevocably determined*," or some words of the like import, are frequently left to be understood from the nature of the stile and subject. Thus, in the Psalms, "*they (i. e. the heavens and the earth) shall perish, but thou (i. e. O God) shalt endure*;" that is to say, "*it is irrevocably determined that they shall perish*," &c.

In compound sentences, if the words, "*it is determined—ordained—decreed—resolved*," or other words of like import, be actually mentioned in connexion with a sentence containing a future state, the form by "*shall*" is always used; as, "*it is determined—ordained, &c. that I—you—he—we—they shall succeed*."

In compound sentences, if a person is represented as determining or fixing his own future state, "*will*" is used; if the future state of other persons or objects, "*shall*" is used.

As, "*I determine that I will go—that you—be—they shall stay,*" "*John determines—resolves that he will go—that you—James, or any other person, shall stay.*"

If in such sentences a person is represented as foreseeing, believing, fearing, hoping, supposing, his own future state; or declaring what he is told of it, "*shall*" is used; if as foreseeing, believing, &c. or as declaring what he is told of the future state of others, "*will*" is used; as, "*I foresee—fear—hope—am told, &c. that I shall go—that you—be—they will stay,*" "*John foresees—fears—hopes—is told, &c. that he shall go—that you—James, or any other person or object, but himself and I will stay.*"

Hence these rules follow for the consistent application of "*will* and *shall*."

1. If the person who is represented as declaring a future state, or as having his thoughts declared, is both himself in the state, and likewise determines it; or if he is neither himself in the state, nor determines it, "*will*" is used.

As, "*I will go—you say you will stay—John determines—resolves he will return.*" Here "*I—you and John,*" each declares a state which himself is in, and also determines.

"*The stone will fall—John says that James will be undone, or John believes—hopes—is told, &c. that James will be undone,*" Here "*I,*" who make the declaration concerning the stone, am neither in the state, "*will fall,*" nor determine it; and John, who is represented as making the declaration, or having his thoughts declared concerning James, is neither in the state "*will be undone,*" nor determines it.

2. If the person who is represented as making a declaration, or as having his thoughts declared, concerning a future state, is either himself in it, but does not determine it, or is not himself in it, but does determine it, "*shall*" is used.

As, "*I shall go—you say that you shall stay—John fears that he shall be undone.*"

Here "*I—you and John,*" are each in the future states which themselves are represented as declaring, or as those whose thoughts are declared; but they do not themselves determine the states, but some other person, or the course of things does it.

"*You shall go—you say that he shall stay—John determines that James shall be undone.*"

Here "*I,*" who make the declaration concerning "*you,*" am not in the state "*shall go,*" but I determine it; "*you,*" who make the declaration concerning "*him,*" are not in the state "*shall stay;*" but you determine it; and "*John,*" whose determination is declared concerning "*James,*" is not in the state "*shall be undone,*" but he determines it.

These rules account for the change of signs, when two persons repeat the same thing with regard to future states. Thus my friend comes to me, and says, "*you will be punished:*" if I tell this to another person, I do it in these words, "*my friend tells me that I shall be punished.*" The reason of this is, that my friend is not himself in the future state of punishment, but I am, and we neither of us determine it; therefore he expresses a future state, which he is neither in, nor determines by "*will;*" but I am in it, and do not determine it, therefore I express it by "*shall.*" Had the magistrate, who determines the state, declared it to me, the words would have been, "*you shall be punished;*" because he determines the state, and is not in it. If I tell these words again, I still say, "*the magistrate tells me that I shall be punished;*" for I am in the state as I was before, and do not determine it any more than I did before.

"*Would* and *should*" are applied on the same principles with "*will* and *shall*," only in compound sentences they depend on the first preterite or pluperfect; as, "*I said I would—you—be should go;*" "*he had foreseen that he should—they would go;*" and so of other instances.

It is manifest, that in the tenses of the indicative mood, the verbal state is always considered as in actual continuance at some time, past, present, or to come, or as actually past and over at some time, past, present, or to come.

So that the state considered as merely "*about to be*," or as any other ways barely contingent, is not taken notice of in the tenses of this mode. Nor does this mood express the state as under an inevitable necessity of existence at any time; and yet it is frequently required to consider, and to express a verbal state as in these situations.

The forms of the imperative and potential mood, are introduced as supplements to the indicative, being intended to express verbal states, either as in contingent situations, or as in a situation of inevitable necessity.

I have hitherto considered the tenses of the indicative mood as they are applied to real states. For when they are used to express states considered as merely imagined, or supposed, the present tense expresses a state as probably existing at the time of speaking, and the first preterite a state as not probably existing at that time, although it is then supposed. Thus, "*if he does this or that, he is to be blamed*," shews that the supposition "*he does this or that*" may probably be true; but "*if he did this or that, he would be blamed*," shews, that "*his doing this or that*" is probably not a true supposition. And, as the first preterite is an indefinite tense, the supposition may relate to past, present, or future time. The second preterite, in suppositions, expresses a state

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that

that has probably been; as, "*if he has done so, I commend him,*" shews, that he probably has done so. But the pluperfect expresses a state that probably has not been; as, "*if he had done so, I should commend him,*" shews, that he very probably has not done so. It is true, that the indefinite states, "*would be blamed*" "*—should commend him,*" contribute much to shew the uncertainty of the premised suppositions on which they depend. But still the tenses, or forms, "*he did—be had done,*" must be in themselves of an indefinite signification; for otherwise no consequences that follow from them could make them so.

Of the tenses of the imperative mood.

THERE usually appears but one tense in this mood, which is called the present tense, although the verbal state to which the tense relates, in almost all commands and entreaties, exists in time posterior to that in which the command is given, or the entreaty made. For what is commanded, or entreated, is usually to be effected after the command is given, or the entreaty is used; yet a command may be given concerning a state in actual existence; as when one person bids another keep in the same posture in which he is; and so of other instances. Also a supposition may be made concerning the state of an object at some time past; and the speaker may enjoin or entreat those to whom he speaks, to look upon the supposition as true, or to take it for granted. And this sometimes occasions a verb of a past tense to appear in the imperative form; as in the expression, "*let him have been perverse, let him have been indiscreet, still he deserves pardon,*" *i. e.* let it be taken for granted, that he has been perverse, &c.

In all commands or entreaties, the state commanded, or entreated, must be contingent; *i. e.* capable of being, or not being, as the command or entreaty expresses it. For it is to no purpose to use commands or entreaties concerning states which are not capable of being, or not being, as the commands or entreaties express them, and that at the pleasure of the object entreated or commanded.

Of

Of the tenses of the potential mood.

I HAVE, in a great measure, shewn the general nature of the several states denoted by the signs of the tenses of this mood, in the account which is given of the mood.

It is necessary to distinguish particularly in the use of this mood, when the forms of it are applied to express real states, and when only imaginary ones. For as the tenses of the indicative mood, when applied to the latter purpose, do not preserve the precise distinctions of time past, present, and to come, as estimated by the time of speaking, so neither do the tenses of this mood, when applied for the like purpose.

“*Shall*” and “*will*” must be considered as signs of the present tense of this mood, as well as of the future of the indicative. For when it is said, “*you shall be as you are—you will be as you are,*” the state denoted by “*shall*” is manifestly a present state of compulsion; and that denoted by “*will*,” a present state of volition; and so of many other instances of the use of “*shall*” and “*will*.” The signs, “*can—may—shall—will—must,*” when they signify real states, and have the present form of the infinitive mood after them, all relate to the time beginning with the present; as, “*I can—may—shall—will—must do this or that—this instant—to-morrow—next year,*” &c. The same signs with the past form of the infinitive mood, relate to time ending before, or with the present; as, “*he cannot—may not—shall not —will not—must not have done this or that, though you say he has.*”

The signs “*could—might—should—would,*” with the present of the infinitive mood, represent the depending state as in continuance, whensoever the states denoted by “*could—might—should—would,*” have the same effect with the states denoted by “*can—may—shall—will.*” Therefore these forms relate to any time, past, present, or to come. To the past, as, “*they could —might—would do this yesterday, but can—may—will not do it*

"*now*;" and when speaking of a past state, we say, "*he ordered that all things should be so or so*;" though his order really was, "*all things shall be so or so*." As to the present and future, these forms are continually referred to them; as, "*he could—might—should—would do this or that—this instant—to-morrow—next year*," &c.

As to these forms, when used with the past of the infinitive mood, they represent the depending state as over, whensoever the states denoted by "*could—might—should—would*," have the same effect with those denoted by "*can—may—shall—will*;" as, "*I could—might—should—would have done this or that last year—now—next year*." Hence all the tenses in which the state of the infinitive verb depends on "*could—might*," &c. are indefinite tenses, as the first preterite, and pluperfect, of the indicative mood are.

Of the tenses of the subjunctive mood.

I HAVE hitherto chiefly considered the definitive forms of verbs, as they may be used in sentences, each of which has no more than one definitive verb in it. But definitive clauses are continually inserted into other sentences as dependent members thereof, by being turned in relative clauses, in the manner already described. And definitive sentences are likewise continually made to express mere circumstances modifying other sentences, by being placed in dependence on conjunctions, or other words which have the force of a relative pronoun, or of a conjunction in them: such as, "*before—except—lest—however*," &c. It has been already observed, that the forms of the subjunctive mood are never used but in dependence on such words, and therefore a verb in this mood is never the principal verb of a sentence, as a verb in the indicative, imperative, and potential mood, may be. Therefore the forms of the subjunctive mood are constantly used to express states as merely imagined, or conceptions some way less ascertained than those are, which are either the result of actual perception, or of memory, or of de-

termined

terminated purpose, or actual obligation. But the indefinite tenses of the indicative and potential moods, are likewise capable of being used for the same purposes; and as the tenses of these moods relate to the same times to which the tenses of the subjunctive mood relate, this last mood is not of absolute necessity. The whole plan of the English language is formed with a constant view to simplicity; for few or no varieties are admitted into it merely for the sake of diversity of cadence, when the precision of sense is no ways promoted by such diversity. Hence the subjunctive mood never was much used in English, and seems to be growing more and more into disuse, the indicative being substituted for it.

All the indefinite tenses of all the moods are peculiarly proper for suppositions; and, when they are so used, the nominative case is often set after the verb, or the sign, and “*if*” is omitted; as, “*did he consider—had he considered—could he—might he—should he—would he consider his own good, he could not do or have done this or that,*” i. e. “*if he considered—if he had considered,*” &c. These forms of construction are likewise used in questions, as has been already observed, when such questions are made by way of supposition: only when a question is asked in this manner, the person who asks it would be told whether the affirmative, or negative of the supposition, is true; and this part of the speaker’s meaning is shewn by joining no clause to the supposition, by which a question is asked. Thus, “*did he consider his own good?*” may be a question; and the answer to it may be “*yes*” or “*no*.” But when suppositions are either made by “*if*,” or by placing the nominative case after the verb, or sign of the verb, some sentence is always connected with them; such as, “*he could not do this or that,*” in the example above. For why should suppositions be made, but to shew what follows from, or is some way connected with them, seeing a mere supposition gives no information? If therefore the speaker can shew what is connected with his supposition, he does it by an additional sentence:

if

if not, it is a notice that he expects the hearer will do it, by adding “*yes*,” or “*no*,” or “*I do not know*,” or some such expression, by way of answer. A wish, when expressed by “*may*,” with the nominative case after it, is likewise a supposition, which would please the speaker if it were a reality; and therefore it admits of the same form of construction that the supposition of a question does. But it is shewn to require no answer by some demonstrative circumstance; as the tone of voice in which it is uttered: or by some circumstances, either actually expressed as attending the wish, or left to be supplied by what is said or done before the wish is expressed.

Thus much may be sufficient for explaining the general nature and use of the tenses of the several moods: some particularities of construction, in which they are applied in the English, will be taken notice of in the practical part of this work.

SECTION XIII.

Of the persons of verbs.

THE distinctions upon which the different persons of verbs are founded, arise solely from the use of language itself, and relate to the distinctions of the several species denoted by the personal pronouns, as these distinctions are in the objects on which the verbs depend. And as in English the personal pronoun is almost constantly applied to the names of objects of the first and second person, both singular and plural, whilst objects of the third person are applied in both numbers without the personal pronoun: there is no absolute necessity for a variation in the personal forms of the verb itself. Hence the subjunctive mood in the English has little or no variation of this kind. But as it is convenient to have the object which is the principal in the subject of what is said, ascertained as precisely as possible; the other definitive moods have a distinction of persons in the

singular number; so that it may be known from the termination of the verb alone in these moods, what person the singular object bears to which the verb is applied. By this means the distinction between single objects engaged in the discourse as speaking, and spoken to, is more effectually kept up, in the subjects of sentences, and of relative clauses, than if the verb had not this distinction of persons; and both these personages are kept distinct from objects which are only brought into the discourse, as the materials thereof, and not as bearing personage, in the discourse itself: consequently, the discourse is more determinate than it would be, without such diversity of termination in the persons of the definitive verb. But if objects, between which the discourse is carried on, be of the plural number, their persons are only distinguished in this language by the personal pronouns, “we” and “ye” or “you,” being added, the first to the name of the plural object speaking, and the second to the name of the plural object spoken to, and not by the termination of the persons of the verb in the plural number.

S E C T I O N X I V .

Of the verbs which are used as signs of the tenses of other verbs.

THESE make so very considerable a part of all the compound tenses of the English verb, that the use and import of them must be particularly accounted for in a treatise of this kind.

These verbs are usually called auxiliar verbs, and some of them (as I think) are used in the conjugating of verbs in all the languages of Europe; at least verbs equivalent to “*have—had*” and “*having*,” are used as auxiliars in the French language: and M. Du Marfais, a most able grammarian, is of opinion, that they have been introduced into that language from a corruption of

of the Latin. "For, says he, the following phrases translated literally, will shew the verbs "*have*" and "*had*" applied exactly as these auxiliars are in French."

"Quæ nos nostramque adolescentiam habent despiciatam ;"
Who us and our youth have despised.

"Cæsar præmisit equitatum omnem quem ex omni provinciâ coactum habebat ;" *Cæsar sent before, all the horse which he had gathered from the whole province.*

Now the first of these expressions really signifies, "*who hold us and our youth in contempt* ;" and the second, "*Cæsar sent all the horse gathered from the whole province which he had*," i. e. which horse he had.

The verbs "*habent*" and "*habebant*" are used in their proper signification of "*holding*" or "*having*," in these instances ; and "*us and our youth*" are "*the objects held*," in the first instance ; and "*the horse gathered from the whole province*" is "*the object had, or possessed*," in the second. In process of time, as M. Du Marlais thinks, the notion of "*having*," or "*possessing*," was transferred by an abuse, or metaphor, to such states denoted by verbs, as are compleated or past ; so that a person was considered as "*having*" any state which he had actually passed through, in the same manner as he possesses his watch, or any thing else which is secured to him as his property.

Now it seems to be evident, that the notion of being secured to an object, in the nature of a fixed possession, first occasioned the verbs "*have—had*," and "*having*" to be applied, as signs, to past verbal states. For no part of these states can be conceived as secured to any object, till that object has actually passed through such part : because these states are occasional, and whatsoever part or period of such a state is not actually concluded, is unsecure. Whereas, such parts or periods as are come to an

end in any object, are experienced fully, or "*bad*" by such object.

But it is very probable that this application of the forms above mentioned of the verbs "*to have*," did not come into the French language from a corruption of the Latin. At least it is clear, that it did not come into the English language from that source; but from the form of conjugation of the Saxon verb, which form, the conjugation of the English verb imitates in all its parts. Now the Saxon, for any thing that appears to the contrary, is as old as the Latin; and is much more simple in its construction. Hence, when the northern nations spread themselves over Europe, and the simplicity of the formation of the parts of their language came to be perceived; it is no wonder that this formation should be adopted, instead of the complex formation of the tenses of the Latin verb, which is so various, as well as that of the cases of nouns, that it may be justly matter of surprise, how such a language could ever be generally spoke by any people, who had not made the speaking of it some part of the course of science in which every youth was to be instructed.

As the formers of the Saxon language applied by an easy metaphor the present tense of the verb "*habban, to have*," in order to denote a verbal state finished at the present time, and the first preterite of the same verb, to denote a verbal state finished at some time past; by the like kind of metaphor, they proceed to apply the same two tenses of the verbs "*ſceoldan, to owe, or to stand obliged*;" "*willan, to will, or resolve*;" and "*magan, to be able*," to express future states considered either as under some present obligation to come to pass in time to come, or as the result of the present determination, or of the present ability of some agent; as is done by our auxiliary verbs, "*ſhall—will—may*," which answer to the present tenses of the verbs above mentioned: or if they chose to express future states as less certain of coming to pass, they used the preterimperfect tenses, or first preterites, as they are now usually called, of the same verbs, which answer to our auxiliary verbs, "*ſhould—*

E c

" *would*

"*would—might.*" The prosecution of analogy has extended the application of these signs to objects which cannot be in the state denoted by the literal meaning of each ; as when we say, "*the work shall stop—a stone will fall—iron may break,*" we do not mean, that the work is under an obligation to stop, of the same nature with that in which a debtor stands to his creditor ; or that the stone is determined to fall, as a man determines his will, or forms a resolution ; or that the iron is in a state of ability to break, as a man, or a living creature, has the ability to do, or not to do, a thing at pleasure. Nevertheless, there is an analogy between the states "*of obligation*" and "*of resolution*" and "*of capacity*" in men ; and the states in which "*the work—the stone*" and "*the iron*" are. And this analogy is sufficient to warrant the application of the signs in the large extent of acceptance in which they are here used. Indeed the termination of a particular tense in the Latin, and Greek, is taken in the same latitude of signification, and oftentimes in a greater than that in which the sign of the same tense is taken in English : only the termination of a Latin or Greek tense has no signification in itself. Whereas, the literal signification of the signs of the *English* tenses, has a remote analogy to what each of these signs signifies, when used in the compound tenses of other verbs ; and this analogy contributes to the ease of learning how to use them with propriety. It is true, the use of the auxiliar verbs prevents the English verb from having that variety of cadence which the Latin and Greek verbs have. But it promotes the perspicuity and ease of applying the language, which is the principal point that the formers of it seem to have attended to ; as being indeed the principal excellence of any language.

The signs "*do*" and "*did*" manifestly denote the exertion of the effort, by which action is produced at some time, present or past. But, by analogy, they are also prefixed to verbal states which require no exertion of effort ; as, "*I do resemble—theu didst suffer,*" &c.

“*Let*” supposes the person or object to which a command is given, to with-hold some other object from being in the state which the person who commands, requires. But it is applied also by analogy to various instances, where no with-holding is actually observed; as in the expressions, “*let the medicine be compounded of such and such ingredients—let care be taken of such and such things.*”

The sign “*to*” is not a verb; yet it appears with the Saxon verb in the infinitive mood, but (as I think) only when it is used like a noun substantive in some oblique case. The reason of making the same particle which is the sign of the dative case of a substantive, also the sign of the infinitive mood of the verb, seems to be, the very frequent application of the verb in this mood, to denote a state which is the object whither some other verbal state is to be pursued in the mind; as also whither some state denoted by a substantive, is to be pursued. This notice, as has already been observed, is given by the sign of the dative case; and the infinitive mood of a verb, in some applications of it, is in a situation so very similar to that of a substantive in this case, that it cannot be known from a substantive, till other words are added to the series. Thus in the expressions, “*a disposition to study—to incline to study,*” it cannot be certainly known, whether “*to study*” is a noun substantive of the dative case, or a verb of the infinitive mood. But in the expressions, “*a disposition to study the mathematics—to incline to study the classics,*” it quickly appears, that “*to study*” is a verb of the infinitive mood.

The verb “*to be,*” which is applied in all its moods and tenses in the formation of the middle, and passive voices of the English verb, may be considered as an auxiliar in these voices, and particularly in the passive voice. Seeing, in that voice, it not only gives notice of the situation of the state denoted by the participle joined with it, as to that state being in continuance, or not completed, or as partly or intirely completed and over; whilst in the definitive moods it refers the state thus circumstantiated, to time past, present, or to come: but it likewise shews, in far the greatest

number of English verbs, that the state denoted by the participle, is that which corresponds with the state denoted by the participle in "*ing*" of the same verb. Whereas, a verbal word, which is the very same with the passive participle, when not used with some form of the verb "*to be*," denotes, in these verbs, not a state which corresponds with the participial state in "*ing*," but a state which actually contains the participial state in "*ing*" in it. Thus, "*I struck*," is equivalent to "*I was striking*;" but "*I am struck*," is equivalent to "*I am the recipient of the effect of striking*;" and so of all the other past tenses of the active voice of very many verbs, if compared with the past tenses of the passive voice of the same verbs. So that the use of the forms of the verbs "*to be*," in the formation of the passive verb, ascertains the very nature of the state denoted by the verbal word or participle, which is used with these forms, in completing much the greatest number of passive verbs, in their several moods and tenses.

Hence it comes to pass, that in far the greatest number of English verbs, the same participial form of the verb may be used in expressing either of the corresponding states (that is, either the active or the passive state) in all the past tenses; by forbearing to use the auxiliar forms of the verb "*to be*," when an active sense is intended; and by using these auxiliars, when a passive sense is intended. Thus, "*I have loved—I had loved—I shall have loved—I may have loved*," are active expressions; and "*I have been loved—I had been loved—I shall have been loved—I may have been loved*," are the correspondent passive expressions.

There is nothing to be added concerning the use of the signs in the middle voice; seeing they are the very same with the signs in the passive voice.

As to the manner of forming the English verb; that is to say, the method by which the roots are discovered when one or more of them is known; and when these roots are found, how to compose the tenses of the several moods from them; this relates intirely to the practical part of grammar, and is accordingly treated of in the practical part of this book. • A Spe-

A Speculative Grammar.

B O O K V.

S E C T I O N I.

Of the adverb.

THIS part of speech usually denotes a conception which may be expressed by an oblique case of a noun substantive: but when such conception is expressed by an adverb, notice is given, that the conception is intended to modify some quality denoted by an adjective, or some state denoted by a verb which is placed in construction with the adverb; whilst the conception itself, denoted by the adverb, is not usually intended to be modified by any substantive in an oblique case, or any adjective, participle, or relative clause, being made to depend upon the adverb.

It is obvious to perceive, that the sense of an adverb may be expressed by some of the forms of a substantive in the ablative case, in almost any sentence. Thus, "*very good*" is in effect "*good in verity,*" or "*in reality;*" "*to act wisely—to act with wisdom;*" "*to go hastily—to go in haste,*" &c.

But if the conception, usually expressed by an adverb, is at any time expressed by the case of a substantive of an equivalent signifi-

signification; that conception may, if the speaker pleases, be farther modified by some connective word made to depend on the substantive; as appears in the expressions, "*good in perfect reality—to act with infinite wisdom—to go in haste continually increasing.*" These modifications by other dependent words, can very seldom be applied when an adverb is made use of; and therefore this circumstance depending merely on the established custom of a particular language, together with the grammatical form of the adverb, are the only particulars which distinguish most of the adverbs from an oblique case of a noun substantive, or from a preposition with a substantive depending upon it; but several kinds of words, such as "*yes and no,*" and the relative words, "*how—why,*" &c. are commonly ranked amongst adverbs; as likewise all sorts of words which fall under no other part of speech. A noun substantive often takes "*more*" and "*most,*" which are the marks of the comparative and superlative degrees of comparison, in construction with it; and the adverb does the same; as, "*wisely*" "*—more wisely—most wisely.*"

It has been observed already, that the import of an adjective may very frequently be expressed by a noun substantive in an oblique case. When this happens, and such an adjective is placed in construction without any word depending upon it to modify its signification, such adjective may be considered as approaching to the nature of an adverb. Thus, "*he told me true,*" is equivalent to "*he told me truly;*" and instances are continually occurring of the like kind of construction.

The names of parts of time, are almost constantly applied in the construction of the English language, as adverbs; although without an adverbial termination, or the sign of an oblique case, or other particle, prefixed. Thus we say, "*I have been reading all this day,*" in which expression, the object "*this day*" has not the passive state in it correspondent with the active state "*reading;*" as, "*this book*" (for instance) has in the expression, "*I have*"

"*I have been reading all this book;*" so that "*all this day*" is an adverbial expression, requiring some preposition, such as "*during,*" or "*through,*" to make the sense complete. In like manner, in the expression, "*I was last year at such a place;*" "*last year*" is not another name of the person denoted by "*I,*" so as to shew in what species of objects the person "*was;*" but one of the prepositions "*in,*" or "*during,*" must be understood to make the sense complete.

There is no danger of ambiguity in omitting the sign of a case, or other preposition, in this particular instance of construction of the names of parts of time; because when objects, which are not parts of time, are referred to them; it easily appears, that the reference is not made, in order to ascertain the species of "*that which is—was,*" or "*will be;*" but the period of duration, "*when*" such or such an object "*is—was,*" or "*will be.*"

It easily appears from these observations, that the same use of the judgment must be made in applying an adverb consistently to an adjective, or a verb, which is made, in applying an oblique case, or an adjective, consistently to a substantive, or to a verb; the principles of application being exactly the same in all the instances: and when these parts of speech are applied consistently to each other; there is the same degree of judgment required in the hearer, or reader, to determine the nature of the coalescence, when the adverb is applied, as when an oblique case, or an adjective is applied. Thus, the object "*fury*" is equally concerned in the conceptions denoted by the expressions "*to fight furiously*" and "*to look furiously;*" but the "*fury of fighting*" is of one kind, and the "*fury of looking*" is of another; and the manner in which "*fury*" attends "*fighting*" is different from the manner in which it attends "*looking.*" And the judgment of the hearer or reader of the words above mentioned, must determine these circumstances, from the nature of the states "*to fight*" and "*to look,*" to which the same adverb "*furiously*" is applied, in both the expressions. As

As adverbs are applied with adjectives, which are coalescent parts of speech, in order to ascertain more fully the nature of the coalescence which is to be attended to in particular instances of the application of adjectives : for the same reason, one adverb may be applied to another adverb, in order to ascertain more fully the degree of the coalescent object intended to be denoted by both the adverbs taken together ; as in the expressions, “ *a thing very much awry—to do quite wrong,*” &c.

There are some adverbs in almost every language which do not appear to be derived from any substantive or adjective, in the language. “ *Anon—ago—quite—now,*” and some few more are such adverbs in the English language, which may be called primitive, or original adverbs. But far the greatest number of them are derived from substantives or adjectives ; and very many of the adverbs, in English, are formed immediately from an adjective, by adding the syllable “ *ly*” to it ; as, “ *wise—wisely,*” “ *foolish—foolishly,*” &c.

SECTION II.

Of the conjunction.

THE conjunctions are either notices of such situations and circumstances amongst expressions of conceptions concerned in sentences, as would require some one or more words to be repeated in a sentence, in order to express the sentence at large : or they are additional notices, either of certain modes of thought, by which one sentence expressed at large, is formed, so as to have dependence upon another sentence likewise expressed at large ; or of the purpose for which one such sentence is placed in dependence upon another, or of other circumstances of connexion, which cannot be taken notice of in the sentences themselves.

When conjunctions are used with the first of the intentions aforesaid, they are considered as joining words together : when with the latter intention, as joining sentences together. Of

Of conjunctions in general, as used to join words together.

IN the use of language, it is frequently required to reduce to one sentence several serieses of words, each of which has some one and the same word or expression in it. This common word or expression, either circumstantiates, or is circumstantiated by, every word, in each of the serieses which are to be united; for otherwise, the serieses would not each consist of words in continued connexion; but the several serieses do not circumstantiate one another. Nevertheless, when several serieses are reduced to one, there may be no necessity to mention the word, or expression, which is common to them all, more than once; provided that certain notices be given, that the rest of the words of the several serieses are not to be considered as circumstantiating one another, but as they all circumstantiate, or are circumstantiated by, one and the same common expression. The conjunction "*and*" is one of the most general of these notices: and may be used in giving instances of the reduction of different serieses of words to one series, in the manner above mentioned. Thus, in the three sentences, "*a man of prudent foresight is to be esteemed—a man well disposed is to be esteemed—a man who exerts himself for the good of others is to be esteemed.*" The words, "*a man,*" and "*is to be esteemed,*" are common to each sentence, and the sentences may be all reduced to one, in which these words are but once mentioned: but then notice must be given, that in the compound sentence, the expressions, "*of prudent foresight—well disposed—who exerts himself for the good of others,*" are not to be considered as circumstantiating one another, but as first one, and then another, circumstantiating the common object "*a man,*" and the common expression, "*is to be esteemed,*" is then to be applied to the object, "*a man,*" so circumstantiated. This is done by placing the conjunction "*and*" before the expressions which do not circumstantiate the expression which they follow; as appears in the sentence,

“ man of prudent foresight and well disposed and, who exerts himself for the good of others, is to be esteemed.”

The conjunction therefore in this kind of construction, is a notice, or declaration, that the speaker is sparing himself the repetition of some common word, or expression; and a direction to the hearer, to supply it as often as the conjunction is used.

But besides the notice to supply the common word, or expression, as often as a direction is given to do it, (which notice is common to every conjunction that is used to connect words;) it is necessary, that other directions should be given by each conjunction. For the conceptions formed, and denoted by uniting the several different expressions with the common expression, as often as a conjunction is used to direct such union, may be either all of them necessary for the speaker's purpose, or any one of them taken at pleasure may be sufficient for that purpose, or only some one or more of them may suit that purpose; or it may happen, that not any of them taken at pleasure, nor any particular one or more of them, will suit the purpose of the sentence, if it be taken affirmatively; or it may be, that some of them are so different from the rest, as to appear like exceptions to what it might be reasonably expected would be joined with them. These notices are therefore united with several sorts of conjunctions, which are used to connect words; and the difference of the notice is the characteristic by which the sort is determined to which a particular conjunction is to be referred.

When the conjunction “*and*” is placed between the several parts of a compound series, in order to refer these parts, first one, and then another, to some common expression; all the conceptions which are expressed by all the references, are equally necessary for the speaker's purpose. Thus in the expressions,
“ the God of wisdom and goodness and mercy—the wise and good

“ *and merciful God* ;” the three conceptions denoted by, “ *the God of wisdom—the God of goodness—the God of mercy* ;” “ *the wise God—the good God—the merciful God*,” are all equally necessary for the speaker’s purpose ; and so of other instances of the use of this conjunction.

When the conjunction “ *either* ” is placed before the first part of a series, and the conjunction “ *or* ” before the other parts of it, in order to refer these parts, one after another, to some common expression ; any of the conceptions expressed by the references, or else some one or more of them, will suit the speaker’s purpose. Thus in the expression, “ *a man either of wisdom, or justice, or honour, would have avoided this fault*,” any one of the conceptions denoted by, “ *a man of wisdom—a man of justice —a man of honour*,” will equally answer the speaker’s intent. But in the expression, “ *either James, or John, or Peter, told me this* ;” only some one of the three persons must be pitched upon, to make the sentence true, although it is not known, or not determined, which particular person is to be pitched upon.

When “ *neither* ” is prefixed to a part of a series, and “ *nor* ” to the other parts which are to be referred, one after another, to some common expression ; it is a notice, that not any one of the conceptions expressed by such references are in the states in which the sentence represents them, if such sentence be taken affirmatively. Thus in the expression, “ *neither James, nor John, nor Peter, told me this*,” it is asserted that none of the three sentences, “ *James told me this—John told me this—Peter told me this*,” are true.

When the conjunction “ *but* ” appears before a part of a series directing that part to be referred to some expression to which other parts of the series are also to be referred : it is a notice that the conception expressed by such reference, is so different

from some conception expressed by a reference of some other part of the same series to the common expression, as to be a kind of exception to what might have been expected. Thus in the expressions, "*a man of parts, but of no industry;*" "*James used pains and application, but without success.*" * It is a kind of exception to what might be expected in the man's character, to deny him industry, after having represented him as a man of parts: and it is an exception to what might reasonably be expected, to represent the using pains and application, as not attended with success. There are but few conjunctions, besides these above described, which are used in a construction which is considered as only joining words together.

Of the conjunctions in general as used to join sentences together.

THE conjunctions used for this purpose, are equivalent to additional affirmations, declaring several manners by which the conceptions expressed at full length in sentences become dependent one upon another. For that which is contained in one sentence may be as the sentence represents it, only upon a supposition, that what is contained in another sentence, is as that sentence represents it. Or what is contained in one sentence may be so, in consequence of what is contained in another sentence, being certainly as the sentence expresses it. Or the truth of one sentence may be an exception to the truth of another: or the truth of one sentence may seem to oppose, or withstand, the truth of another, whilst yet it really does not oppose such truth. Or several other kinds of dependences may exist between sentences, which dependences must either be given notice of by sentences used on purpose to declare them as often as they occur, or by introducing certain words as marks to supply their place.

It will evidently appear that the conjunctions are such marks, if any two sentences, joined by a conjunction, are considered as the parts of another sentence, in which the force of the conjunction

is expressed by a circumlocution. Thus the two sentences, "*I will come, if you will meet me,*" are as much as to say, that what is contained in the words, "*you will meet me,*" is a supposition, and that what is contained in the words, "*I will come,*" is true or false, according as the supposition is true or false. And the two sentences, "*I will come, because you will meet me,*" are as much as to say, that what is contained in the words, "*you will meet me,*" is considered as a cause; and that what is contained in the words, "*I will come,*" is considered as the certain effect of that cause, and so of other instances.

It is not necessary, that the conjunctions should have different forms referring to different times, as verbs have; because the dependences, which they affirm between one sentence and another, are always considered as existing between the sentences at the times to which themselves refer; for the declarations of the conjunctions are declarations concerning the sentences themselves.

The grammarians have reduced the principal of the conjunctions to sorts distinguished by particular names. And as the number of conjunctions is not very large, it may be proper to give an account of each of them under the name of the particular class to which it belongs.

Of the conjunctions copulative.

These are, *and—also—as well as—likewise.*

It has been already shewn, that when "*and*" is considered as coupling words together, it gives notice that all the conceptions which are expressed by the references of several parts of a series to some common expression, are necessary for the speaker's purpose. Hence whensoever it happens, that the series of which the parts are united by this conjunction, is considered as
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the subject of a sentence, and the common expression as the predicate, such common expression is considered as modifying the whole series at once. If therefore the parts of the series consist of expressions which, taken separately, denote so many conceptions which the mind can make so many separate objects of its contemplation, the whole series together is considered as denoting one plural object, and the definitive verb, which is the common expression that circumstantiates every part of the series, instead of being used in the singular number, (as it must be, if considered as first circumstantiating one part of the series, and then another,) is used in the plural number, and considered as applied to the whole series at once. Thus instead of saying, "*John is standing and James is standing,*" we say, "*John and James are standing,*" and so of other instances.

When a series of several expressions is referred by this conjunction to some common expression, it is usual to prefix the conjunction only to the last expression of the series. So instead of saying, "*John and James and George standing in such a place,*" we say, "*John, James, and George standing in such a place;*" and instead of saying, "*the nation being disappointed and dissatisfied and tumultuous,*" we say, "*the nation being disappointed, dissatisfied, and tumultuous;*" and so of other instances.

"*Also and likewise*" are used with "*and*" in joining the parts of a series, when these parts are not to be considered altogether as the expression of one complex conception to be carried all at once to the common expression. So that these conjunctions give notice, that the several parts of the series to which they are prefixed, are to be carried separately to the common expression, and that all the conceptions expressed by the several references, are equally necessary for the speaker's purpose. Thus in the expression, "*John, and likewise James and George also, perceives this;*" the form of the verb "*perceives,*" shews that "*John and James and George*" are not considered as one plural

plural object; but that the several conceptions expressed by "*John perceives this—James perceives this—George perceives this,*" are all equally necessary for the speaker's purpose.

"*As well as,*" is of the same meaning as, "*and also,* or *and likewise.*"

When, in a series of compleat sentences, these sentences are united by the conjunction "*and,*" notice is given, that the sense of all the sentences considered together in one view, is necessary for the speaker's purpose. When, in a series, such sentences are united by "*and also—and likewise,*" or by "*also—likewise—as well as,*" notice is given, that the result of each of the sentences taken one after another, is necessary for the speaker's purpose.

"*Neither and nor*" are usually considered as copulative conjunctions, relating only to negative sentences. They are indeed negatives to, "*and also—and likewise—as well as,*" or to "*and,*" when it is considered as requiring first one part of a series, and then another, to be carried to a common expression. But they are not negatives to "*and,*" when it is considered as uniting the several parts of a series into the expression of one plural object. Thus in the expression, "*neither James, nor John, nor George, thinks as you do,*" the verb "*thinks*" is of the singular number; and this shews, that "*James—John and George*" are not all considered as one plural object, not thinking in a certain manner; but that first the one, and then the other, and then the third, is represented as not thinking in that manner.

Conjunctions disjunctive.

Either—or.

WHEN the parts of a series of words are directed by these conjunctions to be referred to some common expression; the references must be made, first one, and then another, to the common expression, and the judgment of the hearer must determine whether the speaker intends to represent any one of the conceptions, expressed by any one of the references, as sufficient for his purpose, or only some one or more of them, without ascertaining which. And when two, or more, compleat sentences are joined by the same conjunctions; the judgment must determine whether the speaker intends to represent any one of the sentences as sufficient for his purpose, or only some one or more of them; without specifying which. Thus in the expressions,

“ Perhaps either you or John or James will go—either you may send—or I may write—or he may speak for such things;” any of the conceptions denoted by, *“ you will go—John will go—James will go,”* in the first instance; or by *“ you may send—I may write—he may speak,”* in the second, will answer the speaker’s intention in these instances. But in the expressions,

“ Either you or James must go—James either did so, or said he did so,” only one of the persons denoted by *“ you and James,”* are represented as under a necessity of going; and only one of the sentences, *“ James did so—he said he did so,”* are represented as true, but without determining which.

As it is not determined which of the expressions make for the speaker’s purpose in which these conjunctions are concerned, whilst either any of them taken at pleasure, or some one or more of them, do make for such purpose; the hearer or reader is obliged to keep them all in his mind; and hence the grammarians

marians have usually considered them as joining the words, but disjoining the sense; which is not a very clear account of their signification.

• Discretive conjunctions.

But—except—saving.

WHATSOEVER expression depends upon the conjunction “*but*,” whether it be a part of a series that is to be united with some expression, which is also to be taken in common with other parts of the series; or whether it be a sentence expressed at length; such expression or sentence, contains something that is contrary to what either the speaker or some other person is conceived to expect or conclude from the appearances that attend the discourse. Thus in the expressions, “*we went but to such a place—this is but necessary—I do not fear but the business is done*,” it is insinuated, that some person expected that the persons denoted by “*we*,” would have gone farther than such a place—and that it is imagined, something less than what is denoted by “*this*,” would have been sufficient—and that the business was not “*done*.”

In the expressions, “*we went, but you resolved to stay—several messengers are come, but they have brought no news*,” the resolution to stay of the person denoted by “*you*,” is represented as contrary to what the persons denoted by “*we*” might have expected: and the several messengers coming without news, as contrary to what both the speaker and hearer might have expected.

When a number of objects are represented in some certain state, in which it is reasonable to conclude other objects are, and yet these objects are not in such state, either “*but*,” or “*except*,” may be used, to direct to the name of such other objects; as “*all but, or except, you, have been at the court to day—no horses but, or except, black ones, are in the pasture*.”

When a train of thought has been interrupted, and the speaker resumes the train sooner than he imagines it is expected, notice is given of the resumption by “*but* ;” as, “*but to return—*” “*but to proceed.*”

“*Whereas*, or *whilst*, or *yet*,” may be used instead of “*but*,” when it joins full sentences together, but has the appearance from circumstances of some degree of contrariety ; as

“*I sit—but—or whereas—or whilst—or yet, you stand.*”

Conditional conjunctions.

If—if so be—provided—unless.

“*If*, or *if so be*,” prefixed to a sentence, gives notice that the sentence contains a supposition on which another sentence so depends, that it is true or false, according as the supposition is true or false ; as, “*we shall succeed if you will assist us* ;” that is, let it be taken for granted that the sentence, “*you will assist us*,” is true ; and the sentence, “*we shall succeed*,” is true : but the sentence, “*you will assist us*,” is only a supposition.

“*If so be* and *provided*” have the same meaning as “*if* ;” but the word “*that*” is usually interposed between “*if so be*, or *provided*,” and the sentence which depends upon either of them ; for a reason which will appear, when we speak of the word “*that*” in particular, as a conjunction.

“*Unless*” is the negative to “*if*,” signifying “*if not* ;” as, “*I shall succeed, unless you oppose me*,” is of the same import as, “*I shall succeed, if you do not oppose me.*” Hence if a negative sentence is joined with another sentence by “*unless*,” the negative sentence may be turned into an affirmative one, and ~~“*unless*”~~ may be turned into “*if*,” and the sense of the sentences will be but little altered ; for the two negatives will by this means be

taken

taken away, which before only destroyed the effect of each other. Thus, "*I shall not succeed, unless you assist me,*" is of almost the same import with "*I shall succeed, if you assist me.*"

The verb "*suppose,*" or the participle "*supposing,*" may, the one or other of them, be substituted for "*if,*" on almost any occasion, and "*suppose not,*" or "*supposing not,*" for "*unless;*" as, "*I shall succeed, if, or supposing, or upon the supposition that, you will assist me.*"

"*I shall miscarry, unless you will assist me, or supposing you will not assist me, or upon the supposition that you will not assist me.*"

The reason why this substitution can be made, is very evident from what is said above of the conjunctions under consideration.

Adversative, or concessive, conjunctions.

Though—although—notwithstanding.

THESE conjunctions give notice, that a sentence depending upon one of them expresses something which may be taken for granted, and that if it be taken for granted, it has the appearance "*of being adverse to, or of withstanding,*" something contained in another sentence, whilst yet it does not prevent the other sentence from being true; as,

"*I shall succeed—though—although—or notwithstanding you oppose me.*"

"*Though and although*" always connect complete sentences together, but "*notwithstanding*" frequently connects a single word, or an expression which is not a sentence, with a complete sentence; "as, "*I shall succeed, notwithstanding all this;*" &c.

"all this being allowed will not prevent or withstand my success," or will not prevent the sentence, "I shall succeed," from being true.

Redditive conjunctions.

Yet—still—nevertheless.

THESE conjunctions shew, that a sentence which depends upon one of them is no less true, or that which it expresses no less certain, on account of what is expressed in another sentence which appears to oppose such truth or certainty; as, "*I sit—yet—still—nevertheless you stand.*"

The appearance of opposition to what might reasonably be expected, makes the conjunction "*but*" applicable as a redditive conjunction, when the sentence with which the redditive sentence corresponds, does not depend upon an adversative conjunction. Yet the sentence with which the redditive sentence corresponds, most commonly does depend upon an adversative conjunction; as, "*although you are come, yet—still—nevertheless I must go,*" which sentence may be expressed by, "*you are come—but—yet—or still I must go;*" so that "*but*" in reality supplies the place of an adversative conjunction, or of both the adversative and the redditive together, when it is used alone to connect two sentences; as, "*you are come, but I must go.*"

The reason of this is manifest; for the connection between the adversative and redditive conjunction is so very obvious, that the latter of them in effect supposes the other. For if one sentence is introduced by "*notwithstanding,*" and another sentence is made dependent upon that sentence by "*nevertheless;*" the latter only shews, that the sentence which depends upon it is "*no ways less true,*" which need not be shewn if there were nothing united with it that makes it have the appearance of
being

being less true. When "*notwithstanding*" introduces that which makes the other sentence have such appearance, it is a direct declaration, that what depends upon it has such effect upon the other sentence. But the mind can easily determine what it is that has such effect, without such particular notice; and therefore the adverbative conjunction is frequently used without the redditive, or the redditive without the adverbative; and when so used, they may be considered as discrepative conjunctions. Thus,

"*Notwithstanding that I shall oppose him, he will succeed—I shall oppose him, nevertheless he will succeed—I shall oppose him, but, or yet, he will succeed—notwithstanding that I shall oppose him, nevertheless he will succeed,*" are all sentences of nearly the same import; the reason whereof is given in what is said above.

Causal conjunctions.

For—because—seeing—for as much as, and since—so—then—whereas, in some applications of them.

THESE shew that the speaker is proceeding to give a reason for what is said; or that what is already said is a reason for what is farther intended to be said. And as this proceeding so continually occurs in the use of language; it is no wonder to find so many different words applied to give notice of it.

When "*whereas*" is applied for this purpose, it always gives notice, that the sentence to which it is prefixed, expresses the reason of something which is to follow that sentence; as, "*whereas you have done your work, you must be paid.*" "*So and then,*" when applied for this purpose, are always prefixed to a sentence which gives something going before as a reason for what follows; ~~as,~~ "*you have done your work, so, or then, you must be paid.*" —

The others are prefixed to sentences which give the reason either of what goes before, or follows after; but "*for*" most commonly to words, or sentences, which give the reason of what goes before.

It is manifest, that "*for*," in this application of it, has the same signification as it has when used as a sign of the ablative case; seeing it directs in both instances to that, on account of which something appears to be so or so.

"*Because*" is equivalent to "*by the cause*," and therefore it frequently takes a genitive case after it by the sign "*of*," according to the usual construction of substantives; as, "*religion is evil spoken of, because of the vices of its professors.*"

Illative conjunctions.

Therefore—wherefore and *now—then*, in some applications of them.

THESE shew that the speaker is proceeding to draw a consequence from something premised. "*Therefore*" being equivalent to "*for this reason, or for that reason*," "*wherefore*" to "*for which reason*," and "*now and then*" being transferred from their general signification of time, to signify the time when the mind conceives the deductions to succeed each other, which it is making from premises laid down.

"*Therefore* and *wherefore*" are applied to the expressions of deductions made from premises which are considered as certain: "*Now*" to introduce additional helps to the deduction, and "*then*," is usually applied to deductions made from premises which are but suppositions; as, "*you will go, therefore we must part—wherefore we must part*;" "*now, besides the reasons already given, these may be added*;" "*if you will go, then we must part.*"

Exceptive

Exceptive conjunctions.

Unless—otherwise.

THE meaning of “*unless*” has been already shewn to be equivalent to “*if not* ;” “*otherwise*” is equivalent to “*if not so* ;” and therefore it follows a sentence expressing things in some certain state, and precedes a sentence declaring how things will be, upon a supposition that they are in any other state than that in which the first sentence represents them ; as, “*you have done your business, otherwise you would be working at it,*” or “*if not so, you would be working at it.*”

Now things must be, either as they are represented, or in some other manner. If they are as the first sentence represents them, that sentence is true. If in any other manner, the sentence depending upon “*otherwise*” is conceived to be true. So that one of the sentences, joined by “*otherwise*,” is looked upon as true, and either of the sentences may happen to be the true one. Therefore the conjunction “*or*” may be used instead of “*otherwise*,” in consequence of the signification which it bears, when used to give notice that some one expression out of several is true, without determining which ; as “*you have done your business, or we shall assist you.*”

If the sentence which follows “*otherwise*” be placed the first, in another expression ; and that which goes before “*otherwise*” be made to depend upon it ; the conjunction “*unless*,” or the words “*if* and *not*” must now be used to express the dependence of the one sentence upon the other. Thus, if the latter of the two sentences above be placed first, and the other be made to depend upon it so as to express the same sense as they do in the situation above, the expression will become, “*we shall assist you, unless you have done your business,*” or “*if you have not done your business.*” The reason of this is manifest ; for in either way of construction the words “*we shall assist you*” are represented as true, only upon a supposition that your business is otherwise than done.

If

If two sentences are of such a nature, that if the converse of either be supposed true, the truth of the other sentence follows of course, either "*otherwise*," or "*unless*," may be used to connect the sentences. Thus, "*I shall succeed, otherwise I am mistaken*," and "*I shall succeed, unless I am mistaken*," are expressions much of the same import. For, if it be supposed that I shall not succeed; the sentence, "*I am mistaken*," is true; which is upon the supposition expressed by "*otherwise*." And if it be supposed that I am not mistaken, the sentence, "*I shall succeed*," is true, which is upon the supposition expressed by "*unless*."

But if the two sentences are not of the nature above mentioned, "*unless*" cannot be substituted instead of "*otherwise*." Thus in the expression, "*I must do this, otherwise my friends will be displeased*," "*otherwise*" cannot be changed into "*unless*." For although the sentence, "*my friends will be displeased*," is true, upon a supposition that I do not comply with my obligation to do this; it does not follow that the sentence, "*I must do this*," is true, upon a supposition that my friends will not be displeased; which is the situation that "*unless*" would represent them in.

Of the restrictive conjunctions.

As—so.

THESE particles are used to give notice when the mind makes use of the perception of sameness, or of that of similarity approaching to sameness, in shewing how far, or in what respect, things are attended to. For a conception may be raised in the mind, which is intended to be considered only as it is of a particular species, or so far as it is under the same circumstances in which it is represented, and no farther: or the situation of an object at one time, may be so very similar to the situation in which it is at another, as to be considered exactly of the same nature: or the situation of one object may be so very similar to the

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the situation of another, that the similarity may be considered as a kind of sameness; and expressions may be referred to one another under these modes of perception or conception.

When any object is particularly ascertained in an expression, and it is intended that such object shall be considered in that same ascertainment, and not as it may be considered, when not so ascertained, "*as*" is prefixed to the expression to give notice of this proceeding. Thus, "*as thou art a man, I dare—as such a man is a scholar, he is to be esteemed—as to the means by which Augustus gained his power, he is to be blamed; but as to the manner in which he used it, he is to be commended,*" are all instances of objects considered as particularly circumstanced in particular clauses, whilst "*as*" used before these clauses gives notice, that the circumstances must be kept exactly as they are, in order to make the clauses true. Thus the person denoted by "*thou*" may be considered as of some other species besides the species "*man*," and then the affirmation "*I dare*" may not be true. For it may be added, "*as thou art a prince, I fear thee.*" And so Augustus is represented in two situations, the first of which must be kept exactly as it is, in order to make the affirmation, "*he is to be blamed,*" true: and the second must be kept exactly as it is, in order to make the affirmation, "*he is to be commended,*" true. Such expressions as, "*mad as I was—the landlord in his shirt as he was,*" are formed upon the same mode of conception with those above: for the word "*as*" gives notice, that the madness spoke of must be considered as it was circumstanced at the time referred to, and under no other circumstances; and that the landlord must be considered exactly in the situation in which he is represented at the time referred to, and in no situation however little varied from it.

If the instance of sameness, or similarity approaching to sameness, be such, that it is observed in the same object at different times, or in different objects at the same time, or at different

rent times; two expressions are joined by "*as*," which expressions shew the objects and the times; but the precise particular in which similarity is observed, is left to be determined by the judgment. Thus in the expressions, "*when I am as I have been—*" "*I am as thou art, my people as thy people—James will do it as John*" "*bid him,*" many particulars may be taken, the sameness whereof may answer to that denoted by "*as*;" and if these particulars are first mentioned by names, united with the first part of the expression, and the particulars are again expressed by a relative pronoun, and that pronoun is united with the second part of the expression in the same mode of connexion in which the name that the relative represents is united with the first part; the result will be, an expression more precise than that by "*as*," but of the same import, so far as it extends. Thus the first expression may mean, "*when I am in the same situation in which I have been,*" or "*in the same disposition in which,*" &c. and the third may mean, "*James will do it in the same manner,*" or "*in the same order in which,*" or perhaps "*with the same instrument with which,*" or "*in the same time in which,*" or "*at the same place at which*" "*John bid him.*"

The sameness of time in which two different circumstances are observed to exist, is frequently signified by "*as*." Thus, "*it whistled as it flew,*" is equivalent to, "*it whistled during the*" "*time during which it flew.*"

From this extensive signification of "*as*" it comes to pass, that it is applied to denote the manner or order of a proceeding which is to be determined by choice, or by some contingency. This appears in the expressions, "*do as you please—let it fall out*" "*as it will,*" *i. e.* in any manner in which you please, &c.

The sameness which is observed in the correspondence between definitions, general rules, directions, &c. and the particular instances included in them, is given notice of by "*as*."

Instances

Instances of this construction occur continually in this book.

When an object is considered in some situation which admits of degrees, it is frequently necessary not only to represent another object in the same general situation, but likewise in the same degree. This frequently happens in the application of adjectives, and adverbs: for, as what is denoted by them may be considered as united in greater or less degrees with other objects, several objects may have what is denoted by one of them, and yet may not be capable of being considered as in the same situation in that respect, unless *the degree* is the same in which what is denoted by one of them, either attends the same object at different times, or different objects at the same time.

Thus a man may be studious at one time, and studious at another; and yet he may not be capable of being considered in the same situation, with regard to studiousness, at both the times referred to, unless the degree of studiousness be considered as the same at both the times. The circumstance of degree attending the signification of adjectives and adverbs, frequently requires the particle "*as*" to be twice repeated, in order to ascertain the sameness of situation to which such adjective or adverb refers. Thus, "*John is as studious as he was,*" is equivalent to "*John is studious in the same degree in which he was studious;*" and "*this is done as easily as that,*" is equivalent to "*this is done with the same degree of ease with which that is done.*"

The degree of what is signified by two different adjectives may be considered as equal in that to which the adjectives or adverbs are applied, as well as the degree of what is signified by one adjective in two applications of it. The adjective "*studious*" is applied to "*John*" at two different times, and the adverb "*easily*" is applied to two instances of "*doing*," in the examples given above; but different adjectives may be used, and the one may be considered as applied to "*John*" at one time, and the other at

another; and yet the degree of what is signified by each, may be the same. Thus, "*John is as studious as he was negligent,*" is equivalent to "*John is studious in the same degree in which he was negligent,*" and different adverbs may be applied, the one to "*doing this,*" and the other to "*doing that;*" and yet the degree of what is signified by each may remain the same. Thus, "*this is done as wisely as that is done foolishly,*" is equivalent to "*this is done with a degree of wisdom the same with the degree of folly with which that is done.*"

A clause depending upon "*such*" is frequently ascertained by a clause depending upon "*as.*" In this application of these particles, "*such*" gives notice that what is expressed by the clause depending upon it, must be considered no farther than its signification is similar to that of the clause depending upon "*as.*" Thus, "*such precepts as tend to make men good,*" is an expression of a sort of precepts, limited by the additional characteristic of "*tendency to make men good,*" added to the characteristic of the general species, *precept*, and any other instance of the application of these particles in correspondence with each other, may be explained on the same principles.

"*So*" is used to express any circumstance which either can be shewn by a demonstrative action, or can be collected from some expression, either going before, or following, the clause in which it appears. When it expresses what is actually presented by a demonstrative action, it is a notice that the demonstrative action is so similar to that which is intended to be represented by it, that they approach to sameness; as when a person says, "*I will do so,*" and shews how he will do. When "*so*" represents what may be collected from some expression actually made use of, it frequently is equivalent to the actual repetition of such expression. Thus in the expressions, "*John is a good man, and James is so too—you enjoy good health, and so may others,*" the word "*so*" in the first instance, supplies the words, "*a good man;*" and in the second instance it supplies the words, "*enjoy good health.*"

When

When “*so*” expresses what is only of the same general nature with that which is expressed by other words, and not so nearly the same, as that the repetition of the same words must be made use of to represent it to the mind; it is most frequently applied with a clause which corresponds with another clause that has “*as*” before it. Thus, “*I find things so as you told me, or as you told me things would be, so I find them—as three is to four, so is six to eight,*” *i. e.* in the same situation—in the same proportion. “*So may you succeed as you perform your promise—as you must take this method, so I must take the other,*” *i. e.* may the degree of certainty of your success be the same with that of your performing your promise. I must take this method for the same reason that you must take the other.

When “*so*” expresses some circumstance which must be collected from consequences or effects, “*that*” usually follows it, being prefixed to the clause which expresses the consequence or effect, whence that which is denoted by “*so*” is to be collected. Thus, “*he behaved himself so that he became generally esteemed,*” is equivalent to “*—in such a manner as produced the consequence of his becoming generally esteemed.*” Sometimes “*as*” is prefixed to “*that*,” as, “*he behaved himself so as that he became generally esteemed.*” If the clause which expresses the consequence, whence what is denoted by “*so*” is to be estimated, be not a complete sentence, “*as*” is used, and not “*that*,” for a reason which will appear when we consider “*that*,” as it is a conjunction. Thus, “*he behaved himself so as to become generally esteemed.*” For, “*to become generally esteemed,*” is not a complete sentence; but, “*he became generally esteemed,*” which depends upon “*that*” in the former instance, is such a sentence.

When “*so*” is used with an adjective or adverb; it may relate to the individual degree of that which is denoted by the adjective or adverb, so as to represent the attention as fixed upon such degree as is applied in any certain instance, and on no other degree.

degree. This appears in the expressions, "*why is his chariot so long in coming?—I did not think it could be done so easily,*" &c. The sense of these expressions may be ascertained more precisely, by referring them to a clause by "*as,*" so that the clause shall express the precise time, or other particulars, along with which the degree spoke of is observed; as thus, "*why is his chariot so long in coming as it is now?—I did not think it could be done so easily as it has been done in this instance.*" And as the same time, or the same instance, may be returned by a clause depending upon "*as,*" so a different time, or a different instance, may be made to depend upon "*as,*" in which the same degree referred to by "*so*" is observed in the application of an adjective or adverb; as, "*he is not now so studious as he has been—this is not done so well as that.*"

"*So*" is commonly used, when the same degree of what is denoted by an adjective or adverb is denied in one clause, and affirmed in another. For when the same degree is affirmed in both the clauses, "*as*" is twice repeated;—as, "*he is now as studious as he has been,*" &c.

Of the particle "that," when used as a conjunction.

THIS particle has already appeared both as a relative, and as a demonstrative pronoun. But it must be farther considered in a capacity which is of the same general nature with that of a conjunction; seeing, in this capacity, it is a notice, that some compleat sentence depending upon it is to be applied in a manner, the notice of which manner cannot be given in the sentence itself. The manner of connexion denoted by "*that*" is, that the sentence depending upon it is to be considered, all of it together, as the expression of one objective conception connected with other words, on the same principles as any conception may be, which is denoted by a single noun substantive. Thus in the expression, "*that any man should be regardless of his own welfare is*"
"wonder-

"wonderful," the sentence "*any man should be regardless of his own welfare,*" is equivalent to a noun substantive in the nominative case on which the verb "*is*" depends. But in the expression, "*to suppose that any man should be regardless of his own welfare,*" the same sentence, "*any man should be regardless of his own welfare,*" is equivalent to a noun substantive in the accusative case depending upon the verb transitive, "*to suppose,*" i. e. the sense of the sentence, "*any man should be,*" &c. is the thing supposed. In the expression, "*your parents have a great desire that you should be a scholar,*" "*you should be a scholar,*" is equivalent to a substantive in the genitive case; for these words express the thing "*of which*" the parents are desirous. In the expression, "*your parents have an inclination that you should be a scholar,*" the sentence "*you should be a scholar,*" expresses the thing "*to which*" the parents have an inclination; and therefore is equivalent to a substantive in the dative case. And instances may be easily produced in which the sentence depending upon "*that*" is equivalent to a noun substantive in the modes of connexion that are denoted by several prepositions.

A preposition is sometimes expressed before a sentence in this kind of construction, as, "*he is displeased in that, or for that you have proceeded indiscreetly;*" but the kind of connexion in which the conception denoted by the sentence depending upon "*that*" is to be taken, is more usually left to be understood, or supplied, by the mind itself.

I have usually called the particle "*that*" in this particular application of it "*a sentential demonstrative*" in teaching; in order to distinguish it, in this capacity, from its capacity as a demonstrative pronoun, to represent any thing that can be pointed to, or any thing that is mentioned in another clause.

It has been observed by writers on speculative grammar, that the relative pronoun is frequently equivalent to a personal pronoun

noun and a conjunction ; as for instance, the expressions, "*Mr. N—— came yesterday, and he goes away to-day, or but he goes away to-day,*" are, either of them, nearly of the same import with, "*Mr. N—— who came yesterday, goes away to-day ;*" and "*some people will not stick at any thing, if they can get money by it,*" is nearly equivalent to "*some people will not stick at any thing by which they can get money ;*" likewise, "*such a man has bought a Latin book, notwithstanding he cannot read it,*" is nearly equivalent to "*such a man has bought a Latin book which he cannot read.*"

When "*as*" corresponds with "*such,*" it is frequently equivalent to "*who* or "*which.*" Thus in the expression, "*the thoughts of such men as strive to deceive, are evil ;*" "*as*" is a kind of relative pronoun, and supplies the place of the nominative case to the verb "*strive ;*" and the sentence may be turned into the sentence, "*the thoughts of men, who strive to deceive, are evil.*"

The reason of this coincidence is manifest, from the account which has been given of the nature of the relative pronoun, and of the nature of a conjunction : for the use of a relative pronoun reduces two compleat sentences to one ; and the use of a conjunction reduces two compleat sentences to such a connexion with each other, that the one of them cannot be taken without the other, if the intention of the speaker in joining them together be observed. The intent of joining two sentences in dependence upon each other, is more particularly declared by a conjunction, than the reason is declared why two sentences are reduced to one, when a relative pronoun is employed in such reduction. But when two sentences are reduced to one by a relative pronoun, ~~it is~~ always done in consequence of one and the same object being concerned in both the sentences. And this sameness of the object, easily enables the mind to perceive why two sentences are reduced to one in which it is concerned.

Whereas,

Whereas, when the conjunctions are used, there is frequently no one and the same object concerned in the two sentences connected by one of them; and therefore they express directly, either the manner in which the sentences are to be taken in connexion, or the reason why they are to be so taken, or some other purpose which requires the notice that is given by a particular conjunction.

Every one who is conversant in the antient Latin writers must have observed the particular cast that is given by them to many sentences, in consequence of their using a relative instead of a personal pronoun and a conjunction, or some other connective word. Thus in Nepos, "*Servum ad regem misit ut ei nuntiaret suis verbis, adversarios ejus in fugâ esse, qui si decessissent majore cum labore bellum confecturum, quos si statim aggrederetur, brevi universos oppressurum.*" "He (*i. e.* Miltiades) sent a servant to tell the king from him, that his enemies were flying, and if they should depart, that he must be at more pains to finish the war; but if he attacked them immediately, he would subdue them all together in a short time." Here it is manifest, that "*qui*" is equivalent to "*and they*," and "*quos*" to "*but them*;" and so of innumerable instances which may be found in any Latin classic author.

The relative pronoun is also frequently used in Latin, to form a sentence which is equivalent in sense to an English infinitive verb with some words in dependence upon it. Thus in Terence, "*Adeon' videmur vobis esse idonei in quibus sic illudatis?*" "Do we seem to you so very proper to be thus played upon?" "*in quibus sic illudatis*" is equivalent to the English expression, "*to be thus played upon.*" Here the relative clause, "*in quibus*," &c. expresses "*the purpose for which*" we seem proper; and "*to be thus played upon*" does the same in English, although the sign "*for*" is not expressed.

It is frequently necessary to express by a series of words "*the purpose for which*" some one is sent, appointed, commissioned,

missioned, &c. and this series is often equivalent to a sentence. In such instances, the Latins usually turn the sentence into a relative clause, and the English usually apply an objective verb with some words depending upon it. Thus, "*misit Gongylum qui literas regi redderet*" is in English, "he sent Gongylus to deliver a letter to the king," where "*qui literas*," &c. is of the same import as "*to deliver a letter*," &c.

All this shews with undeniable evidence, as I think, that the nature of the relative pronoun and that of a definitive verb, as likewise that of the objective verb and of the causal conjunction, has been properly determined. For the reason plainly appears in what is said of these parts of speech, why a relative clause may have the effect of a sentence depending upon a conjunction, and why an objective verb, with all that depends upon it, may be used as one noun substantive in an oblique case; as likewise that "*for*," when applied as a conjunction, has the same effect as when it is applied as the sign of the ablative case. The sign "*for*" is not indeed directly expressed before the objective verb, "*to deliver*;" but I shall shew in a following section, that the objective verb is used both in Greek, Latin, and English, so as to be equivalent to a substantive in almost any case; although no sign of a particular case is given to it. .

SECTION III.

Of the preposition.

THE general nature of this part of speech has been already explained, in a great measure, in what is said of the signs of the cases of substantives; for all ~~these signs, except~~ *than*, are prepositions, differing in nothing from the rest, but their capacity of being applied in a greater variety of instances than the other prepositions.

It

It is obvious to perceive, that they are all expressions of "relation," but the difficulty is to determine, how such various kinds of relations amongst objects themselves, can be expressed by one and the same preposition without confusion: and why one and the same relation may be expressed, on many occasions, by the help of different signs or prepositions. Thus in an instance already given, "*the distance of London from York—from London to York—between London and York,*" are manifestly three expressions of one and the same distance. This diversity of expression clearly arises from three different modes of estimating one and the same quantity. For in the first instance, "*the distance*" is considered as if it were in the state "*separating,*" and "*London*" as if it were in the state "*separated,*" although these states are not directly mentioned; and "*York*" is the "*object whence*" the mind proceeds in estimating that which separates the two places. But in the expression, "*from London to York,*" London is "*the object whence*" the mind proceeds; and York is "*the object whither*" it carries its estimation: whereas, in the expression "*between London and York,*" "*London and York,*" both together, are considered as one plural object, and the distance as included or bounded at each extremity by one of the constituent objects which together compose the complex object, "*London and York:*" for this manner of estimation is exactly the same with that which is used when we say, "*the distance between the two towns—hills—rivers,*" &c. only, in these last expressions, plural names can be found to denote the objects which limit the distance that is estimated. If the speaker chuses actually to mention the states "*separating,* or "*separated,*" and to consider the distance as "*the object separating,*" and "*London and York*" as "*a complex object separated;*" the expressions, "*the distance separating London and York,* or *by which London and York are separated,*" will be equivalent to any of the former. In these last expressions, the mind has recourse to a fiction of its own; for the abstract object, "*distance*" is considered as exerting the act of "*separating,*" and "*London and York*" are considered

dered as the recipients of the effect of the act which is exerted; and this fictitious state gives occasion to different modes of estimation from any of the former, in connecting the several parts of the conception which is expressed; and therefore different signs of connexion are used in these expressions from the signs which are used in any of the former; whilst yet the result of all the expressions amounts to the same thing. This is no more than comes to pass in estimating all kind of quantity, so as to express the result of the process in algebraic species: for we are usually at liberty to proceed several different ways; and yet, if the reasoning is just, we shall always come at last to an expression, which, though different in form, is in effect the same with that which is the result of any other way of proceeding, in which the reasoning is also just. And to carry on the resemblance farther, a fictitious quantity is always introduced merely to assist the mind in registering the steps of the process; and this quantity is frequently placed in a fictitious state, till the result of the operation arises, in which whatsoever was fictitious is ascertained. This proceeding in algebra is made use of merely to aid the limited powers of the mind of man, and the like kind of proceeding in language is made use of on the very same account. For it will appear from the following list of the English prepositions, that all of them, except "*of—by—for* and *than*," denote the several relations of place, or situation, or of the direction of objects in motion, or of states which may be varied by motion: and it is evident, that abstract objects can really have no such relations to each other; because they are incapable of external place, or local motion. But the mind perceives, that abstract objects have connexions with each other, which require nearly the same modes of estimation which the relations of local situation do; and therefore, in language, whatsoever connexion is conceived to require the same mode of attention in order to estimate it, is denoted by one and the same sign, and the precise nature of the connexion, as it is in itself, is left to be determined by the judgment, from the nature of the conceptions which are united by the sign.

As

As the relations of place, situation, and direction of objects in motion, or of states which may be varied by motion, are of the most frequent occurrence; and as the difference of one from another is most obvious; particular prepositions have been adapted, in almost all languages, to each of the most remarkable of these relations. And as almost all of them are perceived to exist amongst objects at rest, as well as amongst objects when some of them are in motion, whilst yet few external objects are observed to exist constantly in one and the same state, either of rest or motion; these states are taken into the signification of few or no names of external objects; but are denoted by adjectives, verbs, and adverbs, to be occasionally united with the substantive names of these objects; or if a verb is used objectively, the state denoted by it is considered as capable of every modification, which an object in that verbal state would be capable of. For as a man, or other object, may be represented as "*moving to—from—with—near—in—around—above—under*" some other object: so the state "*to move*" may be carried in the mind "*to—from—with,*" &c. some object, although this state cannot exist as an object in itself, except in the mind of man.

Hence the prepositions denoting relations of place are seen in dependence both upon expressions of objects, which consist of substantives alone, and of substantives with adjectives, participles, and adverbs, depending on them; and likewise of objective verbs alone, and of objective verbs with adjectives or adverbs depending upon them; and this in the subjects of sentences. For as to the predicates of sentences, when they consist of several substantives in dependence upon one and the same verb, it is evident that some sign of an oblique case, or other preposition, is necessary, on almost all occasions, to shew how each substantive is made to express ~~some~~ ^{some} circumstance of the state denoted by the verb.

I have already shewn at large the several modes of estimation, to which the relations are reduced that are denoted by "*the sign*"
" of

"*of the accusative case,*" as likewise by "*of—by—for and than,*" which are not particularly applicable to relations of place.

The rest of the English prepositions are as follow.

Afore—before.	About—around.
Against.	Through or thorough—through-
Beside—besides.	out.
Near—nigh—by.	Out of—without.
With.	After—behind.
Toward—towards—to—unto	Beyond.
—into.	Off—from.
At.	Above—over.
In—within.	On—upon.
Between—betwixt.	Below—beneath—underneath.
Among—amongst.	Up.
Amidst.	Down.

Now the relations of place which are denoted by these prepositions are so obvious to observation, that it is quite impertinent to attempt to describe them in words. For every one who has the use of eyes, must have perceived how objects are situated with relation to each other, when the names of the objects are united by the several prepositions; or, if the name of an object is made dependent on a verb by one of them, how the state is related to the object which has the preposition before its name; as, "*to stand before—against—beside—in—out of—behind—behind—on the house,*" are expressions of "*standing,*" so ascertained in position with regard to the house, that every one as readily apprehends the state under these modifications, as he does the state denoted by the verb "*standing,*" used alone. Yet each of the prepositions directs the mind to apply the state to the house under a different mode of estimation; and as these modes have no names, every one must consider how he applies his attention in estimating each of the relations that are between the state and the house. It is manifest, that in these expressions the house is considered in a different manner upon the application of every preposition;

preposition; for the attention proceeds from the fore part, to a closer approach to some part of it, thence to some side of it, thence to the interior parts, thence to the outward parts, thence to the back parts, thence to some distance from it on the contrary part to that on which some other object is placed, and thence to the top of it. So that we are led, in a kind of ideal view, to first one part of the house, and then another, by the prepositions, "*before—against—beside—in—out of—behind—beyond—on.*" The effect of other prepositions, with other objects or states in different local positions, might easily be exemplified in the same manner, were it of any real use.

As to the application of prepositions to objects or states, which are in themselves incapable of local situation; there is no method to be taken, but setting down the principal applications of each preposition which use has established in any particular language. For (as has been already observed) different nations have not applied the same modes of estimation to the same relations. I might therefore proceed with all the prepositions, in the same manner as I have proceeded with those which answer to the signs of the Latin cases; but this would be quite unnecessary for the purposes of speculative grammar. Therefore this is referred to the section of the practical grammar, in which rules are laid down for the construction of English prepositions.

By the custom of the English language, those pronouns which have an accusative form different from the nominative, are placed after both verbs transitive and prepositions in the accusative form, and not in the nominative; as, "*to see me and him,*" not "*to see I and he;*" "*between—around us and them,*" not "*we and they.*" But this change of form adds nothing to the signification of the expression; for "*it—which and that*" have no accusative different from the nominative, any more than the substantives of the language have; and yet, without variety of termination, they may be taken in any mode of estimation which is denoted by a sign or preposition, as well as those pronouns can be, which have an accusative different from the nominative. Any

Any of the relations which are denoted by prepositions may be expressed by substantive names; as for instance, that denoted by "*before*" may be expressed by "*priority*," that denoted by "*against*" by "*opposition*," "*near*" by "*vicinity*," "*between*" by "*interposition*," "*among*" by "*intermixture*;" and so of any of the rest, for which substantive names have been formed. But the substantive conception of no one of these relations can be formed by abstraction from one object only: for there must be two objects at least, or a verbal state and an object, concerned in every relation before the mind can form any conception of it. When therefore the names of two objects, or a verbal state and the name of an object, are joined by a particular preposition; the two objects, or the state and the object, are so situated with regard to each other, that the conception of the relation which is denoted by the preposition might, by one who knew it not, be gained from the situation, if the objects, or the state and the object, were present to the senses. But the use of language supposes, that the conception of every such relation is gained by the previous observation of every one who uses words consistently; and therefore the prepositions, when they join two words, direct the mind to perform an operation, which is the converse of the abstract operation that is used when a relation is so conceived as to be denoted by a substantive name. For in the expressions, "*a man before another—to walk before a man*," the relation of "*priority*," as denoted by "*before*," is not to be separately attended to, but is to be made use of in order to place the two men in a certain situation with regard to each other, and likewise the state "*to walk*" in a certain situation with regard to the man; and so of any other preposition. Hence many of the relations denoted by prepositions, have adjective names; as, "*prior —posterior—interior—exterior—ulterior*;" and when these adjectives are made dependent on a substantive or verb, they show the object denoted by the substantive, and the state denoted by the verb as in a certain situation with regard to some other object which is not directly expressed in the adjective, but which

is

is either supposed to be known, or must be mentioned by some other words; as, "*the interior part of the house,*" &c.

As the relation denoted by a preposition may be expressed by a single substantive name, if the mind pleases to consider it as an abstract object, so it may be "*taken into*" the object that is denoted by a single substantive, or into the coalescent conception denoted by a single adjective or adverb, or into the state denoted by a single verb, so as to become a constituent part of the conception that is denoted by any of these sorts of words. For the mind can compound as many of its conceptions as it pleases into the signification of a single word. If the signification of a preposition is taken into a substantive, the conception which is denoted by such substantive, will not coalesce with that which is denoted by another substantive; as for instance, "*pre-eminence—prevalence,*" although each has the force of the preposition "*above*" in it, will neither of them so unite with another substantive, as in the expression "*eminence above others,*" "*eminence*" unites with "*others*" by means of "*above*." If the signification of a preposition is taken into an adjective, the adjective will coalesce with one substantive; as, "*a pre-eminent station;*" but it will not unite two substantives so together as "*above*" does. And so the adverb "*previously*" will unite with a verb; but will not unite another word with the verb. But a preposition, when united with a verb intransitive, frequently has the effect of a separate preposition; as, "*to precede*" is of the same import as "*to go before,*" "*to succeed*" as "*to come behind;*" and so of other instances. Hence, "*a man preceding or succeeding another,*" are expressions much of the same import with, "*a man coming before or behind another.*" The reason of this manifestly is, because the states "*preceded—succeeded,*" in which the man denoted by "*another*" is represented, have the same kind of correspondence with the states "*preceding—succeeding,*" in which the first man is represented, as the terms of those relations have, which are denoted by "*before—behind,*" only the correspon-

dences of the verbal states are conceived to be estimated by a different kind of proceeding from those which are used when the prepositions are mentioned.

The prepositions which are used in inseparable composition with English words, are much the most frequently not the original English or Saxon prepositions, which are set down in the foregoing list; but the French, Latin, and Greek prepositions; such as, "*em—fur—ab—ad—ante—circum—in—inter—post—super—trans,*" "*anti—apo—dia—meta—peri—pros—syn,*" &c.; for most of our compound words have been borrowed from these languages. This gives as great a variety to the first syllables in English words, as probably is in the words of any language whatsoever.

The original English prepositions frequently depend upon intransitive verbs, and especially on passive verbs, so as to make a part of the verb itself; as in the expressions, "*to be heard of—to be heard from,*" "*to be talked to—to be talked with,*" "*to be bargained for.*" This occasions a kind of construction in the English language, which I have not observed in any other; as in the instances, "*Mr. N—— has been heard of—heard from,*" "*talked to by several people,*" "*the goods are bargained for by Mr. N——.*" Here the substantive which should be the nominative case to the verb, is considered as known of course from the nature of the verb; and the substantives which should depend on the prepositions, "*of—from—to—with—for,*" become of the nominative case on which the verb, when thus compounded, is made to depend. For the four first of the instances above, are manifestly equivalent to "*something has been heard of Mr. N——, has been heard from Mr. N——, has been talked to Mr. N——, has been talked with Mr. N——, by several people;*" and the last instance is equivalent to "*a bargain is made for the goods by Mr. N——.*" So that this mode of construction is used merely to save words, and is not liable to ambiguity if used with care.

SECTION IV.

Of the interjection.

THIS part of speech usually expresses some sudden emotion of the mind, or the perception of pleasure or pain in an unusual degree; and this frequently by a sound formed by the organs of speech, in consequence of a position of these organs which is occasioned by the emotion itself, without the speaker's previous intent.

Thus laughter, in almost all languages, is expressed by "ba ba be," sorrow by "ab ab," or "ob ob," or at least by sounds resembling those which the English annex to these interjections.

Sometimes words of this part of speech are used to signify the intention of a speaker, when he is too far distant from the hearer to hold continued conversation with him; as in "hola—" "so ho," &c.

But as this part of speech is only used in situations in which the speaker is not at leisure, or has not the opportunity, to form connected expression; it is considered, as thrown into sentences, and not as placed in continued connexion with them. Therefore little more is required towards explaining the nature of interjections, than to give a list of them, and to specify the emotions, or starts of intention, which are denoted by each. But this relates to practical grammar, and therefore such a list is given in the practical part of this work.

HAVING thus gone over the parts of speech in order, and having shewn, as I hope, with incontestible evidence, the principal

properties of each; I shall close this part of the work with placing the several kinds of connexion of the conceptions of the mind of man as denoted by words in one view.

It is clear, that these connexions do not arise immediately from the nature of external things, but from the kinds of conceptions which the mind forms of things; because qualities, states, and relations, which cannot exist separately, are denoted by separate words. Therefore the conceptions denoted by several words must be capable of uniting into one conception, whensoever there is occasion for such union. But several sorts of conceptions may be formed by abstraction from one and the same object, and yet each one of these conceptions may be such as represents the object as having a separate and incommunicable principle of existence, and if so, all the names of such conceptions will be noun substantives. Yet these conceptions must be capable of communicating with each other; because they are all applicable to one and the same object. What is said of the conceptions annexed to substantive names of species, shews sufficiently how one and the same object becomes an individual of many species; and likewise why it is at sometimes an individual of certain species, and at other times not. For the characteristics of many species are not fixed and inherent in the individuals, but may be acquired at one time, and lost at another: as for instance, a man may be "*a husband*" now, and then "*a widower*," and then "*a husband*" again. Therefore the several names of one and the same object must be capable of connexion, by the means of some word which will shew whether the conceptions denoted by them, both, are applicable to that object now, or were so formerly, or will be so hereafter. Such a connexion is expressed by interposing some form of the verb "*to be*" between two substantives; for by the reference of the infinitive and participial forms of the verb "*to memory—to actual perception, and to foresight*," and of the definitive forms to time, as distinguished into "*past, present, and to come*," by the demonstrative act of speaking, we are led
on

on to any period of time when two names are equally applicable to one and the same object. This is manifestly the simplest of the manners in which the conceptions, denoted by two substantives, can communicate with each other; and therefore a mere expression of "*being*," in which both the conceptions coalesce, is used to shew their coalescence; as, "*Mr. N—— being—— having been——being about to be a widower.*"

In the instance above, only one "*being*" is concerned, in which the conceptions denoted by two substantives unite. But there are frequent occasions in language to unite two or more separate beings, either actual or ideal, into one complex object. If these beings are all of one species, they may be expressed as united into one complex object, by using a plural name of the species to which they belong; as, "*men—horses—virtues—— vices.*" If they are not all of a species, several substantives must be united by the conjunction "*and*;" as, "*Mr. N—— and Mrs. B——,*" "*virtue and vice.*"

These two modes of communication, as to grammatical expression, are more simple than the first: but as several distinct beings are concerned in each complex conception expressed by either of them, the number is increased; which does not happen in the first mode of communication, and therefore it is more simple in itself than either of these.

The next mode of communication is that between the conception denoted by a substantive and a verb placed in immediate dependence upon it. By this mode, the object and state become so intimately united, that the conception of both together may be expressed by one substantive name, as, "*one thinking*" may be called "*a thinker*," "*one speaking*" "*a speaker*;" and so of other instances.

The next mode is that between a verb transitive and a substantive depending immediately upon it. For the corresponding passive state is so easily supplied, and the object denoted by the
substantive

substantive is so readily placed in it, that it is considered as a mere circumstance of the state which is mentioned; as, “*to tell a tale*” is considered in language merely as one sort of “*telling*,” and “*to tell a lie*” as another kind of “*telling*,” although the “*tail*” and the “*lie*” are not in the state “*telling*,” but in the state “*told*.”

If we consider these two last modes of communication as reduced to one, by interposing a transitive verb between two substantives; we shall have a mode of communication, to which, or to its converse by the passive verb, all the remaining modes may be reduced. For that between a substantive and an adjective is at least as complex as this mode; as, “*a roomy house*” is equivalent to “*a house having room*,” and so of other instances. All the modes of communication denoted by the prepositions (except that which “*by*” denotes after a passive verb) are of the same complex nature; as has been fully shewn in the section concerning the signs of cases. And as the adverb is equivalent to the oblique case of a substantive, its communication with the word on which it depends is of the same nature with that denoted by the sign of a case, or other preposition. Therefore the applying words in connexion by adjectives, or prepositions, or adverbs, is exactly of the same difficulty, as connecting words by the means of a transitive verb; and as the consistent application of a transitive verb is almost one of the first exertions of the discursive powers of a child, the consistent application of the other connective parts of speech, in all common instances, easily follows, when the application of the verb is once learnt.

The connexions by conjunctions different from “*and*,” and by the relative pronoun, are a kind of supplements to these above mentioned; and the most of them arise from the nature of sentences, and not from the conceptions denoted by single words. These connexions have been so largely insisted upon, under their proper heads, that it is unnecessary to add more concerning them in this place.

A Speculative Grammar.

B O O K VI.

S E C T I O N I.

Of the power of use or custom in language.

BEFORE I proceed to speak of words in connected construction, in order to account for that particular plan of construction which is observed in English, it is necessary to premise some observations concerning the original and extent of the power of use or custom in the application of language. For if that is true which is laid down, as a certain principle, by some writers on grammar, viz. that whatsoever is authorized by use and custom, is therefore right in language; it is then evident, that the only province of a grammarian is, to examine what is of the most established use in the language of which he treats; and to give himself no trouble as to speculative reflexions on the general nature of such language. This opinion concerning the authority of custom cannot be right with regard to all the properties of language, because some of these properties are essential to the nature of language itself. As for instance, the words of every language must of necessity, some of them be made to signify objects themselves; and others, the occasional states of being in which these objects are observed; and others, the modes of operation of the mind itself, by which it unites the several parts

parts of a conception, as they are denoted by several words, into one complex conception ; which must represent either some object, or some state of being, or some object in some state of being. Therefore the reason of man has shewn the necessity of introducing different sorts of words into every language, to be applied in connected series, in different manners, and for different purposes. Words of the same meaning and use are indeed different from one another, as to sound, in every different language ; and no reason can be given why different sounds were first applied by different nations to signify one and the same sort of objects, or of states of being, or of modes of contemplation of the mind itself. But when the sorts of words are once formed in a language, they cannot be joined in connected series with convenience, except in certain orders ; because the organs of speech are not capable of pronouncing some sounds immediately before or after some other sounds, without difficulty. Every speaker is quickly sensible of this ; and therefore the most common appearances and occurrences, are expressed in every language by words so placed in series, that the words will easily go off the tongue of the speaker, if he has been previously accustomed to pronounce the capital, or leading words concerned in each series. The general plan of construction, in every language, has manifestly been formed from these expressions. For the most ordinary appearances and events must have expressions adapted to each, in every language, in the very first application of it ; because the ordinary and necessary affairs of life cannot be carried on in concert without such expressions. Yet no plan of language has been formed, or ever can be formed, at random ; but so as to suit the discursive powers of the mind of man. The first effect of these powers is, the perceiving that different particulars which are not constantly observed to exist all together, cannot with any convenience be included in the conception denoted by any one single word. For the same word must always signify the same conception, or the same operation of the mind ; or such word will have an indeterminate meaning.

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If therefore several particulars, which seldom exist together, should be included in the signification of any one word, such word could be seldom used, because the conception denoted by it would seldom occur to the mind. Hence no one word can be made, with any convenience, to signify all that is at once before the mind of a speaker, even upon the simplest occasions. For the mind of man seldom contemplates any object under such circumstances as are never changed. And if circumstances are changed, the expression must be likewise changed, or it will not convey to the hearer the conception which the speaker has in his mind. On this account it is, that the capital object in every series of connected words, must be expressed no farther, by its name, than as it may be distinguished by characters which exist together in such object, whilst the circumstances which either may or may not be taken along with it, must be denoted by coalescent words to be occasionally united with the name.

It appears from hence, that the proceeding by which separate words are applied to express only parts of what is before the mind at once, is the artificial proceeding in language; and that the putting a series of these words together to express any common occurrence, is the natural consequence of attending to such occurrence, as the conception of it is all at once in the mind. Hence it comes to pass, that children, and persons utterly illiterate, can put words together consistently, to express any ordinary occurrence; and this without any explicit knowledge of the general plan of construction of the language in which they speak. Yet even this application of any language to common occurrences, was not first made at random, but by a reasonable adjustment of means to ends. For the words of every language, when reduced to connected series expressing truth or falsehood, are put into the form of complete sentences: and nothing but reason could have suggested this proceeding. This appears, in some degree, in what is already said of the definitive verb,

and will be made more apparent in the next chapter.

What has been hitherto observed, chiefly relates to the common colloquial language of any community of people ; but there is seldom any regular grammar composed of any language in which there are no books. Hence written language becomes the main object of grammar, and custom has much less power over such language, than over the common language of conversation. If conversation is held with illiterate persons, it must be carried on in such words, and such forms of construction, as these persons are accustomed to ; otherwise it will not be understood. But when an author sits down to write, he must adapt his style to his subject, and this subject may be of a kind that has never been treated of in the language in which he writes. Here then he is at liberty to exert his genius upon the language itself in which he composes. And, provided he does not quite lose sight of the accustomed plan of construction, he may model his expressions into various forms that never have been used before ; and every original genius has constantly done thus in poetry, oratory, history, and in every work of imagination. It is true, that original writers seldom sit down to consider the abstract nature of the language in which they write : but form striking conceptions in their own minds, and adjust their expressions to these conceptions. So that the received forms of construction in the language in which they write, supply them, not with fixed patterns, from which they must never depart ; but with rough materials, which they mold and fashion so as to fit them to their conceptions of excellence in the language in which they write. Thus it is, that patterns of style become established in all languages, and not by the mere caprice of arbitrary fashion. Many attempts in every language are usually made, before the plan of construction is brought to such a degree of perfection as the language is capable of reaching. And posterity easily perceives, that the language used in one age by the writers of a nation, is better than that which is used by those
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of another age. As for instance, all agree that the language of Virgil is better than that of Ennius; and very few but acknowledge the stile of Terence to be better than that of Plautus. Yet there is no doubt, but that each of these writers followed the custom of speaking that was generally used in the age when each of them lived, and that each adapted the custom to his subject in many instances.

If therefore custom were the only test of what is right or wrong in language, the stile of all these authors would be equally good. But it is clear, that posterity has little regard to custom, in judging of the excellence of a writer's stile; but determines that to be most excellent, which conveys the thoughts of the writer in the most clear and forcible manner to the mind of the reader.

It is indeed very difficult to shew from the nature of the Latin language, considered abstractedly, why the stile of one of these authors is better than that of another: and the same obtains with regard to different writers in all other languages. But it is most evident, that the custom of the age in which each author lived, is very little concerned in the determination; for it is that internal perception of the mind of man, which is usually called taste, that determines upon all points of the like kind with this under consideration; and when once the taste of different ages and nations has pronounced certain modes of composition to be excellent, there is no appeal from it. Now what we call "*taste*," is nothing else but "an exertion of the intellectual powers of man" in such instances as are so nearly connected with the nature of a "sensitive and rational being, that the perception of what is the" "most agreeable or disagreeable to such nature, requires no medium of proof to the mind of any person who has employed his" "attention steadily on many instances similar to any one of those" "which happens to be at any time under consideration." For previous use, and custom, and instruction, enable every such

person to compare objects, in themselves of a very complex nature, with the patterns of excellence of which he has formed conceptions in his own mind : and this at once, without proceeding step by step in the comparison. If the person's skill stops here, such person is a nice judge of excellence and defects in performances of art and genius, when these performances are actually accomplished and presented to observation. But the minds of men of deep speculation seldom stop here ; for they are naturally led on to discover why one instance of performance is more excellent than another. And this puts them upon analysing those complex conceptions which taste makes use of as standards ; and the result of this analysis produces science : for the most simple and general principles, to which the subject under consideration can be reduced, are discovered by this proceeding. And thus it is that, in all instances, the common conceptions of the mind of man are improved by men of genius and observation, into taste more and more refined ; and that taste itself is advanced into science by men of abstract speculation. The consequences of science in any subject are general rules, which extend to the main and leading principles of the subject to which they relate. But if the subject is not merely abstract and scientific, but is to be actually applied in a very great variety of instances of use and practice, no general rules will extend to all the instances of application ; for general rules have little regard to convenience of practice in particular instances. Hence in the actual application, even of arithmetic, to the ordinary affairs of commerce, most people depart from the general rules, and use those which the teachers of the art have called rules of practice : because they are better accommodated for dispatch in practice, than the general rules of proportion are. And if this comes to pass in the application of numbers in the common affairs of life, there is much greater reason to expect an event of the same kind in the application of words, which extends to a far greater variety of instances than the application of numbers does. Now it is possible, that a man may learn,
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by mere strength of mind, assisted by use and custom, to apply numbers readily and surely to such affairs as he is engaged in; and it is likewise possible to teach children to apply the rules of arithmetic, without shewing them the reason of any of these rules. And this way of teaching arithmetic is undoubtedly the best suited to the capacities of children. But surely the teacher himself ought to understand the scientific principles upon which the application proceeds, and ought likewise to instruct his pupils in these principles, as soon as their minds become sufficiently enlarged to comprehend them. And so in language, use and custom may enable any person to apply it pertinently; and children may be taught to make use of rules, the reason of which is not shewn them. But the teacher ought to understand, both the general principles which obtain in the application of all languages, and likewise those which obtain in the particular language that he teaches, and which give that particular cast, or turn of construction, which is peculiar to such language. And it is evidently the duty of every teacher to communicate those principles to his scholars, as soon as they are capable of comprehending them: because this knowledge will save the scholars much labour in their future studies, in any language. It is the province of speculative grammar to consider, both language in general, and likewise each language in particular, so as to discover the principles upon which the application proceeds: not pretending to account for each particular mode of expression; but for the properties of construction which are observed in all languages, and for the peculiar turn and genius of any language that is to be especially explained. The following section will shew how the principles, already laid down in the foregoing parts of this work, may be applied in investigations of the nature above mentioned, both with regard to language in general, and to the English language in particular.

SECTION II.

Of words in connected construction.

WHAT has hitherto been said of each of the parts of speech, considered separately, is only preparatory to this part of grammar. For the meaning of words, as reduced to several classes, is considered by grammarians with no other intent but to enable themselves and others, who do consider them in this manner, to apply them with more certainty in connected series, expressing the various conceptions of the mind of man.

In this part of grammar, the first thing required is, to shew why almost every expression in any language, must take the form of a compleat sentence, before it can be conceived to answer the intention of any rational speaker.

This arises from the great inconvenience which would ensue from uniting the force of a definitive verb with almost any expression in language, except of person and number. For, by what has been observed of the power of the definitive forms of the verb, it plainly appears, that the expression to which a definitive verb is subjoined, can neither itself be farther compounded, by interposing additional words between it and the verb, nor by making it dependent on some other word by the sign of a case, or other preposition. For the composition of every expression on which a definitive verb depends, must be absolutely compleated, before such verb can be applied to it in consistent construction; and this, because the definitive form itself of the verb (considered independently of the rest of its meaning) gives notice, that the composition of the expression on which it depends is compleated, and that the verbal *state of being* contained in the rest of the signification of the predicate of the sentence, affects the

the whole conception denoted by the subject of the sentence, whether such subject be expressed by one word or more.

The circumstances of person and number, may be united with *states of being* in the signification of such verbal forms as are never intended to be applied in language, but in dependence upon some subject. For the principal object in that which is denoted by the subject of every sentence, must be in one of the situations which are the characteristics of the three personal species; *i. e.* it must either be "*speaking*," or "*spoken to*," or "*neither speaking nor spoken to*;" and it must likewise be of one of the numbers. And therefore, to give notice of these circumstances as observed in some object which is likewise considered as in some verbal state of being, nothing more is necessary than to give each verb three different forms in each number of each tense, and to make one of the forms in each number signify the verbal state as united with some object considered as "*naming itself*," another of the forms as united with the object "*to which that which is said is addressed*," and another of the forms as with an object "*in neither of the above-mentioned circumstances*."

Single verbs of definitive forms thus constituted, will each of them have the effect of a sentence on several occasions. But this effect does not ensue from the single verbs, but from the demonstrative circumstances which may attend the act of pronouncing any one of them single. For the hearer is conceived to know the meaning of every single word which the speaker makes use of, before the word is mentioned; and therefore no single word, if considered in itself, gives the hearer any new information. But the demonstrative circumstances attending the act of mentioning a single definitive verb, may so far aid the signification of the verb, as to give new information to the hearer. For some object of a certain person and number is to be represented as, in the state denoted by a verb of a definitive form,

form, either at, or before, or after, the time of speaking; and the act of speaking, or mentioning such verb, is a demonstrative circumstance, which at once determines the object itself of the first or second person that is represented in the state denoted by the verb (supposing the speaker and hearer are present with each other when the words are spoke) and likewise a point or period of time; and the state is considered as co-existent with, or as preceding, or succeeding such point or period. And if the speaker can point out a particular object, neither speaking nor spoken to, when he uses a definitive verb of the third person, the hearer will conceive that the speaker's intention is to represent the object pointed out, as in the verbal state, at, or before, or after, the particular time of speaking according to the tense of the verb which he makes use of; and by the help of such ascertainment, one single verb may frequently express a speaker's whole intention. As if a man says, "*audio, I hear,*" or "*erras, you mistake,*" (and the persons concerned in the discourse are present with each other at the time of speaking) or "*audiebam, I heard—audiam, I shall hear—errabas, you were mistaken—errabis, you will be mistaken;*" or if a man points to a person and says, "*errat—errabat, or errabit, he is—was, or will be mistaken:*" the circumstances attending the discourse enable the hearer to comprehend particulars, which the words themselves do not contain in their signification. For the verbs "*audio—audiebam—audiam,*" denote "*any speaker whatsoever*" considering himself as hearing: the first at, the second before, and the third after, "*any point of time whatsoever*" in which the words are spoke; and so "*erras—errabas—errabis*" denote "*any object spoken to,*" as "*being mistaken*" at, or before, or after, "*any point of time whatsoever,*" in which these words are addressed; and "*errat—errabat—errabit,*" if considered in themselves, denote "*any object neither speaking nor spoken to,*" as being mistaken "*at, or before, or after, any point of time,*" in which the words are actually mentioned.

Knowledge taken for granted by the speaker as in the hearer, may have the same effect as the demonstrative circumstances above-mentioned; and such knowledge is taken for granted, in the use of the Latin impersonal verbs; such as, "*pudet—tædet—tonat*" "*—pluit*:" for "*pudet*" may be translated, "*shame torments*," and "*tædet*," "*weariness torments*." Now "*shame* and "*weariness*" always "*torment*," and this the speaker and hearer both know; but they do not always torment the same person: and therefore the speaker is conceived to represent them as tormenting himself at the time of speaking, if he mentions the words "*pudet—tædet*," and adds nothing more; so that the Latin word "*me*" is always understood in this application of the words. As to the words "*tonat, it thunders—pluit, it rains*," it is conceived that the hearer knows the object which is conceived to exert the acts of "*thundering* and "*raining*," and that this object (be it the clouds or the air, or whatsoever else) is not always in the state "*thundering* or "*raining*." When therefore a speaker uses one of these verbs, he represents the known object as in the state denoted by the verb at the particular time of speaking the word; and this circumstance of the time, may not be known to the hearer, till the word is mentioned, so as to determine the point of time spoken of to be the same with that in which it is mentioned. But many circumstances, which are either given or supposed to be known, may enable a speaker to declare either truth or falsehood by words which are not reduced to the form of a sentence, and which have even no verb whatsoever in them. Thus if a speaker should point to a house, and say "*that tree*," the expression would contain a manifest falsehood: or if any one should cry out "*fire!*" when nothing was in danger by fire, the person who cried out would be conceived to be a liar. For the act of pointing, in the first instance, and the tone of voice in the second, amount to declarations, by the established customs observed in the use of language.

In the instances above mentioned, only one speaker is supposed. But if we conceive two speakers to be concerned in a discourse, the one may supply the other with such materials to proceed upon, as shall enable this other to express his whole intention, on some occasions, by a single word which is not a verb. One instance of this kind always happens when the speaker proposes a question by way of supposition, and only requires to know whether the affirmative or negative of the supposition is true: for the answer by “yes,” shews the affirmative to be true; that by “no,” the negative. This has been already observed, when we spoke of the nature of such questions as can be answered by “yes or no.”

The course of any transaction may likewise supply many circumstances which the speaker may take for granted, or known, by every one concerned in, or present at the transaction; and by the help of this previous knowledge supposed in those who hear him speak, he may express his full intention by words not reduced to the form of a sentence. Thus when Richard, in Shakespear, cries “*my kingdom for a horse!*” the poet takes it for granted, that every hearer must have learned from the course of the representation, that Richard has lost his horse in battle; and that his extreme want of another is declared in the words above.

But the instances in which demonstrative circumstances, or previous knowledge, can be applied as supplements to what is expressed by words, are but few, in comparison of the great variety of instances in which those circumstances cannot be so supplied. And in all these latter instances, every series of connected words must be reduced to the form of a compleat sentence, before such series can be conceived to convey the full intention of any rational speaker. For if it is inconvenient to consider the force of a definitive verb, as inseparably united with what is denoted by any single substantive, or other objective word; it would be
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much more so, to consider the force of such a verb, as inseparably united with what is denoted by a series of words; because such series, on this supposition, could neither be enlarged by any word interposed between it and the verb, nor could it be diminished by taking a word, or more, from it; nor yet could it be made dependent on any other word by the sign of a case, or other preposition: for all these proceedings would contradict the notice which is given by the form itself of the verb, independent of the rest of its signification; viz. “that the composition of the expression on which the verb depends, is compleated; and that the verbal state affects the whole object, which is denoted by the expression that is shewn as compleated in its composition.”

I have observed in what is said of the verb definitive, that if single words could be made, which should be the names of whatsoever the mind of man considers, as it does the object which is denoted by any one noun substantive, there would be no occasion for the definitive forms of verbs. But it is not possible that single words can be made to answer every such purpose: for the conceptions annexed to single substantives, or to single objective verbs, must not include in them any particulars which are not constantly observed to exist together: seeing these conceptions must always be similar which are denoted by any one and the same name; otherwise the mind could not recall a certain conception upon the mention of a certain name. Yet the mind frequently does consider an object, or state, containing various circumstances, which do not always exist together, in the same manner as it does an object that is denoted by a single substantive; and when the mind does so, the expression of the object, or state, must consist of several words put together occasionally, to express these circumstances as taken along with some capital, or principal object, or state: and these circumstances may be more or fewer, according as it suits the speaker's convenience to take more or fewer of them together with some capital object,

or state, on any particular occasion. Therefore the liberty of adding more and more words to the name of every object, must be left unrestrained; and of consequence the definitive verb must be kept separate from other words: for by doing so, a speaker may proceed till he has compleated the composition of the expression of such a conception as he thinks proper merely to raise in the mind of the hearer, without representing the object of such conception as in any fixed state of being, till he adds the definitive verb. When this conception is raised in the mind of the hearer, it is of the same nature as the conception denoted by any single noun substantive in the nominative case; for the verbal state affects it all, as if it were expressed by one single name. Therefore the subject of every sentence is formed, either by mentioning a single substantive, or a single objective word, when one such word can be found to suit the speaker's purpose: or when one word cannot be found to suit his purpose, by mentioning a series of words expressing a conception which will suit his purpose; by considering this series as if it were a single noun substantive; and by giving notice by a definitive verb, when either one word is used without any composition, or if composition is used, when it is sufficiently compleated for the speaker's purpose.

The definitive forms of the verb "*to be*," if placed in dependence upon a single name, or upon a series of words, will any of them give notice that the composition of the expression, on which the verb depends, is stopped; and that the conception denoted by the expression, exists in the speaker's mind, either by actual perception, or by memory, or by foresight; according as the form of the verb is of a present, past, or future tense. But every hearer knows, that almost any conception of the mind of man may be considered by any speaker, at any time, in any one of these situations. Therefore such expressions as, "*a man is—was—will be*," "*the large possessions of rich men are*" "*—were—will be*," although they have the form of compleat sentences,

sentences, yet will seldom be conceived to express the full intention of any rational speaker. Hence the verb "*to be*" must be capable of admitting expressions of all kinds to depend upon it, in order to modify it so as to express every state of communicable being, which the mind of man can form a conception of; for some of these states, thus modified, may communicate with some conception of the mind of man which can be expressed by some objective word, or by some series of words. Hence every kind of word which can be used as dependent on the principal word of the subject of a sentence, may be used in dependence upon the verb "*to be*," or on some verb which modifies the verb "*to be*," and which is the principal word of the predicate of a sentence; and every predicate may be made more and more complex at pleasure; and this by the very same kinds of proceeding, by which the subject of every sentence may be made more and more complex at pleasure, till the composition of such subject is stopped by some definitive verb. And as the subject of every sentence is either actually one single noun substantive, or a series of words considered as one substantive; so the predicate of every sentence is either one single verb, or a series of words considered as one verb. And thus the whole application of language, however diversified in appearance, is reduced to this simple proceeding, viz. of finding single names suited to our present purpose, or of making serieses of words to be considered as single names; and of finding single verbs suited to our present purpose, or of making serieses of words to be considered as single verbs representing the objects denoted by the expressions on which they depend, as in certain states of being, such as the speaker has occasion to represent these objects in.

It is manifest from hence, that all the connective parts of speech are no more than auxiliaries to the substantive in the nominative case, and to the definitive verb. For the conceptions denoted by every series of words reduced to a sentence in which these connective parts of speech are concerned, are of a similar nature

nature to those denoted by some one substantive in the nominative case, and by some one definitive verb representing the occasional state of being of the object on the expression of which such verb depends.

It is likewise manifest, that the connective part of the signification of all words whatsoever, as likewise of all the signs used to connect words in language, are no more than kinds of notices to the mind to contemplate the conceptions denoted by the connected words under certain modes of estimation, which are the converses of the abstractive modes of operation by which the conceptions annexed to substantives and objective verbs, were first separated from each other. For every compleat series of connected words expresses a complex conception, consisting of the several conceptions denoted by one or more substantives, and one or more objective verbs, reduced all into one again. Only for the convenience of the hearer principally, one part of every such series is represented as intended merely to raise the conception of a certain object in his mind, and the other part to declare *some* state of being in which such object is observed, or remembered, or foreseen, or supposed, by the speaker. If the matter, concerning which any one proposes to speak, is of such a nature, that it cannot all be expressed in one sentence; it is as much for the convenience of the speaker, as for that of the hearer, to consider it by piece-meal; and when this is done, first one part of it is expressed as an object of especial attention, in the subject of one sentence, and then another part as such an object, in the subject of another sentence, and so forward till the whole matter is exhausted. And by the predicate annexed to each of the subjects, the states of being are ascertained, in which the objects denoted by each of the subjects, are occasionally considered: and thus the mind of any man is enabled both to register its own proceedings within itself, by the assistance of words; and likewise to direct the mind of any other man to follow the same proceedings step by step; and this operation produces that effect which is called,

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“ *understanding what a speaker or writer means.*” Hence the reason appears why the most effectual way of understanding any writer is to endeavour, as far as possible, to put ourselves in his place, so as to follow his train of thought, step by step : for till we do thus, we do not fully apprehend his meaning. If this proceeding were conscientiously observed in the interpretation of the laws, both of God and man, how many disputes would be avoided ! But from the nature of words, and especially of the connective part of their signification, they may easily be interpreted different ways, if the interpreter is determined to force them to his own sense, and not to follow that of the writer ; yet every such proceeding is directly contrary to sincerity.

The reason being thus shewn, why words take the form of a compleat sentence in connected speech, it is necessary in the next place to consider the order in which words are to be placed in the composition of sentences. For the very same words may be placed in various orders ; and yet every order may not be equally convenient, either for clearness of conception, or ease of pronunciation.

As to clearness of conception, it is manifest that no method can be taken more effectual to promote it, than to place the capital word of the subject of every sentence either the first, or as near the first as may be ; and to place every word which immediately modifies another, either immediately before or after the word which it modifies, and to proceed in this manner till the subject of the sentence is compleated ; and when this is done, to give immediate notice of it, by placing the definitive verb after the subject : and if the verb is to be modified by several dependent words, to place each word immediately depending upon the word which it modifies, or as near it as possible, and to proceed in this manner till the sentence is concluded.

The English construction, and, as I believe, that of most of the present languages of Europe, proceeds upon this plan. But the Latins and Greeks were not satisfied with this simplicity: for in their languages, the words of the subject and predicate of a sentence, are almost constantly intermixed; and the definitive verb very frequently stands the last word in the sentence. But in order that words thus placed should be intelligible, there was a necessity to introduce into these languages certain marks, to shew which words are immediately dependent on each other, although they do not stand close by each other. It is for this purpose, and this only, that the terminations of adjectives, pronouns possessive, relative, and demonstrative, are made to vary; as likewise the participles; so as to answer the grammatic gender, number and case, of the substantive on which one of them happens to depend; and the distinction of termination in the persons and numbers of the definitive verbs arises from the same source. This agreement of termination is called "*Concord*," in grammar; and by this contrivance, the same words of any sentence may be mixed in various orders, and yet may continue intelligible in any of these orders; because the correspondent terminations shew which words are to be taken in immediate dependence on each other. Hence ensue, in these languages, the rules which are laid down concerning the three concords; and which have no other foundation nor use but the above-mentioned, viz. that of shewing the words which are to be taken in immediate dependence on each other. This variety of correspondent terminations creates a correspondence of cadence in the Greek and Latin, which cannot be in any language of a construction like that of the English; and therefore, as to accordance of corresponding sounds, these antient languages have an advantage over the European languages in use at present. But the perspicuity arising from the order of construction, is quite lost in the Greek and Latin; and this seems to be the principal reason of their being fallen into disuse as living languages: for even the modern Greek has lost the antient plan of construction, although the antient

words are very many of them retained with little alteration.

The rule of the first concord directs, that the termination of the definitive verb shall agree with the number and person of the capital object which is in the subject of the sentence, on which the definitive verb depends. This capital object is usually expressed by a substantive in the nominative case; but it may be expressed by an objective verb, or even by a sentence on some occasions. Whatsoever the expression is by which this capital object is denoted, it must frequently happen that many additional words must depend upon it, in order to express various circumstances occasionally taken along with it in the subjects of many sentences. Hence the definitive verb must, on many occasions, necessarily stand at a distance from the capital word of the subject which it defines. On this account the English language retains distinction of person in the singular terminations of several of the forms of its definitive verbs: for by means of these terminations it is known of what person the capital word of the subject is which is defined by the verb. But the plural terminations are alike in all the persons, and the same with the termination of the first person singular in almost all the tenses of all verbs, except some of the tenses of the verb "*to be*." For as a plural object denoted by several names joined by the conjunction "*and*" may consist of objects of all the three persons, no termination of the verb can take notice of all the persons of objects so constituted; and therefore the same plural termination of the English verb is made, with great propriety, to relate equally to objects of any of the persons. In consequence of this proceeding, the observation of the first concord is attended in English with very little difficulty.

The rule of the second concord in Latin and Greek, directs that the termination of the adjective shall be varied so as to suit with the grammatic gender, number, and case, of the sub-

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stantive on which it depends. Now the adjective always unites with its substantive, or with any other objective expression on which it depends, so as to form with it an expression of one objective conception; there is therefore no occasion to express the gender, or number, of the object of this conception twice over, once by the substantive, and again by the adjective; nor is there any occasion to express the mode twice over in which this object communicates with what is denoted by some other word: for the case of the substantive on which the adjective depends does this sufficiently. But if the adjective is not placed immediately either before or after its substantive, or other objective word on which it depends; some grammatic marks must be introduced to direct the hearer, or reader, to the word with which the adjective is to be taken in immediate connexion. Now in English, the adjective is placed as near as possible either before or behind its substantive; and this position makes this concord utterly unnecessary in the construction of the English language. And this simple and obvious way of proceeding likewise makes it utterly unnecessary, in English, to consider objects of no sex as denoted by names of any grammatic gender. And hence all the perplexity occasioned by the grammatic genders of substantives which denote objects of no sex, is utterly removed from the English.

The rule of the third concord in Latin and Greek directs, that the relative shall agree with its antecedent in gender, number, and person. This rule extends in English to all the pronouns; for it includes the possessive pronouns, which are made in Latin and Greek to agree in grammatic gender, number, and case, with these properties of the substantives to which they are applied. The relatives in English have no grammatic number: for as they can seldom be used without their antecedents, these antecedents sufficiently shew the number of the object which the relative represents. If therefore it be remembered that "*who*" is applied to persons, and "*which*" to things, this concord is easily

easily observed in English, so far as the relative pronoun is concerned. And as to the application of the possessive pronouns; the sex, number, and person, of the object contained in the signification of one of them, are as easily perceived, as they are, when the same object is denoted by a personal pronoun. So that the observation of concord in the construction of pronouns requires very few directions in the English language.

The determination of the case of a relative pronoun, is not a proceeding of the same nature with that of adjusting the concords. For the relative always stands in the same mode of communication with the words of its own clause, as its antecedent would do, if it were placed in the clause instead of the relative, and the clause were reduced to a compleat sentence by such substitution. As this has been made fully evident, in what has been said of the relative pronoun in particular, there is no need to repeat it here.

As to the construction of words in dependence upon substantives, adjectives, and verbs; the principle is exactly the same upon which the English language proceeds with regard to them all. Only when a verbal transitive state is not mentioned which joins the objects denoted by two substantives, the preposition "*of*" is used, if the state can easily be understood. If such state cannot be easily understood, some transitive verb must itself be mentioned, or some preposition different from "*of*."

When "*of*" follows a verb in English, it has usually the signification of "*out of*" or "*concerning*," as has been already observed, in what is said of the signs of the cases of substantives.

There is no need to consider the construction of single substantives in dependence on other words more particularly in this place. Nor is it necessary to add any thing here concerning the construction of adjectives, pronouns, adverbs, conjunctions, or

propositions. For the nature of their connexions with other words has been shewn, when each of them was treated of in particular. So that there remains nothing farther to be done, with regard to any of these parts of speech, but to lay down practical rules for the application of each, according to the established custom of the English language. And this must, of consequence, be referred to the practical part of this work.

But it is necessary to make some observations on the English construction of infinitive verbs and participles, when used single, or in conjunction with other words, so as to answer the effect of one noun substantive in some case: and likewise when they are used with other words, so as, together with them, to answer the effect of a whole sentence taken into some other sentence as a constituent part thereof. And for the illustration of my subject, it will be proper to compare the English forms with the corresponding forms in Latin and Greek.

When infinitive verbs or participles are used singly as so many noun substantives, they are applied in the manner which constitutes what I have called, in the foregoing treatise, the objective character of the verb. I have observed, that participles in Greek and Latin are not used in this objective character. But that the Greek uses the infinitive forms commonly with an article prefixed in some case, to shew when the verb is applied objectively, and frequently with a preposition prefixed to the article. Thus what is expressed in English by "*speaking—of speaking—ing—to speaking—in speaking*" may be expressed in Greek by το λεγειν—τα λεγειν—τω λεγειν—προς το λεγειν—εν τω λεγειν: whereas the participle λεγων is coalescent, *i. e.* it does not merely express the state "*speaking*," but gives notice that some object, expressed, or understood, is in the state. So that ο λεγων signifies "*one speaking*," or "*a speaker*;" and so of other instances of the application of the Greek participles.

The Latin participles are likewise coalescent, so that "*loquens*" or "*dicens*" (for instance) do not signify the state "*speaking*," but some object, expressed, or understood as "*speaking*." The infinitive forms of the Latin, as well as those of the Greek, much the most frequently denote verbal states considered objectively; but the Latin has no prepositive article by which to turn the objective verb into what shall be equivalent to a noun substantive, first in one case, and then in another. And therefore the gerunds, and supines, are introduced into this language, to express the objective verb when it is used as a substantive in different cases. Thus, "*dicendi*" is of the same import as "*of speaking*," "*ad dicendum*" as "*to speaking*," "*in dicendo*" as "*in speaking*." If the verbal active state is considered as "*the reason why*" some other state exists, the first supine is used; as "*veniunt spectatum*," "*they come to see*;" i. e. "*on account of seeing*." If the verbal passive state is considered as "*the respect in which*" some object has the quality that is denoted by an adjective, such state is expressed by the latter supine, as "*difficile factu*," "*difficult to be done*;" i. e. difficult in respect of being done, or, as to its capacity of being done.

Neither the Latin nor the Greek has a pair of forms of the verb equivalent to the English forms with "*must*;" and therefore the gerund in "*dum*" is used in Latin to supply these forms; as "*eundum est mihi*," "*I must go*:" and the Greek forms in *τεον* are used for the same purpose, as *βαδιζεον εμοι*, "*I must go*."

There is evidently a defect in the Greek language, occasioned by a want of objective forms of the verb. For although the infinitive tenses may be used objectively, it is not convenient to use them on all occasions. Hence we find the participle frequently used in effect as an objective verb, as *επαυσατο λαλων*—"*he ceased speaking*," *μετεμελοντο αποδεδωκοτες*—"*they repented the giving up*," *επην κεκαμω πολεμιζων*—"*when I have been wearied with fighting*," *ιππευων ητιων ειμι*—"*I am less skilful in riding*,"

"riding," ἀνηλωκεὶ δακνων καὶ βαλλων—"be destroyed by pursuing and casting," i. e. darts. These expressions, if literally translated, are, "he speaking ceased," "they having given up repented," "when I fighting have been wearied," "I riding am less skilful," "he pursuing and casting destroyed," &c. Expressions of the like construction continually occur in the Greek, and are considered by the grammarians, as elegancies; but they evidently arise from the want of objective participles in the language.

It happens in the Latin, that there are coalescent participles of the very same forms with the gerunds, and with the first supine. For "*amandi—amando—amandum*" may be considered as cases of the participle "*amandus*," and "*amatum*" may be considered as the accusative case of the participle "*amatus*." This gives an ambiguous meaning to these forms. Thus "*amandus vir*" may signify "*a lovely man*," as "*amanda vox*" signifies "*a lovely voice*;" but "*amandi viri*" may either signify "*of a lovely man*," or "*of loving a man*," and so "*ad opus faciendum*," may signify either "*to the work which is to be done*," or "*to doing the work*;" and in like manner "*in opere faciendo*" may signify either "*in the work which is to be done*," or "*in doing the work*." This has occasioned abundance of perplexity to the grammarians, to shew in what a gerund or supine differs from a participle. But this may easily be determined: for when these forms denote objective states, they are gerunds and supines: and when they denote coalescent states, they are participles. The gerunds frequently carry on their case into some substantive that depends upon them, and sometimes take the number and gender of the substantive; as "*illarum videndi gratiâ*," "*for the sake of seeing those women*;" "*mirando hoc repentino gaudio*," "*with wondering at this sudden joy*;" "*his libris legendis*," "*by reading these books*;" "*defendendâ pace*," "*by maintaining peace*."

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These are manifestly all of them expressions of objective states of being, and not of objects in coalescent states of being: for if they were so, "*illarum videndi*" would mean "*of those women to be seen*;" "*mirando hoc gaudio*," "*with this joy to be wondered at*;" "*libris legendis*," "*by books to be read*;" "*defendendâ pace*," "*by peace to be maintained*;" and therefore the verbal forms are gerunds, and not coalescent participles. These gerunds seem to me to have taken their name from this mode of construction. For they are to be *carried on*, first in one case and then in another, into the substantives that depend upon them (which in Latin is *gerenda* or *gerunda sunt*) so that the verbal form and the substantive taken together, is in effect one complex noun substantive in some case. But the supines have seldom any substantive depending upon them: the latter supine, as I believe, never has one. And if the first supine is found with one; the case of the substantive is such as the verb requires from whence the supine is derived. So that some grammarian seems to have considered the supines as indolent words, in not carrying on first one case and then another into a dependent substantive, and thence to have given them this name.

Any objective verb may either stand alone as a substantive in some case, or may have one or more words depending on it, to circumstantiate the state which it denotes; and the verb together with such words may be considered as equivalent to one noun substantive in some case. The verb in the infinitive mood is used, in all languages which I am acquainted with, in both these sorts of construction; and in English, Latin, and Greek, it frequently, either single, or with one or more words depending on it, supplies the place of a noun substantive in every case, although no sign of a particular case is united with it. Thus in English, "*to think requires attention*," "*to read books requires attention*," "*to read books of mathematics requires attention*," the expressions "*to think*," "*to read books*," "*to read books of mathematics*," are each of them equivalent to one noun substantive

stantive in the nominative case. And in the expressions “*desiring—to read—to read books—to read books of mathematics*,” the expressions “*to read—to read books—to read books of mathematics*,” are equivalent to substantives in the genitive case; for these expressions denote that “*of which*” some one is desirous. And so in “*inclined to read*”—or “*to read books*,” “*To read—to read books*” is that “*to which*” some one is inclinable; and therefore “*to read—to read books*” are here equivalent each to one substantive in the dative case. And in “*desiring to read—to read books*,” “*to read—to read books*” expresses that which is “*desired*,” and therefore are equivalent to substantives in the accusative case. And in “*prohibited—to read—to read books*,” “*to read—to read books*” denote that “*from which*” some one is prohibited, and therefore are equivalent to substantives in the ablative case. Sanctius has shewed by examples that the Latin infinitive verb either without or with words depending upon it, is equivalent to one noun substantive in any case; see Sancti Minerva, Book 3. Chap. 6. The Greek infinitive verb, without any article before it, most commonly, either alone or with some depending words, supplies the place of a substantive in the nominative or accusative case; as *αγαθον ως ταχιστα επιμελεισθαι*—“*to take care as quickly as possible is a good thing*,” where *ως ταχιστα επιμελεισθαι* is equivalent to a nominative case. *μανθανω ιππευειν*—“*I learn to ride*,” where *ιππευειν* is equivalent to an accusative. Yet the Greek infinitive is often found in expressions equivalent to other cases, although it has no article before it; as *ωρα απιεναι*—“*time to go away*,” where *απιεναι* is equivalent to a genitive case. *Θεειν ανεμοισιν ομοιοι*—“*like the winds in running*,” where *Θεειν* is equivalent to an ablative case: and so of many instances of other cases.

Hence it appears, that the Greek use of the infinitive form of the verb is no more precise, as to giving it the sign of a case, than the English is; yet such sign may be easily given to it by prefixing the prepositive article in the proper case, as *ωρα τε απιεναι*, and so of other instances. And in English, by using the objective

objective participle instead of the infinitive verb, the sign of the case may be prefixed, as instead of saying "*the time to work is the day,*" we may say "*the time for working is the day.*" The gerunds may likewise be substituted in Latin instead of the infinitive verb, as instead of "*parati respondere,*" "*ready to answer,*" we may say "*parati ad respondendum.*" But if some other words depend upon a gerund, its meaning may be ambiguous, for the reason given above. Thus it appears, that (when the verb is used in its objective capacity in the manner above described) the verb itself, together with the words that depend upon it, are in effect a kind of complex noun substantive formed out of several words.

But these words taken together are not equivalent to a whole sentence considered as one noun substantive. For, "*to read a book — reading — of reading — by reading a book,*" cannot be considered as expressions equivalent to whole sentences. But the expressions "*your — their — John's — reading such a book,*" may be considered as whole sentences, only not reduced to form, because they are to be made constituent parts of some other sentence. Thus, "*I am told of your — their — John's reading such a book,*" are expressions manifestly equivalent to "*I am told that you read — they read — John reads — such a book,*" and in these expressions the clauses "*you read such a book,*" "*they read such a book,*" "*John reads such a book,*" are so many complete sentences answering each to one noun substantive in the genitive case, seeing they each of them express "*that of which*" I am told. This kind of construction cannot be imitated by the participles, either in Latin, or Greek, because they are not used objectively in these languages. Yet serieses of words in themselves equivalent to complete sentences must, in all languages, be considered as answering the effect of single substantives; and in order to accomplish this, the English, Latin, and Greek, on some occasions, retain the form of the sentence, and give notice by a particle prefixed, that it is to be considered as equivalent to one

substantive in some case. I have already shewn, that the particle "*that*" is used in English for this purpose. "*Quod*" is thus used in Latin and *ὅτι* in Greek. Thus, "*I know that truth is of God,*" may be expressed in Latin by "*scio quod veritas a Deo est,*" and in Greek by *οἶδα ὅτι ἡ ἀληθεία ἐστὶν ἀπο τοῦ Θεοῦ*. In all these instances a sentence, *i. e.* "*truth is of God,*" "*veritas a Deo est,*" *ἡ ἀληθεία ἐστὶν ἀπο τοῦ Θεοῦ*, is equivalent to a noun substantive in the accusative case, for it is "*the thing known.*" But the same notice may be given, either in English, Latin, or Greek, by turning the nominative case of this sentence into the accusative, and the definitive verb into its infinitive form; as, "*I know truth to be of God,*" "*scio veritatem a Deo esse,*" *οἶδα τὴν ἀληθειαν εἶναι ἀπο τοῦ Θεοῦ*. It is evident, that either the placing of "*that*" before a sentence, or turning the nominative into the accusative, and the verb into the infinitive mood, are nothing more than notices concerning words themselves; *i. e.* that a certain series of them is to be looked upon as one noun substantive in some case. The infinitive forms of verbs which are objectively used on other occasions, become coalescent in this mode of construction. For "*truth*" is here considered in the state "*being of God,*" and it is asserted, that I know truth as being in that state.

This form of construction, by turning the nominative case into the accusative, and the verb into the infinitive mood, is much more frequent in Latin and Greek, than it is in English. For we in English usually retain the definitive form of the verb with "*that*" placed before the dependent sentence. In all compositions by way of narration, in Latin, this form of construction by the infinitive mood occurs perpetually; and when one person tells what another said, the whole discourse takes this form. Thus when Cæsar is giving an account of what Ariovistus said at the conference held between them; he proceeds thus, "*Ariovistus de suis virtutibus multa prædicavit. Transisse Rhenum sese non suâ sponte,—non sine magnâ spe domum reliquisse,—sedes habere in Galliâ,*" &c. which in English

English is, "*Ariovistus vaunted much of his own exploits (saying) that he had passed the Rhine not upon his own motion,—that he had left his home not without great hopes,—that he had a settlement in Gaul,*" &c. The Greek uses the like form of construction on several occasions; but it should seem, that it was not usual in that language to deliver whole speeches of another person in this manner. For the Greek translator of Cæsar's Commentaries turns them into direct speeches. So in the instance above, he expresses the sense of Cæsar's words thus. Ο δ' Αριοβιστος ὡς ἀπημειβόη, πολλὰ περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἰχθους μεγαληγορούμενος. Ἐγὼ μὲν διέβην τὸν Ῥήνον, ἔφη, ἐκ αὐτοκελεύσεως, &c.—Which is directly in English, "*Ariovistus answered thus, boasting much of his own strength. I, says he, passed the Rhine not of my own motion,*" &c. Serieses of words with the accusative case and the infinitive mood, are frequently turned into any case, in Greek, by prefixing the prepositive article in the case of which the whole series is to be considered, supposing it were one noun substantive. Thus in Zenophon, ἐπικυφίζει τὰς πόδας τῷ ἀρχόντι, τὸ αὐτὸν εἶδεναι ὅτι ἔλανθανει "*his knowing that he is not unnoticed lightens a commander's labours,*" where τὸ αὐτὸν εἶδεναι ὅτι ἔλανθανει is equivalent to a nominative case: but in τὸν ἀρχόντα χρὴ διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων τῷ φιλοπονεῖν προθυμύμενον—" *a commander ought to excell those under his command, in his being cheerfully ready to undergo labour,*" τῷ φιλοπονεῖν προθυμύμενον is equivalent to an ablative case. And again, in ἐβριμάτο τε τῷ Κυρῷ καὶ τοῖς Μηδοῖς τῷ καταλιπόντας αὐτὸν οἰχέσθαι—" *he was violently enraged at Cyrus and the Medes for their going away and leaving him.*" The Latins sometimes imitate the Greeks in this kind of construction. Thus in Virgil,

—Tunc tempus figere damas

Stuppea torquentem balearis verbera fundæ.

" *Then is the time for one whirling the flaxen blows of the balearian sling to pierce deer,*" where "*figere damas stuppea torquentem,*" &c. is manifestly equivalent to one substantive in

the genitive case depending on "*tempus*." But it is evident that this kind of construction in Latin, is forcing the language into a mode of expression which is not suitable to it, as it has no prepositive article to give notice of the case in which the series of words is to be considered. The Greeks frequently use a nominative case with an infinitive dependent verb, in clauses of this construction whereof I am treating; but there is no occasion to multiply examples: for every one who is at all conversant in the language must have observed, that the use of clauses either depending on infinitive objective verbs, or with coalescent infinitive verbs depending either on nominative or accusative cases, yet so that the whole clause expressed in any of these manners is equivalent to one substantive in some case, gives a particular cast to the Greek language.

I now proceed to give an account of the use of the coalescent participle in clauses which the grammarians have called "*abso-lute*." In these clauses in Latin, the participle in the ablative case depends upon a substantive also in the ablative case: or if the participle depends upon a series of words, such series is considered as equivalent to a substantive in the ablative case. Thus in "*audito regem in Sciciliam tendere*," "*it being heard that the king was going towards Sicily*;" "*regem in Sciciliam tendere*," must be considered as one substantive in the ablative case. The participle, in this application of it in the Greek, is much the most usually placed in the genitive case depending upon a substantive that is likewise in the genitive case; but not always; as in this expression of Zenophon, Εγὼ γὰρ εἶφη ὁ Κυρῶς θιομαι; ἀμα μὲν ὑμῶν συναγορευουστων, ἀμα δὲ αἰσχρον ὄν ἀντιλεγειν—
 "I think so, says Cyrus, both by your speaking in conjunction with me, and likewise as it is infamous to speak to the contrary." Zenoph. Cyropædia, Book 2. Sect. 14. where αἰσχρον ὄν ἀντιλεγειν is of the nominative or accusative case. But in whatever case these absolute clauses are expressed, they are usually equivalent to whole sentences depending on relative ad-verbs;

verbs; such as "*while—when—as—after,*" &c. Now I have already shewn, that these adverbs destroy the affirmative power of a definitive verb, as a relative pronoun does. And hence it comes to pass, that a clause which has no definitive verb in it, may be made to answer the effect of a definitive clause in dependence on one of these adverbs. Several of the conjunctions have much the same effect with these adverbs; such as "*if,*" "*since,*" &c. and therefore absolute clauses may sometimes be turned into equivalent expressions consisting of compleat sentences depending on conjunctions.

When absolute clauses are made use of, there is always something to be supplied in the mind which is not directly expressed; and particularly when the participle is not mentioned; which frequently happens in Latin. Thus "*te duce*" may signify, either "*when you were a leader,*" or "*whilst you are a leader,*" or "*if you shall be a leader,*" or "*if you were a leader;*" according to the sense which the other words wherewith this clause is joined require to be given to it. And therefore it is no argument of excellence in any language to admit frequently of such a form of construction.

The Latin admits of it much more frequently than the Greek, and that for a reason, which, as I believe, has not hitherto been observed. This reason is, that there is no past participle of an active signification belonging to any Latin verbs, but the verbs deponent; such as "*locutus,*" "*having spoke,*" "*secutus,*" "*having followed;*" &c. and these verbs are but few, in comparison of the whole number of Latin verbs. Now I have already shewn, that there are two ways of representing an object as in a passive state, *viz.* either by placing the name of the object in immediate dependence on an active transitive verb, or by placing the corresponding passive verb in dependence on the name of the object. Thus in the expression "*James having read over the book,*" "*the book,*" is in the state "*having been read.*"

“read over by James;” and it may be expressed in this latter situation, by the Latin clause “*liber a Jacobo perlectus*,” but no Latin form by a participle can be found to express “James having read over the book.” The verb definitive with “cum,” must be used for this purpose, as “*Jacobus cum perlegisset librum*,” “James, when he had read over the book.” Now suppose that the clause “gave it to me,” depends upon “James having read over the book,” the sentence “James having read over the book, gave it to me,” cannot be conveniently expressed in Latin by “*Jacobus cum librum perlegisset dedit illum mihi*,” because the use of “*illum*” is here, according to the Latin idiom, a kind of tautology. Therefore it must be expressed by “*Jacobus librum a se perlectum dedit mihi*,” which is literally “James gave me the book read over by him.” In the first English sentence “the book” is twice named; once by “the book,” and again by “it;” and it is represented as in the passive state denoted by “*perlectus*,” “read over,” in consequence of standing after the English past active participle “having read over.” When it is again expressed by the pronoun “it,” the book is in the accusative case, with regard to the verb “gave.” Therefore “the book” being expressed by the passive participle as actually “read over” is, together with the participle, put in the accusative case in Latin, “*librum perlectum dedit*.” If the pronoun “it” had been in any other case, “*liber perlectus*” must have been of the same case. Thus, “James having read over the book, told me the contents of it,” may be in Latin “*Jacobus libri a se perlecti argumentum mihi narravit*,” for “of it,” is in the genitive case, and therefore “*libri a se perlecti*” is so too. Thus an object may be represented in a past passive participial state, and (if it is expressed again in the same sentence) when considered in that state, it may be consistently applied to some other word in the sentence. But if the same object be only represented in a past passive state by standing after an English active past participle, and be no more mentioned in the same sentence: it may indeed in Latin be represented in the past participial passive

passive state, by making the passive past participle depend on its name; but there will now be no word to determine the case of its name with such participle depending upon it. Thus in the sentence "*James having read over the book, began to talk on different subjects.*" If the book be expressed as "*read over*" by the participle "*perlektus*," there is nothing in the sentence which determines its case: and when this happens, the noun and the passive participle, are put, in Latin, into the ablative case; as "*perlektō libro de diversis rebus loqui cœpit Jacobus.*" Whosoever has the curiosity to examine any Latin book, especially on an historical subject, will find, that of the numerous instances in which the ablative case absolute occurs, by far the greatest number is occasioned by the want of an active past participle in the language. For when such a participle can be found (as in the deponent verbs) that participle is used just as the English active past participle is used. Thus, "*they having entered the tent, ordered him to be seized,*" is in Latin, "*tabernaculum ingressi com-
prendi jusserunt*;" "*Bessus and the rest of his associates having overtaken the chariot of Darius,*" is, "*Bessus et cæteri participes vehiculum Darii assequuti*;" "*they having fulfilled the answer of the oracle,*" is "*defuncti oraculi response.*" But when the English use an active past participle of a transitive verb which cannot be expressed by a Latin deponent, and the object which is in the correspondent passive state is not twice mentioned in the sentence; then the ablative case is used absolutely with a passive participle depending upon it. Thus, "*having distributed these as recruits of his forces, and having put the pirates to death,*" is in Latin, "*his in supplementum capiarum suarum distributis, piratisque supplicio affectis*;" and "*Alexander having passed the river, came into the country of the Uxii,*" is "*Alexander amne superato in regionem Uxiorum pervenit*;" and so of innumerable instances which may be found in any Latin book, but especially of a narrative or historical kind. For in every such book there is a continual occasion to represent objects in past states denoted by passive participles, and that in sentences wherein

wherein the object that is in such a state is not twice mentioned.

I have given the examples above from Mr. Clarke's grammar of the Latin tongue. For he has treated expressly of the ablative case absolute, and has given six rules about it. Yet he does not seem to have discovered the reason why this kind of construction appears so frequently in Latin, especially in narrations. This construction is usually considered as an elegance in the Latin; but its frequency, in reality, arises from a want of active past participles; as any one will be fully sensible who shall consider Mr. Clarke's examples. For at least two-thirds of them relate to passive past states, which have no corresponding active participles in the Latin.

The use of the absolute case is an effectual proof of the truth of what has been determined concerning the nature of an oblique case, viz. that it is a mark of a certain mode of estimation of the mind of man, to be applied to premises or data of certain kinds. For it is clear, that a coalescent participle and the name of an object must be found or understood in every absolute clause, and that the object's being in the state denoted by the participle, is used either to determine the "*time when*" something comes to pass; as "*imperante Augusto natus est Christus*," "*when Augustus was emperor*," "*Christ was born*;" or as a supposition whereof the consequences are to be shewn; as "*quo extincto se pœnas daturos*," "*for if he were destroyed, they should suffer*;" or to determine various other circumstances which may be expressed in Latin by "*dum—quum—postea—quam—si*," and other adverbs or conjunctions, and the form of a sentence retained; as "*dum* or "*quum Augustus imperabat natus est Christus*," "*si ipse extinctus esset se pœnas daturos*." But as it is conceived, in Latin, that all these circumstances may be supplied by one and the same mode of estimation, if first one sort of premises are used and then another, therefore one and the same case, viz. the ablative, is used in all the instances to direct to the mode of estimation; but the

result thereof is left to the judgment, to be adapted so as to suit the sort of premises to which the mode of estimation is at any time applied. Absolute clauses of sentences are not very frequent in English, but when they do appear, both the substantive and the participle are usually in the nominative case; as, "*John being negligent, James will get his place;*" "*things having succeeded, we shall now be out of fear;*" and so of other instances. But we much more usually place a relative adverb or a conjunction before the clause, and express it by a definitive verb; as, "*because John is negligent, James will get his place;*" "*as things have succeeded, we shall now be out of fear.*" This manner of expression is more precise and determinate, than that by an absolute clause, and therefore it is an excellence of the English that it makes little use of such a clause.

The exceeding simplicity of the plan of construction in the English language is such, that whatsoever is farther necessary to be observed concerning it, may very properly be referred to the chapter of the practical part of this work, which contains the rules of English syntax. But it may be necessary to observe here, that the want of simplicity of syntax can never be compensated by any correspondence of cadence, or by any other advantage which can be supposed to be gained by a complex syntax; such as that of the Greek and Latin. For the business of life is not to learn language, and therefore that plan of expressing our thoughts which may be soonest apprehended, is undoubtedly the best for the generality of men, provided it be precise, and sufficiently general. Neither poetry nor oratory are essentially necessary for the purposes of life; and therefore, although it should be granted, that the Greek and Latin are more suited to poetry and oratory than the English is; it will not follow from hence, that the Greek and Latin are more excellent languages than the English. The excellence of the English is its simplicity: and if with this simplicity it be capable of conveying the thoughts of one man to another, on all

occasions, with clearness and precision; the end of language is answered effectually by it. As to multiplicity of monosyllables, they are not to be avoided in any language of so simple construction as that of the English; because the prepositions, and signs of the tenses, must be kept distinct from the nouns and verbs, that they may be applied with any noun, or with any verb. But if they were considered as united into one word with the noun or the verb with which they are placed in construction, such word would for the most part contain as few syllables as the correspondent Latin or Greek noun or verb. Thus, "*of a man*," is an expression of as few syllables as "*hominis*," or "*ανθρωπου*," and "*may run*" has as few syllables as "*currat*," or "*τρεχει*," and so of almost all other instances. Therefore the complaint of the English being weakened by the auxiliary verbs, or by any other means, is without foundation; and if Tacitus, or any other author, cannot be translated into English so short as the original; neither can almost any good English author be translated into Latin so short as the original. Let any man take a scene of Shakespear, and try if he can turn it into iambic verses which shall not exceed the number of the English verses; and yet every iambic verse contains twelve syllables, and the English heroic verse contains but ten. Or without taking so much pains, let the speech of Cato just before his death in Mr. Addison's tragedy be compared with the Latin translation of it in N° 628 in the eighth volume of the Spectator; and it will appear, that the Latin is at least one third longer than the English. Yet this speech is in the character of a Roman, on a common topic; and so is more nearly in the Roman way of thinking than otherwise it would be: and hence it is more suited to the Latin idiom than an Englishman's speech upon an English subject would be.

The reason why translations cannot be so short as originals, is because the nouns and verbs of no two languages exactly suit each other, nor do the allusions, or figures, in any two languages exactly suit each other; and when this happens, circum-

locution

locution must necessarily be used in the language into which any original is translated.

I have supposed above, that the English is not so proper for poetry and oratory as the Latin and Greek; yet there seems not to be any sufficient reason to allow of these suppositions, in their utmost latitude. Mr. Addison says, that the English language sunk under Milton. So would the Greek language have sunk under Homer, if he had made an epic poem on Milton's subject. The English language cannot fall into the measure of the Latin and Greek heroic verse, because there are few or no spondees in the English, *i. e.* few or no single words which have two long syllables the one immediately after the other. But the iambic, trochaic, anapaestic, and many other measures, may be observed in English, as easily as they are in the Latin and Greek, and actually are observed by the English poets in variety of compositions. The reason why the English language falls into these measures is, because the signs of cases, and the articles, are prefixed to its substantives, and the signs of the tenses to its verbs; and these are, with great propriety, usually pronounced short; for they are but auxiliars to the main conception which is denoted by the noun or verb itself. As these are pronounced short, a necessity ensues of bringing the accent upon our nouns and verbs as forward as may be; that the voice may rest strong upon the accented syllable, after having passed lightly over several prefixed signs, articles, or other parts of words, which are merely connective. Whereas in the Latin and Greek, as we read these languages, the voice frequently passes lightly over the main part of a noun or verb, and rests strongly on the sign of its case, or tense. The English seldom place a strong accent on more than one syllable of any word of a moderate length; nor do the Latins seem to have done it, any more than the English, if we may judge from their iambic verses. And if the Latins really did thus, their hexameter or heroic verse could not be read according to the manner of speaking in or-

dinary conversation, but must have been pronounced in a kind of recitative. The usual pronunciation of the Greek language seems to have been in a sort of modulation somewhat like singing; and this language is exceedingly suited for such modulation, both by the number of vowels which are found in the very most of its words, and likewise by the particles which we now consider as mere expletives, and which may be some of them inserted in almost any sentence, without any alteration of the sense that we can perceive at present. But the modulation of a sentence may be considerably altered by the putting in, or leaving out these particles; and this may have affected the sense, when the language was actually spoke, although we cannot now determine exactly in what manner. This language, in point of modulation, seems to excell all others. But it is as defective in its plan of construction as any language can be that is to be intelligible. For the cases, tenses, moods, voices, and the prepositions, are applied in so loose and indeterminate a manner, as scarcely to admit of being reduced to any certain plan. Dr. Clarke has observed, that Homer is more perspicuous than any other author; but if he is so (which yet may be questioned) the perspicuity arises from his subject, and not from the language itself in which he writes. It may be easily shewn that this is true, from the Greek language as used in a mathematical book, such as Euclid. For in such a book, the nature of the proposition which the writer is upon, shews what he must mean by the words of the proposition. Yet every one who has read this book in the original Greek and in an English translation, must be satisfied that the English expresses the propositions at least as clearly and precisely as the Greek, and in as short a compass.

As to oratory, surely several set speeches in Shakespear, are as excellent as any that ever were made. If our public speakers would take as much pains to arrive at excellence as Demosthenes and Tully did, there is little doubt but the English language would shew such excellence as effectually as either the Greek or Latin.

The

The following properties of the English language will shew that it is well adapted to oratory, *viz.* the great variety of sounds both in the beginning and ending of its words. I have shewed why this variety of sounds is found in the beginning of its words, when I mentioned the prepositions of different languages which are used in inseparable composition with its nouns and verbs. As to the variety of the ending of its words, that must be much greater than it can be in the actual construction of any language in which the nouns are declined by cases, and the verbs are conjugated by final terminations. For the same terminations must be continually recurring, of all the cases, tenses, and persons, in every such language; and such terminations must in many instances be in a kind of rhyme to each other. This correspondence of rhyme between the substantive and the adjective, and between many of the terminations of the verb, in Latin and Greek, would be exceedingly tiresome in any long speech, if the corresponding terminations were not removed far from each other. But the farther they are removed, the longer suspension is created in the mind with regard to the conceptions which are to be united immediately together; and hence the most admired orators in these languages make use of sentences with words so transposed, as to make the sentences intricate at the first reading, at least to an Englishman who is accustomed to a more simple order of construction. And yet when all is done, either in the Latin or Greek, something like rhimes will be occurring every now and then, from the correspondent terminations of many of the cases of substantives and adjectives, and of many of the persons of the verbs. Thus in Virgil,

———*en quo discordia cives*
Perduxit miseros en queis consecvimus agros!

And in Horace. ——*metaque fervidis*
Evitata rotis, palmaque nobilis.


And in Homer. ——*Πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμης δακ.*
Ἦν δια μαντοσύνην την δακ.

But it is unnecessary to make many quotations. For it must be apparent to any one, that the mechanism of these languages depends in a great measure on the correspondence of final syllables; so that while we are reading them, we are compelled to be continually attentive to such correspondence. Now in English, there is no danger of wearying the ear by a too frequent repetition of similar final sounds, and therefore there is no occasion to embarrass the construction, in order to avoid this inconvenience. On the contrary, in English poetry with rhyme, the construction is often embarrassed for the sake of gaining a correspondence of termination. But this in no way affects oratory, or prose of any kind; which may be made as flowing and various, and yet as intelligible, as the speaker pleases, without forcing the construction of the language.

I am in hopes, that from the account of the nature and application of language given in this book, I may safely pronounce, that the English is an excellent language, on account of the simplicity of its construction, and the precise meaning of its sentences. And as to copiousness, it seems capable of expressing every subject which the mind of man is capable of comprehending.

If our authors often are careless, or inaccurate, in their construction, that is not the fault of the language in which they write: but arises, either from want of attention, or from an affectation of introducing plans of construction from the learned languages, or from the French, and other modern languages, which the English will not admit of. As to inversion of order, in placing words in sentences, I believe the English admits of it in as great variety as any language can do, which observes a plan of construction equally simple with it. But the consideration of this point relates not to the grammatic, but to the oratoric, and poetic plan of construction; and of consequence is the proper province of the critic, and not of the grammarian.

The END of the SPECULATIVE GRAMMAR.



A

P R A C T I C A L
G R A M M A R.



A

Practical Grammar

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

GRAMMAR, when reduced to practice, naturally resolves itself into four general heads. The first treating of the pronunciation and spelling of syllables and words, according to the established custom of some particular language. The second, of the several parts of speech, and their variations by declension and conjugation. The third, of uniting these parts of speech into connected series, expressing the various conceptions of the mind of man; and this either in prose or verse. The fourth, of the composition of verse, so as to preserve harmony and cadence in each kind of measure that is made use of in poetical composition.

These several parts of grammar are usually distinguished by the names of orthography, etymology, syntax, and prosody. I shall observe this fourfold division in the following treatise; but shall consider the first head as only introductory to the rest, for reasons which will appear in the conclusion of what is said upon the letters.

INTRODUCTION.

Concerning orthography, or the pronunciation and spelling of syllables and words, according to the established custom of the English language.

SYLLABLES may be considered as expressed either by sounds of the voice, actually formed by a person speaking, or by letters so placed, as to direct a reader to form the sounds upon the sight of the letters. Different sounds of the voice require different positions of the organs of speech, and likewise the breath to be emitted in different manners, so as to co-operate with those different positions, first in forming one sound, and then another. The principal positions of the organs of speech, which are necessary in the pronunciation of a language, are usually (but not always) denoted by so many single letters in that language. These positions may be called articulations, if any one pleases, for the sounds which proceed from them are called articulate sounds.

Six and twenty letters are used in English to denote these articulations, according to the table of them which is given below. Such a table is called the alphabet of a language.

<i>Roman.</i>		<i>Italic.</i>		<i>Old English.</i>		<i>Name.</i>
A	a	A	a	Æ	a	a
B	b	B	b	Ɓ	b	be
C	c	C	c	Ɔ	c	see
D	d	D	d	Ð	d	dee
E	e	E	e	Ǝ	e	e
F	f	F	f	ƒ	f	eff
G	g	G	g	Ɠ	g	jee

Roman.

Roman.	Italic.	Old English.	Name.
H h	H b	h h	aitch
I i	I i	i i	i
J j	J j	J j	j consonant or ja
K k	K k	h k	ka
L l	L l	l l	el
M m	M m	m m	em
N n	N n	n n	en
O o	O o	o o	o
P p	P p	p p	pee
Q q	Q q	q q	cue
R r	R r	r r	ar
S s	S s	s s	efs
T t	T t	t t	tee
U u	U u	u u	u
V v	V v	v v	v consonant or va
W w	W w	w w	double u
X x	X x	x x	ex
Y y	Y y	y y	wy
Z z	Z z	z z	zed.

To these letters may be added the character &², which is used for *and*.

The letters are divided into two principal sorts, called *vowels* and *consonants*.

A, e, i, o, u, are vowels, as likewise *y* and *w*, in some applications of them. The rest are consonants.

Of the vowels in general.

THE articulation denoted by every vowel leaves a free passage for the breath through the lips; and so long as the breath continues to be emitted without any check, and the organs of speech preserve the articulation denoted by a particular

Q q 2

vowel,

vowel, so long the sound continues, of which the vowel is the sign. Therefore the sound of every vowel may be either made long or short, and that in two manners. For we may either continue to emit the breath for a longer or shorter time, preserving the articulation of the vowel unchanged, and then stop the passage of the breath from the lungs, so that all sound shall cease; or we may change the articulation while the breath continues to pass, and this change may be made sooner or later, at our pleasure. But there are many modifications which may be given to the sound of a vowel besides length and shortness. For such a sound may be pronounced slender, or it may be made broad; or it may be pronounced open, or made close; and in any of these manners the sound of the same vowel may be long, or short, for the passage of the breath through the lips is still kept free. The diphthongs are intended to give notice of these varieties in the pronunciation of vowels, and therefore in English the diphthongs frequently denote short sounds. For a deep sound may be continued only for a short time. Thus, for instance, the diphthongs *ou* and *oo*, denote as deep sounds as any in the English language, yet these sounds are short in *labour*, *vapour*, *endeavour*, and in *good*, *stood*, *wool*, and many other words.

The variety of sounds which are denoted by one and the same vowel or diphthong, and the sameness of the sounds which are yet denoted by different vowels or diphthongs, are the greatest imperfections which are found in the English language when written. This has chiefly come to pass from the introducing words from several languages into the English, and retaining most of the letters of the original words.

Of the consonants in general.

SOME of the consonants direct to such positions of the organs of speech, as prevent all passage of the breath, either through the lips or nose.

B, d, k, p, t, are of this kind, and therefore are called mutes. For so long as all passage of the speaker's breath is stopped, all sound from him must be likewise stopped.

But the articulation denoted by one of these consonants may be run into the articulation denoted by a vowel, by discharging the former articulation upon the latter, and by continuing to emit the breath by the latter articulation; and thus the sound of the vowel will partake of the modification of the consonant which precedes it. Or the sound denoted by a vowel may be modified by the articulation of a consonant which succeeds it, if we run the vocal articulation into that denoted by the consonant, without checking the course of the breath till the articulation of the consonant is compleatly formed; for thus the sound of the vowel will partake of the modification of the consonant which succeeds it.

Some of the consonants are so used on some occasions, as to admit the breath to pass leisurely through the mouth or nose while the articulations continue which they denote; and on other occasions so as to prevent the breath from passing till the articulation ensues which is denoted by some other letter.

C and *g* are of this kind, and are therefore said to be sometimes soft and sometimes hard. When a little of the breath passes during the continuance of the articulations which the letters themselves denote, they are pronounced soft; as in *celebrate, civil, gem, giant*. When none of the voice passes during

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during such articulations, the letters are mute consonants, and are said to be pronounced hard; as in *cavil*, *compose*, *Cupid*, *game*, *give*, *go*.

All the other letters, viz. *f*, *b*, *j*, *g*, *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, *s*, (*y* and *w*, even when used as consonants) *x* and *z*, direct to such positions of the organs of utterance, as permit the breath to pass in some degree either thro' the lips, or nose, or both, without any change of these positions during the time that the breath passes.

F is equivalent to *p*, pronounced with the lips a little open, and with a small percussive of the breath.

H directs to give the breath some percussive as it passes into the cavity of the mouth, and to keep the lips open. Therefore *f* is nearly equivalent to *ph*.

J is equivalent to *dg* when the *g* is pronounced soft, or without stopping the course of the breath.

Q directs to such an articulation, that the breath cannot pass the lips without pronouncing *u* after it; therefore it is never used without *u* immediately following it.

L, *m*, *n*, *r*, are called liquids. The particularity of sound for which this name has been given them, proceeds from forcing the breath towards the roof of the mouth while we sound these letters, and passing it leisurely off, partly by the sides of the tongue, and partly by the nose. The breath, while it passes in this manner, causes an obscure sound to begin with the articulation denoted by each of these letters, and to continue as long as the articulation continues; and hence they are thought to partake of the nature of vowels, and are called semivowels.

S may be easily pronounced before any consonant; for both the lips and the palate of the mouth are quite at liberty in the articulation denoted by it, so that they may be put into the position required by any consonant during the time that the hissing sound denoted by *S* is carrying on, or just as it is ceasing.

V, consonant, is the liquid *f*.

The articulation denoted by *w* is like that denoted by *v*, only the cavity between the tongue and the palate is larger when *w* is pronounced. The percussive of the breath denoted by *b* cannot be given immediately after this articulation, for the articulation requires the breath to continue to proceed with one constant tenor. Nevertheless, in the words *why*, *when*, *where*, and several others, the *b* is placed immediately after the *w*, yet the words are pronounced as if they were written, *bwiy*, *bween*, *bwere*, &c.

X is equivalent to *ks*.

Y, when used as a consonant, is the liquid *j*.

Z is the liquid *f*.

Of the vowels in particular.

A.

THIS vowel has three sounds in English, the slender, the open, and the broad.

A, slender, is very frequently used in this language; as in words ending in silent *e*, such as *place*, *waste*, *gaze*: and in *ation*, *ageous*, *arious*; as *vexations*, *courageous*, *various*, &c.

A, open, is like the *a* of the Italian; as *father*, *language*, *grace*.

A, broad, is the open *a* pronounced long; as *call*, *wall*; for when this sound is pronounced short, as in *sally*, *valley*, it is the same with that of *a* open.

If the *a* is shewn to be long, by a silent *e* placed at the end of a word after a single consonant, it is always *slender*; as *face*, *gaze*, *name*: but in several words ending in silent *e*, after a double consonant, *a* is broad; as *farce*, *scarce*.

A forms a diphthong with *i* or *y*, and with *u* or *w*. With *i* or *y*; as *vain*, *sail*, *play*, *betray*. These diphthongs have

the sound of *a* long and slender; for *vain*, *sail*, are pronounced as *vane* and *sale*.

Au or *aw* have the same sound as *a* broad; for *haul*, *awl*, *haul*, are pronounced as *ball*, *all*, *ball*.

In some words derived from the Greek and Latin, *ae* appears as a diphthong, as *Æacus*, *Æneas*, *Cæsar*.

When this diphthong precedes a vowel, it has the sound of *ee*; when it precedes a consonant, it is sounded as *ea*.

E.

This vowel, when placed single, is seldom pronounced long, except in words derived from the Greek, in which it is used instead of the η or α of that language; as *scene*, *demon*, from $\Sigma\eta\eta$, $\Delta\alpha\iota\mu\omega\nu$, &c.

The *e* short is the most common vowel in the English language. When the *e* is placed before two consonants, or a double consonant, the vowel is short, but the syllable is usually long. Thus in *bleffing*, *bending*, *fetching*, the syllables *bleff*, *bend*, *fetch*, are long, although the *e* which is in them is short.

This is effected by passing quickly from the articulation denoted by *e* to those denoted by *ff*, *nd*, *tch*, and dwelling pretty long on the latter articulations.

This vowel is used at the end of many words, merely to give notice that the sound of the last syllable is to be opened and softened. The *e*, when thus used, is said to be silent; as in *babe*, *shade*, *recede*, *strike*, *hope*, *tribute*.

If the letter which precedes the silent *e* be a mute consonant, it is manifest that the syllable cannot be opened by the articulation of the consonant; because in every such articulation the passage of the breath is stopped. Therefore the syllable is opened by dwelling upon the preceding vowel with a gentle current of the breath before the articulation follows, which is denoted by the mute consonant. Thus *rob* becomes *robe*; *lad*, *lade*; *trip*, *tripe*; *tub*, *tube*; *fit*, *site*; &c. The silent *e* has much the same effect when it follows a consonant that is not a mute; for although

though the passage of the breath is not quite stopped by the articulation of such a consonant, the sound which follows the articulation is not agreeable to the ear; and therefore is seldom continued long after the sound of the preceding vowel is modified by it.

When a syllable is pronounced, the breath may either all or most of it be emitted through the lips with a quick percussive; and when so, the syllable is pronounced open; as in *strife*, *glass*, *bus*: or part of the breath may be conveyed to the roof of the mouth, and there delayed a little till some of it passes by the nose, or departs gently by the sides of the tongue, which is made to obstruct its passage in some degree; and when thus, the syllable is pronounced close, as in *strive*, *glaze*, *buzz*.

The vowel of the syllable which is closed by a silent *e*, is not always pronounced open by softening the syllable. Thus in *hermitage*, *pasturage*, and in many other words in *age*, the *a* is close; and in *live*, *give*, the *i* is close, and in *love*, the *o* is close, and in *treasurer*, the *u* is so.

E, at the end of words before *n*, or after *l* and *r*, is a notice to form the sound of the last syllable within the mouth towards the roof or palate, without suffering much of the breath to pass through the lips, as in *open*, *taken*, *quadruple*, *thisle*, *metre*, *lucre*.

E forms a diphthong with *a*, as in *bear*, *fear*; with *i*, as in *perceive*, *vein*; and with *u*, or *w*, as in *eunuch*, *flew*, *grew*.

Ea has the sound of *e* long and open, as *dream*, *stream*; or of *ee*, that is, of *e* long and close, as *dear*, *fear*: but in *bread*, *stead*, *sweat*, and some other words, *ea* has the sound of *e* short and close.

Ei has a sound which is intermediate between the open and close sounds of *ea* long, as in *teize*, *perceive*.

Eu has the sound of *u* long and soft, but not made liquid by letting the breath escape by the nose, as in *eulogy*.

The French spelling by *e*, *a*, *u*, is preserved in *beauty*, and its derivatives. But the three vowels have only the sound of *u*, or *eu*.

Ee is the mark of the strong close sound of *e*, as in *agree*, *free*, *see*.

Lo, in *yeoman*, is founded as *e* open and short. In *people*, it is founded as *e* close and long. In *George*, as *o* open and long. It is found in very few other English words.

I.

I has a long open sound in all monosyllables in which it is found, if they end in silent *e*, or in *ind*, as *mine*, *vine*, *fire*, *file*, *bind*, *find*, *rind*. In other monosyllables, its sound is short, as *rib*, *bid*, *if*, *thin*, *this*.

I before *r* is often founded as a close *u*, as in *first*, *flirt*.

I forms a diphthong only with *e*, as *field*, *believe*.

• This diphthong is founded like *e* long and close.

I is joined with *eu* in *lieu*, and with *ew* in *view*, and in these words is founded as *u* long and close.

O.

O is usually long before single consonants, as in *bone*, *odious*; and short before two or more consonants, as *black*, *loll*, *worth*. Yet it is long in *toll*, *roll*; and frequently before *r*, with other consonants after it, as in *border*, *born*, *forge*, *lord*, &c.

O may take any vowel after it to form a diphthong. But *oe* is only found in some few words derived from the Greek, as *oeconomy*, *oecumenical*, and is founded as *e* long and open.

Oa is founded as *o* long and open, as *coal*, *boast*.

Oi shews the sounds of *o* and *i* very intimately united, as in *oil*, *noise*. *Y* is used with *o* at the end of words to form a diphthong, as in *coy*, *joy*, *toy*, *employ*, &c.

Oo directs the sound of *o* to be formed towards the roof of the

the mouth, while the breath is emitted by a round aperture of the lips. This aperture of necessity enlarges the internal cavity of the mouth, and is the articulation denoted by *w*. Therefore the sound of *oo* is that of a close *o* united with the following articulation of *w*. The sound is necessarily deep, because the mouth is very hollow whilst it is pronounced, but it may be either long or short. The long sound of *oo* is in *boot*, *shoot*, *cool*; the short sound in *good*, *blood*, *wool*.

Ou and *ow* denote the sound of an open *o* united with the articulation of *u* or *w*, as in *our*, *flour*, *shower*, *flower*: the sounds may be more or less deep, according as we make the mouth more or less hollow whilst we articulate them. Thus *bowl*, an orbicular body; *bow*, an instrument for shooting; *sow*, the female of the boar; require a deep sound of *ow*. But *bowl*, a vessel; *bow*, a depression of the head; *sow*, to scatter seed; require a more open sound.

By varying the cavity of the mouth farther still, and by emitting the breath more or less towards the lips or palate, we sometimes vary the sound of *ou*, till it approaches to that of *u* long and soft, as in *court*.

Sometimes to that of *u* short and soft, as in *labour*, *vapour*.

Sometimes to that of *u* close, as in *cou'd*, *wou'd*, for *could*, *would*.

Sometimes to that of *u* open, as in *rough*, *tough*.

Sometimes to that of *o* close, as *cough*, *slough*, meaning a dirty deep place in a road.

U.

U has a long open sound in the last syllables of words which end in silent *e*, or in *ution*, or *usion*, as *blue*, *true*, *to use*, *to confute*, *resolution*, *confusion*.

But in the nouns *use*, *abuse*, *abstruse*, &c. the *f* is pronounced hard, so as to give the *u* a closer sound.

Its sound is usually close and short before two consonants, or a double consonant, as in *bustle*, *concussion*; and before single

consonants at the end of words, as in *thus, us, put.*

It forms a diphthong, in the middle of words, with all the other vowels, as *quaint, quest, queer, quite, anguish, quote*; but when thus used, it has the effect of *w*, which is actually used at the beginning of words, as in *wain, west, wild, wore.*

U is sometimes mute before *a, e, i, y*, as in *guard, guest, guide, buy.*

In *ue* at the end of *virtue, ague*, *e* is mute, and *ue* is mute at the end of *prorogue, synagogue, plague, barangue.*

Y.

This letter, when used as a vowel, supplies the place of *i* at the end of word, as in *my, thy*; and before an *i*, as *dying, flying*; and it is usually retained in derivative words, if it was the latter part of a diphthong in the primitives; as from *day, days*; from *way, ways, wayward*; from *play, plays, player, playful*: and so from *destroy, destroys, destroyer*; from *joy, joyous, joyful, &c.*

Of the consonants in particular.

B.

THIS letter denotes only one articulation, and therefore is uniform in its effect when it is pronounced. But it is silent in *debt, subtle, doubt, lamb, limb, climb, dumb, thumb, comb, womb*, and their derivatives.

C.

C is hard before *a, o, u*, as in *can, concord, percussion.*

It is soft before *e* and *i*, as in *cellar, sincere, civil, simplicity.*

When *c* is hard, it has the sound of *k*, when soft, that of *s*; therefore it is not of absolute necessity in the alphabet.

Ch, at the beginning of many words, sounds as *tch*, as in *church, charm, child.*

It sounds as *k* in words derived from the Greek; as in *scheme*, *chorus*, *christian*.

Arch is founded *ark* in *archangel*, and some few other words in which it precedes a vowel. But in composition with words beginning with a consonant, *arch* retains the open sound of *ch*, as in *archbishop*, &c.

Ch in some words taken from the French, sounds as *sh*, as in *chaise*, *machine*.

C never ends a word purely English, but takes *k* after it for this purpose, as *black*, *neck*, *brick*, *flock*, *struck*.

The close *c* is used before *l* and *r*, as *claim*, *cross*.

D.

This letter is used before *r* and *w*, as in *draw*, *dwell*. It is uniform in its effect.

F

Is uniform in its effect, and is used before *l* and *r*, as *flat*, *frame*, *flute*, *fruit*.

G.

G is hard, or close, before *a*, *o*, *u*, as in *gather*, *go*, *gun*; likewise before *l* and *r*, as *glow*, *grow*; and at the end of words, as *flag*, *leg*, *dig*, *frog*, *snug*.

G before *e* is usually soft, or open, as *gem*, *gentle*; except *gear*, *geld*, *geese*, *get*, *gewgaw*; and derivatives from words ending in *g*, as *fling*, *flinger*; *wrong*, *wronger*, *wronged*; &c. and generally before *er* at the end of words, as *finger*, *linger*; but the *g* is soft in *barbinger*, *ginger*, and some others.

G is mute before *n*, as *gnash*, *gnaw*, *sign*, *foreign*.

G is hard, or close, before *i*, as *gift*, *gild*; except in *giant*, *gibbet*, *Giles*, (a man's name) *gill*, a measure of liquids (for in *gills*, a part of a fish, the *g* is close). *gilly-flower*, *gin*, *ginger*, *gingle*, *gipsy*.

Gh in the beginning of words has the sound of *g* close, as *ghost*. In the middle and end of some words, it is silent, as in *right*, *bright*, *straight*, *fought*, *thought*, &c.

At the end of words *gh* is frequently used for *f* pronounced somewhat in the throat, as in *cough*, *trough*, *tough*, *enough*, *slough*, meaning the skin which any animal casts.

H.

This letter shews that some vowel which follows it, must be aspirated, *i. e.* must be pronounced with a strong percussive of the breath. Except in *heir*, *herb*, *hostler*, *honour*, *humble*, *honest*, *humour*, and their derivatives. It seldom (if ever) begins any syllable of a word, except the first.

J consonant.

This letter sounds like *dg*, the *g* being open, as in *jealous*, *joy*, *July*.

Foreigners often pronounce it as the English pronounce *y* consonant. Thus they speak the word *John* as an Englishman speaks *yon*, and so of other instances.

K.

This letter denotes the articulation of the hard or mute *c*, and is used before *e* and *i*, where, according to the custom of the English language, *c* would be soft, or open, as in *keen*, *kept*, *kind*, *kill*.

K is never doubled, but *c* is placed before it to shorten the preceding vowel, as *cackle*, *fickle*, *cockle*, *buckle*.

L.

This is the first of the liquids, or semivowels.

It is doubled at the end of monosyllables, if they are not formed by a diphthong, as in *fall*, *call*, *fell*, *swell*, *fill*, *still*, *toll*, *roll*, *full*, *dull*.

L is mute in several words, as *calf, half, would, could, should, psalm, qualm, talk, salmon, falcon.*

Le at the end of words is equivalent to *el* sounded very weak and liquid, as in *saddle, feeble, Bible, boggle, shuttle.*

M.

While the articulation denoted by this letter continues, the breath passes constantly through the nose, and no part of it by the mouth.

It is uniform in its sound.

N.

This letter is sometimes mute. After *m*, as in *damn, condemn, solemn, hymn.*

It is uniform in its sound.

P.

P is sometimes silent, as in *psalm, ptizan*; and between *m* and *t*, as in *tempt, exempt.*

Pb is used for *f* in words originally Greek, as *philosophy, Philip, phantom*; in *pbial*, *pb* is pronounced almost like *v*.

Q.

The articulation denoted by this letter might have been expressed by *kw*. It always has *u* after it.

In some words derived from the French, *qu* is sounded like *k*, as in *conquer, liquor, risque, chequer.*

R.

The sound of this letter may be made as rough, or as smooth as we please, by making the mouth more or less hollow, and by forcing the breath more or less strongly through the lips, so as to make the several parts of the mouth vibrate more or less strongly.

At the end of a word, if the syllable be long, it has its rougher sound, as in *bar, confer, cur, recur, &c.*

But when it goes before vowels, it has a smooth sound, as in *range, renew, rise, roll, ruin.*

Re at the end of words derived from the French, has the sound of *er* weak and liquid, as in *theatre, lustre.*

S.

This letter is used at the beginning of words, to denote an open hissing sound, as in *salt, sell, side, sold, sudden.* It denotes the same sound at the end of the pronouns *this, us,* and of the adverb *thus,* and of a few words derived from the Latin, as *Venus, surplus, rebus.* In other instances, this sound at the end of words is denoted by *ss,* as in *glass, less, amiss, loss, trusts.*

Single *s* has a smooth liquid sound at the end of words varied by what answers to declension and conjugation in English. Thus the plural of nouns is formed. As from *god, gods;* from *king, kings; &c.*

And the third person singular of verbs. As from *call, calls,* from *send, sends; &c.*

And the possessive pronouns have this soft *s,* in their variation from the personal primitives; as from *him, his,* from *her, hers;* from *us, our, ours;* *you, your, yours;* *they, their, theirs;* the *s,* in this use of it, has a sound almost the same with *z,* or with *s,* followed by a silent *e.*

S is soft before *y* at the end of words, as in *rosy, poesy;* and in *bosom, desire, wisdom, prison, present, présent, damsel, casement,* and their derivatives.

It is usually soft before the silent *e,* but *verse, herse, worse, horse,* and several other words, must be excepted.

S before *ion* and after a vowel sounds like *z;* as in *confusion, intrusion;* but like *sh* after a consonant, as in *conversion, aspersión.*

S is silent in *isle, island, demesne, viscount*, and their derivatives.

T.

This letter being a mute consonant, cannot denote an open articulation which shall produce an effect similar to that of the mute *t*; yet, before vowels, *ti* is made to denote an open sound: but this sound is like that of *shi*, and not that of *ti*, on other occasions; as in *salvation, patience, disputations*. Unless an *s* goes before *ti*, as in *question, suggestion, bastion, combustion*; or the word be derived from one that ends in *y*; as from *mighty, mightier, mightiest, &c.*

Tb denotes an articulation which foreigners find very difficult to form. In this articulation the tip of the tongue touches the inward edge of the upper teeth, and the breath is so emitted as to make the sides of the tongue vibrate. If this vibration is to be strong, all or most of the breath must be forced through the mouth; and if this is done, the sound of *tb* will be hard, as in *thank, thin, thunder*.

But if the breath be forced toward the palate, and so detained, that part of it escapes by the nose, the sound will be soft; as in *that, thine, thus*.

The sound of *tb* is likewise soft in *thou, those, thee, thy, they, their, there, this, these, those, them, then, though*; and in all words when between two vowels, or between *r* and a vowel, as in *father, mother, whether, rather*; and in *farther, farthing*.

When *tb* is to be softened at the end of a word, a silent *e* is added; thus, from *bath, to bathe*; from *breath, to breathe*; from *cloth, to clothe*.

V consonant.

This is the liquid *f*, as from *staff, to slave*; from *proof, to prove*; &c.

W.

This letter, at the beginning of words and syllables, is a consonant; but, placed after vowels in the same word, it is a vowel. Hence it easily goes before all the vowels except *u*; and in different words it follows a vowel without any difficulty; as in *rainy weather*, &c.

Wh is pronounced as *hw*; but in *whore*, and sometimes in *wholesome*, it has the sound of *h*.

X.

This letter has the sound of *ks*, as in *ax*, *wax*. It begins no English word.

Y.

Y, when before a vowel or diphthong, is a consonant; as *yes*, *yonder*. When it follows a vowel, it is a vowel; as in *say*, *joy*. When used as a consonant, it is the liquid *j*.

Z.

This letter is the liquid *z*. It begins no word of English original.

From this consideration of the English alphabet, and of the application of it to the simple sounds of the language, it is very evident that the alphabet is redundant in several instances, and deficient in others. For the same sound is frequently expressed several ways, as *ail*, *ale*; *bore*, *boar*; *deer*, *dear*; *bread*, *bred*; *coal*, *cole*; and so in many other instances of the vowels and diphthongs, as has been sufficiently shewn in what is said of each in particular.

Yet the vowels and diphthongs are very deficient, as to the proper expression of vocal sounds. For every long vocal sound should be expressed by a vocal mark, which might shew it to be long; and every short vocal sound, by a mark shewing it to be short.

short. The diphthongs might be properly enough applied to denote long vocal sounds. But those which on some occasions denote the longest and deepest sounds in the language, on other occasions are used, to express the shortest. Thus, in *allow*, the syllable *ow* is long, and the same in *allowed*. But in *ballow*, the syllable *ow* is short; and the same in *ballowed*; and so of many other instances of the use of the English diphthongs.

As to the consonants, although many of them always denote the same articulations, yet others do not; as is most evident in what has been said of *c* and *g*. And yet, on several occasions, one and the same articulation is denoted by different consonants. Thus the same articulation, which is denoted by *f* in *for*, is denoted by *ph* in *philosophy*, and by *gh* in *tough*: and so of many other instances.

It is possible, no doubt, to redress many, if not most of these imperfections of the English spelling. But it is not absolutely necessary for those persons who have the sense of hearing, and who live with those that speak the language. For learners, by hearing the words of any language frequently pronounced, and by attempting themselves to pronounce them, become at length capable of uttering all the simple sounds of the language, by mere imitation. And when this capacity is acquired in some degree, the assistance of a teacher quickly enables an attentive person to perceive what letters, or combinations of letters, require such or such sounds to be applied to them. For the teacher presents the letters to the eye of the learner, and actually pronounces the sounds which they require. This proceeding is what we call learning to read a language. And thus the audible ideas of the sounds of the language become intimately connected, in the mind of the learner, with the letters which are the visible representations of these ideas. Hence a faculty is acquired, by degrees, of expressing these audible ideas by letters,

and that even by a person who does not actually utter the sounds of which he has the ideas successively in his mind. Thus we become enabled to write down our thoughts when we ourselves do not speak : and thus the bulk of mankind arrive at the ready use of a language, both in speaking and writing, by mere imitation, without any explicit attention to the exact positions of the organs of speech, which each letter, or assemblage of letters, requires in the language which they make use of.

But the person who first invented an alphabet, considered the nature of articulate sounds more accurately ; and, by such consideration, was led on to invent marks for articulations, which, in themselves, produce no articulate sounds. All the consonants are such marks ; and these are the only letters which are found in the most antient alphabets (as the Hebrew and Phœnician.) Now, although it be difficult, yet it is not impossible, to give some account in words, of the position of the organs of speech which each letter requires. Dr. Wallace and Dr. Holder have done it in very ingenious treatises on the subject ; but such a proceeding is not necessary for any learners, except those who are born deaf ; and it was for the use of such persons that the learned authors above-mentioned composed their treatises. Nevertheless, it is of some use to all learners to have the letters ranged into classes. And when one letter is applied to two articulations, or several letters are used to denote one and the same articulation, to have the principal instances set down in which this variety appears. For these reasons I have considered the letters and simple sounds of the English in what is already said. But as some ability, at least, in pronouncing the simple sounds of a language, must be acquired before the language can be used in rational composition, either by speaking or writing it ; and as all the other parts of practical grammar are intended to direct to a regular composition in speaking and writing, but especially in writing ; I have chose to consider what is said of the letters and syllables, as only introductory to the rest.

As

As foreigners are very apt to mistake in the pronunciation of *j* consonant, and *th*, perhaps the following rules may be of some assistance to them, if committed to memory.

To speak *j* consonant, pronounce a *d*
As follow'd by a *y* or open *g*.

For the English sound of *j* is like that of *dy*, or *dg*, the *g* being open.

On th' edge of th' upper teeth, the tongue you press
To speak *th*, and breathe as for an *s*.

For *th* is spoke as *f*, except that the tip of the tongue presses against the inward edge of the upper teeth when *th* is spoken; whereas the tip of the tongue is quite at liberty when *f* is spoken.

The following rules also may, perhaps, be of some use to assist the memory in the different pronunciation of *c* and *g*.

C, before *a*, *o*, *u*, as *k* expresses;
But, before *e* or *i*, speak *c* as *s*.

G, before *a*, *o*, *u*, is hard in sound,
Or at the end of any word, if sound;
And before *i*: except that open *g*,
In *giant*, *gibbet*, *gillyflow'r*, must be.
And *ginger*, *gingle*, *gipsy*, *giblets*, claim,
And *gibe*, *Giles*, *gill*, and likewise *gin* the same.

G, before *e*, is soft: except in *gear*,
Geld, *geese*, *get*, *gewgaw*; and when words appear
With *g* before the termination *er* *.
And if a simple word in hard *g* ends,
The same on its derivatives attends.

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* But in *harbinger*, *warfinger*, *ginger*, and perhaps in some few other words in *er*, the *g* is open or soft.

Practical Grammar

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

BOOK I.

Of etymology, or the several sorts of words, with
their grammatical variations.

SECTION I.

*Of the sorts of words, as they are distinguished each
by a grammatic name.*

EIGHT sorts of words, as the grammarians teach,
May comprehend the several parts of speech.
Noun, pronoun, verb, and participle too,
Adverb, conjunction, preposition, shew,
With *interjection*, their respective names:
The *article* with these, a place in English claims.

The sorts of words are, by established custom, reduced to eight in almost all languages, and these sorts in grammar are called *the parts of speech*; their names are given above, viz.

Noun,	Adverb,
Pronoun,	Conjunction,
Verb,	Preposition,
Participle,	Interjection.

But to these, in English, must be added, the Article.

Some writers on grammar have divided words into more or fewer sorts than are here set down, and have given other names to the several sorts. But no real benefit ensues from such a proceeding; and therefore it is mere trifling, or worse, to put the learner to the trouble of learning a new grammatical language, when the old received terms of the art will answer the same end.

I shall consider each of these parts of speech, particularly, in the order in which they are here set down, except the article, which will be considered along with nouns, called *common*, or *appellative*, because of the particular relation which it bears to this sort of nouns.

Before I proceed to treat of each of the parts of speech separately, it will not be improper to consider the NOUN and the VERB, in a general manner, both together. For they are the principal parts of speech, to which all the rest are but so many kinds of auxiliars. And they have some properties in common, and some peculiar to each, which will be best understood by placing them in one view.

As I am obliged to use the word *object* in a sense more extensive than it commonly bears; it is necessary to give notice, that by *an object* is meant, in this treatise, *whatsoever gives*

gives occasion to such a conception as the mind can attend to singly, or separately from all other conceptions.

Of the general nature of the noun and verb.

OBJECTS are named by nouns, when, in the mind,
With its own principle of being, join'd,
Each object we conceive: or when, in speech,
Such principle we quite abstract from each.

The states of verbs, more latitude allow,
For on these states, at pleasure, we bestow
Sep'rate existence. Hence, when use demands,
Each verbal state a sep'rate object stands.
But, at our pleasure, we from verbs resume
Sep'rate existence. Hence their states become
What may with any object coalesce,
Such object's state of being to express.
Yet either way conceiv'd, we may with ease
From verbs take all existence when we please,
And give it back by fits; and thus repeat
Successive periods of each verbal state.
And verbal being, howsoe'er employ'd,
May be, when need requires, by negatives destroy'd.

Nouns are the names of objects, conceived in the mind of *man* under two different modes of being, or existence. For these objects are denoted by one sort of nouns, as each object is conceived to be or exist in consequence of *a particular separate principle of its own*, in which no other object partakes. And another sort of nouns denotes the objects, as they are conceived to be deprived of all *separate principle* of being, or existence.

The nouns which express objects under the first manner of conception, are called *noun substantives*. These may stand single, and yet make full sense; because they denote persons and

T t

things,

things, as the conception of each is separate and distinct in the apprehension of the mind. Thus *Socrates, a man, an animal, a mineral, the sea, the house, virtue, vice, relation, contrariety,* are all noun substantives: for each of them expresses a conception which represents the object denoted by it as a single thing, conceived to exist by its own principle, much as every living creature exists by a principle peculiar to itself.

The nouns which express objects under the second manner of conception, are called *noun adjectives*. These cannot stand single and make full sense, because they give notice that the principle which gives being to what each of them signifies, must be considered as in some other object or state which must be mentioned by its name. If therefore such name be not mentioned together with the adjective, the mind is at a loss; not being able to determine the being or thing in which that which is denoted by the adjective has its existence. Thus what is denoted by *godly, manly, good, great*, cannot be conceived in itself; because the form of the words gives notice to look out for some other word expressing an object or state with which to unite that which is denoted by each of these words. Therefore they are noun adjectives. But if we take the substantive *a person*, and form the expressions, *a godly person, a manly, good, great, person*, all these expressions become compleat sense: for what is denoted by each of the adjectives unites in the object, *a person*. Or if we take the state *to be*, and form the expressions, *to be godly, to be manly, good, great*, each of these expressions becomes compleat sense; for what is denoted by each of the adjectives unites in the state *to be*.

If we now take the names *godliness, manliness, goodness, greatness*, these words will evidently denote what was denoted by the adjectives, *godly, manly, good, great*, only under another mode of conception. For the names, *godliness, &c.* express so many objects of the mind as so many distinct beings, or things; where-

as the adjectives represent them as requiring to coalesce in some other object or state which must be mentioned by some other word. It is manifest that the reality of what is denoted by *godly*, *manly*, &c. is as great as the reality of what is denoted by *godliness*, *manliness*, &c. but the being or existence of what is denoted by the former words is conceived to be coalescent with that of other objects or states; whereas what is denoted by the latter is conceived to have a separate principle each in itself. Therefore the latter words are substantives.

Verbs are the names of states of being which may either be considered singly, or separately in the mind, as the objects are which are denoted by substantives: or may be conceived as coalescing with other objects, and denoting the states of being of these objects. But the principle by which a verbal state exists, is not conceived to be peculiar to one period of the state only, nor to be fixed in it: but to be communicated to it, or withdrawn from it occasionally, for the convenience of the mind.

Hence if a verbal state is considered as an object like that denoted by a substantive, it may be considered as having the principle, by which it exists, communicated to it, and withdrawn from it by fits; and this proceeding will distinguish the state into a number of successive periods all existing by the same principle exerting itself by fits. As the state *to be* may be considered as repeated *once*, *twice*, *thrice*, &c. and all by means of one and the same principle. Or any object or thing may be represented as *being in the same state once*, *twice*, *thrice*, &c. and all by the same means. And any other verbal state may be applied in the same manner. Hence every verbal state must be capable, in every application of it, of being destroyed at pleasure; for otherwise it could not be brought into existence by fits, and suspended by fits. The negative *not* is used to represent a verbal state as deprived of all principle of existence, either when the verb

is used to denote a separate object, or a coalescent state. Thus *to be*, becomes *not to be*; *a thing being*, becomes *a thing not being*; *a thing is*, becomes *a thing is not*; and so of other instances of the application of any other verb. This subject is treated of at large, Sect. I. Book I. of the speculative part of this work.

The verb is applied, in the use of language, in more capacities than any other part of speech, and therefore it has more grammatic forms than any other sort of word. The power and use of each of these forms will be shewn, when the verb is treated of in particular.

SECTION II.

Of the noun.

NOUNS are distinguished into two sorts, called noun substantives, and noun adjectives, as has been already observed.

Of the noun substantive in particular.

Noun substantives have the establish'd claim
On ev'ry object to bestow a name,
When with a principle of being shown
Sep'rate in each, and fixt to it alone.
Hence objects thus conceiv'd, discrete must be,
And such as we may count, by one, two, three.

Noun substantives are the names of objects, as each object is conceived to be, or exist, by a principle peculiar to itself. Hence these objects are not conceived as capable of being renewed and destroyed at the pleasure of the mind; but as so many separate and distinct beings or things, which being taken together, may be counted by the numbers one, two, three, four, &c. so as to ascertain.

ascertain the number of individuals which are in any aggregate or collective quantity of them. But the object denoted by a substantive cannot be considered as repeated once, twice, thrice, &c. at our pleasure; for the principle by which such an object exists, is not conceived as revocable and communicable at pleasure by fits or intervals.

S E C T I O N III.

Of the sorts of noun substantives.

OF substantives two different sorts appear:
 Since *proper* and *appellative* they are.
 To single individuals those confin'd;
 These to express whole species are design'd.

Noun substantives are of two sorts, *the proper*, and *the appellative* or *common*.

Noun substantives proper are more usually called *proper names*, being intended to denote particular objects, whether persons or things. Thus every man, woman, country, river, city, street, palace, &c. has usually a name, which is considered as peculiar to it only, as *John N—*, *Mary M—*, *Europe*, *England*, *the Thames*, *Holbourn*, *Whitehall*, &c.

Noun substantives, appellative or common, are names denoting conceptions so formed in the mind of man, that the same conception may represent any object of a whole order or species. Thus the conception annexed to the names *man*, *woman*, *tree*, *house*, *virtue*, *vice*, may respectively represent any man whatsoever, or any woman, tree, house, virtue, or vice whatsoever: therefore the names *man*, *woman*, &c. are appellative substantives.

When an object is named by one of these substantives, it is only distinguished by the name, from objects denoted by other

names, and not at all distinguished from the objects which may any of them be called by the same name. As for instance, if I say *a man*, the object which I speak of is no ways distinguished by this name from other men, and so of any other instance of an appellative substantive when used alone. Hence it is manifest, that appellative names only denote objects so far as they are similar to all other objects of a certain sort, and of consequence, that every distinction which is peculiar to any individual object, and by which it may be known from all others, is quite excluded from the meaning of every common or appellative substantive.

SECTION IV.

Of the numbers, declension, and cases of substantives.

OF substantives the nature makes it fit,
That each of case and number should admit.
Number is two-fold. Singly whatso'er
The mind conceives, demands the singular.
If of a species more than one unite
To form an object; 'tis the plural's right
Such object to denote. A proper name
Has to a plural form, no necessary claim.

The nature of the conceptions which are annexed to common or appellative names gives occasion to the grammatic distinction of number in substantives. For it is frequently necessary to consider more objects than one of a sort as an aggregate object; and although the conception which is annexed to the name of the sort will equally represent *any one* of the objects which compose the aggregate, yet that conception will not represent *the aggregate object*. To do this, several of the conceptions must be taken together, and considered as coexistent, and not as the same conception repeated several times in succession. *The number of coexistent objects* which are represented by the aggregate conception

conception is thus encreased; and as the single conceptions which constitute the aggregate conception, are all of one and the same sort or species, there is no necessity to repeat the name of the species over and over to express the aggregate conception; but it is sufficient to denote the encrease of number by some variation of the name itself which denotes a single object of the sort or species. The name without any variation is considered as of the singular number, as *virtue, labour*; and when regular English substantives have an *s* annexed to the end without any mark of elision, they are considered as of the plural number, as *virtues, labours, &c.* As to proper names, it is manifest that they have no occasion for plural forms.

Some modes of thought, of the most gen'ral use,
When objects to dependence we reduce
As circumstances, serving to compleat
Some object partly nam'd, or verbal state;
Require, in use of language, that we place
Those marks in grammar call'd the signs of case.

It is not possible to form single substantive names for the endless variety of objects which we have occasion to mention by names; nor is it possible to form single verbs for the endless variety of occasional states which occur to our observation. Therefore the conceptions which are ready formed into separate subjects for the mind's contemplation must be used to enable the mind to circumstantiate all sorts of objects and states which are not sufficiently expressed by one noun or by one verb. This must be done without encreasing *the number* of the object or state to which more and more circumstances are applied, although these circumstances are each of them denoted by a noun substantive. For when we examine almost any object attentively, we discover many circumstances attending it which escaped our first observation, and yet we find the object still continues to be the same object, not being itself multiplied or *encreased in number* by those additional

additional circumstances, although each of them be so conceived in the mind as to be a separate object denoted by a noun substantive. When therefore substantives are applied to denote meer circumstances, and not capital objects, some notice must be given of it. And as what is denoted by the same substantive may circumstantiate another object or a verbal state in several different manners, the principal of these manners are denoted each by a different sign; and when these signs are prefixed to an English substantive of either the singular or plural number, the expression may be considered as a case of the substantive, seeing it answers to what is called by that name in Latin and Greek.

These cases have usually been considered as representing the object denoted by the substantive under different relations to some other object or state expressed by a noun or by a verb: but it is evident that this representation does not sufficiently explain the nature of a dependent case. For if two objects are only represented as related to each other, they still continue to be two distinct things; whereas the result of what is denoted by a substantive with another substantive depending upon it by the sign of some case, is the conception of an object no ways encreased in number by what is denoted by the dependent substantive: thus *of a man*, *to a man*, are two dependent cases of the substantive *a man*; yet the expressions, *the head of a man*, *a prejudice to a man*, do not denote plural objects, although two objects are concerned in each of them. Therefore the signs *of*, and *to*, are only notices to circumstantiate the objects *head*, and *prejudice*, by different modes of proceeding with the object *a man*, within the mind itself; and these different modes of proceeding are denoted by the signs *of*, and *to*. The nature of the other signs is the same with that of these two above-mentioned; for each of them directs to a certain mode of proceeding of the mind itself to circumstantiate one object by another, without encreasing the number of the object that is circumstantiated. This subject is treated of at large, Book I. Sect. XIV.  in the speculative part of this work. When

When objects in connexion are survey'd,
 Six cases to each number yield their aid.
 The nouns themselves in both the numbers give
 The forms contained in the nom'native.
 The genitive may *of* prefix, or join
S to its end. *To* is the dative's sign.
 Th' accusative and nom'native the same.
O! to the vocative exerts its claim.
 The particles prefix'd, *from*, *with*, *in*, *by*,
 And *for* and *than*, the ablative supply.

Nouns in Latin appear under six different forms in each of the numbers, the difference of the forms being found in the last syllable, which is different in the most of them. These forms are called cases; and the cases of both the numbers being placed in a certain order, form a declension; which is a pattern whereby to vary other nouns.

These cases are called the nominative, the genitive, the dative, the accusative, the vocative, and the ablative; their names being given them from the principal use or purpose to which they are respectively applied.

Thus the nominative means the case which barely names a thing.

The genitive that which implies begetting.

The dative that which is used in giving.

The accusative that which shews the person that is accused.

The vocative that which is used in calling to a person.

And the ablative that which is used to denote the person or thing whence any thing is taken.

These cases of the noun are, by established custom in grammar, placed under one another in the order in which I have described them, and that in both the numbers; and when so

placed, they form a declension according to the following instance :

Singular Number. •		
Nominative	<i>Dominus</i>	a lord or the lord
Genitive	<i>Domini</i>	of a lord or of the lord
Dative	<i>Domino</i>	to a lord or to the lord
Accusative	<i>Dominum</i>	a lord or the lord
Vocative	<i>Domine</i>	O lord
Ablative	<i>Domino</i>	by a lord or by the lord.

Plural.		
Nominative	<i>Domini</i>	lords or the lords
Genitive	<i>Dominorum</i>	of lords or of the lords
Dative	<i>Dominiis</i>	to lords or to the lords
Accusative	<i>Dominos</i>	lords or the lords
Vocative	<i>Domini</i>	O lords
Ablative	<i>Dominis</i>	by lords or by the lords.

The English forms of expression, *of a lord, to a lord, &c.* which correspond with those of the Latin, may also be called cases; and the pattern composed of these forms may be called the declension of the English noun. For if any other noun is placed instead of *lord*, in the form above described, that noun will appear in the several connective modes of consideration, wherein nouns (or the objects denoted by them) most frequently do appear in language: for the other prepositions are not near of so general use as the signs of cases; so that it is exceedingly convenient to have such a pattern by heart, both as a model by which to vary other nouns; and also that, when rules are given for the construction of substantives, the terms *nominative, genitive, &c.* may be used in this language, as they are, by established custom, in almost all others. For these reasons (although several writers on grammar have not allowed of cases in the English language) I shall consider the English substantive as varied.

varied by declension; and shall also consider that declension as containing six cases in each number, although the nominative and the accusative are of the same form, as having no sign prefixed to them.

Of the regular declension of English substantives, with its four subordinate varieties.

THE English substantives, by settled use,
 Their plural from the singular deduce :
 If to the singular an *s* subjoin'd,
 Without increase of syllables you find,
 Look on such plural form as regular,
 For multitudes of nouns will this formation bear.
 But to four different plural forms attend,
 Which on some sorts of singulars depend.

All noun substantives in the English language, whether proper or common, are of one and the same form of declension, so far as concerns the particles prefixed to the cases.

But common or appellative substantives admit of different methods of deriving the plural form from the singular. And this difference may be made the foundation of establishing one regular declension in the language, with four subordinate varieties.

Those substantives are of the regular declension, which form the plural by adding an *s* to the singular, without increasing the number of syllables, as *God*, *gods*. Much the greatest number of substantives form the plural in this manner.

Es is the plural of the silent *e*,
 Preceded by an *f*, *z*, *c*, or *g*.

Those substantives are of the first variety which end in a silent *e*, following *c*, *g*, *s*, or *z*; as *face*, *cage*, *case*, *maze*. For although these substantives only take an *s* after them, to form the plural, as the regular nouns do; yet the *e*, which was silent in the singular, forms an additional syllable in the plural; as *face*, *faces*; *cage*, *cages*; *case*, *cases*; *maze*, *mazes*. Whereas it does not form such additional syllable when it is placed after other consonants: thus *babe*, *pike*, *love*, though in their plurals they make *babes*, *pikes*, *loves*, yet these plurals have no more syllables in them than their singulars.

Y final, not in diphthongs us'd, supplies
Its plural by the termination *ies*.

Those substantives are of the second variety which end in *y*, when it is not part of a diphthong, and form their plurals by substituting *ies*, instead of *y*; as *fly*, *flies*; *mercy*, *mercies*.

If the final *y* joins with another vowel to form a diphthong at the end of a substantive, the plural is formed in the regular manner; as *boy*, *boys*; *trey*, *treys*; *way*, *ways*.

C-b, *s*, *f-b*, *x*, and *z*, increase
Their plural forms, by each assuming *es*.

Those substantives are of the third variety which end in *ch*, *s*, *sh*, *x*, or *z*: for, seeing an *s* cannot be pronounced after these consonants, the syllable *es* is added to them, in order to form the plural; as *church*, *churches*; *loss*, *losses*; *flash*, *flashes*; *box*, *boxes*; *buzz*, *buzzes*.

F single, or with silent *e*, if clos'd,
Takes plural forms, by *v-e-s* compos'd:
Except *dwarf*, *wharf*, *hoof*, *proof*; with *grief*, *relief*,
fife, *strife*, *brief*, *mischief*, *handkerchief*, and *chief*.

Those

Those substantives are of the fourth variety, which either end in a single *f*, or in a silent *e*, with an *f* before it; such as *calf*, *life*, for in these the plural is formed by substituting *ves* instead of *f*, or *fe*, as *calves*, *lives*.

The following substantives are to be excepted, *brief*, *chief*, *dwarf*, *fife*, *grief*, *handkerchief*, *hoof*, *mischief*, *proof*, *relief*, *strife*, *wharf*, which form their plurals after the regular manner; as *chiefs*, *dwarfs*, *fifes*, &c. and perhaps some few others may be found.

Staff makes *staves*, in the plural, although it ends in double *f*.

There is a double form of the genitive case singular of all the substantives of the English language, viz. that formed by *of*, which appears in the instance of declension already given; and another formed by adding an *s* to the nominative, with the mark of elision; as *virtue's excellence*, or *the excellence of virtue*. This double form is not found in the plural number, either of regular substantives, or of those which are of any of the varieties above described: but there are several irregular nouns which form the genitive, both of the singular and plural, in this manner; as *man*, plural *men*, genitive singular *man's*, or *of man*, genitive plural *men's*, or *of men*. Nevertheless the nouns, which are either regular, or of some of the four varieties, are sometimes used in the plural as genitives, without the sign *of* before them; and when they are so used, the mark of elision is placed over the final *s*; as *the commons' determination*, for *the determination of the commons*. The form by *s* is placed before its correspondent substantive, whereas the form by *of* is placed after its correspondent substantive; as *Britain's glory*; *the glory of Britain* *.

* All the cases but the *nominative* and *vocative*, are usually called *oblique cases*, for a reason which appears Book I. Sect. XIII. of the speculative part of this work.

As an article is usually prefixed in the form of declension to an appellative substantive, and the particle, which is the sign of a particular case, is placed immediately before the article, it is necessary to explain the meaning of both the articles before they are used in the examples of the declension of substantives.

S E C T I O N V.

Of the article.

A, *an*, and *the*, are articles and give
 Some limitation to a substantive.
 Appellatives with *a* or *an*, import
 One individual of a certain sort ;
 When in some situation it appears,
 In which, with others of its kind, it shares.
 But names appellative, with *the*, relate
 To objects of a sort in some exclusive state.
 Hence *a* or *an*, *th'* *indefinite* becomes ;
 And *the*, of *definite*, the name assumes.

An appellative substantive is a name common to every individual object of a certain species or sort ; and therefore a singular appellative may as well represent one object of the species as another. Hence, when we represent an object denoted by such a substantive, as in some certain state, or in certain circumstances ; we may do it without proposing to exclude other objects which may be denoted by the same substantive, from being in the same state or circumstances. When we proceed in this manner, the article *a*, or *an*, is prefixed to the appellative name (viz. *a*, if the name begins with a consonant ; *an*, if it begins with a vowel, or an *h*, sounded softly) and this gives notice that the object named is, or may be, equally concerned with several other objects of the same species, in the state or circumstances in which it is represented. And hence the appellative name with
 this

this article, may represent *every one individual of a certain species, or any one, or some one, or one that may be any ways equally concerned with others of the same species, in the state or circumstances that are mentioned or supposed as known*, according as the state or circumstances are more or less comprehensive.

But we may likewise mention one or more objects by an appellative name either singular or plural, and may propose to exclude all other objects of the species from the state or circumstances in which we proceed to represent the objects: and when this is our intention, we prefix *the* to an appellative name. And this we do whether the exclusive state or circumstances are actually mentioned, or are taken for granted or known both to the speaker and hearer.

As the article *a*, or *an*, represents but *one object*, although the object is some way equally concerned with others of a certain species, this article is not usually prefixed to nouns in the plural number. And as it does not exclude other objects, it very frequently leaves the object which it serves to denote, not particularly defined, or determined to one certain individual. Therefore it is called, *the indefinite article*.

Yet the noun with this article before it may be conceived to represent several objects, each one of which is equally concerned in some state or circumstances. If therefore such noun be conceived to represent first one and then another of these objects, and this proceeding be many times repeated; the indefinite object will represent many objects of a sort which the mind considers one after another as in the state or circumstances. Hence the expressions *many a man is or does so and so, many a house may be found of such and such dimensions, &c.* are only elliptical forms of speaking, equivalent to *each one man of many (men) is or does so and so, each one house of many (houses) may be found of such and such dimensions*, and a greater or less number of ob-

jects may be considered as in some circumstances, in which any like number may also be. Hence the expressions, *a great many people* or *a few people say so or so*, are only elliptical expressions equivalent to *people in such numbers, that each one set of the like numbers may be called a great or small number, say so or so*.

As either *one*, or *more*, objects of a certain species may be considered as in some state or circumstances exclusive of all other objects of the same species, *the* is prefixed to nouns both singular and plural. And as the object whether singular or plural that is considered in some state or circumstances exclusive of all others, is ascertained or defined by such consideration; therefore *the* is called *the definite article*.

This subject is treated of at large at Book I. Sect. XXII. of the speculative part of this work.

Examples of the regular declensions of the noun and of its four varieties.

THE regular noun in which the plural is formed only by the addition of an *s* to the singular, without increasing the number of its syllables.

Singular.

Nominative	a king	the king
Genitive	{ a king's of a king }	{ the king's of the king }
Dative	to a king	to the king
Accusative	a king	the king
Vocative	o king	o the king
Ablative	by a king	by the king.

Plural.

Nominative	kings	the kings
Genitive	of kings	of the kings
Dative	to kings	to the kings
		Accusative

Accusative	kings,	the kings
Vocative	o kings	o the kings
Ablative	by kings	by the kings.

The first variety ; in which the plural is formed from the singular ending in a silent *e*, only by the addition of an *s*, but so that the number of syllables is one more in the plural than it is in the singular. This only happens in nouns which end in a silent *e*, after *c*, *g*, *s*, *z*.

Singular.

Nominative	a place	the place
Genitive	{ a place's of a place }	{ the place's of the place }
Dative	to a place	to the place
Accusative	a place	the place
Vocative	o place	o the place
Ablative	by a place	by the place.

Plural.

Nominative	places	the places
Genitive	of places	of the places
Dative	to places	to the places
Accusative	places	the places
Vocative	o places	o the places
Ablative	by places	by the places.

The second variety ; in which the plural is formed from the singular ending in *y*, by substituting *ies*, instead of the *y* : this only happens when the *y* does not join with another vowel so as to form a diphthong. For nouns which end in a diphthong, of which *y* is the latter vowel, make their plural after the regular manner, as *day*, *days*, &c.

Singular.

Nominative	a fly	the fly
Genitive	{ a fly's of a fly }	{ the fly's of the fly }
		X x
		Dative

Dative	to a fly	to the fly
Accusative	a fly	the fly
Vocative	o fly	o the fly
Ablative	by a fly	by the fly.

Plural.

Nominative	flies	the flies
Genitive	of flies	of the flies
Dative	to flies	to the flies
Accusative	flies	the flies
Vocative	o flies	o the flies
Ablative	by flies	by the flies.

The third variety ; in which the plural is formed by the addition of the syllable *es* to the singular. This happens in nouns ending in *ch*, *s*, *sh*, *x*, and *z*, for a single *s* cannot be pronounced after these consonants.

Singular.

Nominative	a church	the church
Genitive	{ a church's of a church }	{ the church's of the church }
Dative	to a church	to the church
Accusative	a church	the church
Vocative	o church	o the church
Ablative	by a church	by the church.

Plural.

Nominative	churches	the churches
Genitive	of churches	of the churches
Dative	to churches	to the churches
Accusative	churches	the churches
Vocative	o churches	o the churches
Ablative	by churches	by the churches.

In like manner,

	Singular.	
Nominative	a surplus •of a surplus	the surplus of the surplus, &c.
	Plural.	
Nominative	surpluses of surpluses	the surpluses of the surpluses, &c.
	Singular.	
Nominative	a fish of a fish	the fish of the fish, &c.
	Plural.	
Nominative	fishes of fishes	the fishes of the fishes, &c.
	Singular.	
Nominative	a fox of a fox	the fox of the fox, &c.
	Plural.	
Nominative	foxes of foxes	the foxes of the foxes, &c.

The nouns ending in *z* are so few, that it is not of any moment to give any other example than that of *buzz*, already produced.

The fourth variety; in which the plural is formed by substituting *ves* instead of *f*, or of *f* with a silent *e* after it, at the end of a noun.

A PRACTICAL

Singular.

Nominative	a loaf	the loaf
Genitive	{ a loaf's of a loaf }	{ the loaf's of the loaf }
Dative	to a loaf	to the loaf
Accusative	a loaf	the loaf
Vocative	o loaf	o the loaf
Ablative	by a loaf	by the loaf.

Plural.

Nominative	loaves	the loaves
Genitive	of loaves	of the loaves
Dative	to loaves	to the loaves
Accusative	loaves	the loaves
Vocative	o loaves	o the loaves
Ablative	by loaves	by the loaves.

Singular.

Nominative	a wife	the wife
Genitive	{ a wife's of a wife }	{ the wife's of the wife, &c.

Plural.

Nominative	wives	the wives
Genitive	of wives	of the wives, &c.

These nouns in plural forms the rules forsake,
Man, woman, ox, men, women, oxen, take.
 † Brethren and brothers, both from *brother* flow,
 And cows and † kine are both derived from *cow*.
Children from child; foot, feet; goose, geese; die, dice;
Penny makes pence; tooth, teeth; louse, lice; mouse, mice.

N. B. When any word has this mark † annexed, it is a notice that the word is obsolete, or at least only used in the style of the Scriptures.

The same in both the numbers, *sheep, swine, deer,*
And *pound* sometimes as plural may appear.

There is a small number of English substantives which form their plurals in a manner different from any of the former, which are therefore considered as irregular.

Thus, *man, woman, ox,* in the plural take *men, women, oxen.* *Brother,* has both *brothers* and *† brethren*; *child,* *children*; *cow,* both *cows* and *† kine*; *die,* has *dice*; *louse, lice*; *mouse, mice*; *goose,* has *geese*; *foot, feet*; *tooth, teeth*; *penny, pence.*

Deer, sheep, swine, are the same in both the singular and plural. *Pound* is also used as a plural in the expressions *ten, twenty, an hundred pound.*

In the English, as in other languages, there are several classes of substantives which have only the singular form; as there are also other classes which have only the plural.

All proper names are confined to the singular, for the reasons given already.

As also the names of virtues, vices, dispositions of mind; such as *goodness, justice, wickedness, injustice, idleness, indolence, &c.*

Of herbs, as *sage, rue, parsley, &c.* except *collyflowers, cabbages, leeks, artichokes, nettles.*

Of spices, as *cinnamon, ginger, &c.* except *cloves and nutmegs.*

Of drugs, as *mercury, opium, the bark, &c.*

Of liquors, as *beer, ale, vinegar, milk.*

Of unctuous matter, as *butter, fat, grease, pitch, tar, &c.*

Of metals, as *gold, silver, copper, tin, lead, &c.*

Of grain, as *wheat, rye, barley, &c.* except *oats.*

Of abstract qualities, *i. e.* of such properties, habits, and powers, as are never observed to have any being separate from other objects, but which are nevertheless considered as separate objects, and as such denoted by substantives. • Such are *wisdom, folly, modesty, impudence, speed, slowness, courage, cowardice, vigour, remissness, &c.* To these may be added, *hunger, the vulgar, people, offspring*; as also *dust, soot, wool, rust, &c.*

The substantives, which have only the plural number, are chiefly the names of instruments, consisting of two principal parts corresponding to each other; such as *shears, scissors, snuffers, tongs, bellows.*

To these may be added *annals, Alps, ashes, bowels, breeches, goods, entrails, ides, nones, lungs, creffes, &c.*

SECTION VI.

Of the gender of nouns.

THREE genders, in the English tongue, annex
To the third person, difference of sex.

The masculine denotes each male by *he*.

Each female takes its feminine in *she*.

Objects of neither sex, may each admit

Neuter distinction by the pronoun *it*.

But these, confin'd to singulars, convey

No mark of gender in their plural, *they*.

The gender of nouns, in English, is confined to the distinction of sex; those objects which are males being of the masculine gender, those which are females being of the feminine, and those which are of no sex being of the neuter.

This distinction of sex is also no wise necessary to be attended to, except when an object of the singular number is to be denoted by a pronoun of the third person. For, upon such occasion, any one male, of any species, is denoted by *he* or *his*; any one female by *she* or *her*; and any one object of neither sex by *it* or *its*. It is also usual to speak of a little child, or any diminutive animal, or any object in which the sex is not considered, by *it*.

[In the Greek and Latin, and in most of the modern languages, all objects, which in themselves are of no sex, are yet considered as of some one of the genders; and as in them the distinction of gender is meerly arbitrary, as resulting from custom only; many rules are required to shew what substantives are masculine, what feminine, and what neuter, in order to make an adjective or pronoun agree with them, by giving a masculine, or feminine, or (in the Latin and Greek) a neuter termination to such adjective or pronoun. The English language is free from this perplexity, and this is justly to be accounted a very great excellence of the language.]

The substantive, *ship*, although of no sex, is usually considered as of the feminine gender, and consequently is spoke of by the pronoun *she*; and any object, if it be represented as a person, may be considered as of the masculine or feminine gender. Thus, if the sun is considered as a god, it may be called *he*; if the moon as a goddess, it may be called *she*; and so of other instances.

SECTION VII.

Of the noun adjective.

NOUN adjectives are *common names*, design'd
Objects to signify, from which the mind

For its convenience, by abstraction's aid,
 That principle of being has convey'd ;
 Which, as peculiar, we to each conceive,
 When it is nam'd by a noun substantive. •

Adjectives are names of objects, when considered as destitute of all principle of *separate existence*,

The objects denoted by adjectives are all of that kind which are called *abstract* ; that is to say, the conceptions of them are formed into separate objects, merely by considering the powers, properties, qualities, and relations, of persons and things, as withdrawn from those persons and things, and reduced to several sorts by the operation of the mind itself. Thus the objects denoted by *goodness, greatness, virtue, vice, length, breadth, blackness, brightness, size, shape, &c.* can never have a separate being each by itself, although the mind, for its own convenience, considers each of them as if it had such being, and under such consideration gives a substantive name to each. As therefore the mind supposes a separate being in abstract objects, merely for its own convenience, it can withdraw this supposition at its pleasure ; and when it is withdrawn, abstract objects are denoted by adjectives, as *good, great, virtuous, vicious, long, broad, black, white, sizeable, shapely, &c.*

The being of objects, thus denoted, is conceived to be as real as their being is when they are denoted by substantives. But it is conceived to depend upon a principle, that is in some other object to be denoted by a substantive, or in some state to be denoted by a verb. Hence the conception denoted by an adjective, cannot be considered consistently by itself : for the grammatic form of the adjective is a notice to the mind to look out for some substantive or verb, which expresses an object or state, with the being whereof that which is denoted by the adjective must unite ; so that if no such word is found, the direction of
 the

the grammatic form cannot be fulfilled, and of consequence part of the meaning of the adjective is left in suspense.

Hence the conceptions denoted by adjectives are subject to no kind of number. For they neither denote objects existing separately; nor states which depend upon such a principle as can be occasionally communicated to them, and taken from them by fits; but whatsoever is denoted by an adjective, unites with the fixed being of the object expressed by a substantive, or with the occasional being of the state denoted by a verb, according as the adjective is made to depend upon a substantive or a verb. This subject is treated of at large Book II. Sect. I.

Of number, gender, case, the English give
 No variation to the adjective:
 Yet *er* and *est*, as terminations join,
 Or *more* and *most* prefix, when they define
 The forms by which the three degrees are known.
 Denoting regular comparison.
 The adjective itself is said to be,
 In grammar, of the *positive degree*;
 Of the *comparative*, if there appear
 Or *more*, before it, or behind it *er*;
 Of the *superlative*, by *most*, or *est*,
 When it's degree is to the height encreast.

Adjectives in English are wholly undeclinable, having no grammatic diversity of number, case, or gender.

But the comparison of adjectives occasions a variety in the grammatic forms of each. For an adjective denotes a quality or property which must be considered as in some object or verbal state. And it frequently happens that a quality or property, which may be denoted by one and the same adjective, is observed in different degrees in different objects or states, or even in the same objects or states at different times. The usual de-

gree is denoted by the adjective without any variation, as *a wise man, a generous prince*. A degree exceeding the usual degree, but not to the utmost limit, is denoted by giving the termination *er* to the adjective, or by prefixing *more* to it; as *a wiser man, a more generous prince*.

The degree which extends to the utmost limit of excess, is denoted by giving the termination *est* to the adjective, or by prefixing *most* to it; as *the wisest man, the most generous prince*.

The following adjectives, by use, disown
The form of regular comparison.

Bad, worse, and worst requires, *good, better, best*.

Late, latter, latest, last, little, less, least.

From, much, or many, more, and most, appear

Deriv'd; and *nearer, nearest, next*, from *near*.

Out, former, nether, under, upper, give

Most, in their forms of the superlative.

The following adjectives form the degrees of comparison irregularly. As

Good, better, best; bad, worse, worst; little, less, least; much, more, most; many, more, most; near, nearer, nearest, or next; late, later, or latter, latest, or last.

Some comparatives form a superlative by adding *most* to their end; as *nether*, i. e. lower, *nethermost*; *outermost*, or *utmost*; *under, undermost*; *upper, uppermost*; *fore, former, foremost*.

Many adjectives do not admit of forming comparison by the terminations *er*, and *est*, but are, by the established custom of the language, compared by *more*, and *most*, only; by which all adjectives may be compared, even those which admit of the form by *er*, and *est*; as

Great, greater, or more great; greatest, or most great.

Words

Words of one syllable are usually compared by *er*, and *est*.

Words of more than two syllables are seldom compared otherwise than by *more*, and *most*.

Words of two syllables are some of them compared by *er*, and *est*, and others of them by *more*, and *most*. The following sorts of them are seldom compared by change of termination, but by prefixing *more*, and *most*, viz.

Those which end in *ain*, or *al*, as *certain*, *more*, *most certain*; *mortal*, *more*, *most mortal*; in *ed*, or *ent*, as *recent*, *more*, *most recent*; *fervent*, *more*, &c. *fervent*; in *id*, *ive*, or *ing*, as *splendid*, *native*, *charming*; in *ous*, as *captious*; in *full*, as *careful*; in *less*, as *childless*; in *some*, as *gamesome*; in *dy*, *fy*, *ky*, *my*, *ny*, *py*, and *ry*, as *cloudy*, *puffy*, *rocky*, *balmy*, *skinny*, *ropy*, *hoary*.

But these rules admit of many exceptions.

S E C T I O N VII.

Of the pronoun.

THE use of language from itself supplies Distinctions, whence the pronouns take their rise. These of five sorts, five different names receive; The *personal*, *possessive*, *relative*. With which the *interrogative* is placed, And the *demonstrative* appears the last.

The pronouns are all of them either substantive or adjective names of species. And the situations in which objects are, when of one or other of the species denoted by pronouns, are chiefly situations which arise from the use of language itself.

Pronouns are divided into the five following sorts, personal, possessive, relative, interrogative, and demonstrative.

A PRACTICAL

SECTION VIII.

Of the pronouns personal.

OBJECTS *themselves as speaking, I and we*
Denote: as *spoken to, thou, you, and † ye.*
What neither of these personages bears,
By he, she, it, or they, exprest appears.
These are the pronouns, which grammarians call,
From their just character, *the personal.*

He

These are I, thou, she, we, † ye or you, they.

It

I and we are of the first person. *Thou and you or † ye,*
are of the second person. *He, she, it and they,* are of the third.

Whosoever is speaking and names himself, may do it by *I.* If he considers other persons as united with himself, so as to be a complex object, distinguished by his speaking, and included together with himself in one name, he considers himself together with them, as a plural object of the first person, and calls this object *we.*

Whosoever is the object to which words are addressed, is of the second person; and if a single object, may be called *thou*: if several objects are addressed at once, they become a plural object of the second person, and may be called † *ye, or you.*

Thou is used either in the most solemn addresses, as to God in prayer; or in the most familiar addresses to some persons with whom the speaker can take the greatest freedom, as a most intimate friend, for instance, or a servant: &c. for to other persons, *you* is made use of, whether the address be to one or more. † *Ye* seldom appears, except in the solemn stile of the Scriptures.

Every

Every object which neither speaks and names itself, nor is spoken to, is of the third person. If this object be a single male, it may be called *he*; if a single female, *she*; if a single object in which the sex is not considered, *it*. If several objects neither speaking and naming themselves, nor spoken to, are considered as one plural object, *they* may be used to denote them all together, of whatsoever sex they are, or without regard to sex.

I and *we* are equally the names of *any one or more objects who speak and name themselves*; *thou*, *you*, and *ye*, of *any one or more to whom what is said is addressed*. But in conversations carried on by word of mouth, the speaker and hearer are present with each other, and of consequence see who speaks, and who is spoken to; so that there is no occasion, when things are thus situated, to say in words, who the persons are that are denoted by *I* or *we*, *thou*, or *you*: but in a letter, the sight cannot determine those who support the first and second persons; and therefore the person who writes it, signs his name; and this shews who supports the first person, *i. e.* who is meant by *I* or *we* in the letter. And the direction of a letter shews who is the person addressed, *i. e.* who is meant by *thou*, and *you*, in the letter.

But objects of the third person cannot be thus ascertained: for they are seldom present, when conversation is held by word of mouth concerning them; and all objects whatsoever are of this person in any particular discourse, except the speaker, and those to whom the discourse is addressed. Therefore objects of this person must be mentioned each by some name, before they are denoted by one of these pronouns. For otherwise, the hearer could not know more of the object intended to be expressed, than that it is a male, or female, or considered without regard to sex, and that it neither speaks nor is spoken to, in the present sentence. This is so, supposing the object is of the singular number, and called *he*, *she*, or *it*; for if it be of the plural number, and called *they*, nothing more can be known of it
from

from the pronoun, than that it is a plural object neither speaking nor spoken to. This name by which an object is to be mentioned, in order to ascertain it when named by a pronoun of the third person, is called the antecedent to the pronoun, because it almost constantly appears in the discourse before the pronoun is made use of. Thus in the expression, *the lord God made the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, to dress it, and to keep it. The man* is the antecedent to *him*, and *the garden of Eden* to *it*; for *him* in itself denotes *any male that neither speaks nor is spoken to*, and *it* in itself denotes *any object of no sex that neither speaks, nor is spoken to*; but *the man* determines *him* to one certain male, and *the garden of Eden* determines *it* to one certain object of no sex: and so of other instances of the use of the antecedent to the personal pronoun.

In general truths, the antecedent is often left to be understood or taken at pleasure. Thus in the expression, *he that bideth hatred with lying lips, and he that uttereth slander, is a fool*, the antecedent to *he* may be *any man*, or *every man*.

The pronouns personal must each receive
The various cases of a substantive.
But, in the plural, none of them will bear
A derivation from the singular;
So different their forms. Nor yet does use
The cases from the nominatives deduce.
For here, th' accusatives *me, us*, afford,
And *thee, you, him, her, them*, the added word,
Which with it's proper sign must form each case:
But *it*, unvaried with each sign you place.

As these pronouns denote objects as each is conceived to have a separate principle of being, they are noun substantives, and admit of declension, as other substantives do; only the accusative is a different word from the nominative, and the oblique

cases are formed, by placing the usual signs before the accusative in both the numbers; and not before the nominative, as in other substantives.

I, and its cases, are pronouns of the first person; and its declension is as follows.

Singular.		Plural.	
Nominative	I	Nominative	we
Genitive	of me	Genitive	of us
Dative	to me	Dative	to us
Accusative	me	Accusative	us
Vocative	o me	Vocative	
Ablative	by me.	Ablative	by us.

Thou, and its cases, are pronouns of the second person. Its declension is as below.

Singular.		Plural.	
Nominative	thou	Nominative	† ye or you
Genitive	of thee	Genitive	of you
Dative	to thee	Dative	to you.
Accusative	thee	Accusative	you
Vocative	o thou	Vocative	o you
Ablative	by thee.	Ablative	by you.

He, *she*, and *it*, with their cases, are pronouns of the third person, and their declension is of the following form.

Singular.		Singular.		Singular.	
Nominative	he	Nominative	she	Nominative	it
Genitive	of him	Genitive	of her	Genitive	of it
Dative	to him	Dative	to her	Dative	to it
Accusative	him	Accusative	her	Accusative	it
Vocative		Vocative		Vocative	
Ablative	by him.	Ablative	by her.	Ablative	by it.
					Plural.

Plural.

Nominative	they
Genitive	of them
Dative	to them
Accusative	them
Vocative	
Ablative	by them.

I have placed the vocative cases in the declension of the pronoun of the first person, although, strictly speaking, o me! is a kind of interjection.

I have likewise placed *thou* and *† ye* or *you* as nominative cases of the second person, although, strictly speaking, they are vocative cases, and the pronoun of this person has no nominative case. *6/8*

SECTION IX.

Of the possessive pronouns.

PRONOUNS possessive are the adjectives
 In which each pronoun personal receives
 A coalescent form : as will appear
 In *my, our, thy, your, his, her, its, and their.*
 With substantives express these forms we join :
 If understood; *theirs, hers, yours, thine, ours, mine.*

These are *my, thy, our, your, his, her, their.* They have each of them, except *his*, another form in English, viz. *mine, thine, ours, yours, hers, theirs.* The first form is used when some object is mentioned, and the pronoun is united immediately with its name, as *my, thy, your, their book.* The second is
 used

used when the name is not mentioned with which the pronoun is to be immediately united, but is left to be understood, or supplied by the mind, as *this book is yours*, i. e. *your book*.

These are all adjective names derived from the personal pronouns, and of consequence they denote abstract conceptions formed from the same objects which the personal pronouns denote. But the property, or relation, which is signified by a possessive pronoun, is not conceived to have any principle of being in itself. Thus in the expression *your book*, the relation of *belonging to you* is considered as existing in union with the book; and so of other instances.

There is no grammatic variation of case, gender, or number in the English possessive pronouns; for they are but a sort of adjectives; and (as we have already observed) the English admits of no variation in its adjectives.

SECTION X.

Of the relative pronoun.

WHO, *which*, and *that*, are relatives, and give

The coalescence of an adjective
To a whole sentence: but, when this is meant,
The objects which these pronouns represent,
By other names denoted, must receive
The clause in which we use a relative.

What, *when*, *why*, *wherefore*, *how*, *where*, *whither*, *whence*,
And *while*, and *whether*, each contain the sense
Of relatives. And *whither*, *who*, *which*, *where*,
Whence, *what*, *when*, *how*; if plac'd before *soe'er*.

The simple pronouns of this class are, *who*, *which*, and *that*.
The compound pronouns, that partake of the nature of relatives,
Z z are,

are, *what*, *whosoever*, *whichsoever*, *whatsoever*; for *what* is equivalent to *this which*, or *that which*, and *who*—*which*—*what*—*soever*, are only *who*, *which*, and *what*, applied to represent some object that is not fully known, or is to be taken at pleasure.

There are also several words, usually accounted adverbs, which partake of the signification of a relative pronoun.

As *when*, *why*, *wherefore*, *how*, *where*, *whither*, *whence*, *whether*, *while*, *till*, or *untill*.

For *when* is equivalent to *sometime at which*; *why*, or *wherefore*, to *some reason for which*; *how* to *some manner in which*; *where* to *some place at which*; *whither* to *some place to which*; *whence* to *some place from which*; *whether* to *which of two*; *while* to *some time during which*; *till*, or *untill*, to *during some time at the end of which*.

The following examples shew that these words have the force of a relative pronoun. For *I know*, *when*, *why*, *wherefore*, *how*, *where*, *whither*, *whence*, *the goods were conveyed*, are expressions equivalent to *I know—sometime at which—some reason for which—some place in or at—to—from which—the goods were conveyed*. *I know not whether to take*, is equivalent to *I know not which of the two to take*; *I sit while you stand*, to *I sit during the time in which you stand*; *I shall work till you bid me give over*, to *I shall work during some time, at the end of which you will bid me give over*.

These words express only some time, reason, manner, place, &c. considered as some way distinguishable from other times, reasons, manners, places, &c. but not as actually distinguished; so that when the distinction comes to be actually made, the time, reason, manner, place, &c. that is spoke of, may happen to be one of another, for any thing that is previously expressed

pressed or determined. Hence these words are called indefinites in grammar.

The relative pronouns denote objects themselves, as the personal pronouns do; and not coalescent *properties*, or *relations*, as the possessive pronouns do. But the relatives, when an object is denoted by one of them, give notice, that what is signified by a whole clause that bears the form of a compleat sentence, in which the relative is concerned, is not to be considered as of any meaning separately from some other name of the same object which the relative represents.

Hence the whole clause in which a relative is concerned, becomes of the nature of a noun adjective, although it bears the form of a compleat sentence. But this clause can only be applied as an adjective to the same object which the relative represents, as that object is expressed by some other name. This other name is the antecedent to the relative. And the clause of the relative when united with the antecedent partakes of all the antecedent's connexions, as an adjective partakes of all the connexions of its substantive.

Every compleat sentence must consist of a noun substantive in the nominative case, or of one or more words considered as equivalent to one substantive in that case, and of a definitive verb with or without words depending on it. I shall shew at large what a definitive verb is, when I treat of the verb in particular; it is sufficient to observe here, that the verbs *is*, *created*, *will judge*, *may avoid*, are definitive verbs. Let the following sentences be formed by these verbs. *God is righteous, God created men, God will judge men, men may avoid condemnation.* And as the objects *God*, or *men*, are concerned in every two of them, any two may be reduced into one sentence, by substituting a relative pronoun in one, instead of the name of the object that is common to both. Thus the second may be taken into the first, by substituting *who*, instead of *God* in it, and the com-

plex sentence will then become, *God who created men is righteous*; or the first may be taken into the second, by substituting *who* instead of *God* in it, as *God who is righteous created men*; or if *whom* be substituted in the second sentence instead of *men*, that sentence may be taken into the third, as *God will judge men whom he created*. Here the pronoun personal *he* is also substituted instead of *God*, in the second sentence, for as *God* is mentioned once in the compound sentence, there is no occasion to mention his name over again. If *whom* be substituted instead of *men*, in the third sentence, it may be taken into the fourth; as *men whom God will judge may avoid condemnation*. In the two last instances, *whom* is substituted instead of *men*, and not *who*. The reason of this is, because *whom*, and not *who*, is in the accusative case of the relative pronoun, and *men* is in the accusative case in the two sentences, *God created men*, *God will judge men*, which are turned into relative clauses. And farther, *whom* is not placed in the compound sentences behind the verbs *created*, *will judge*, although *men*, which it represents, stands immediately behind them in the original sentences, before they are turned into relative clauses. This is done to bring the relative as near as possible to its antecedent *men*, in the compound sentences. This subject is explained at large, in what is said of the relative pronoun, in the Speculative Grammar, Book III. Sect. III. and rules must be given for the case and position of the relative in the practical syntax, which is to follow. So that there is no necessity to say more of the nature of the relative in this place.

Who is used to represent objects that are conceived capable of reason and discourse: these are usually called persons. *Which* represents objects that are not capable of reason and discourse: these are usually called things. *That* may represent either persons or things.

The declension of the relatives.

THE relatives no plural forms put on,
But objects of both numbers shew by one.
Nor do the cases change of words allow:
Except that *whom* appears in those from *who*.

Singular and Plural.		Singular and Plural.	
Nominative	who	Nominative	which
Genitive	whose or of whom	Genitive	whose or of which
Dative	to whom	Dative	to which
Accusative	whom	Accusative	which
Vocative		Vocative	
Ablative	by whom.	Ablative	by which.

Singular and Plural.		Singular and Plural.	
Nominative	that	Nominative	where
Genitive	of that	Genitive	of where
Dative	to that	Dative	to where
Accusative	that	Accusative	where
Vocative		Vocative	
Ablative	by that.	Ablative	than where.

I have placed *that*, as declined like the other relatives, although the sign of a case never goes immediately before it when it is used as a relative, but the sign is left where the word that is represented by the relative would have stood, if the clause had been a complete sentence. Thus the two sentences, *I saw the books, you told me of them*, if reduced to one, by substituting *that* instead of *them*, become, *I saw the books that you told me of*, not of *that you told me*; and so of other instances.

When is sometimes declined like *where*; *whosoever*, and *whatsoever*, are declined like *who*, and *what*.

As the relative pronoun can seldom be used without its antecedent actually mentioned, the antecedent determines the number of the object which the relative represents; and therefore the relative, in English, has no grammatic distinction of number. Thus in the expression, *the man of whom I speak*, *whom* represents the singular object, *the man*; and in *the men of whom I speak*, *whom* represents the plural object, *the men*.

SECTION XI.

Of the interrogative pronouns.

THESE are the relatives, when so they stand
 In questions, as to shew, that we demand
 Such answers to be giv'n, as shall supply
 More fully what these pronouns signify.

These are the relatives *who*, *what*, and *which*, when used in questions to represent *that concerning which* a question is asked.

Now whatsoever is *that concerning which* a question is asked, must be so far known to him who asks the question, that he can make the person, from whom he expects an answer, sensible of that to which the answer must relate. If this happens to be *one*, or *more persons*, *who* is used to represent that about which the question is, till the answer determines it more fully. As *who is that man?* answer, *Mr. N——*: *who are miserable?* answer, *the wicked*.

If either one or more *things*, or a *verbal state*, is that about which the question is asked, *what* represents it till the answer determines it more fully; as *what has happened?* answer, *nothing of moment*: *what are these books?* answer, *grammars*: *what are you doing?* answer, *writing*.

If

If that which the question is about, happens to be amongst some number or quantity of persons or things, and he who asks the question wants to know some one or more of these persons or things more particularly, *which* represents that about which the question is, till the answer determines it more fully; *which is Mr. M—?* answer, *the gentleman who is sitting.*

All the indefinites which were mentioned in the last section, except *while*, and *till*, or *untill*, may be used in asking questions, as appears by the nature of their signification already explained. For each of them represents some object as determinable, though not actually determined. And the answer gives the determination. As *when, why, how, was this done?* answer, *at such a time, for such a reason, in such a particular manner*; and so of other instances.

The interrogative pronouns are declined in the same manner as the relatives.

S E C T I O N XII.

Of the demonstrative pronouns.

These are *this, that, other, another, the same.*

OF the demonstratives, *this, these, that, those, Another, others, and the same*, compose The list. You *this*, and *these*, use to denote Things near you, *that* and *those* things more remote. Diff'rence perceiv'd in *other* finds a name, Unvaried perception, in *the same*.

These pronouns may be considered either as substantives or adjectives. For one of them may be united with any common or appellative substantive, as an adjective is. But if the object can be seen, or pointed to, or the conception of it can be any ways

ways supplied by signs, or words mentioned, or to be mentioned, one of these pronouns may stand alone to denote it. Hence they are declined like substantives, as appears below.

Singular.		Plural.	
Nominative	this	Nominative	these
Genitive	of this	Genitive	of these
Dative	to this	Dative	to these
Accusative	this	Accusative	these
Vocative	o this	Vocative	o these
Ablative	by this.	Ablative	by these.

Singular.		Plural.	
Nominative	that	Nominative	those
Genitive	of that	Genitive	of those
Dative	to that	Dative	to those
Accusative	that	Accusative	those
Vocative	o that	Vocative	o those
Ablative	by that.	Ablative	by those.

Singular.		
Nominative	another	the other
Genitive	of another	of the other
Dative	to another	to the other
Accusative	another	the other
Vocative	o another	o the other
Ablative	by another	by the other.

Plural.		
Nominative	others	the others
Genitive	of others	of the others
Dative	to others	to the others
Accusative	others	the others
Vocative	o others	o the others
Ablative	by others	by the others.

Nominative

Nominative	the same	} Singular and Plural.
Genitive	of the same.	
Dative	to the same	
Accusative	the same	
Vocative		
Ablative	by the same	

This denotes any singular object or thing that is near, and can be shewn or pointed out, or that is lately mentioned, or is to be immediately mentioned; as when a person says *this*, and shews or points to what he means; and in the expressions *this which I have said*, or *which I am going to say*.

These denotes any plural object or thing in the situation above-mentioned.

That and *those* denote, the first a singular, and the second a plural object, that is somewhat distant, and can be shewn or pointed out, or that has been mentioned, or is to be mentioned at some distance. As when a person says *that*, and shews or points to what he means; and in the expressions, *that which I have said*, *that which I am going to say*.

Other, if used without an article, is always applied as an adjective; and when so applied, it gives notice, that some name, or expression, is or will be used, in what is said, to signify something of the same sort with that which is denoted by the word to which *other* is joined, but that, what is denoted by this word is different in itself, although of the same sort. As *other men may think as they please, but I think a knowledge of grammar absolutely necessary*, where *I* denotes a man as well as the word *men*.

Another, *others*, the first of these is used to shew that a singular, and the second, that a plural object of some sort or species is different from some one or more objects of the species, as *other men or others may be mistaken, but such a man was present, and saw what he declares*.

The same is used, when some certain object or state is considered more than once, to shew that it is not merely what is capable of being called by the same general name, or denoted by the same general expression, but is altogether unaltered; as *the same sun which sets to-night will rise to-morrow*.

The words *every, any, some, many, few, such,* and some others, are much of the nature of demonstrative pronouns, although they are usually ranked amongst the indefinites. For if all objects and states could have each a name of its own, there would be no place in language for either demonstrative pronouns, or those words above-mentioned. This is shewn more at large in Book III. Sect. V. of the Speculative Grammar.

SECTION XIII.

Of the verb.

THOSE states of being we to verbs allow
On which, for our convenience, we bestow
Occasional existence; such as may
Be taken, at our pleasure, quite away,
And then restor'd. Hence the same verbal state
Once, twice, or times at will, we may repeat.
Thus the same period of such state may be
What we perceive, remember, or foresee.
States thus existing, either may be made
So many sep'rate objects; or convey'd
To other objects, may the states declare
In which these objects to the mind appear.

Hence, in the use of verbal forms, 'tis fit
That some the application shall admit
Of substantives which sep'rate things express;
Whilst others shall with objects coalesce, •

If

If in dependence on their names they stand :
Or the same forms must either use demand.

And hence, with other words the verb must bear
Connexion in *a threefold character*.

The verb objective, as a substantive
Each mode of estimation must receive
Which any case admits, or sign supplies,
Or any preposition signifies.

The verb, when in its *coalescent state*,
Must with some object so incorporate,
As, for our present purpose, to confer
Upon the object a new character,
Or state, in which the object we foresee,
Perceive, or recollect by memory.
And this in words which may, in any kind
Of composition, with more words be joined.

When composition, to the mind's intent,
Compleats th' expression which shall represent
The subject of a sentence; would you give
This notice? use *the verb definitive*.

Verbs denote states of being, which the mind can conceive
as destroyed and renewed by intervals, so as to suit any occasion;
and this either in verbal states considered as separate objects, or
as united with other objects, and shewing the occasional states of
being of these objects.

This property of a verbal state, of being stopped or put an
end to, and then begun again, and then put an end to, and
so on, is the reason why such a state may be counted by the
numbers, once, twice, thrice, &c. For as the state may be-
gin

gin and cease by intervals, or fits, it becomes thereby distinguishable into different successive parts or periods, which may be counted by the numbers of repetition, once, twice, thrice, &c. And this no object or state can be, except those which are denoted by verbs.

And as no two periods of the same sort of verbal state that depends upon the same principle can exist together; if several of them are conceived to succeed each other by intervals, one of them may be actually perceived, and another merely remembered, and another barely foreseen, or proposed. Or the same individual period may be conceived as passing through all these situations in the mind of man; and this when the period is considered as a single or separate object. Likewise one and the same object may be considered as merely remembered in one of these states, or as actually perceived in it, or as only foreseen in it.

Hence it comes to pass, that in the English there are three forms of the verb, called the tenses of the infinitive mood: and of these, the present tense expresses a verbal state as *it is perceived*, the past tense as *it is remembered*, and the future as *it is foreseen or proposed*; as *to be*, *to have been*, *to be about to be*. There are likewise three participles which express the state under the same distinctions, as *being*, *having been*, *about to be*.

Any of these forms of a verb, either single or with one or more words in dependence upon it, may express a state of being, as an object which the mind conceives or contemplates separately, like an object denoted by a noun substantive. As in the expressions, *to read*, *to have read*, *to be about to read*, *the reading*, *the having read*, *the being about to read*, or *to read a grammar*, *to have read a grammar*, *to be about to read a grammar*, *the reading a grammar*, *the having read a grammar*, *the being about to read a grammar*; for any of these expressions manifestly

nifestly denotes a conception similar to that which is denoted by one noun substantive. The expressions formed by the participles may take the sign of any case, or any other preposition before them; as *of reading, to reading, by reading, of having read, by having read, &c.* When the verb is thus used, either without or with words in dependence upon it, I think it may be said to be in its *objective capacity*, seeing the expression then denotes what may be conceived, as any object is when denoted by a substantive.

But these forms may likewise be used in immediate dependence upon the name or expression of any object, and when so used, they express *some occasional state of being* of the object, on the name or expression whereof one of them depends.

The infinitive tenses are seldom used in this kind of construction. Yet they are so used on some occasions; as in the expression, *I know Mr. N— to be a good man*; where *Mr. N—, as being a good man*, is manifestly *the thing which I know*. The occasions which require this kind of construction will be shewn particularly in the syntax.

But the participles are chiefly thus used, and are continually occurring in this kind of application; as *a man reading, having read, about or going to read*; *a woman speaking, having spoke, about or going to speak, &c.*

When the verb is thus used, I think it may be said to be in its *coalescent capacity*, seeing it then unites its state with the object, on the name or expression whereof it depends, so as to shew the object either as remembered, or perceived, or foreseen in the state which it denotes: as *a man reading*, shews the man to be considered as actually perceived in the state *reading*; *a man having read*, shews him as remembered in the state *reading*; *a*
man

man about or going to read, shews him as foreseen in the state *reading*.

The verb itself, in its *objective capacity*, may depend on any other word by the sign of a case, or other preposition, as has been observed above. And *the name of the object with which the coalescent participle unites*, may depend on any other word by the like means. Thus (to give instances of both) in *the satisfaction of having finished a book*; *of having finished a book* is equivalent to a substantive in the genitive case depending on *the satisfaction*: and in *delight in reading a book*; *in reading a book* is equivalent to a substantive in the ablative case: so that in these instances the verbs *having finished*, and *reading*, are used in their objective capacity. But in the instances, *attention to a man reading*, *the satisfaction arising from labours finished*, *to a man reading*, is equivalent to one substantive in the dative case depending on *attention*; and *from labours finished*, to one substantive in the ablative case depending on the state *arising*: but the verbs *reading* and *finished*, are here used in their coalescent capacity, for they unite with the objects *a man* and *labours*, so as therewith to express complex objects.

Hence the verb either in its *objective* or *coalescent* character may be concerned in an expression which may enter into the composition of another expression that may be farther compounded at pleasure, and this in such a manner, that the state denoted by the verb shall only be *the state of being of some part of the objects concerned in the expression*; as in *the attention to a man speaking*, the man is in the state *speaking*, but *the attention* is not. And this expression may have more words added to it at pleasure, as *the attention to a man speaking a tedious speech*, &c. Therefore the verb, whether objective or coalescent, gives no notice, either that the composition of the expression, in which it is concerned, is completed, or that the verbal state affects
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the whole of what is denoted by the expression on which the verb depends.

Now there is no possibility of making single names to denote every kind of object about which we propose to speak, and therefore, when single names cannot be found, serieses of words must be made which shall be considered as equivalent to single names of objects; and as single names may sometimes be found suited to the speaker's purpose, and sometimes not, some notice must be given of this; as likewise, if a series of words is used to denote the object about which the speaker is speaking, some notice must be given when this series is sufficiently compounded for the purpose which occasions the expressing of this object. Such notice can only be given by a verb. For no other sort of word in language expresses *an occasional state of being*; and when the conception of an object is raised in the hearer's mind, either by one name, or by a series of words equivalent to a name, the whole of such object must be represented in some state, so as to suit the occasion. Now this occasion usually requires a state, that the object either might or might not be in for any thing the hearer knew till he was told; for otherwise no information is given to the hearer. Therefore the verb appears in a third character in language; and this character, I think, may be called the *definitive character of the verb*, for it shews *that the composition of the expression on which it depends is stopped, and that the whole object denoted by this expression is affected by the verbal state*: this creates the form of a sentence, as distinguished into *subject* and *predicate*; that part of the sentence which denotes the object about which the sentence is spoke, is the subject of the sentence; and the definitive verb, with all that depends upon it, is the predicate. Whether the subject consists of one word or more, it is equivalent to one noun substantive in the nominative case; and the verbal state of the predicate, whether it consists of one word or more, affects the whole of what is denoted by the subject, as if it were an object denoted

by one substantive in that case. Thus in the sentence, *a man addicted to vicious pleasures is miserable*; *a man addicted to vicious pleasures*, is the subject of the sentence, and *is miserable*, is the predicate; and it is plain, that the verbal state *is miserable* affects the whole subject, as if it were expressed by one noun substantive. And in the sentence, *to take pains in considering the nature of language, procures credit to a teacher*; *to take pains in considering the nature of language*, is the subject, and *procures credit to a teacher*, is the predicate. And it is evident that the subject is equivalent to one noun substantive in the nominative case, and the predicate to one verb affecting the whole subject.

Thus the whole business of forming words into sentences is reduced to *finding single substantives suited to our purpose, or to making serieses of words to be considered as single substantives*; and *finding single definitive verbs suited to our purpose, or to making serieses of words to be considered as such verbs*.

The definitive forms of verbs have likewise a reference to time as distinguished into past, present, and to come, by the act of speaking the sentence in which one of these verbs is used. As if I say *such a thing is, was, will be*, I give notice by *is* that the thing spoke of exists at the time when I speak the words, but by *was*, I give notice that it existed before that time; and by *will be*, that its existence is not actually begun at that time, but only foreseen or proposed. Now there is no occasion to tell those persons who actually hear me speak the words, the precise point of time in which they are spoke. For the senses of those persons determine this. And when the present is thus determined, the past and future is determined with regard to this present. On this account, there is no need, in words actually spoke, and heard by those to whom they are addressed, to mention the particular point of time to which the present forms of the definitive verbs relate. But in words written down, as in letters, deeds, bonds, &c. which are to be read after the time
when

when they are considered as actually spoke, this time must be mentioned; otherwise the meaning of much of what is written will be left indeterminate. For the precise points or periods to which the past, present, and future forms of the definitive verbs relate, as these forms are used in the letter, deed, &c. cannot otherwise be known; and this present time written down is called the date of the letter, deed, &c. And in historical narrations, usually many of these dates are inserted: for without them, the periods of time to which the present, past, and future forms of the definitive verbs relate, are undetermined: because the present forms, *in themselves*, equally relate to *any time in which the words are conceived to be spoke*, and the past forms to *time preceding*, and the future forms to *time succeeding any time in which the words are conceived to be spoke*. This whole subject of the several characters or capacities of the verb is treated of at large, Book IV. Sections II. III. IV. of the speculative part of this work.

S E C T I O N XIV.

Of the different sorts of verbs.

THREE diff'rent sorts of revocable state
 Like diff'rence in the sorts of verbs create.
 These sorts, in grammar, for distinction's sake,
 The names of *active*, *passive*, *neuter*, take.
 The neuter forms and active are the same,
 But in construction diff'rent modes they claim.
 Hence diff'rent names in grammar they receive,
Intransient those; but these are *transitive*.
 For to dependent substantives they bear
 The mind, and *correspondent states* transfer.

Verbs may be distinguished into different sorts, either by the manners in which they are used in construction; or by the manners in which their grammatic forms are composed.

When the manners in which they are used in construction are considered as distinguishing the sorts of verbs, they are divided into *verbs transitive*, and *verbs intransitive* or *neuter*. Every verb transitive contains in it several pairs of forms, which express pairs of states so constituted, that both the states of each pair are conceived to owe their original to one and the same principle. The grammatic forms by which these pairs of states are denoted, are usually called the same tenses, active and passive, of one and the same verb. But these forms not only represent each pair of states as existing at the same times, but likewise as the original of each pair is owing to the same principle. For if either state of a pair is conceived to result from *ability*, *freedom from contradiction*, *determination of the will*, *compulsion* or *absolute necessity*, which are the states denoted by *can*, *may*, *will*, *shall*, *must*, the other state of the pair is conceived to result from the same principle. Hence the signs *can*, *may*, *will*, *shall*, *must*, are equally found in the corresponding active and passive tenses of the same verb. As likewise the signs *have* and *had*; the first of which refers to time present, the second to time past. But although each pair of these states is conceived to exist at the same time, and to have its original from the same principle; yet the one state of a pair is most commonly observed in one object, and the other state in another object: and if either state of a pair be mentioned, and some other object be considered as in the corresponding state; there is no occasion to mention such corresponding state directly, but to place the name of the object with some sign or notice that the object is to be considered as if it were in the verbal state corresponding with that which is mentioned. That state of each verbal pair which usually denotes some effort, that in a large sense may be looked upon as *a kind of acting*, is only considered as transitive in grammar.

grammar. Every such state, when expressed by a verb, may have a substantive placed in immediate dependence upon it; and the object denoted by the substantive thus placed, is considered as if it were in the 'passive state which corresponds with the active state that is mentioned. Thus the verbs *to see*, *to read*, are transitive verbs: and in the expressions *to see a book—to read a book*, *the book* is considered as if it were in the states *seen* and *read*, although these states are not directly mentioned. If two objects are joined by placing a transitive verb between their names, the mind is enabled to pass on from the one object to the other by means of these verbal states. As in *a man seeing a book—a man reading a book*, we are enabled to unite *the man seeing* with *the book seen*, and *the man reading* with *the book read*, without mentioning directly the states *seen* and *read*; and so of any other instance of the use of a transitive verb. Hence this sort of verb has its name from its conveying the mind by a kind of transition from one object to another.

But many states which may be conceived to be begun, ended, or repeated, occasionally, (and which are therefore denoted by verbs) are not easily resolvable into pairs corresponding in the manner above-mentioned. Such as the states *to be*, *to rest*, *to sleep*, *to grow*, *to fade*, &c.

For they either imply no effort exerted, or if an effort is supposed, it's effect is the state itself denoted by each verb, and not a corresponding passive state. Therefore these verbs do not admit of a substantive being placed in immediate dependence upon one of them, to denote an object which is to be conceived as in a corresponding state. And if one of them is placed in dependence upon a substantive, the object denoted by the substantive will be conceived to have in it the effect of the state itself; as in the expressions, *such a thing being*, *a man resting—sleeping*, *a tree growing—fading*. Hence these states do not carry on the mind from one object to another, as the verbal transitive states

do; and therefore they are called *intransitives*: and, because many of them denote states which are neither states of *acting*, nor *suffering*, and the rest denote states which seem to partake of both *acting* and *suffering*, the grammarians have considered them as neither the one nor the other, or as intermediate between both, and on this account have called them *verbs neuter*.

SECTION XV.

Of the voices and conjugation of verbs.

THREE sets of patterns, form'd to comprehend
 The sev'ral variations which attend
 The English verb, in forms of grammar take
 The name of *voices*, and together make
A conjugation, which each form will give,
 That verbs, when regular, in use of speech receive.

The distinction of verbs by the manners in which their grammatic forms are composed, gives occasion to what, in grammar, are called the voices of the verb; and these voices taken together are called a conjugation. The voices may be considered as three in the English verb; and may be called the *active*, *passive*, and the *middle voice*. For the forms of the first voice most frequently denote some state of action; those of the second, some state of suffering or passion; and those of the third, or middle voice, on some occasions, states of action, and on others, states of suffering.

The forms which compose these voices will appear at large in the patterns or paradigms of the conjugation of verbs which will be given in what follows.

One English conjugation may suffice,
Since the formations which in verbs arise
Of different structure, no proportion bear
To those which form'd by *ed* we call the regular.

On the three voices, we the names bestow
Of *active*, *passive*, *middle*, thence to show
The gen'ral nature of the verbal state
Denoted by the forms, which to each voice relate.

The English verbs may be reduced to one regular conjugation, in which the termination *ed* is used in the past tenses; with irregular verbs, reduced to five classes.

As to the voices, any verb of any of the forms of the first voice, is said to be of the active voice. As *to call, I call, he may call*, are of the active voice. Any verb of any of the forms of the second, is of the passive voice; as *to be called—I am called—he may be called*. Any verb of any of the forms of the last, is of the middle voice; as *to be calling—I am calling—I may be calling*.

Each of the voices consists of five sets of forms, called moods. And each mood, of one or more sets of forms, called tenses. And each tense of every mood, but the infinitive, of two numbers; and each number consists of three forms, called persons; and this in verbs regular or irregular.

SECTION XVI.

Of the moods of verbs.

THESE may be reduced to five, *the indicative, the imperative, the potential, the subjunctive, and the infinitive*.

The moods are intended to shew the same verbal state under different modifications, without having recourse to any words but

but such as are conceived to be part of the verb itself.

If to distinguish verbal states we mean,*
 As states *perceiv'd, remember'd, or foreseen,*
 Three forms infinitive of verbs present
 Expressions to accomplish such intent.
 And 'tis the same distinction, which creates
 Three participial forms, as names of verbal states.

The infinitive is the most simple of the moods. For of its three forms, or tenses, the first, or present, expresses the verbal state as it is, or may be, the object of actual perception; the second, or past tense, expresses the state as it is, or may be, the object of memory; and the third, or future tense, expresses the state as it is, or may be, the object of foresight, as *to call—to have called—to be about to call*. The verb in these forms is much the most frequently used in an objective capacity.

The participles may be considered as other forms of the verb in this mood. They express the state as actually perceived, remembered, or foreseen; as *calling—having called—about to call*; and may be used either in an objective or coalescent capacity.

Neither the infinitive nor participial forms of the English verb have grammatic distinctions of number and person, nor do they give the distinction of subject and predicate to a series of words in which one of them is concerned.

To all the forms of other moods we give
 The gen'ral title of *definitive*;
 For, in construction, all these forms depend
 On subjects, and define, or fix the end
 Of the expressions us'd to bring to mind
 These subjects; into which, when thus defin'd,

The verb conveys it's characteristic state:
And *affirmation* thus becomes compleat.

The other moods are all definitive ; that is to say, the forms of which they consist, cannot be used but in dependence upon some subject expressed or understood, and that subject considered as sufficiently ascertained for the speaker's purpose. They may be conveniently reduced to the *indicative*, *imperative*, *potential*, and *subjunctive*.

Th' *indicative* is used to declare
What objects *do* or *suffer*, *have*, or *are*.

The indicative mood is used to represent *some subject, the expression whereof is ascertained* ; as in some state of being which is *in continuance*, or which is partly or intirely *over* ; *before*, or *at*, or *after*, the time of speaking.

If you command, or exhortations give,
Or would entreat, apply th' *imperative*.

The imperative mood is used to represent *some state of being*, which the speaker signifies that it is his pleasure or desire some object shall be placed in.

On *power*, *leave*, *duty*, *will*, what state foe'er
Depends, to the *potential* you refer.

The potential mood is used to represent *some subject, the expression whereof is ascertained*, as *capable* or *free from impediment*, or *under the necessity* of being in some state. Or as *itself resolving* or *inclining*, or as *some way under obligation*, or *compulsion*, to be in some state.

But *states suppos'd*, or otherwise if made,
Contingent, call for the *subjunctive's* aid.

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The subjunctive mood is used to represent *some subject, the expression whereof is ascertained*, as in some contingent state, in consequence of the dependence which the subject and state have upon what must be expressed by some other clause.

SECTION XVII.

Of the tenses of verbs.

THOSE of the infinitive mood have been already described, as likewise the participles, which may be considered as another set of tenses of the infinitive mood.

The tenses of the *definitive moods* relate to time, as the periods of it are distinguished into *past, present* and *to come*, by the act of speaking. For the *present*, to which the *past* and *future* are referred, as denoted by these tenses, is always determined by the act of speaking the words of the sentences in which these tenses are used. These periods are therefore continually shifting, for no two sentences can be spoke at the same instant of time; so that if the precise present, to which they are referred, is not determined by actual speaking, it must be written down as in the dates of letters, deeds, &c.

The sev'ral tenses of each finite mood,
When us'd in simple sentences, include
Time in their meaning, as we estimate
It's periods from a transient present state.
For no fix'd point by any tense is shown,
But with the time of speaking all flow on.

Time thus distinguish'd in three sev'ral pairs
Of tense in th' indicative appears,
To *present time*, there is a reference
Both in *the present* and *the perfect tense*.

Tb' im-

Tb' imperfect, and *pluperfect*, both assume
Past time; and *both the futures time to come*.
 The first of ev'ry pair *unfinish'd state*,
 Denotes, the latter shews it as *compleat*.

The tenses of the indicative mood are six, viz. the present, the first, and second preterite, the pluperfect, and the first, and second future.

The present and second preterite, both relate to the time of speaking. The present expresses the state as then in continuance, and the second preterite, so far as it is then over; as *I call, I have called*.

The first preterite and pluperfect, both relate to time preceding the time of speaking. The first preterite expresses the state either as in continuance at that preceding time, or as over at the time of speaking, or as in continuance, but not actually perceived to be so, at any time, and therefore is an indefinite tense; as *he spoke a long time, he spoke the word, if he spoke he would be blamed, for if he were to speak, &c.*

The present and first preterite have each of them a double form. The forms without any prefixed sign are used in common affirmative clauses. The forms by *do* and *did* are used in negative and interrogative clauses, or when it is intended to add emphasis to an assertion; as, *many people talk of things which they do not well consider; I did not foresee what is now come to pass; do you go to-morrow? did you go yesterday? I do assure you that things are as I tell you; they did give this account, although they now deny it.*

The pluperfect expresses the state as preceding some period which itself precedes the time of speaking; as *I had read half of the book before you came.*

The first and second futures both relate to time succeeding the time of speaking. The first expresses the state as in continuance, and the second so far as it is over at that time; as *I shall read the book, I shall have read half of the book by to-morrow night.*

There are two forms of each of the English future tenses; the one form by *will*, and the other by *shall*.

Will denotes a state which the person whose thoughts are declared or asked determines concerning himself: but a state which he foresees, hopes, fears, believes, or is told concerning other objects.

Shall denotes a state which the person whose thoughts are declared or asked foresees, hopes, fears, believes, or is told concerning himself: but a state which he determines concerning other objects.

In simple sentences used on ordinary occasions, if no mention is made of the person whose thoughts are declared, these thoughts are conceived to be those of the speaker, *i. e.* of the singular or plural object which bears the first person. So that the expressions *I will go—we will go*, are equivalent to *I or we who speak determine to go*; but *I shall go—we shall go*, are equivalent to *I or we who speak foresee our going*.

But *you—he—they will go*, are expressions equivalent to *I or we who speak, foresee your—his—their going*. And *you—he—they shall go*, are equivalent to *I or we who speak, determine your—his—their going*.

In compound sentences, if the words *it is determined—decreed—ordained*, or other words of like import, be actually mentioned, and the sentence which contains the future state depends on such words, *shall* is used; as *it is determined—ordained, &c. that I—you—he—we—they shall go*. In

In poetic or sublime language, the words *it is irrevocably ordained—decreed*, or words of the like import, are frequently left to be understood from the nature of the stile and subject. Thus in Mr. Addison's *Cato*, *but thou shalt flourish in immortal youth*, i. e. *it is irrevocably decreed that thou (o soul) shalt flourish*, &c.

In compound sentences, if a person is represented as determining his own future state, *will* is used. But if the future state of other objects, *shall* is used.

As *I resolve—determine—that I will*, *you resolve—determine that you will go*; *he resolves—determines that he will go*; and so *we that we will—you that you will—they that they will go*: but *I resolve—determine that you—he—they shall go*, *you resolve—determine that—I—he—they shall go*; *he resolves—determines that I—you—we—they shall go*.

But in compound sentences, if a person is represented as foreseen, believing, hoping, fearing his own future state, *shall* is used; if the future state of other objects, *will* is used. As *I foresee—believe—hope—fear that I shall*, *we that we shall*, *thou that thou shalt*, *he that he shall*, *you that you shall*, *they that they shall go*.

But *I foresee—believe*, &c. *that you—he—they will go*, *you foresee*, &c. *that I—he—they will go*, *he foresees that I—you—we—they will go*. Hence these rules arise for the consistent application of *will* and *shall*.

If the person who is represented as declaring a future state, or as having his thoughts declared, or as required to declare them in answer to a question, is *both himself in the state, and determines it*, or *is neither in the state, nor determines it*, *WILL* is used. But if the person who is represented as declaring a future state, or as having his thoughts declared, or as required to declare them, is *either in the state, but does not determine it*, or *determines the state, but is not in it*, *SHALL* is used.

This subject is more largely treated of, Book IV. Sect. XII. of the speculative part of this work.

The speaker's *present purpose*, who exhorts
Begs or commands, th' imperative imports.

The imperative mood has only one tense ; and this tense is only capable of depending upon the speaker ; because it expresses what *he requires to be*, yet the name of the speaker is not directly mentioned, but understood of course. For *go you*, if expressed at length, is, *I require that you go* ; and so of any other instance. As this tense expresses what the speaker requires at the time when he speaks, it is a present tense.

The states of *power, leave, duty, will*, include
Four diff'rent forms in the potential mood.
Can, may, shall, will, these sev'ral states express,
When more confirm'd: *could, might, should, would*, when less.
And rank'd with these, a form by *must* appears,
Which states of *fix'd necessity* declares.

The tenses of the potential mood are of a complex nature, the signs *can, may, must, could, might, would, should*, express states all of which equally relate to present or future time, as *I can—may—must—could—might—would—should do this—now—to-morrow—next year*. And all of them, but *can*, may likewise relate to past time ; as *I may—must—could—might—would—should have done this yesterday*. Hence the form of the verb that depends upon some of these signs directs us in some measure to the time : for the form *do* in the examples above shews the state of *doing*, as in continuance, and *have done*, shews it as over partly or intirely. Now what is over can no ways be affected by any present state of power, such as is denoted by *can*, except in questions and suppositions, therefore the past form, *have done*, does not take *can* before it, unless by way of question or supposition ; as, *is it possible that he can have been so indiscreet ?* But it may imply no present contradiction to *suppose a state as over*,
and

and therefore *may* is united in direct affirmation with *have done*; and this form relates to a present supposition concerning time past; as *they may have done, so or so*. The states denoted by *must*, *could*, *might*, *would*, *should*, may be states either *merely remembered to have been states of necessity—power—freedom from contradiction, will, or obligation*, or states actually perceived, *which are capable of being states of necessity, power, &c.* and therefore these signs may equally affect states which are *over* or *in being*, or *unbegun*, and hence the time to which these forms relate is not directly ascertained by the forms themselves; and on this account other words, such as adverbs of time, or some other sentence which ascertains the time, are almost constantly connected with clauses that have these indefinite forms of the potential mood in them; as, *I could do this formerly, but cannot now; I would have said more on this point hereafter, if it had been thought necessary*. This subject is considered at large, Book IV. Sect. X. XI. XII. of the speculative part. *Should* and *would* are used with the like distinctions that *shall* and *will* are used with.

Of the subjunctive mood though you perceive
Some forms which differ from th' indicative
Both in the present and the preter tense,
The moods are yet equivalent in sense.

The forms of the subjunctive mood are always used in clauses which depend upon some *indefinite*, such as *whosoever*, *whatsoever*; or upon some conditional or concessive conjunction, such as *if*, *provided*, *unless*, *though*, *although*, *notwithstanding*; so that the states denoted by this mood always imply some contingency, or some circumstance of uncertainty. Yet as they have not this power in themselves, but receive it from the words on which they depend, the forms of the indicative mood may be made to receive the same power, by depending on indefinites, or concessive, or conditional conjunctions; and of consequence the one mood or the other may be made to answer the same purpose.

Thus the expressions, *whosoever he be that said so*, and *whosoever he is that said so*, are equivalent; as likewise *although I be mistaken*, and *although I am mistaken*; and so of other instances.

SECTION XVIII.

Of the numbers and persons of verbs.

NUMBER and person which in verbs appear
Of forms definitive, serve to refer
To objects which the like distinctions bear.

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These are different terminations given to several forms of the definitive tenses, in order to shew what number and person the capital object bears in the subject on which the definitive verb depends. But this is shewn, in objects of the first and second persons both of the singular and plural number, by using, in English, the pronouns of the first and second person; as *I call*, *thou callest*, *we call*, *ye* or *you call*: and with verbs of the third person, either the pronouns *he*, *she*, *it*, or *they*, are actually mentioned, or the singular or plural name of some object is mentioned without any pronoun. And this omission of the pronoun shews that the object to which the verb is applied, is of the third person; as *he called*, *they called*, *James called*, *the boys called*, are expressions which equally shew that the objects to which the definitive verbs are applied, are of the third person, whilst the names themselves determine the number. So that difference of termination in the persons and numbers of English verbs, is not of absolute necessity. Hence the first person singular, and the three persons plural, have the same termination in almost all the English verbs; as *I—we—you—they call*. What is hitherto said of the distinction of number and person in verbs, relates to the indicative and potential moods; for the subjunctive forms have little or no variety of termination of number or person.

The

The imperative forms of the English verb are all of the second person singular or plural. For they all contain an expression of a state that the object is required to be in, to which a command, or entreaty, or exhortation, is addressed. This object is *the object spoken to*, and of consequence is always of the second person, and therefore the verbal form which expresses the state of the second person, must itself be of the second person. But the speaker may address an exhortation to himself, or to himself and others. If he does thus; himself, or himself and others, support two persons, viz. that of *the object speaking*, and that of *the object spoken to*. When this instance occurs, the sign *let* is applied to the object as *spoken to*, i. e. to the object as it is of the second person. This sign is considered as a verb transitive, and the name of the object, considered as of the first person, follows the verb in the accusative case; as *let me*, *let us*; and the verb which expresses the state of the same object, considered as of the first person, follows its name; as *let me consider*, *let us consider*. If the command, entreaty, or exhortation, is conceived to be of such a nature, that *the person spoken to* is to procure an object of the third person to be in some verbal state, the sign *let* is applied to the person spoken to, and the name of the object of the third person in the accusative case follows *let*; as *let him*, *let them*, *let the man*; and the verb which expresses the state of this object of the third person, follows its name; as *let him consider*, *let them consider*, *let the man consider*. But if the verbal state, to which the command, entreaty, or exhortation, has respect, is a state that the object to which the command, entreaty, or exhortation, is addressed, is only itself to be in, there is no need of the sign *let*, but it is sufficient to name the verb which expresses the state, as applied to the name of the second person in the nominative or vocative case; as *do you consider*, *o, sir, consider*; or to leave this name to be supplied by the demonstrative circumstance of *actually addressing the words of the command, entreaty, or exhortation*; as when the speaker looks at the person spoken to, and says, *consider* or *remember*; and so of other instances.

SECTION XXI.

Of the manner of composing the several grammatic forms of the English verbs.

THE composition of these forms is effected, partly by certain variations of the last syllables, and partly by prefixing other verbal forms as signs to some of the tenses.

The signs are the same in the same mood and tense in the same voice of every verb. So that if they are well observed and remembered in any one verb, they may be easily applied to any other.

The verb *to have* is the most simple of all the English verbs. And the verb *to be* is the most irregular. Most of the forms of these two verbs are used as signs of the tenses of the other verbs, so that when these forms are known, together with two, three, or, at most, four forms of any other verb, the conjugation of the other verb is also known through all its voices. These two verbs may therefore be considered as auxiliars to all the rest in English, as the verbs which correspond with these are considered, in all or most of the languages of Europe. The learner must, of consequence, make himself perfectly acquainted with these two verbs, before he proceeds to compose the forms of any other verb through its several voices: and on this account these auxiliar verbs are inserted in the first place.

The manner of conjugating the verb *to have*.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

	Present Tense.	† hath
Sing. <i>I have</i>	<i>thou hast</i>	<i>he has</i>
Plur. <i>we have</i>	† <i>ye</i> have	<i>they have</i>
	<i>you</i>	

First

First Preterite.

Sing. <i>I had</i>	<i>Thou hadst</i>	<i>He had</i>
Plur. <i>We had</i>	<i>You had</i>	<i>They had</i>

Second Preterite.

Sing. <i>I have had</i>	<i>Thou hast had</i>	<i>He has had</i>
Plur. <i>We have had</i>	<i>You have had</i>	<i>They have had</i>

Pluperfect.

Sing. <i>I had had</i>	<i>Thou hadst had</i>	<i>He had had</i>
Plur. <i>We had had</i>	<i>You had had</i>	<i>They had had</i>

First Future.

Sing. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} I \text{ shall} \\ I \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} Thou \text{ shalt} \\ Thou \text{ wilt} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} He \text{ shall} \\ He \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have
Plur. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} We \text{ shall} \\ We \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} You \text{ shall} \\ You \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} They \text{ shall} \\ They \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have

Second Future.

Sing. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} I \text{ shall} \\ I \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} Thou \text{ shalt} \\ Thou \text{ wilt} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} He \text{ shall} \\ He \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have had
Plur. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} We \text{ shall} \\ We \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} You \text{ shall} \\ You \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} They \text{ shall} \\ They \text{ will} \end{array} \right.$ have had

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Sing. <i>Let me have</i>	<i>Have thou</i>	<i>Let him have</i>
Plur. <i>Let us have</i>	<i>Have you</i>	<i>Let them have</i>

D d d

POTEN-

POTENTIAL MOOD.

Present Tense.

Sing.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} I \text{ may} \\ I \text{ can} \\ I \text{ must} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Thou mayst} \\ \textit{Thou canst} \\ \textit{Thou must} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{He may} \\ \textit{He can} \\ \textit{He must} \end{array} \right.$ have
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Plur.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{We may} \\ \textit{We can} \\ \textit{We must} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{You may} \\ \textit{You can} \\ \textit{You must} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{They may} \\ \textit{They can} \\ \textit{They must} \end{array} \right.$ have
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First Indefinite.

Sing.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} I \text{ might} \\ I \text{ could} \\ I \text{ should} \\ I \text{ would} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Thou mightst} \\ \textit{Thou couldst} \\ \textit{Thou shouldst} \\ \textit{Thou wouldst} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{He might} \\ \textit{He could} \\ \textit{He should} \\ \textit{He would} \end{array} \right.$ have
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Plur.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{We might} \\ \textit{We could} \\ \textit{We should} \\ \textit{We would} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{You might} \\ \textit{You could} \\ \textit{You should} \\ \textit{You would} \end{array} \right.$ have	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{They might} \\ \textit{They could} \\ \textit{They should} \\ \textit{They would} \end{array} \right.$ have
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The Preterite.

Sing.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} I \text{ may} \\ I \text{ can} \\ I \text{ must} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Thou mayst} \\ \textit{Thou canst} \\ \textit{Thou must} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{He may} \\ \textit{He can} \\ \textit{He must} \end{array} \right.$ have had
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Plur.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{We may} \\ \textit{We can} \\ \textit{We must} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{You may} \\ \textit{You can} \\ \textit{You must} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{They may} \\ \textit{They can} \\ \textit{They must} \end{array} \right.$ have had
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Second Indefinite.

Sing.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} I \text{ might} \\ I \text{ could} \\ I \text{ should} \\ I \text{ would} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Thou mightst} \\ \textit{Thou couldst} \\ \textit{Thou shouldst} \\ \textit{Thou wouldst} \end{array} \right.$ have had	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{He might} \\ \textit{He could} \\ \textit{He should} \\ \textit{He would} \end{array} \right.$ have had
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Plur.

Plur.	<i>We might</i>	<i>have had</i>		<i>You might</i>	<i>You could</i>	<i>have had</i>		<i>They might</i>	<i>They could</i>	<i>have had</i>	
	<i>We could</i>										
	<i>We should</i>										
	<i>We would</i>										
				<i>You would</i>				<i>They would</i>			

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD. *If*

Sing.	<i>I have</i>	<i>Thou have</i>	<i>He have</i>
Plur.	<i>We have</i>	<i>Thou have</i>	<i>They have</i>

First Preterite, as in the INDICATIVE.

Second Preterite.

Sing.	<i>I have had</i>	<i>Thou have had</i>	<i>He have had</i>
Plur.	<i>We have had</i>	<i>You have had</i>	<i>They have had</i>

The rest, as in the Indicative.

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Pref. *To have*—Pret. *To have had*—Fut. *To be about to have*.

Participle present. *Having*—Participle past. *Having had*.

Participle future. *Being about to have*.

It is to be observed on this verb thus conjugated, that so much of the several forms as is printed in Italicks, remains the same in every verb of the active voice. For the only difference between the verb *to have*, and other verbs of the active voice, is, that one of the roots of some other verb is used instead of the roots *have*, *had*, and *having*, in the several tenses in which these roots appear in the Roman characters.

The form † *hath* may be used instead of *has* on any solemn occasion, such as a sermon, or wheresoever it is intended to imitate

the title of the Scriptures; but on other occasions, *has* is to be used.

† *Ye* may be also used instead of *you* on any occasion of like nature with the former; but *you* is to be used on other occasions.

Any name of the singular number representing an object neither speaking and naming itself, nor an object to which the sentence is addressed, may be substituted instead of *he* in the third person singular of the verb. And any name of the plural number representing an object in the circumstances above-mentioned, may be substituted instead of *they*.

The forms, *to be about*, *being about*, which are set down in the future of the infinitive mood, and in the future participle, are little used at present; for the participle *going* is now commonly substituted instead of *about*; as, *to be going to have*, *being going to have*. But this is only in the language of conversation.

It is almost unnecessary to observe, that the whole present tense of the indicative mood of this verb constitutes the signs of the second preterite; and that the first preterite constitutes those of the pluperfect, and the first future those of the second future. And so in the potential mood, the present tense becomes the signs of the preterite, and the whole first indefinite becomes the signs of the second indefinite.

The manner of conjugating the verb *to be*.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Sing. I am	Thou art	He is
Plur. We are	You are	They are

First

First Preterite.

Sing. I was	Thou wast	He was
Plur. We were	You were	They were

Second Preterite.

Sing. I <i>have</i> been	Thou <i>hast</i> been	He <i>has</i> been
Plur. We <i>have</i> been	You <i>have</i> been	They <i>have</i> been

Pluperfect.

Sing. I <i>had</i> been	Thou <i>hadst</i> been	He <i>had</i> been
Plur. We <i>had</i> been	You <i>had</i> been	They <i>had</i> been

First Future.

Sing. { I <i>shall</i> be I <i>will</i> be	{ Thou <i>shalt</i> be Thou <i>wilt</i> be	{ He <i>shall</i> be He <i>will</i> be
Plur. { We <i>shall</i> be We <i>will</i> be	{ You <i>shall</i> be You <i>will</i> be	{ They <i>shall</i> be They <i>will</i> be

Second Future.

Sing. { I <i>shall</i> <i>have</i> been I <i>will</i> <i>have</i> been	{ Thou <i>shalt</i> <i>have</i> been Thou <i>shalt</i> <i>have</i> been	{ He <i>shall</i> <i>have</i> been He <i>will</i> <i>have</i> been
Plur. { We <i>shall</i> <i>have</i> been We <i>will</i> <i>have</i> been	{ You <i>shall</i> <i>have</i> been You <i>will</i> <i>have</i> been	{ They <i>shall</i> <i>have</i> been They <i>will</i> <i>have</i> been

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Sing. Let me be	be thou	Let him be
	† ye	
Plur. Let us be	be you	Let them be

POTENTIAL MOOD.

Present Tense.

Sing.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{I } \textit{may} \\ \text{I } \textit{can} \text{ be} \\ \text{I } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Thou } \textit{mayst} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{canst} \text{ be} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{He } \textit{may} \\ \text{He } \textit{can} \text{ be} \\ \text{He } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$
Plur.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{We } \textit{may} \\ \text{We } \textit{can} \text{ be} \\ \text{We } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{You } \textit{may} \\ \text{You } \textit{can} \text{ be} \\ \text{You } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{They } \textit{may} \\ \text{They } \textit{can} \text{ be} \\ \text{They } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$

First Indefinite.

Sing.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{I } \textit{might} \\ \text{I } \textit{could} \text{ be} \\ \text{I } \textit{should} \\ \text{I } \textit{would} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Thou } \textit{mightst} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{couldst} \text{ be} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{shouldst} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{wouldst} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{He } \textit{might} \\ \text{He } \textit{could} \text{ be} \\ \text{He } \textit{should} \\ \text{He } \textit{would} \end{array} \right.$
Plur.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{We } \textit{might} \\ \text{We } \textit{could} \text{ be} \\ \text{We } \textit{should} \\ \text{We } \textit{would} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{You } \textit{might} \\ \text{You } \textit{could} \text{ be} \\ \text{You } \textit{should} \\ \text{You } \textit{would} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{They } \textit{might} \\ \text{They } \textit{could} \text{ be} \\ \text{They } \textit{should} \\ \text{They } \textit{would} \end{array} \right.$

The Preterite.

Sing.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{I } \textit{may} \\ \text{I } \textit{can} \text{ have been} \\ \text{I } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Thou } \textit{mayst} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{canst} \text{ have been} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{He } \textit{may} \\ \text{He } \textit{can} \text{ have been} \\ \text{He } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$
Plur.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{We } \textit{may} \\ \text{We } \textit{can} \text{ have been} \\ \text{We } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{You } \textit{may} \\ \text{You } \textit{can} \text{ have been} \\ \text{You } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{They } \textit{may} \\ \text{They } \textit{can} \text{ have been} \\ \text{They } \textit{must} \end{array} \right.$

Second Indefinite.

Sing.	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{I } \textit{might} \\ \text{I } \textit{could} \text{ have been} \\ \text{I } \textit{should} \\ \text{I } \textit{would} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Thou } \textit{mightst} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{couldst} \text{ have been} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{shouldst} \\ \text{Thou } \textit{wouldst} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{He } \textit{might} \\ \text{He } \textit{could} \text{ have been} \\ \text{He } \textit{should} \\ \text{He } \textit{would} \end{array} \right.$
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Plur.	{	We <i>might</i>	{	You <i>might</i>	{	They <i>might</i>
		We <i>could</i>		You <i>could</i>		They <i>could</i>
		We <i>should have been</i>		You <i>should have been</i>		They <i>should have been</i>
		We <i>would</i>		You <i>would</i>		They <i>would</i>

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense. *If*

Sing. I be	Thou beest	He be
Plur. We be	You be	They be

First Preterite.

Sing. I were	Thou wert	He were
Plur. We were	You were	They were

Second Preterite.

Sing. I *have been*—Thou *have been*—He *have been*.

The rest of the mood the same as the Indicative.

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Pres. *To be*—Preterite. *To have been*—Future. *To be about to be*.

PARTICIPLES.

Pres. Being—Preterite. *Having been*—Future. *Being about to be*.

It is proper to observe here, that the signs of every mood and tense of the verb *to be*, are exactly the same with those of every active verb : and that there is no other difference (except in the two first tenses of the indicative mood, and in the subjunctive) between the verbs *to have* and *to be*, but this, viz. that in all the compound tenses

tenfes of the former, where *have* depends upon the figns; *be* in the latter depends upon the fame figns; and where *had* depends upon the figns of the former, *been* depends upon the fame figns of the latter; and where *having* is ufed in the former, *being* is ufed in the latter. So that in the verb *to be*, one whole tenfe does not become the figns of another tenfe, as happened in the verb *to have*: but fo much only of each tenfe of *to have* as is confidered as a fign (and is therefore printed in Italicks) remains with the fame tenfe of *to be*.

The whole of the forms of this verb, when thus conjugated, become themfelves the figns of the feveral tenfes of the paffive and middle voice of the Englifh verb, by a method of proceeding which will quickly appear by examples.

SECTION XX.

Of the roots of Englifh verbs.

BEFORE the other verbs can be conjugated, we muft know the capital or principal forms of each verb, which are one or other of them to be joined with the figns in all the compound tenfes, and two of which themfelves form the prefent and firft preterite of the indicative mood in the active voice. Thefe forms are four in each verb, and are called *the roots of the verb*, and contain all the varieties of termination which the Englifh verb admits of, except thofe of the perfons in the prefent and firft preterite of the indicative mood.

Three of thefe roots are found in the firft perfons fingular of the three firft tenfes of the indicative mood, when thefe perfons of the two firft tenfes are confidered without the pronoun *I*, and that of the third tenfe without the pronoun and the fign *have*. Thus in the verb *to call*, the firft perfons of the three firft tenfes are, *I call, I called, I have called*. Therefore the three roots of
this

this verb are *call*, *called*, *called*, and if to these we add *calling*, we have all the varieties of termination which this verb admits of, except in the second and third persons singular of the present, and the second person singular of the first preterite of the indicative mood. Two of the first three roots are the same words in this verb, viz. *called*, *called*, and are formed by adding the syllable *ed* to the first root *call*; and the fourth root is likewise formed from the first by adding the syllable *ing*, as *call*, *calling*. This manner of forming the roots of the verb may be considered as the regular manner; because so very many of the verbs observe it.

If a verb ends in a silent (*e*), as *to place*, *to grace*, the two following roots are formed by adding only a (*d*), and not the syllable (*ed*) to the first root; as *place*, *placed*; *grace*, *graced*. For the silent (*e*) becomes vocal when the (*d*) follows it; so that the syllable *ed* is by this means added to the first root. Yet we usually pronounce *pláced*—*gráced* as monosyllables; and so of other instances. But to form the root in *ing* from the first root of these verbs, the silent (*e*) of that root must be taken away, and the syllable *ing* added to the rest of it; as *place*—*placing*, not *placeing*; *grace*, *gracing*, not *graceing*.

The verbs of this formation may be also considered as regular; because the silent (*e*) is easily made vocal before the *d*: and it as easily appears, that it is no wise necessary to retain the silent (*e*) before the syllable *ing*; for the use of this (*e*) in English is only to give notice, that the syllable which precedes it is to be lengthened in pronunciation; and if this notice is given by the syllables *ed* and *ing*, the silent (*e*) is no longer necessary.

The syllable *ed* is often supplied by a *d* with the mark of elision, as *call'd*; and in some verbs by a *t*, without the mark, as *dress't* for *dressed*, &c. The verbs which admit of the contraction by *t*, end in *ch*, *ck*, *p*, *x*, *ll*, *fs*; as *fetch't*, *check't*, *tipt*, *fix't*, *dwelt*, *past*, &c.

If a verb end in a single vowel before a single consonant, and is either a monosyllable, or has the accent on the last syllable, the last consonant must be doubled in all the forms of the verb which have an additional syllable subjoined.

As, *to bar—barring—barred, to fit—fitting—fitted, to stir—stirring—stirred, &c.*

To beset—besetting, to regret—regretting—regretted, to aver—averring—averred, &c.

There are four thousand and about five hundred verbs in the English; and the roots of all of them, except about a hundred and fifty simple verbs with their compounds, form their roots in one of the manners above-mentioned. Therefore all the verbs, except the hundred and fifty above-mentioned with their compounds, may be considered as of one and the same regular conjugation of the following form.

SECTION XXI.

The regular conjugation in English, through all its voices.

To call. THE ACTIVE VOICE.

The roots of the verb. Call—called—called—calling.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Sing. I call	Thou callest	† calleth He calls
Plur. We call	† Ye You call	They call

First Preterite.

Sing. I called	Thou calledst	He called
Plur. We called	You called	They called

Second

Second Preterite.

Sing. I have	} called	Thou hast	} called	† hath	} called
Plur. We have		You have		He has	

Pluperfect.

Sing. I had	} called	Thou hadst	} called	He had	} called
Plur. We had		You had		They had	

First Future.

Sing. { I shall } { I will } Plur. { We shall } { We will }	} call	Thou shalt	} call	He shall	} call
		Thou wilt		He will	

Second Future.

Sing. { I shall have } { I will have } Plur. { We shall have } { We will have }	} called	Thou shalt have	} called	He shall have	} called
		Thou wilt have		He will have	

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Sing. Let me call	Call thou	Let him call
Plur. Let us call	Call you	Let them call

POTENTIAL MOOD.

Present Tense.

Sing.	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{I may} \\ \text{I can} \\ \text{I must} \end{array} \right\}$	} call	Thou mayst	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Thou canst} \\ \text{Thou must} \end{array} \right\}$	} call	He may	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{He can} \\ \text{He must} \end{array} \right\}$	} call
Plur.			You may			They may		
	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{We may} \\ \text{We can} \\ \text{We must} \end{array} \right\}$	} call	You can	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{You must} \end{array} \right\}$	} call	They can	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{They must} \end{array} \right\}$	} call
			You must			They must		

The first Indefinite.

Sing.	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{I might} \\ \text{I could} \\ \text{I should} \\ \text{I would} \end{array} \right\}$	} call	Thou mightst	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Thou couldst} \\ \text{Thou shouldst} \\ \text{Thou wouldst} \end{array} \right\}$	} call	He might	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{He could} \\ \text{He should} \\ \text{He would} \end{array} \right\}$	} call
Plur.			You might			They might		
	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{We might} \\ \text{We could} \\ \text{We should} \\ \text{We would} \end{array} \right\}$	} call	You could	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{You should} \\ \text{You would} \end{array} \right\}$	} call	They could	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{They should} \\ \text{They would} \end{array} \right\}$	} call
			You should			They should		
			You would			They would		

Preterite.

Sing.	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{I may have} \\ \text{I can have} \\ \text{I must have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called	Thou mayst have	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Thou canst have} \\ \text{Thou must have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called	He may have	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{He can have} \\ \text{He must have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called
Plur.			You may have			They may have		
	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{We may have} \\ \text{We can have} \\ \text{We must have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called	You can have	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{You must have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called	They can have	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{They must have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called
			You must have			They must have		

Second Preterite.

Sing.	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{I might have} \\ \text{I could have} \\ \text{I should have} \\ \text{I would have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called	Thou mightst have	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Thou couldst have} \\ \text{Thou shouldst have} \\ \text{Thou wouldst have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called	He might have	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{He could have} \\ \text{He should have} \\ \text{He would have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called
Plur.			You might have			They might have		
	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{We might have} \\ \text{We could have} \\ \text{We should have} \\ \text{We would have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called	You could have	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{You should have} \\ \text{You would have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called	They could have	$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{They should have} \\ \text{They would have} \end{array} \right\}$	} called
			You should have			They should have		
			You would have			They would have		

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

, Present Tense. *If*

Sing. I call	Thou call	He call
Plur. We call	You call	They call

The first Preterite as in the Indicative.

Second Preterite.

Sing. I have } called	Thou have } called	He have } called
Plur. We have }	You have }	They have }

The rest as in the Indicative.

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Pref. To call—Pret. To have called—Fut. To be about to call.

PARTICIPLES.

Pref. Calling—Pret. Having called—Fut. Being about to call.

The present and first Preterite of the Indicative Mood are also formed in the following manner.

Present.

Sing. I <i>do</i> call	Thou <i>dost</i> call	He <i>doth</i> call
Plur. We <i>do</i> call	You <i>do</i> call	They <i>do</i> call

First Preterite.

Sing. I <i>did</i> call	Thou <i>didst</i> call	He <i>did</i> call
Plur. We <i>did</i> call	You <i>did</i> call	They <i>did</i> call

And the second person of the Imperative Mood is likewise by *do*; as, *do thou* or *you* call. If

If the formation of this voice of the verb *to call* be well attended to, it will appear that it no way differs from the formation of the verb *to be*, except in the following particulars, viz. that the two first tenses of the indicative mood are composed of forms which are derived from the roots *call*, *called*, of the verb itself. And that in all the other forms, where *be* is used in the verb *to be*, *call* is used in the verb *to call*; but where *been* is used in the verb *to be*, *called* is used in the verb *to call*; and where *being* is used in the verb *to be*, *calling* is used in the verb *to call*. Likewise in all the compound tenses of the active voice of every other verb, the signs of the several tenses remain the same, and nothing more is done but placing one of the roots of another verb after these signs, in order to conjugate this other verb through all the compound tenses of this voice.

INDICATIVE MOOD. THE PASSIVE VOICE.

Present Tense.

Sing. I am	} called	Thou art	} called	He is	} called
Plur. We are		You are		They are	

First Preterite.

Sing. I was	} called	Thou wast	} called	He was	} called
Plur. We were		You were		They were	

Second Preterite.

Sing. I have been	} called	Thou hast been	} called	He has been	} called
				They have been	
Plur. We have been		You have been		They have been	

Pluperfect.

Sing. I had been	} called	Thou hadst been	} called	He had been	} called
Plur. We had been		You had been		They had been	

First

First Future.

Sing.	{ I shall be }	{ Thou shalt be }	{ He shall be }	} } called
	{ I will be }	{ Thou wilt be }	{ He will be }	
Plur.	{ We shall be }	{ You shall be }	{ They shall be }	
	{ We will be }	{ You will be }	{ They will be }	

Second Future.

Sing.	{ I shall have been }	{ Thou shalt have been }	{ He shall have been }	} } called
	{ I will have been }	{ Thou wilt have been }	{ He will have been }	
Plur.	{ We shall have been }	{ You shall have been }	{ They shall have been }	
	{ We will have been }	{ You will have been }	{ They will have been }	

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Sing.	Let me be }	Be thou }	Let him be }	} } called
Plur.	Let us be }	Be you }	Let me be }	

POTENTIAL MOOD.

Present Tense.

Sing.	{ I may be }	{ Thou mayst be }	{ He may be }	} } called
	{ I can be }	{ Thou canst be }	{ He can be }	
	{ I must be }	{ Thou must be }	{ He must be }	
Plur.	{ We may be }	{ You may be }	{ They may be }	
	{ We can be }	{ You can be }	{ They can be }	} } called
	{ We must be }	{ You must be }	{ They must be }	

First Preterite.

Sing.	{ I might be }	{ Thou mightst be }	{ He might be }	} } called
	{ I could be }	{ Thou couldst be }	{ He could be }	
	{ I should be }	{ Thou shouldst be }	{ He should be }	
	{ I would be }	{ Thou wouldst be }	{ He would be }	
Plur.	{ We might be }	{ You might be }	{ They might be }	} } called
	{ We could be }	{ You could be }	{ They could be }	
	{ We should be }	{ You should be }	{ They should be }	
	{ We would be }	{ You would be }	{ They would be }	

The Preterite.

Sing.	{	I may have been	}	called	{	Thou mayst have been	}	called	{	He may have been	}	called
		I can have been				Thou canst have been				He can have been		
		I must have been				Thou must have been				He must have been		
Plur.	{	We may have been	}	called	{	You may have been	}	called	{	They may have been	}	called
		We can have been				You can have been				They can have been		
		We must have been				You must have been				They must have been		

Second Indefinite.

Sing.	{	I might have been	}	called	{	Thou mightst have been	}	called	{	He might have been	}	called
		I could have been				Thou couldst have been				He could have been		
		I should have been				Thou shouldst have been				He should have been		
Plur.	{	I would have been	}	called	{	Thou wouldst have been	}	called	{	He would have been	}	called
		We might have been				You might have been				They might have been		
		We could have been				You could have been				They could have been		
	{	We should have been	}	called	{	You should have been	}	called	{	They should have been	}	called
		We would have been				You would have been				They would have been		

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense. *If*

Sing. I be	} called	Thou beest	} called	He be	} called
Plur. We be		You be		They be	

First Preterite.

Sing. I were	} called	Thou wert	} called	He were	} called
Plur. We were		You were		They were	

Second Preterite.

Sing. I have been	}	called	Thou have been	}	called	He have been	}	called
Plur. We have been			You have been			They have been		

The rest of the tenses as in the Indicative.

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Present—To be called. Preterite—To have been called.
 Future—To be about to be called.

PARTICIPLES.

Present—Being called. Preterite—Having been called.
 Future—Being about to be called.

It is apparent, that the whole conjugation of the verb *to be*, becomes the signs of the tenses of the English passive verb; and that in the instance of the verb *to call*, these signs, in all the tenses, not only give notice of the times to which each tense relates, but likewise of the nature of the state that is signified by the root *called*. For the word *called*, in the active voice, signifies a state of action; as, *I called, I have called, &c.*; but in this voice, by the help of different signs, it signifies a passive state, that corresponds with the states of action that are expressed by the several active forms of the verb *to call*.

It is the same in all the regular verbs, viz. the same word which has an active sense in the first preterite, and all the compound past, or perfect tenses of the active voice, is applied through the whole passive voice in a passive signification, by the means of the forms of the verb *to be*. Thus, *I loved—I have loved—I had loved—I shall have loved—I may—I must—might—could—would—should have loved*, are active expressions; but *I am—was—have been—had been—shall have been—may be—must be—might have been—must have been loved*, are all passive expressions. This word, which bears both an active and passive signification by the means of different signs, ends in *ed* in all the regular verbs.

Of the middle voice.

THERE is no occasion to draw out this voice at large; for, in order to compose its several tenses through all the moods,

F f f

nothing

nothing more is necessary than to take the participle in *ing*, of any verb, and to place it behind the several forms of the verb *to be*; as, *I am calling—I was calling—I have been calling—I had been calling*, &c. So that the middle voice differs in nothing from the passive, except in the different root that is used in composing its several tenses.

Before the irregular verbs can be conjugated, their roots must be known; and as the knowledge of these roots can only be acquired by memory, I have reduced them, in the following section, to several classes, in order to assist the learner in remembering them the more easily, by having those which form their roots nearly in the same manner placed all together in one class.

Observe, that the first root is called *the imperfect root*; the second, *the indefinite*; and the third, *the perfect root*. There is no difficulty in the formation of the fourth root, or participle, in *ing*; because it is composed in the irregular verbs as it is in the regulars, viz. by adding the syllable *ing* to the first or imperfect root, if that root does not end in a silent (*e*), and if it does, by removing the (*e*) and adding *ing* to the rest of the imperfect root. Thus, *seek* is the imperfect root of the irregular verb *to seek*, and the fourth root is *seeking*; and *give* is the imperfect root of the irregular verb *to give*, and as this root ends in a silent (*e*) the fourth root is *giving*, not *giveing*. As therefore this root is formed in the same manner in all sorts of verbs, there is no occasion to take notice of its formation amongst the roots of the irregular verbs.

It is likewise to be observed, that verbs ending with a single consonant preceded by a single vowel, and, if of more than one syllable, having the accent on the last syllable, double the consonant in every part of the verb in which a syllable is added; as *to stir, stirring, stirred*; *to remit, remitting, remitted*, &c.

SECTION XXII.

Of the formation of the roots of the English irregular verbs.

THESE verbs may be reduced to five principal classes.

The first class consists of verbs in which *all the roots are the same.*

The second, of verbs in which *the second and third roots, (i. e. the indefinite and perfect roots)* are the same, but are not formed by *ed*, as in the regular verbs.

The third, of verbs in which *the third root* is derived from *the second*; i. e. in which *the perfect root* is not the same with *the indefinite root*, but is nevertheless deduced from it.

The fourth, of verbs in which *the first and third roots* are the same, i. e. in which *the imperfect and perfect roots* are the same.

The fifth, of verbs in which *the third root* is derived from *the first*, i. e. in which *the perfect root* is not the same with *the imperfect root*, but is nevertheless deduced from it.

The second class is by much the largest, and therefore it will be convenient to reduce the verbs which it contains to inferior classes, consisting of such verbs as are nearly the same with each other in the change or addition of letters in the formation of their roots.

The verbs of the **FIRST CLASS**, *i. e.* in which *the three roots are the same words*, are thirteen in number, as follows:

The form remains unvaried, which is plac'd
In the three roots of *hit*, *cut*, *cost*, and *cast*;
The like obtains in *hurt*, and *knit*, and *split*,
Likewise in *let*, *put*, *set*, *shed*, *shut*, and *slit*.

Imperfect root.	Indefinite.	Perfect root.
cast	cast	cast
cost	cost	cost
cut	cut	cut
hit	hit	hit
hurt	hurt	hurt
knit	knit	knit
split	split	split
let	let	let
put	put	put
set	set	set
shed	shed	shed
shut	shut	shut
slit.	slit.	slit.

As the verbs of this class all end in *t*, or *d*, as the indefinite and perfect roots of the regular verbs do, it has been thought unnecessary to add to, or alter their termination in any of their roots.

The verbs of the **SECOND CLASS**, in which the second and third roots are both alike, may be reduced to four inferior classes or sorts.

The following verbs have the establish'd claim,
To *second* and *third* roots which are the same.
But most of these the form by *ed* forsake,
Which regulars so very num'rous take.

First

First fort, in which the final letters of all the roots remain the same; the second and third roots being formed by the change of one vowel for another, or by substituting the short sound of the same vowel instead of its long sound, or by other alterations which do not affect the last letters of the roots.

Stand—stood; *hang—hung*; and *hang'd*; but *lead* has *lead*;
Read—Read; *sprēad—sprēad*; *bleed—bled*; and *breed* has *bred*;
Whilst feed and *speed* have roots in *fed* and *sped*.
Meet—met; *bide* and *abide* in *bode*; *bind—bound*;
Find, grind, and wind, have *found*, and *ground*, and *wound*;
Digged and *d'g*, as roots from *dig* are found.
Stick—stuck; *swim—†swam*, and *swum*; *†slang—flung*, from *fling*;
 So *cling, ring, sing, sling, spring, sting, string, swing, wring*,
 Have roots in *†ang*, and *ung*. *†Began—begun*,
 Come from *begin*. So *spin* has *†span* and *spun*;
Shine—shined—stone; and *win* has *†wan* and *won*.
 Or *†drank*, or *drunk*, appear as roots from *drink*;
 And of like forms from *sink, slink, shrink, and stink*.

Stand—st-ood—st-ood
 Hang—h-ung—h-ung
 -anged—anged
 L-ead—l-ed—l-ed
 Rēad—r-ēad—r-ēad
 Spr-ead—spr-ēad—spr-ēad
 Bl-eed—bl-ed—bl-ed
 Br-eed
 F-eed
 Sp-eed
 M-eet—m-et—m-et
 B-ide—b-ode—b-ode
 Ab-ide
 B-ind—b-ound—b-ound

F-ind
 Gr-ind
 W-ind
 -digged—digged
 Dig—dug—dug
 St-ick—st-uck—st-uck
 †-am
 Sw-im—sw-um—sw-um
 Fl-ing—fl-ung—fl-ung
 -ang †
 Cl-ing
 R-ing
 S-ing
 Sl-ing

Spr-ing

Spr-ing

St-ing

Str-ing

Sw-ing

Wr-ing

†-an

Beg-in—be-gun—be-gun

Sp-in

†-an

W-in—w-on—w-on

Sh-ine—sh-one—sh-one

†-ined—†-ined

Dr-ink—dr-unk—dr-unk

S-ink

Sl-ink

Shr-ink

St-ink.

The verbs of this sort are thirty-eight in number.

Second sort of the SECOND CLASS of irregular verbs, consisting of such as form their second and third roots, merely by changing the final consonant of the first root from *d* to *t*.

Build, lend, rend, send, and spend, their final *d*,
In both the other roots, change to a *t*.

These verbs are five in number.

Buil-d—buil-t—built

Len-d—len-t—lent

Ren-d—ren-t—rent

Sen-d—sen-t—sent

Spend—spen-t—spent.

Third sort of the SECOND CLASS of irregular verbs, consisting of such as both change the intermediate vowels, and add the letter *d*, or *t*, to the end of their second or third roots; or in which some consonants in the final syllable are changed to a *d*.

Make, made; have, had; pay, paid; say, said; leave, left;
Mean, meant, reave, and bereave, have roots in *reft*;
Tell, told; sell, sold. *Deal* forms its roots in *dealt*;
And flee has fled; and feel has roots in felt.

Crept, kept, and slept, proceed from *creep, keep, sleep*,
And *swept, and wept*, descend from *sweep and weep*.
Clothe, cloth'd, and clad; *shoe, shoe'd, and shod*, becomes,
And *lose* in *lost*, its radicals assumes.

M-ake, m-ade, m-ade.	F-eel, f-elt, f-elt.
H-ave, h-ad, h-ad.	F-lee, f-led, f-led.
P-ay, p-aid, p-aid.	Cr-eeep, cr-ept, cr-ept.
S-ay, f-aid, f-aid.	K-eeep, ept, ept.
M-ēan, m-ěant, m-ěant.	Sl-eeep.
L-eave, l-eft, l-eft.	Sw-eeep.
-eav'd, eaved.	W-eeep.
R-eave, r-eft, r-eft,	Cl-othe, cl-othed, cl-othed.
Be-reave.	Cl-ad, cl-ad.
T-ell, t-old, t-old.	Sh-oe, sh-od, sh-od.
S-ell.	Sho-ed, sho-ed.
D-ēal, d-ěalt, d-ěalt.	Lo-se, lo-ft, lo-ft.

Twenty-one in number.

The fourth sort of irregular verbs of the SECOND CLASS, in which the second and third roots are formed by *ught*, the *u* making the latter vowel of a diphthong. The verbs of this sort are eight in number.

Teach, taught; *beseech, beseeched, and besought*,
Seek, sought; *buy, bought*; *fight, fought*; and *bring* has *brought*,
And *think* has *thought*; and *work* has *work'd* and *wrought*. }

T-each, t-ought, t-ought.	Fi-ght, f-ought, f-ought.
-eeched, -eeched.	Br-ing, br-ought, br-ought.
Bef-eech, bef-ought, bef-ought,	Th-ink, th-ought, th-ought.
S-eeek, f-ought, f-ought.	-orked; -orked.
B-uy, b-ought, b-ought.	W-ork, w-rought, w-rought,

The **THIRD CLASS** of irregular verbs, in which the third, or perfect root, is not the same with the second, or indefinite root, but is nevertheless derived from it.

Upon the following verbs three roots attend,
And from their *second roots*, the *third* descend.

Lay, laid, and lain ; † *brake, broken, broke*, from *break* ;
So † *spake, spoke, spoken*, all descend from *speak*.
Steal, stole, and stolen ; † *bare, bore, born*, from *bear* ;
Share, shore, shorn, † *sware, swore, sworn*, from *shear* and *swear* ; }
Tare, tore, torn, † *ware, wore, worn*, from *tear*, and *wear*. }
† *Clave, cleft, clove, cloven*, are the roots from *cleave*, }
*Hove, heaved, * hoven*, all descend from *heave* ; }
Wove, weaved, woven, are deduc'd from *weave*. }
Swell, swell'd, and † swollen ; *tread, trode, trodden, trod* ;
Get, † gat, got, gotten ; † *seeth, seethed, and † sod*,
And *sodden* ; *lie, lay, lain* ; *stride, strode, and strid*,
And *stridden* ; *bide*, in *bidden* forms, and *b.id* ; }
So *slide, slid, slidden* ; *ride, rode, ridden, rid* ; }
Bite, bit, and bitten ; *write, writ, written, wrote* ;
Choose, chose, and chosen ; *shoot, † shotten, and shot*.

L-ay, l-aid, l-aid,	-are. †
-ain.	Sh-ear,
†-ake.	Sh-ore, sho-rn.
Br-eak, br-oke, -oke.	-are. †
Br-oken.	Sw-ear,
†-ake.	Sw-ore, -orn.
Sp-eak, sp-oke, oke.	-are. †
Sp-oken.	T-ear,
St-eal, st-ole, st-ole,	T-ore, -orn.
-olen.	-are. †
-are. †	W-ear.
B-ear,	W-ore, orn.
Bare, -orn.	

* *Hove* and *Hoven* are of doubted authority.

Cl-eave,

-ave. †	-ode.
Cl-eave, -eft, -eft.	Str-ide,
Cl-ove, -oven.	Str-ide, -id.
-eaved, -eaved.	Str-idden.
H-eave,	H-ide, -id, -id.
H-ove, -oven.	H-idden.
-eaved, -eaved.	Sl-ide, -id, -id.
W-eave,	Sl-idden.
-ove.	-ode, -ode.
W-ove, -oven.	R-ide,
-ode, -od.	-id, -id.
Tr-ead,	R-idden.
Tr-od, -odden.	B-ite, -it, -it.
Sw-ell, -elled, -elled.	B-bitten.
Sw-ollen. †	-ote, -ote.
-at. †	Wr-ite,
G-et,	-it, -it.
Got, -ot,	Written.
-otten.	Ch-oose, -ose, -ose.
-eethed, -eethed.	Ch-osen.
S-eeth,	Sh-oot, -ot, -ot.
S-od, -od.	Sh-otten.
S-odden.	
L-ie, -ay.	
L-ain.	

Twenty-five in number.

The FOURTH CLASS of irregular verbs, in which the third or perfect root is the same with the first or imperfect root.

In *come, came, come*, and *run, ran, run*, the word Which is the first root, also is the third.

These are but two in number,

C-ome, c-ame, c-ome;

R-un, r-an, r-un;

G g g

but

but they have several compounds, such as *become*, *overcome*, *out-run*, *overrun*, &c.

The FIFTH CLASS of irregular verbs, in which the third or perfect root is not the same with the first or imperfect root, but is nevertheless derived from it.

Verbs of the following class, by settled use,
From their *first radical*, the third deduce.

Dare—*dared*—*durst*, *forfaken* and *forfook*,
Come from *forfake*; so *take*—*taken* and *took*;
Wake, *waked*—† *woke* and *waken*; so *awake*;
Grave, *graved*—† *graven*; *fall*, *fell*—*fallen*, take;
Eat, *eat* and *eaten*; *beat*, *beaten* and *beat*.
So † *sweaten*—*sweat* and *sweated* come from *sweat*;
Bid, *bad*—*bid*—*bidden*, *sitten*—*sat* from *sit*;
So † *spat*—*spit*—*spitted* are derived from *spit*;
Smite, *smote* and *smitten*; *rise*, *arise*, have *rose*
And *risen*; *give* in *gave* and *given* shows
Its roots. But *riv'd* and *riven* come from *rive*;
† *Drive*—*drove* and *driven* are the roots from *drive*.
Thus † *shrive* has † *shrove* and † *shriven*; *strive* has *strove*
And *striven*; likewise *thrive*, *thriven* and *throve*;
Hold, *beld* and *bolden*; *do* has *did* and *done*;
And *go* has *went*, from † *wend*; and likewise *gone*;
Bursten from *burst*, or else it's roots alike;
Help, † *holpt* and † *holpen*; † *stricken*—*struck* from *strike*.

-ared.

T-ake, -ook.

D-are, -urst. D-ared.

T-aken.

-ook.

W-ake, -aked, -ked,

Forf-ake,

-oke. W-aken.

Forf-aken.

Aw-ake.

Gr-ave,

Saved, -aved.	Ar-ise.
Gr-ave,	G-ive, -ave.
Gr-avon.	Given.
F-all, -ell.	R-ive, -ived.
Fallen.	R-iven.
E-at, e-at.	-ave. †
E-aten.	Dr-ive,
B-eāt, -eāt, -eāt.	-ove, -ove.
B-eāten.	Driven.
-eāt.	Shr-ive, -ove.
Sw-eat,	Shr-iven.
-eāted, -eāted.	Str-ive, -ove.
Sw-eaten. †	Stri-ven.
-ad.	Thrive, -ove.
B-id,	Thr-iven.
-id, -id.	D-o, -id.
B-idden.	D-one.
S-it, f-at.	G-o, went.
S-itten.	G-one.
-at. †	H-old, -eld -eld.
Sp-it,	H-olden.
-it. Sp-it,	B-urft, -urft, -urft.
-itted.	B-urften.
-ote, -ote.	Help, -elped, -elped.
Sm-ite.	-elpt. † H-olpen.
Sm-itten.	Str-ike, -uck, -uck.
R-ife, -ofe.	Str-icken.
R-ifen.	

Twenty-eight in number.

The following verbs are of this fifth class, but are placed by themselves on account of the analogy by which the most of them form their second or indefinite root, which is not observed in other verbs.

*Slay, slew and slain ; see, saw and seen ; fly, flew
And flown ; whilst draw as roots has drawn and drew ;
Saw, sawed—sawn ; hew, hewed—hewn ; and show,
Showed and shown. But blow, crow, grow, know, throw,
Of roots which end in -ew and -own allow.*

Sl-ay, -ew, -ain.	Cr-ow.
S-ee, -aw, -een.	Gr-ow.
Fl-y, -ew, -own.	Kn-ow.
Dr-aw, -ew, -awn.	Thr-ow.
S-aw, -awed, -awn.	Sh-ow, -owed, own,
H-ew, -ewed, -ewn.	or
Bl-ow, -ew, -own.	Sh-ew, -ewed, -ewn.

Twelve in number.

When these roots of the irregular verbs are known, the formation of the several tenses of all the voices is very easy.

*The present and the future both receive
TH' IMPERFECT ROOT in the infinitive.
In the indicative, their forms to make,
The simple present and first future take
Th' imperfect root ; (and the first pret'rite too,
And present when complex, or form'd by did and do.)
TH' IMPERFECT ROOT must it's assistance lend,
And ev'ry form imperative attend.
In the potential present tense you find,
And in the first indefinite subjoin'd,
TH' IMPERFECT ROOT, and this alone you take,
When the subjunctive present tense you make.*

TH' INDEFINITE, or SECOND ROOT will give
The simple pret'rite of th' indicative.

In ev'ry mood to each remaining tense
THE PERFECT ROOT maintains it's just pretence.

You

You *the first participle* constitute
By *ing* subjoin'd to *the imperfect root* ;
But if a silent *e* the root shall close,
Ing us'd without the *e* must then the form compose.

The first or imperfect root with the sign *to* before it, makes the present tense of the infinitive mood of the active voice ; as, *to see* ; and the future of the same mood with *to be about to* before it ; as, *to be about to be*. The same root is used in the present of the indicative of this voice without any sign ; as, *I see* ; and in the first future with the signs *shall* and *will* ; as, *I shall see, I will see*. The whole imperative mood is likewise formed by this root ; as, *let me see, see or see thou, let him see, let us see, see you, let them see*. The present and first indefinite of the potential mood are formed by the same root ; as, *I may—can see, I might—could see* ; and so is the present of the subjunctive ; as, *if I see*. The forms by *do* and *did* also require the first root ; as *I do see, I did see, do you see*.

The second or indefinite root is only used in the first preterite of the active voice ; as, *I saw*.

The third or perfect root is used in all the other tenses of this voice, viz. in the second preterite and pluperfect, and second future of the indicative, the preterite and second indefinite of the potential, the second preterite of the subjunctive, and the preterite of the infinitive ; as, *I have seen, I had seen, I shall have seen, I may have seen, I might—could have seen, if I have seen, to have seen*.

The participle present is the fourth root, and is formed by subjoining *ing* to the first ; as *seeing* ; only if a silent *e* ends the root, it must be removed, and *ing* subjoined to the remainder ; as, *give, giving, not giveing*.

The PERFECT ROOT on *have* depending plac'd
Supplies *the active participle past*.

A future

A future form (but seldom us'd) you see

In the IMPERFECT ROOT join'd with *about to be*.

The participle preterite is the third or perfect root with *having* before it; as, *having seen*. The future participle is the first root with *about to*, or *being about to*, before it; as, *about to see*, *being about to see*. But this participle, as likewise the future tense of the infinitive mood, is little used.

The whole passive voice is formed by subjoining the third root to the forms of the verb *to be*;

As, *I am seen, I was seen, I have been seen, &c.*

The whole middle voice is formed by subjoining the fourth root, *i. e.* the participle in *ing*, to the forms of the verb *to be*;

As, *I am seeing, I was seeing, I have been seeing, &c.*

As to the formation of the persons of the verb, there is nothing to be observed, except that the simple present and simple first preterite of the active voice, form the second person singular, by subjoining the syllable *est*, or the letters *st*, to the first person; as from *call*, *callest* or *call'st*; from *called*, *calledst*; from *give*, *givest* or *giv'st*; from *gave*, *gavest* or (*gav'st* pronounced as a monosyllable.)

The two first tenses of th' indicative

From the first person singular receive

Their second singular; which is express'd

By joining to the first *-t* or *est*.

The third person singular of the simple present tense was anciently formed from the first, by subjoining the syllable *eth*; as from *call*, *calletb*; but this form is now disused, except in the solemn style of the Scripture, and the third person of this tense is formed from the first by the same proceeding which is used in

forming the plurals of noun substantives from the singulars. But there are few verbs which end either in a single *f* or in *f* followed by a silent *e*, and in those the *f* is retained, as *I chafe*, *he chafes*.

Th' analogy by plural forms pursu'd
Of substantives, you find in verbs renew'd.
For the *third persons* sing'lar, which we give
To the first tense of the indicative,
In multitudes of verbs; by *s* subjoin'd
Without encrease of syllables, you'll find
Flow from *the first*. By *es*, if silent *e*
Before it has an *s*, *x*, *c*, or *g*;
Y final, not in diphthongs us'd, supplies
This person by the termination *ies*;
C-b, *s*, *f-b*, *x*, and *z* encrease
This person from the first, by each assuming *es*.

- As, 1. *I call*, *he calls*; *I stand*, *he stands*, &c.
2. *I raise*, *he raises*; *I blaze—piece—forge*, *he blazes—pieces—
forges*.
3. *I fly—try—tarry—burry*, *he flies—tries—tarries—burries*.
4. *I teach—pass—wash—vex—buzz*, *he teaches—passes—washes
—vexes—buzzes*.

S E C T I O N XXIII.

Of the adverb.

BY farther circumstance to ascertain
What verbs, or adjectives in part explain,
Dependent adverbs are by use applied,
While substantives refuse to be so modified.

Adverbs denote certain circumstances to be united with what is partly expressed by some verb or adjective, and not with what is partly expressed by a substantive. The

The property of depending on verbs and adjectives, so as to unite with what is partly signified by them, is the principal mark by which far the greatest number of adverbs can be known from a substantive in some oblique case, or in dependance on some preposition; particularly the adverbs which end in *ly*, and are derived from adjectives, which adjectives are themselves derived from substantives. These adverbs are exceedingly numerous in English; for almost every adjective has such an adverb derived from it. Thus, from *admiration* a substantive, we have *admirable* an adjective, and *admirably* an adverb; from *affection*, *affectionate*, *affectionately*; and so of other instances. These adverbs are all of them equivalent in meaning to some oblique case of the substantive from which each of them descends, or to this substantive in dependance on a preposition. Thus, *to perform admirably*, is of the same import with *to perform to admiration*; and *to be affectionately dutiful*, with *to be dutiful from affection*; and so of any other adverb of this class. There is also a considerable number of English adverbs not ending in *ly*, each of which is nevertheless equivalent to some noun substantive (either single or with other words) in dependance upon a preposition; and as it may be of use to the learner to have a list of these drawn out together, I have subjoined such a list. But there are likewise several sorts of adverbs which are not equivalent each to a substantive depending on a preposition; I have therefore placed each of these sorts by themselves in what follows, and have given a short account of the nature of each sort.

A list of adverbs which do not end in ly, and which yet are each of them equivalent to some substantive (either single or with other words) depending on a preposition.

Abed, in some bed; *aboard*, within the limits of some ship; *abreast*, with the breast in the same line; *abroad*, in or into some place of large extent; *abroach*, in the state *broached*; *across*, in the

the state *crossing*; *adrift*, in the state *driving* or floating at random; *adry*, in the state of thirst; *afar*, at a great distance; † *asfeld*, to the field; *asflat*, on a level; *asfloat*, in the state *floating*; *asfoot*, on the feet; *afresh*, in a manner similar to the first; *afront*, in front, or in the state *directly fronting*; *again*, by repetition; *agape*, in the state *gaping*; *agast*, in the state *gasted*, or violently affrighted; *agog*, in a state of eager impatience from desire; *aground*, on the ground; *alike*, in a state of likeness; *alive*, in the state *living*; *all*, in every part or respect; *almost*, nearly in every part or respect; *aloft*, in some high situation; *alone*, singly; *along*, in a situation or direction estimated by length; *along with*, in the state *accompanying*; *aloof*, at a distance; *aloud*, with a loud sound; *altogether*, in every respect; *always*, at all times; *amain*, with violence; *amiss*, in a wrong manner; *amort*, in deadness of spirits; *anights*, at, or in a succession of nights; *ever and anon*, or *every now and then*, constantly by intervals of time; *apace*, with speed; *apart*, at a distance; *apeak*, on the point, spoken only of an anchor; *apiece*, each one considered by itself; *aright*, in a right manner; *arow*, in one row; *ashore*, on the shore; *aside*, to one side; *askance*, in an oblique direction; *askew*, out of the direct line of vision; *aslant*, in a direction not perpendicular; *asleep*, in, or into the state *sleeping*; *aslope*, in the state *sloping*; *asquint*, in the state *squinting*; *astern*, on, or towards the stern or hinder part of a ship; *astray*, in the state *straying*; *astride*, in the state *striding*; *asunder*, in the state *separated*; *athirst*, in a state of thirst; *atilt*, in the posture *tilting* (or *being tilted*, when spoken of a barrel;) *atop*, on, or at the top; *aware*, in a state of attention; *away*, at, or to some distance; *awhile*, during some short time; *awry*, in an oblique direction.

Back, in a state or direction contrary to the state *advancing* or *advanced*; *backward* or *backwards*, towards whatsoever is considered as behind; *before*, in time, place, or situation more forward; *behindhand*, in a backward situation; *belike*, in all appear-

ance ; *betime*, or *betimes*, before much time spent ; *to boot*, by way of overplus.

Downward, or *downwards*, to a lower situation.

Early, the same as *betimes* ; *elsewhere*, in place different from what is mentioned ; *endwise*, on one end ; *enough*, in a sufficient quantity or degree ; *ere* and *† or ever*, sooner than ; *ever*, at any time, or at all times ; *forever*, or *evermore*, eternally.

Far, at or to a great distance ; *fain*, gladly ; *fast*, immovably, closely, or swiftly ; *forth*, out of ; *† forthright*, straight forwards ; *forward* or *forwards*, towards something that is before.

Headlong, with the head foremost ; *homeward*, towards home ; *however*, or *howsoever*, in any manner, degree, situation, or circumstance, which may be assumed or supposed.

Indeed, what must be allowed as really true.

Just, so and no otherwise.

At large, in a diffuse manner ; *at last*, in the conclusion ; *at least*, taking things in the very lowest degree ; *lest*, in order to prevent ; *lief*, or *lieve*, willingly, used in the expression *I had as lief*, i. e. *I would* with equal willingness ; *longways*, or *longwise*, in the direction of length.

Needs, of necessity ; *neither*, not even, or, nor even ; *never*, in no time, or, in no degree ; *never so good—wise*, &c. good or wise in a degree at no time to be exceeded ; *ever so good—wise*, &c. good or wise in as great a degree as can at any time be assumed or imagined ; *next*, at some time immediately succeeding ; *no where*, not in any place.

Of, or *often*, at many times ; *once—twice—thrice*, at one, two, three periods of time ; *onward*, in progression ; *otherwise*, in any or some different manner or respect ; *out*, in a state of disclosure, exhaustion, or extinction ; *outright*, without delay or restraint ; *outward*, or *outwards*, to the outer part.

Perforce, by violence ; *perhaps*, it may be ; *pretty*, in some tolerable degree ; *as, pretty well—good*, &c.

Quick,

Quick, with readiness; *quite*, in every point or respect.

Sidelong, or *sideways*, towards one side; *soon*, in a little time; *so*, with vehemence attended with pain or distress; *sound*, only used of sleep, meaning as in a state of perfect health; *still*, uninterruptedly; *straight*—*straightway*, or *straightways*, directly, or without delay.

Through, from one extreme limit to the other; *thoroughout*, quite through; *together*, without separation or intermission; *together with*, in union or connexion with.

Verbatim, word for word; *very*, in an eminent degree.

Unawares, without warning, or without considering; *upward* or *upwards*, toward that which is higher.

Within, in the interior parts; *without*, in the outer parts.

The remaining adverbs of the English language may be reduced to five classes, which I shall take the liberty to call the **NEGATIVE**, the **REDDITIVE**, the **RELATIVE**, the **DEMONSTRATIVE**, and the **CONJUNCTIVE**.

THE NEGATIVE ADVERB

Not.

THIS adverb is used to give notice, that the mind considers what is represented by a verb or adjective as never begun, or as quite destroyed; or that what is denoted by a substantive is to be considered as exterminated or removed from the rest of the conceptions contained in a series of connected words. Thus, *not to be* expresses the state *to be* as never begun, or as destroyed; and *not good* expresses the quality *good* as without existence; and *John and not James told me this*, shews that *James* is to be exterminated or removed from the conception expressed by *John and James told me this*; and so of other instances.

REDDITIVE ADVERBS

Ay, yes, no.

THESE are applied as answers in return to questions asked by way of supposition. *Ay* or *yes* shews the affirmative to be true, *no* the negative.

Thus if I say, *is the work done?* I want to be informed which of the suppositions, *the work is done*, *the work is not done*, is true. The answer by *ay* or *yes* shews that the first is true; the answer by *no* that the second is so. See the Speculative Grammar, Book III. Chap. IV. for a more full account of this subject.

RELATIVE ADVERBS.

These are *when*, *why*, *wherefore*, *how*, *where*, *whither*, *whence*, *whether*, *while*, *till*, *untill*.

THEY have all been explained in what is said of the relative pronoun. All of them but *while*, *till* and *untill*, may be called *interrogative adverbs*, because they may be used in asking questions. The reason why they may be so used appears in what is said of the relative and interrogative pronouns.

The adverbs *whereat*, *whereby*, *wherein*, *whereinto*, *whercof*, *whereon*, or *whereupon*, *wheresoever*, *whereto*, *whereunto*, *wherewith* or *wherewithall*, are also of this class, for they are only other forms analogous to oblique cases of *which* or *what*. Thus, *whereat* is equivalent to *at which*; *whereby*, to *by which*, or *by what*; *wherein*, to *in which*, or *in what*; *whereinto*, to *into which*; *whercof*, to *of which*; *whereon*, or *whereupon*, to *on which time*; *wheresoever*, to *at what place soever*; *whereto*, or *whereunto*, to *unto what*, or *which*; *wherewith*, or *wherewithall*, to *with what*, or *with which*.

The forms of these adverbs, which are equivalent to any case of *what*, may be used in questions; as, *whereunto shall I liken this or that?* is of the same import as *to what shall I liken this or that?* and so of other instances.

DEMONSTRATIVE ADVERBS.

THESE are such as require some demonstrative circumstance to determine their meaning, and therefore include in that meaning some demonstrative pronoun which has the object denoted by it

ascertained by something already said, or by some circumstance attending the act of speaking the sentence in which the demonstrative adverb is used. Thus, *afterwards* is equivalent to after this or that time, the time to be determined by something already said, or by some circumstance attending the discourse; *anon*, immediately after this instant time; *by and by*, soon after this or that time; *ere long*, before a long time passes over from this time; *now*, at this or that instant of time; *ere now*, before this instant; *erst*, long before this instant; *forthwith*, immediately after this or that time; *hence*, from this place, or from this time; *henceforth*, or *henceforward*, in all time succeeding this or that time; *here*, in this place, the place to be determined by what is already said, or by some demonstrative circumstance; *hereabouts*, near this place; *hereafter*, after this time; *hereat*, at this; *hereby*, by this; *herein*, in this; *hereof*, of or from this; *hereon*, upon this; *herewith*, with this; *heretofore*, the same as *formerly* or *erst*; *hither*, to this place, the place to be determined by some description in words, or by the actual situation of the speaker; *hitherto*, to this place; *hitherwards*, towards this place; *at present*, at this instant time of speaking; *since*, or *ago*, before this instant time of speaking; *then*, at that time, the time to be determined by something already said; *thence*, from that place, the place to be determined by something already said, or by pointing to it, or some other demonstrative circumstance; *thenceforth*, or *thenceforward*, continually from that time; *there*, at that place, the place to be determined as above; *thereabout*, or *thereabouts*, near that place, time, quantity, or number, the place, time, &c. to be determined as above; *thereat*, at that place or circumstance; *thereafter*, according to that; *thereby*, by that; *therefore*, for this, or, for that; *therefrom*, from that, or, from this; *therein*, in that, or, in this; *thercinto*, into that, or, into this; *thereof*, of that, or, of this; *thereon*, or *thereupon*, on, or, upon that, on, or, upon this; † *thereout*, out of that; *thereto*, or *thereunto*, to, or, unto that; † *thereunder*, under that; *therewith*, with that, or, at that time; *therewithall*, together with that; *thither*, to
that

that place; *thitherwards*, towards that place, the place to be determined as above; *thus*, in this manner, the manner to be determined by some previous description, or by actually shewing the process which determines it; *whilom*, at some time long before this instant of speaking; *yet*, at this time, or beyond this time or degree; the time or degree to be determined by what is said, or by some demonstrative circumstance.

It is manifest that these adverbs all require antecedents as much as the demonstrative pronouns do, and that these antecedents are sometimes to be expressed by words, and that sometimes the adverbs may be supplied with what is equivalent to an antecedent by the demonstrative circumstances which attend the discourse.

The points or periods of time to which the demonstrative adverbs of time relate, are all determined as the points or periods are to which the definitive verbs relate. Thus *since*, in itself, equally relates to time preceding *any time of speaking*; *now*, to time coexistent with *any time of speaking*; and *hereafter*, to time succeeding *any time of speaking*; and *the very point of time* to which they relate in any particular sentence, must be determined by actually speaking the sentence; or, in a letter, deed, &c. by putting a date to it; and so of other instances. Yet these words are not verbs; and therefore the relation which a verb has to time, as distinguished into past, present, and to come, by the act of speaking, is not a property peculiar to the verb only.

CONJUNCTIVE ADVERBS

Also, too, farther, farthermore, moreover, besides, likewise.

EACH of these adverbs is a notice, that what is denoted by some one or more words, in dependence on, or connexion with, the adverb, is to be considered as put to the rest of a series by an additional

~~additional proceeding of the mind, beyond that which is absolutely and indispensably necessary to compleat the sentence in which the adverb is found.~~

Even, ev'n, e'en ; these words shew, that what depends on one of them is exactly as it is represented, notwithstanding any appearance of unlikeliness, difficulty, or contrariety.

Forsooth, this word gives notice, that something which is said, is to be looked upon as certain, although it be attended with some seeming impropriety.

Nay, in old language, the same as *no*. It is now used to signify *not only so, but even*.

It is manifest that all the words of this class are of the nature of conjunctions ; for they signify some additional declaration concerning that with which they are connected ; and this declaration is by way of supplement to that of the sentence in which one of them is concerned ; and this kind of declaration is the characteristic of a conjunction, as appears fully in what is said of that part of speech in the speculative part of this work.

Some of the adverbs contained in the list which is given first, may perhaps be as properly placed in some one of the five following classes : as *perhaps* may be considered as a conjunctive adverb ; and so of some other instances. But as I have explained the general nature of each particular adverb of the first list, every one may range them, as he finds most convenient, into more and more subdivisions or inferior sorts or classes.

SECTION XXIV.

Of the conjunction.

CONJUNCTIONS are the marks of supplement
 To affirmation ; shewing an intent
 Words to resume in sentences, and bear
 To other words therein : or to declare
 That sentences themselves must so attend
 On other sentences, as to depend
 The one upon the other, in the views
 In which the speaker's thought these sentences pursues.

Conjunctions are additional declarations of certain connexions amongst words in the same sentence, and likewise between one sentence and another ; which connexions cannot be shewn, with any convenience, by the usual manner of affirmation or declaration.

The conjunctions, when used to shew the connexions amongst words in the same sentence, give notice that there is some word or expression in the sentence, which is either to be referred to several words, or that several words are to be referred to it, whilst the several references do not circumstantiate each other ; but the common word or expression either circumstantiates, or is circumstantiated in every reference.

And, either, or, neither, nor, but, are the principal conjunctions which are thus applied. *And* shews that the results of all the references made by it are equally necessary for the speaker's purpose. Thus the sentence, *John and James and George came yesterday ; "came yesterday"* is the common expression to which references are all to be made, and the sense of the whole is equivalent to *John came yesterday, James came yesterday, George came yesterday :* and in the expression, *the good and wise and merciful*

~~ciful~~ God; *the God* is the common name to which the references are all to be made; and the expression is equivalent to *the good God, the wise God, the merciful God*; and so of other instances.

When *either* is placed before a part of a series of words, and *or* before some other part of the same series, notice is given, either that any one of the references, or that some one of them, is sufficient for the speaker's purpose. Thus in the expression, *either John or James may go to-morrow*, that which is signified by *John may go to-morrow*, or by *James may go to-morrow*, is equally proper for the speaker's purpose. But in, *either John or James must go to-morrow*, only one of the sentences, *John must go to-morrow, James must go to-morrow*, can take place. As it is not determined which of the references is to take place, whilst yet it is signified by these conjunctions, that no more than one actually does take place, the hearer is obliged to keep them all in his mind as much as the references which are made by the conjunction *and*.

Neither is equivalent to *not either*; and *nor* is the negative of *or*. These are therefore only used to deny, in the same manner that *either* and *or* are used to affirm. Therefore these conjunctions shew, that *not any one* of the references in which they are concerned will answer the speaker's purpose, if these references are taken affirmatively. Thus, *neither James, nor John, nor George, must go to-morrow*, is equivalent to, *not either James, or John, or George, must go to-morrow*:

When *but* appears before a part of a series of words, directing that part to be referred to some other expression; it is a notice that the reference expresses something which looks like an exception to what might have been expected from the circumstances which attend the discourse. Thus in the expression, *who but a fool would labour to undo himself?* it is insinuated, that

the fool is an exception to what might be expected; ~~for it~~ is reasonable to think, that *no man whatsoever would* labour to undo himself; and so of other instances of the use of *but*, when it is applied to shew the connexions of words in the same sentence.

All these conjunctions which I have spoke of, as joining words together in the same sentence, are likewise used to shew whole sentences as depending on, or connected with, each other; and there are several conjunctions which are not used to connect words together in the same sentence, that are applied to shew the connexion of one whole sentence with another whole sentence.

The whole number of conjunctions may be reduced to the following sorts or classes. The COPULATIVE, the DISJUNCTIVE, the DISCRETIVE, the CONDITIONAL, the ADVERSATIVE or CONCESSIVE, the REDDITIVE, the CAUSAL, the ILLATIVE, the EXCEPTIVE, the RESTRICTIVE, and the SENTENTIAL DEMONSTRATIVE.

COPULATIVE CONJUNCTIONS.

And, also, as well as, likewise.

THESE shew that all the references made, or that all the sentences connected by their means, equally obtain, or make for the speaker's purpose. Thus, *in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, and the earth was without form and void*, is equivalent to, *in the beginning God created the heaven; in the beginning God created the earth; the earth was without form; the earth was void*; and so of other instances.

DISJUNC-

DISJUNCTIVES.

Either, or.

THESE shew that any of the references made, or any of the sentences connected by them, or at least that some one of them must obtain or make for the speaker's purpose, but without determining which: thus in *either your brethren have miserably deceived us, or power confers virtue*. Swift. Only one of these sentences, *your brethren have miserably deceived us; power confers virtue*; obtains, but it is not determined which of them does obtain.

DISCRETIVES.

But, except, saving.

THESE shew, that what depends upon one of them is either directly excepted out of what is expressed by the other part of the series of words in which any of them is concerned; or, at least, is different from what might reasonably be expected from the circumstances which attend the discourse. As *we have no objection but the obscurity of some passages*. Swift. i. e. except the obscurity.

'And in *did but men consider the true notion of God, he would appear full of goodness*'. Tillotson. It is insinuated, that "*men consider the true notion of God*" expresses an exception to the notion of God which men really do consider, and that exception such as could not reasonably be expected.

CONDITIONALS.

If, if so be, provided, unless.

THESE shew, that what depends upon one of them contains a supposition with which some other sentence is so connected,

that it is true or false, according as the supposition is true or false; as, *if a thing be true, it is impossible to be false.* Tillotson.

Unless is the negative of *if*, signifying, *if not*. Thus, *I shall succeed, unless you disappoint me*; and so of other instances.

ADVERSATIVES or CONCESSIVES.

Though, although, notwithstanding.

THESE shew, that what depends upon one of them expresses what may be taken for granted, and if so, that it has the appearance of being adverse to, or withstanding what is contained in another sentence, whilst yet it does not prevent the other sentence from being true. Thus, in *many things are believed, although they exceed the capacity of our wits.* Hooker. It is taken for granted, that many things exceed the capacity of our wits. It is also signified, that this circumstance seems to withstand or be adverse to, these things being believed; but that in fact it does not prevent their being believed.

REDDITIVES.

Yet, still, nevertheless.

THESE shew, that what depends upon one of them is no less true on account of some other sentence which expresses what appears to oppose such truth. Thus, in *many of our men were gone to land, nevertheless the admiral, with such ships only as could be put in readiness, made forth towards them.* Bacon. It is asserted, that the admiral's making forth, &c. is no less true, on account of many of our men being gone to land, which yet appears to oppose the truth of it.

CAUSALS.

CAUSALS.

For, because, seeing, forasmuch; and since, so, when, whereas,
in some applications of them.

THESE shew, that the speaker is proceeding to give a reason either for what is already said, or intended to be said. Thus, in *Christ died for him, because he died for all.* Hooker. That Christ died for all men, is shewn to be the reason why it is asserted, that he died for the particular man who is denoted by *him*.

ILLATIVES.

Therefore, wherefore; and now, then, in some applications of them.

THESE shew, that the speaker is proceeding to draw a consequence from something promised, except *now*, which shews that some additional help is going to be introduced to the deduction which is intended to be made; as, *he blushes; therefore he is guilty.* Spectator. i. e. for this reason he is guilty. *Now it is true that I am thy near kinsman.* Old Test.

Sometimes a question is asked by *wherefore*; as,

O wherefore was my birth from heaven foretold

Twice by an angel?

Milton.

i. e. for what reason was my birth, &c.?

EXCEPTIVES.

Unless, otherwise.

I HAVE already shewn, that *unless* is equivalent to *if not*.

Otherwise gives notice, that the speaker is going to declare what is the consequence on the assumption that things are
in

in any other manner than they are already represented, so that (when used as a conjunction) it is equivalent to, ~~but~~ *or for if things are not thus*; as, *take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them: otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven.* New Testament.

RESTRICTIVES.

As, so.

THESE are used to give notice, that some circumstance or situation is to be ascertained by it's sameness with, or similarity to, what is or will be expressed in the discourse, or by some demonstrative circumstance; as, *were I as you?* Philips.

The SENTENTIAL DEMONSTRATIVE

That.

THIS particle is used to give notice, that a whole sentence is to be considered as one noun substantive in some case. As in the expression, *I know that virtue is the excellence of man*; *that virtue is the excellence of man*, is equivalent to one substantive in the accusative case, for it is *the thing known*. And in *I give you notice that the cause will be tried to-morrow*; *that the cause will be tried to-morrow*, is equivalent to one substantive in the genitive case depending on the substantive *notice*, for it is the thing of *which* notice is given. And so in Cowley, *forgive me that I thus your patience wrong*; *that I thus your patience wrong* is the thing which is *to be forgiven* me, and therefore is equivalent to one substantive in the accusative case; and *me* is equivalent to a dative case. This latter form of construction will be taken notice of particularly in the syntax.

This

This whole subject of the conjunctions is treated of at large in the fifth book, Section II, of the speculative part of this work.

S E C T I O N XXV.

Of the preposition.

THE prepositions are as marks design'd
 Of modes of thought exerted, when the mind
 By substantives so circumstantiates,
 Or objects nam'd by nouns, or verbal states,
 That sev'ral things unite in diff'rent views,
 And no encrease of number thence ensues.

It is the capital property of a preposition, that when by means thereof a substantive is placed in dependance upon another substantive, or verb, the compound expression denotes the conception of an object, or state, no ways encreased in number, although the parts of the conception are separate and distinct in the mind, till they are united by the particular mode of thought which the preposition denotes. Thus *the Creator of the universe*, denotes but one object, although two distinct objects, viz. *the Creator* and *the universe*, are concerned in the expression. And *to preside over the universe*, denotes but one verbal state, although the object *universe*, as well as the state *to preside*, is concerned in the expression; and so of other instances. Therefore the prepositions are not meer marks of relations amongst objects and states, but directions to the mind to apply its discursive powers in certain manners, in order to circumstantiate that which is denoted by a noun or verb, by what is denoted by a substantive that depends on such noun or verb by the means of a preposition. For objects essentially separate, howsoever related to each other,

can never by that relation unite into an object not encreased in number. But the conceptions of these objects may be used in assisting the mind to circumstantiate verbal states, or other objects, by certain modes of proceeding of the mind itself; and different marks may be used to denote different modes of proceeding, and the prepositions are such marks.

Relations very different in themselves may be apprehended and applied by the same mode of proceeding, and therefore it frequently happens, in the use of language, that very different relations are denoted by the same preposition. Thus in the two English expressions, *to be at a place—to be at cards*, two very different relations are denoted by the preposition *at*, but they are both conceived to be apprehended and applied by the same mode of operation, and therefore are both denoted by the same sign *at*; and so of all other instances of the use of a preposition. This is the reason that meer custom has so much power in the application of this part of speech in all languages. For as different sorts of relations may be denoted by the same preposition, there are no certain means of knowing what sorts of relations are actually denoted by a particular preposition in a particular language, but by observing the use of that language, and thence determining the various applications of the same preposition which such use or custom has established.

The prepositions are applied for two different purposes in language, viz. either to connect one word with another in continued discourse; or in fixed union or composition with some one word, so that both the preposition, and the word with which it is united, are considered together as one compound word. Few of the original English prepositions are used in inseparable composition; for most of our compound words have been borrowed from the Latin or Greek; and therefore the prepositions of these languages usually appear in such words.

The

The original English prepositions appear in the following list.

Afore, before.	Through, thorough, throughout.
Against.	Out of, without.
Beside, besides.	After, behind.
Near, nigh, and (by, denoting vicinity of place.)	Beyond.
With.	Off, from.
Toward, towards, to, unto, into.	Above, over.
At.	On, upon.
In, within.	Below, beneath, underneath.
Between, betwixt.	Up. Down.
Among, amongst.	Of.
Amidst.	By.
About, around.	For.
	Than.

All these, except *of*, *by*, *for*, and *than*, are used to denote relations of place, and by analogy, to denote the connections amongst objects which are not capable of local situation. An account of the principal applications of each of them will be given in the *syntax*.

The principal of the French prepositions, which are found in inseparable composition in English words, are, *contre* or *counter*, *em*, *en*, *entre* or *enter*, *pour*, *sur*.

Those of the Latin are, *ab*, *ad*, *ante*, *circum*, *con*, *contra*, *de*, *di*, *dis*, *e* or *ex*, *extra*, *in*, *inter*, *intro*, *ob*, *per*, *post*, *præ*, *preter*, *pro*, *re*, *retro*, *sub*, *subter*, *super*, *trans*.

Those of the Greek are, *amphi*, *ana*, *anti*, *apo*, *cata*, *dia*, *epi*, *ex*, *en*, *hyper*, *hypo*, *meta*, *para*, *peri*, *pro*, *pros*, *syn*, or *sym*.

These prepositions, as likewise some few of those which are originally English, are placed in composition at the beginning of words; and frequently the compound word has a very different sense to that which the parts whereof it is compounded seem to

denote. Thus *to undertake*, *an undertaker*, do not signify the action of taking the under-part of any thing, nor the person who does so; but the action of entering into an obligation to perform or execute something, and the person who enters into such obligation; and so of many other instances.

The English prepositions are frequently subjoined to verbs, so as to make a kind of compound verbs differing in signification from the simple verbs. Thus, *to dispense* is of the same meaning with *to distribute*; but *to dispense with* is of the same import as *to excuse* or *disannul*; as, *to dispense with a man's attendance*, means *to excuse his attendance*, or *to be satisfied with his not attending*; and *to dispense with an oath*, means *to disannul the effect of it*. The English language has many of its verbs thus compounded, as may be seen in Mr. Johnson's excellent dictionary of the language.

SECTION XXVI.

Of the interjection.

THE sev'ral sounds which unconnected start,
Expressive of emotions of the heart;
And words which we in situations use
That regular connected speech refuse,
Are interjections, form'd to represent,
With instant force, the speaker's main intent.

This part of speech usually expresses some sudden emotion of the mind of the speaker: or his intention, when he is in some situation which makes him incapable of holding connected conversation with the hearer. The interjections therefore are inconnective in their nature, and each of them singly is a declaration of the situation of the speaker's mind, or of his intention, if he is too far distant from the hearer, or otherwise incapacitated from holding continued conversation with him.

The

The principal interjections of the English language are the following.

Adieu, an expression of the good wishes of the speaker for a person of whom he is taking leave.

Ab! an expression of dislike, sorrow, contemptuous exultation, or plaintive compassion in the speaker, or in those who are represented as speaking.

Ab that, of great concern that things should be as they are represented, but of little hope that they are so.

Aba! of pleasing surprise, or contemptuous exultation.

Alack! of sorrow, real or ironical.

Alack aday! the same as alack.

Alas! of lamenting sorrow, pity or concern.

Alas the day! alas the while! the same as ah unhappy day! ah unhappy time!

Aroynt, away, or be gone. Used to a witch.

Awaynt, be gone instantly.

Fob, an indication of abhorrence in the speaker.

Fy, of disapprobation, a word of reproof.

† *Go to*, of exhortation with contempt.

Ha! of surprise.

Ha, ha, or *he, he*, laughter.

Hab, an indication of the exertion of some violent effort.

Hail, solemn salutation at meeting.

Halloo, incitement to dogs to pursue the chase.

Hark! an exhortation to listen.

Havock! incitement to slaughter.

Heigh ho! an indication of uneasy languor.

Hey, joyous congratulation or exhortation.

Hey day! an indication of wonder attended with cheerfulness.

Hist, an exhortation to silence.

Ho, or *hoa*, notice to attend to what the speaker is going to say.

Holla, notice to some one at a great distance to stop and attend.

Hum, a notice of deliberation in the speaker, proceeding from doubt.

Hush, the same as *hiss*.

Huzza, an expression of exulting joy.

Lo, and sometimes *la*, an exhortation to give attention, properly to some object of sight, but sometimes applied to other things, either expressed or understood.

Mum, an exhortation to continue in silence.

O, an indication of wishing or being anxious either from desire of something good, or from apprehension of something evil.

This particle is also used in the solemn form of the vocative case, and is a notice to the person to whose name it is prefixed, that he is the person to whom the solemn address is made. In poetry and in solemn language, it sometimes happens that inanimate things are considered as persons, and are addressed by *O*!

Off, an injunction to retire, proceeding from disgust in the speaker, at the near situation of some object.

Oh! an indication of bodily pain, sorrow, or surprize at any disagreeable object.

Peace, an injunction to desist from speaking.

Pish, or *pshaw*, or *pugh*, indications of disgust attended with contempt.

See, the same as *lo*.

Silence, the same as *peace*.

So, or *so then*, an indication that the speaker is satisfied of the certainty of what he is going to say, although he gives no reason why he is satisfied.

Soft, an injunction not to proceed so fast.

Sobo, a signification to a person at a great distance, that the person who speaks directs his words to the distant person.

Strange! an indication of wonder in the speaker.

Tush, or *† tut*, an indication of contempt in the speaker.

† Welaway, or *† weladay*! the same as *alas*! or *alas the day*!

Welcome, a signification of joy in the speaker at the arrival of a stranger.

Well done, an expression of approbation in the speaker of what is done. *Well*

Well met, an expression of satisfaction in the speaker at the meeting of another person.

What ? an indication of surprise producing a question.

What ho, the same as *bola*, or *sobo*.

It is manifest that these interjections are all affirmations either *declarative*, *imperative*, or *optative*; and consequently that each of them is equivalent to a full sentence containing a definitive verb, either of the indicative or the imperative or the optative mood in it. But the demonstrative circumstances which attend the use of an interjection make it unnecessary, and sometimes impossible, to form a regular sentence to declare what the interjection denotes; as when *bola* or *sobo* are used to some person at a great distance from the speaker. These circumstances always exist at the time when the interjections are used, and therefore an interjection is always equivalent to a sentence containing a definitive verb of the present tense in it, *i. e.* a definitive verb which relates to time, not *preceding* or *succeeding*, but *coexistent with* the time in which the interjection is actually pronounced. Hence it appears, that the property of *affirmation* is not peculiar to the definitive verb only, but is common to it with the interjection: only, in the use of interjections, the subject of affirmation is supplied by demonstrative circumstances; whereas, in the use of a definitive verb, the subject is expressed by one or more words which are equivalent to one noun substantive in the nominative case.

A
Practical Grammar

OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

BOOK II.

OF SYNTAX.

THIS part of grammar consists of rules directing how to unite words in connected series, so as to express the various conceptions of the mind of man.

In order to produce this effect, it is necessary not only to represent all the words of a series as united together; but likewise to give notice which of the words are to be taken in immediate connexion with each other: for the very same words may be placed in various orders; and in some of the orders it may not be easy to discern which words are to be considered as immediately connected together. In the Latin and Greek, that correspondence of termination which is observed between the numbers and persons of substantives and definitive verbs; of gender, number, and case, between substantives and adjectives; and of gender, number, and person, between the relative and personal pronouns and their antecedents; is made use of to direct to those words which are to be considered as immediately united, although they are not placed close by each other. This correspondence is called concord in grammar, and by means thereof the same words may be placed in various orders in these languages.

languages, and yet continue intelligible in any of the orders. The English makes some use of diversity of termination of number and person in its definitive verbs, and of gender and number in its pronouns, for the same purposes that the concords are used in Latin. But the principal effect of these concords is answered in the English by observing a certain order of position in the words of its sentences. And therefore although it be necessary in English syntax to take notice of the concords, and to give some rules concerning them, it is likewise necessary to give rules for the order of position of words, and to consider these rules as rules of concord adapted to the English language.

I have shewed at large in the speculative part, Book VI, Section II, why serieses of words expressing the conceptions of the mind of man take the form of a sentence, and why there must be in every compleat sentence one nominative case of a substantive (or that which is equivalent to such case) and one definitive verb. If there is no more than one such substantive and one such verb in the sentence, it is called a simple sentence. Several such sentences may be reduced to one complex sentence, by the means of relative pronouns or conjunctions; but such a complex sentence may be resolved into the simple sentences of which it consists; so that the order of position, which obtains in simple sentences, in effect extends to all others with very few exceptions.

Rules for the order of position of words, which in the English answers several of the purposes of what is called concord in the Latin and Greek.

1. **I**N sentences at large used to declare,
The nominatives before the verbs appear.
2. But in a question, wish, or a command,
The nom'natives behind their verbs must stand

- Of ev'ry simple tense; but if complex,
 3. After the signs we nom'natives annex.
 4. And suppositions, not by *if*, receive,
 After the verb or sign, a nom'native.

1. In declarative sentences, the nominative case stands before the verb; as,

THE LORD GOD FORMED man of the dust of the ground. Old Test.
THE WORD WAS MADE flesh, and dwelt among us. New Test.
OUR VIRTUES WOULD BE PROUD, if our faults whispered them not.
 Shakespeare.

2. But when a question is asked, or a command given, or a wish expressed, if the verb be of any simple tense, the nominative case is placed behind the verb; as,

IS ANY THING too hard for the Lord? Old Testament.
BELIEVEST THOU the prophets? New Testament.
GO ye therefore and teach all nations. New Testament.
STAND THOU here by me. Old Testament.
FAR BE THE THOUGHT OF THIS from Henry's heart. Shakespeare.

3. If the verb be of any compound tense, the nominative case is placed after the sign of the tense; as,

HAST THOU EATEN of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? Old Testament.
SHALL I HIDE from Abraham that thing which I do? Old Test.
DO WE BEGIN again to commend ourselves? New Testament.
DID I REQUEST thee, Maker, from my clay To mould me man? DID I SOLICIT thee? Milton.
Be not afraid, neither BE THOU DISMAYED. Old Testament.
MAY YOU LIVE happily and long for the service of your country. Dryden.

4. And when a supposition is made without giving notice of it by *if*, the nominative case stands after the verb, if it be of any sim-

ple tense, and after the sign, if the verb be of any compound tense; as,

I would make the remembrance of them to cease among men: WERE IT NOT that I feared the wrath of the enemy. Old Testament.

WERE I so minded; I here could pluck his Highness' frown upon you. Shakespeare.

HADST THOU BEEN there—thou couldst not have discern'd Fraud in the serpent. Milton.

COULD GREAT MEN THUNDER

As Jove himself does; Jove would ne'er be quiet. Shakespeare.

In compound tenses, adverbs oft are seen,
And sometimes other words, the verb and sign between.

Adverbs are often placed between the sign and the verb of all the compound tenses; as,

I WAS NEVER BETTER PLEASED in my life. Spectat. N° 556.

HE WOULD REALLY WANT a dictionary—and WOULD HARDLY AT FIRST BELIEVE at what a low rate the highest strains and expressions of kindness DO COMMONLY PASS in current payment. Tillotson.

I HAVE HITHERTO ONLY ARGUED against the partiality. Spectator, N° 564.

This kind of position of adverbs is continually occurring, and sometimes other words are placed between the sign and the verb; as,
If I had but one soul, it COULD NOT AT THE SAME TIME PANT after virtue and vice. ibid

The genitive by 's, use has decreed
Must go before a noun, and that by of succeed.

Those who consider change of termination as that only which constitutes a case, will allow of no other oblique case in English nouns, but this only, which they call the positive case. It always goes before the substantive with which it is connected;
as, Now

Now Sarai ABRAM'S WIFE bare him no children. Old Test.
And he said, Hagar, SARAI'S MAID, whence comest thou ?
 Old Testament.

No ceremony that to great ones 'longs,
THE MARSHAL'S TRUNCHEON, NOT THE JUDGE'S ROBE,
Becomes them with one half so good a grace
As mercy does. Shakespeare.

After verbs transitive those nouns appear,
 To which the verbs their passive states transfer.

The position of a substantive after a transitive verb supplies, in English substantives, the effect of the accusative case, which in Greek and Latin has a different termination from the nominative.

The English personal pronouns, *I, thou, he, she ; we, ye, and they ;* and the relative *who ;* have indeed each an accusative case different from the nominative ; but the personal pronoun *it,* and the relatives *which* and *that,* have no such case.

The effect of this case, howsoever expressed, is to shew the object denoted by a noun substantive, as having in it the passive state of the verb on which the noun in this case depends.

As in the expression, *John sees—bears—helps—binders James ;* *James* is evidently the person who is *seen—heard—helped—injured ;* and so of other instances of the use of transitive verbs, with substantives in this case depending upon them.

My father peradventure WILL FEEL ME, and I shall seem to him as a deceiver. Old Testament.

If sinners INTICE THEE, consent thou not. Old Testament.

Jehoshaba TOOK JOASH, and STOLE HIM from among the king's sons which were slain. Old Testament.

Before their clauses plac'd, by settled use,
 The relatives these clauses introduce.

The relative pronouns are always placed at the beginning of the clauses which are made dependent on other clauses by their means. This will appear by examples in what will be said of the case of the relative.

To adjectives prefix'd we adverbs find,
But verbs require them to be plac'd behind.

Adverbs are usually placed before adjectives; as,

And God saw every thing that he had made, and behold, it was
VERY GOOD. Old Testament.

Wisdom alone is TRULY FAIR. Milton.

The secret villain—so RASHLY BRAVE *to dare the sword of Theseus.*
Smith.

And after verbs; as,

Admitting their principles to be true, they ACT WISELY. Rogers.

When he came to die, he made him THINK MORE REASONABLY.
Dryden.

These rules for the order of position of words in English are not so fixed as never to admit of exceptions, especially in very solemn or very familiar language, and in poetry. Thus in the beginning of the Gospel of St. John we find the expression, *In the beginning was the Word*, instead of, *The Word was in the beginning*; and in common colloquial language we frequently use *says he*, instead of *he says*; and Mr. Pope uses the expression, *sounds the tough bow*, instead of *the tough bow sounds*; and Mr. Dryden begins his translation of Virgil's Eneis with, *Arms and the man I sing*, instead of *I sing arms and the man*; and instances occur continually in which these rules for the position of words are not strictly observed. But notwithstanding this, these rules are generally to be observed in the ordinary construction of the language, and nothing but much observation and judgment can determine the instances in which we may safely depart from them.

I have already observed, that we make some use, in English, of forms of construction like the Latin concords. These are
three

three in the Latin, but might be reduced to two in English; because our adjectives have no difference of termination, either of case, gender, or number. But we supply the want of such difference of termination by the position of the adjective with regard to the substantive on which it depends, and therefore this position may be considered as a kind of concord.

The first concord; or that between the nominative case and the verb.

IN personal construction verbs receive
Number and person from a nominative.

The observation of this concord determines the form of a sentence; and, if the sentence be of the very simplest kind, no rule is necessary to be observed in the construction of it, but that of position, and this concord.

The most simple of all sentences which can be expressed at large, are such as consist each of one nominative case, and one definitive verb. The most simple of all words which can be applied as substantives in the nominative case, are the personal pronouns. Therefore the forms, *I have—thou hast—he has, we—you—they have; I am—thou art—he is, we—you—they are; I call—thou callest—he calls, we—you—they call, &c.* which appear in the conjugation of the definitive moods of the verb, are all sentences of the most simple form; and if they are well observed, will shew the meaning of the first concord.

For the three singular forms of the present tense of the indicative mood have each a peculiar termination; and the first of these terminations corresponds with a nominative case of the first person, the second termination with a nominative of the second person, and the third with a nominative of the third person. Therefore we must not say, *I hast* or *I has*, but *I have*; nor *thou am* or *thou is*, but *thou art*; nor *he call* or *he callest*, but *he calls* (or *he calleth*, in solemn language); and so of other instances.

instances. There is also a difference of termination between the singular and plural number, in some of the tenses of the verb *to be*; and therefore we must not say, *I are—thou are—he are*, nor apply the verb *are* to any nominative case of the singular number. There is no English verb, but the verb *to be*, which has a plural termination in any tense different from the termination of the first person singular. But this verb is used as an auxiliary in all the passive and middle verbs, and therefore a regard to difference of number, as well as of person, must be attended to in the first concord, as applied to the English language.

Any substantive of the nominative case singular and of the third person (*i. e.* which denotes what neither speaks and names itself, nor is spoken to) may be substituted instead of *he*; as, *John has—Jane calls*: and any substantive of the nominative case plural of this person may be substituted instead of *they*; as, *the men have—the women call*. But if the nominative case be of the first person singular or plural, the personal pronouns must be retained together with such case; as, *I John N—— declare—we the under-written persons promise*. There is, strictly speaking, no nominative case of the second person; because every object of that person is *the object spoken to*; and therefore its name, even when it is the subject of a sentence, is *of the vocative case*. But the name of an object of the second person answers all the purposes of a nominative case with regard to the definitive verb, which depends upon it; and therefore the pronouns, *thou*, *you*, and *ye*, are usually considered as nominative cases of the second person. These pronouns must also be retained in declarative sentences, together with the substantives of the second person; as, *thou Lord art gracious—you children must be silent*. The reason why the personal pronouns of the first and second persons must be used with the verb in English, is, because each person of each number of the verb has not a different termination, as in Greek and Latin; and therefore the pronouns in English are used to distinguish both the first and second persons from the third.

A noun

A noun of multitude, *i. e.* which signifies many objects, may have a verb plural in dependence upon it, although it be of a singular grammatic form; as, *The ASSEMBLY of the wicked HAVE enclosed me.* • Old Testament.

And several nominative cases singular may be joined by copulative conjunctions, and such an expression may be considered as the name of a plural object; and of consequence, if a definitive verb depends upon it, when thus considered, the verb must be of the plural number; as, *ABRAHAM AND SARAH WERE OLD.*

Old Testament.

But a noun of multitude may be considered as denoting one complex object, and if so, the verb must be singular; as, *THE MULTITUDE of the city WAS divided.* New Testament.

And a verb of the singular number may be considered as first applied to one, and then to another of the substantives singular, which are joined by copulative conjunctions; as,

SAND, and SALT, and A MASS OF IRON, IS easier to bear, than a man without understanding. Ecclesiasticus, ch. 22. ver. 15.

The want of variation of person in the plural number of the English verb contributes to the simplicity of the language. For a plural object may consist of single objects of all the three persons; as, *I, thou and he are met together*, which in Latin would be *ego, tu & ille convenimus*; which is as if we were to say in English, *I, thou and he we are met together*; and *thou and he are met together* is in Latin *tu & ille convenistis*; which is as if we said in English, *thou and he you are met together*; and so of other instances in which several substantives of different persons require a verb plural in dependence upon them. For no one termination of the person of the verb can suit plural objects so constituted; and therefore the English, with great propriety, makes the termination of all the persons plural the same in the same tense.

Thus we are freed, in English (so far as the verb is concerned) from the perplexity occasioned to children in Latin by the rule;
The

The first person is more worthy than the second, and the second than the third.

A verb infinitive, or train of words
Sometimes, what answers to this case affords.

A verb of the infinitive mood, either alone, or with one or more words depending upon it, may supply the place of one noun substantive in any case. It frequently supplies the place of a nominative case of the third person singular; as in the following examples.

TO HAVE RESPECT OF PERSONS IS not good. Old Testam.

TO me TO LIVE IS Christ, and TO DIE IS gain. New Testam.

TO BE WEAK IS to be miserable. Milton.

IF TO HAVE DONE THE THING YOU GAVE IN CHARGE

BEGET your happiness; be happy then. Shakespeare.

A whole sentence with *that* before it may likewise supply the place of one noun substantive in any case, and often supplies a nominative to the verb. But when it does so, the sentence is usually introduced by *it*, and the sentence with *that* before it is placed after the verb; as,

IT CAME TO PASS upon a day, THAT JONATHAN THE SON OF SAUL SAID UNTO THE YOUNG MAN THAT BARE HIS ARMOUR, COME, AND LET US GO OVER TO THE PHILISTINES' GARISON. Old T.

IT MAY BE THAT I WILL ABIDE, yea, AND WINTER WITH YOU.

New Testament.

This kind of construction usually appears with the passive verbs, *it is said—denied—thought—believed—foretold—ordained—decreed, &c.* For that which is *said, thought, denied, &c.* must be expressed by a sentence on almost all occasions; and this sentence must in effect be a nominative case to the passive verb with which it is connected; as,

It is denied, THAT IT IS necessary to the character of a fine gentleman, THAT HE SHOULD TRAMPLE UPON ALL ORDER AND DECENCY.

Spectator, N° 65.

It

It must be confessed, THAT THE GREAT FAMILIARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO SEXES, ON THIS OCCASION, MAY SOMETIMES PRODUCE VERY DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES. Spectator, N° 68.

The second concord: or that between the substantive and the adjective.

THE adjectives unvaried in their end
By gender, number, case, on substantives attend.
Before their substantives our speech applies
Those adjectives which nothing modifies,
Adverbs excepted: but removes behind,
When other words dependent are subjoin'd.

The English adjectives have no diversity of case, gender, or number; but, without change of termination, are applied to all kinds of substantives of every case, gender, and number, and coalesce with them by meer apposition.

But it must be observed, that the distributives, *every, each, either*, are only applied to singulars, or to plurals considered as denoting collective quantities taken separately; as,

All the congregation are holy, EVERY ONE OF THEM. Old Test.
EVERY TWELVE YEARS. Bacon.
By hunger, that EACH OTHER CREATURE tames,
Thou art not to be harm'd. Milton.
How unreasonable it is to expect the same proof for EVERY THING. Tillotson.

These distributives are really a kind of pronouns, and as such are frequently used by themselves to represent objects; as,

The virtue and force of EVERY of these three. Hammond.
Let EACH his adamantinè coat gird well. Milton.
Nor EITHER cares for him. Shakespeare.

Hence the substantives, with which these words are sometimes connected, may be considered as antecedents; and if so, the construction

construction of these pronouns will fall under the rule, *Pronouns to antecedents*, &c. which appears in the third concord.

If the adjective is simple (*i. e.* if it have no word depending upon it,) we usually place it immediately before its substantive, and the article before it, if an article is required; as, *a good man, the large houses*: or if an adverb unites with the adjective, it is frequently placed immediately before the adjective which precedes the substantive; as, *a very good man; the infinitely wise God*.

But if one or more dependent words modify an adjective, it follows the substantive immediately; except an adverb is also concerned; and if so, the adverb follows the substantive, and the adjective follows the adverb; as, *a man good to others; a house very convenient for summer*.

All these rules for the position of adjectives admit of exceptions. For even simple adjectives follow their substantives, if those substantives depend immediately upon a verb, and the adjectives express the circumstances attending the verbal states in which the objects denoted by the substantives are represented; as, *to make a man happy; to find a friend melancholy; I left the company chearful*. And if the adjective be emphatical; as, *Alexander the Great; James the Less*.

As to adjectives with adverbs, they are almost as frequently placed behind a substantive as before it, and before a verb as behind it; as,

A man excessively passionate; a woman remarkably chearful.

There is SOMETHING WONDERFULLY DIVINE in the airs of this picture.

Addison.

I VERY MUCH APPROVE of the contempt the society has of beauty.

Spectator, N° 32.

And the article is placed behind *all, such, many*, and any adjectives depending on *as, so, and how*; as, *all THE company stayed; such A person has been here; many A time; he is AS GREAT A PRINCE*

as Augustus; he is not so GREAT A PRINCE as Augustus; how GREAT A PRINCE was Augustus!

The third concord: or that between the pronoun and its antecedent.

PRONOUNS to antecedents must refer
Their gender, number, and their person bear.

With substantives we the possessives place,
Unchang'd by gender, number, or by case.

All the pronouns in English take their gender, number and person from the antecedent. For even the possessive pronouns, *his*, *her* or *hers*, *its*, admit of no grammatic variation of gender and number, so as to suit those of the substantive, to which they are applied, any more than the other adjectives of the language do.

The English personal pronouns of the third person have a distinction of sex or gender in the singular number; for *he* must represent a male; *she*, a female; and *it*, an object of no sex; or, at least, an object in which the sex is not considered; as a little child, for instance, or any diminutive animal. But the plural *they* equally represents objects of all the three genders; for a plural object may consist of singular objects, some of which are masculine, others feminine, and others neuter; as, *a man and a woman and some iron were in the waggon, and they were all overturned.*

The possessive pronouns have also a distinction of gender in the singular number; for *his* shews what is related to a male; as, *his house—his estate*: *her* shews what is related to a female; as, *her house—her estate*: and *its* shews what is related to an object in which the sex is not considered; as, *its size—its price*: but *their* shews what is related to a plural object, but without any distinction of sex or gender. For the plural object referred to may consist of single objects of all the

three genders; as, *a man and a woman and some iron should have been in the waggon, but THEIR place was taken up by other goods*

This frees the English, in a great measure, from the perplexity of such rules, as, “ The masculine gender is more “ worthy than the feminine, and the feminine than the neuter, “ unless in things not apt to have life, for in them the neuter “ is the most worthy gender.” These rules arise in the Latin and Greek, because the adjectives and possessive pronouns must agree, in grammatic gender, with the gender of the substantives to which they are applied; and when several substantives of different genders happen to denote a complex object, no one gender of an adjective or possessive pronoun, will suit those of such a series of substantives. And therefore neither the English adjectives, nor the plural personal, nor the plural possessive pronouns, have a distinction of gender.

The demonstrative pronouns, *this, these, that, those*, &c. are sometimes considered as adjectives; and if they are so considered, these adjectives have a diversity of number, and *this* and *that* can only unite with substantives of the singular number, *these* and *those* with substantives of the plural. But it is more easy to consider the substantives with which these pronouns unite as a kind of antecedents, ascertaining the meaning of the pronouns more fully, and if the substantives are thus considered, the construction of these pronouns falls under the rule given above, viz. *Pronouns to antecedents*, &c.

It sometimes happens, that a plural object, consisting of objects of different persons, is to be expressed over again by a personal or possessive pronoun; and if so, the same pronoun cannot take notice of all the persons. When this instance occurs, the first person is preferred before the second or third, and the second before the third; as, *I, you, and he must share this amongst us; neither you nor she have done your business.*

To

To things we *which* apply, to persons *who*,
While *that* may either things or persons show.

The relatives *who* and *which* have a distinction as to the nature of the objects which they represent. For *who* is only applied to persons, and *which* only to things; but *that* may equally represent either persons or things.

None of the relative pronouns have a distinction of number in English; for *who* equally represents one man, woman, or rational being, or more than one of such beings; as, *the man who came—the men who came*: and *which* equally represents one thing, or more than one; as, *the sum which will be paid, or the sums which will be paid*: and *that* equally represents a singular or plural object of any kind; as, *the man THAT came—the men THAT came—the sum THAT will be paid—the sums THAT will be paid*; and so of other instances. This contributes to make the construction of the relative in English, easier than it is in the Latin and Greek.

Of the case of the relative.

THE relatives are in the nom'native,
Number and person when to verbs they give.
Which characters, when other names confer,
The relatives dependent cases bear:
Such as the verbs require; or other words,
Which to the relative the clause affords.
But whatsoe'er their case, by settled use
The relatives their clauses introduce.

The case of the relative must always be the same, as that of its antecedent would be, if the antecedent were substituted in the clause instead of the relative. This proceeding would turn the relative clause into a complete sentence, and every relative clause

clause is such a sentence, before it is incorporated into another sentence, by substituting the relative instead of its antecedent, to give notice of such incorporation. Thus, the man *who spoke—of whom I spoke—to whom you spoke—whom Mr. N. sent—by whom we are injured—with whom you debated—for whom the people work*, are expressions which evidently consist of the sentences, *he spoke—I spoke of him—you spoke to him—Mr. N. sent him—we are injured by him—you debated with him—the people work for him*, all applied to the antecedent *the man*; only the sentences are turned into relative clauses by using *who—of whom—to whom—whom—by, with, for whom*; instead, of *he—of him—to him—him—by, with, for him*.

In the first instance, viz. *the man who spoke*, *who* is the nominative case to the verb *spoke*; but in all the other instances, there are other nominative cases to the several verbs; as, *you, Mr. N.; we, the people*; and when this happens, the relative is in the same depending case which the pronoun *he* would be in, supposing that the relative clause had been expressed as a sentence of itself, viz. as it appears in, *I spoke of him—you spoke to him—Mr. N. sent him, &c.* But the relative is always at the beginning of the clause; and therefore when it is in any dependent case, it does not stand in the same place where its antecedent stands in the sentence which is turned into a relative clause; for *I spoke of him*, if turned into a relative clause, becomes, *of whom I spoke*; *Mr. N. sent him*, becomes, *whom Mr. N. sent*; and so of other instances.

If on a preposition *that* depends,
 Such preposition in the clause attends
 Somewhere behind the verb. But *which* and *who*
 Of prepositions plac'd before allow.
 Yet even when those are us'd, the following train
 Of words the preposition may contain.

When *that* is used as a relative pronoun, it does not admit of a preposition before it, but the preposition is placed where it should

should have stood in the sentence, which is turned into a relative clause. Thus if the sentences, *I spoke of him—you spoke to him*, are turned into relative clauses, by using *that* instead of *him*, the clauses must be, *that I spoke of—that I spoke to*; as, *the man that I spoke of—the man that I spoke to*; and not *the man of that I spoke—the man to that I spoke*. But if *whom* be used instead of *him*, the relative clauses may either be, *of whom I spoke*, or *whom I spoke of*; *whom I spoke to*, or *to whom I spoke*; as, *the man of whom I spoke*, or *the man whom I spoke of*; and so of other instances. *Which* is used in the same manner as *whom*; for we equally say, *the place from which I came*, or *the place which I came from*; and so of other instances: but we do not say, *the place from that I came*, but *the place that I came from*.

Answering to *such*, *as*, *so*, you *as* perceive
Plac'd in construction like a relative.

As, when redditive to *such*, *as*, or *so*, very frequently supplies the place of a relative pronoun; as,

Such precepts AS TEND to make men good, singly considered, may be distributed into such AS ENJOIN piety towards God, or such AS REQUIRE the good government of ourselves. Tillotson.

He has not done so well AS was expected.

They have done AS much AS could be desired.

Of the construction of the oblique cases of substantives.

Of the GENITIVE CASE.

THE genitives are in dependence seen
On nouns, when correlations intervene.

When a substantive in the genitive case depends on another noun, either substantive or adjective, the objects denoted by the

two nouns are so united, as they would be if a verb transitive were placed between them, and one of the objects were in the active or passive state of such verb, and the other object in the corresponding passive or active state of the same verb. This correspondence between the active and passive, or between the passive and active state of any transitive verb, is what is meant by the word *correlation* in the rule, because either of these states supposes the other, as the terms of all correlations do. Thus the word *parent* supposes *offspring*, and the word *offspring* supposes *parent*; for the states *generating* and *generated* are contained in the signification of the words; seeing a parent is *an object generating*, and offspring is *an object generated*, and either of the states, *generating*, or *generated*, supposes the corresponding state. Therefore we may either say, *the parent or such offspring*, or *the offspring or such a parent*; and so of very many instances of the genitive case of one noun substantive in dependence upon another. And in the expression, *desirous of honour*, the state *desiring* is included in the adjective *desirous*, and *honour* is *the object desired*; and this correspondence is denoted by the sign *of*, or by *of honour*, considered as a substantive of the genitive case; and so of other instances of adjectives, with a genitive case in dependence on them.

It is usually laid down as a rule, that when two substantives, signifying different things, come together, the latter must be in the genitive case; and indeed correlations are much the most frequently found between different things. But one and the same object may be considered in two capacities, and a correlation may exist between these two capacities; as appears in the expressions, *an injurer of himself—lovers of themselves*, &c.; for here the same person is *the object injuring* and *that which is injured*, and the same persons are *the objects loving* and *those loved*.

The pronouns personal are seldom used in dependence upon substantives by the sign *of*, but the pronouns possessive are used.
Thus

Thus we do not say, *the estate, loss, gain, faults, &c. of me, of thee, of him, of us, of you, of them*; but *my, thy, his, our, your, their estate, loss, gain, faults, &c.*

Adjectives derived from the names of nations and cities are frequently used instead of the genitive case of these names; as, *the English fleet, the Roman emperors, Spanish gold, Swedish iron, &c.* instead of *the fleet of England, the emperors of Rome, &c.*

Adjectives which denote the fixed qualities of objects, are likewise frequently used, so as to be equivalent to a substantive in the genitive case, which substantive is contained in the signification of the adjective.

Thus, *a wise, worthy, virtuous man*, are expressions equivalent to, *a man of wisdom, of worth, of virtue*; and so of many other instances, which use and experience only can shew; for we do not say, *a man of vice, of folly, of covetousness*; but *a vicious, foolish, covetous man*; and so of many other instances.

On verbs depending *of* to objects leads
From out whereof the verbal state proceeds.
Or to the objects of our words or thought;
Or those whence things are borrow'd, begg'd, won, bought;
Or to the things by deprivation gain'd
From others; or by force or fraud obtain'd.

A substantive, when made dependent upon a verb by the sign *of*, denotes objects in different kinds of connexions or dependencies, according to the nature of the state signified by the verb with which the substantive is united by this sign.

After verbs of *making, framing, compounding, &c.* *of* directs to the material out of which something is made, framed, &c. as,

*All the days of his separation shall he eat nothing that is made of
THE VINE TREE.* Old Testament.

The Lord God formed man OF THE DUST OF THE GROUND. Old Test.

*Zeal ought to be composed OF THE HIGHEST DEGREES OF ALL PIOUS
AFFECTIONS.* Sprat.

After verbs of *lineal descent*, of directs to the family, or lineage, whence the descent is estimated; as,

Man that is born OF A WOMAN. Liturgy.

OF Priam's royal race thy mother came. Dryden.

After verbs denoting the exertion of the intellectual, or discursive, powers of the mind, of directs to the subject upon which these powers are exerted; as,

TO SPEAK plainly OF THIS WHOLE WORK. Spectator, N° 65.

*He proceeds in his inquiry into sciences, resolved to JUDGE OF THEM
freely.* Locke.

After verbs of *accusing, convincing, admonishing, acquitting, &c.* of directs to the name of the crime, fault, &c. concerning which the accusation, admonition, &c. is; as,

If any be blameless—not ACCUSED OF RIOT. New Testament.

*The discovery of a truth formerly unknown, DOETH rather CONVINCE
men OF IGNORANCE, than nature OF ERROR.* Raleigh.

*Things that at the first shew seem'd possible—HAVE BEEN CONVICTED
OF IMPOSSIBILITY.* Bacon.

———*HE OF THEIR WICKED WAYS*

SHALL them ADMONISH.

Milton.

I HAVE ACQUITTED myself OF THE DEBT.

Dryden.

Verbs of *requiring, receiving, buying, borrowing, begging*, or any kind of getting that is not fraudulent or compulsive, require the sign of before the object whence the acquisition is made; as,

They that carried us away captive REQUIRED OF US *a song.* Old Test.
Whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same SHALL *be* RECEIVE
 OF THE LORD. • New Testament.

The sepulchre that Abraham BOUGHT for a sum of money OF THE SONS
 OF EMMOR. New Testament.

They BORROWED OF THE EGYPTIANS jewels of silver. Old Test.
To ASK alms OF THEM *that entered into the temple.* New Testam.

But verbs of *depriving, preventing, robbing, cheating,* or of any kind of getting that is compulsive or fraudulent, require the sign of before the name of that which is lost by such proceeding; as,

Why SHOULD I BE DEPRIVED OF YOU BOTH in one day? Old Test.
The Janisaries DISAPPOINTED by the bassas OF THE SPOIL of the
 merchants. Knolles.

Let a bear ROBBED OF HER WHELPS meet a man, rather than a fool
in his folly. Old Testament.

She TRICKS US OF OUR MONEY. Gay.

A kind of expressions, much of the nature of adverbs, are formed by the sign of after a verb, and with a substantive depending upon the sign; as, *he did it of himself*, i. e. without being prompted or solicited; and so, *of necessity, of choice, of his own motion, &c.*

These are particular expressions,

To be sick—To die of a distemper. To surfeit OF *play.* Locke.

To BE TIRED OF THE VANITIES of the world.

To make SURE OF the bear. L'Estrange.

To CRY OUT OF an unequal management. Atterbury.

i. e. to complain loudly against it.

Of the DATIVE CASE.

The limits whither states or objects tend,
In names of dative forms, on nouns and verbs attend.

States of approach, either of *local motion*, or of *the attention*, or of *direction*, whether expressed by nouns or verbs, admit a substantive in this case to depend upon them; which substantive determines the object whither the motion or direction tends, or that with which the attention closes; as, *to go to a place—to direct a letter to such a man—to attend to the direction*; and so,

I promised to call upon him—that WE MIGHT GO TOGETHER TO THE ABBEY. Spectator, N^o 329.

Continued APPLICATION to public affairs. Addison.

APPLY thine heart UNTO INSTRUCTION, and thine ears TO THE WORDS of knowledge. Old Testament.

—still TO THIS PLACE

My heart INCLINES. Rowe.

The laws of our religion TEND TO THE UNIVERSAL HAPPINESS of mankind. Tillotson.

States of *adding*, *giving*, *inclining*, *applying*, *appropriating*, *proportioning*, &c. are included in the former, and therefore admit of a noun in this case to depend upon them; as,

Addition to a store—to add to a store—to apply to such a study—application to such a study—applicable to such a study, &c. and so, To WHICH the knight ADDED. Spectator, N^o 329.

The satisfaction which it HAD GIVEN TO THE OLD MAN.

Spectator, N^o 335.

ENCLINE your ears TO THE WORDS of my mouth. Old Testament.

What he says of a portrait IS APPLICABLE TO POETRY. Dryden.

Marks of honour ARE APPROPRIATED TO THE MAGISTRATE.

Atterbury.

In

In the loss of an object WE DO NOT PROPORTION our grief TO the real value it bears; but TO THE VALUE our fancies set upon it.

Spectator, N° 256.

The substantives, *advantage*, *disadvantage*, *benefit*, *profit*, *harm*, &c. may take either a genitive or dative case after them to shew the object to which the advantage, &c. accrues; as, *the advantage*, *disadvantage* *of* or *to* *such a man*.

But the adjectives *advantageous*, *disadvantageous*, *beneficial*, *profitable*, *harmful*, &c. require a dative case only; as, *advantageous*, *disadvantageous*, &c. *to such a man*, or *to such a cause*.

A kind of adverbial expressions are frequently formed by this preposition; as, *face to face*, *hand to hand*, *foot to foot*, i. e. *face OPPOSED to face*, &c. So, *two to one*, *five to four*, &c. i. e. *two OPPOSED IN A WAGER to one*, &c.

The names of *limits whither*, you'll perceive,
Plac'd with some verbs as in th' accusative.
Such as, *to give*, *procure*, *get*, *leave*, *fetch*, *send*,
To borrow, *carry*, *do*, *make*, *raise*, or *lend*,
To tell, *appoint*, *advance*, *provide*, *sell*, *bring*,
To teach, *cost*, *cut*, *deliver*, *answer*, *sing*;
These verbs in active forms, of course, retain
Double accusatives in their dependent train.
And in their passive forms they may receive
A noun which bears the form of an accusative.

The object which is the limit whither several states tend, is so very easy to be distinguished in a connected series of words, that there is no necessity to place the sign *to* or *for* before the name of such object. The states which have this property are usually called *acquisitive states* in grammar; and if an active transitive form of any of these verbs is applied *acquisitively*, such form may

may in English have two substantives depending upon it without any sign; as, *to make him a present—to send her a letter*, &c. which are of the same import, as, *to make a present to him—to send a letter to her*; and so of other instances.

Hence it comes to pass, that several of these verbs, in their passive forms, have a substantive following, of the form of an accusative, which substantive supplies the place of a dative; as, *a demand was made for several things which had been lent HIM—given HIM—sold HIM*; &c. instead of, *lent to HIM—given to HIM—sold to HIM*, &c.

It is to be observed in this kind of construction, that the name of the object to which the acquisition accrues, stands immediately after the verb, and if a noun in the accusative case is also used, it follows the other. Thus we say, *he sent me a letter—they paid the labourers so much*, and not *he sent a letter me—they paid so much the labourers*; but we say, *he sent a letter to me—they paid so much to the labourers*. This kind of construction, by substantives placed as if they were both in the accusative case, appears in the following instances, out of multitudes of others which may be found in almost every English book.

I have had letters, &c. that request I would give them an exact account of the stature of the prince, &c.

Spectator, N° 340.

To learn whether the peasant, who shewed him the way, is drawn in the map.

ibid.

Upon going to pay her a visit one morning, he writ her a very pretty epistle on this hint.

Spectator, N° 343.

Give me the damsel to wife.

Old Testament.

Prepare me a lodging.

New Testament.

Elisha telleth the king of Israel the things thou speakest.

Old Testament.

Of the ACCUSATIVE CASE.

The active verbs their passive states transfer
On nouns which in th' accusative appear.

I have already observed, that a substantive in the accusative case, when placed in dependence upon a transitive verb, shews the object expressed by the noun in this case, as having in it the passive state which corresponds with the active state of the verb on which the noun depends. Thus in the expressions, *to see, bear, meet, follow a man*; the man is in effect represented as *the object seen, heard, met, followed*; and so of other instances.

All the English personal pronouns, except *it*, have an accusative different from the nominative, as likewise the relative *who*: all the prepositions, as well as those which are considered as the signs of cases, require the accusative forms in dependence upon them; as, *at me, at him, behind us, behind them, above whom, below whom*; not, *at I, at he, behind we, behind they, above who, below who, &c.*

Of the VOCATIVE CASE.

Objects to which our language we address,
If nam'd, we by the vocative express.

The name of every object to which words are addressed is of this case, and every such object may be called *thou* or *you*; therefore *thou* and *you* are really of the vocative case, and the pronoun personal of the second person has no nominative case.

We may address ourselves to a person, and never speak any thing united with the name of that person, in the whole of what is addressed to him. If so, the name of such person (if mentioned) must appear in the vocative case, without any word connected with it; as,

My

My heart is fixed, O God, my heart is fixed, I will sing and give praise. Old Testament.

If the vocative case is made part of a sentence, the pronoun of the second person is united with it ; as,

Theu, O Lord, art a God full of compassion. Old Testament.

Unless the verb which forms the sentence be of the imperative mood, for with such verb the pronoun is often omitted ; as,

OPEN thy doors, O LEBANON—HOWL FIR TREE, for the cedar is fallen. Old Testament.

Of the ABLATIVE CASE.

From, by, with, in, for, may be considered as the signs of this case ; and *than* after an adjective of the comparative degree ; but *than* is a redditive conjunction rather than the sign of a case.

FROM.

The ablatives by *from* as names we use
Of limits whence the mind a state pursues.

This sign is the reverse of *to*, and therefore states of *forsaking* are referred by it to *the limit whence* the forsaking is estimated ; as,

It came to pass as they journeyed FROM THE EAST, that they found a plain. Old Testament.

Hence such states as *freedom, deliverance, exemption, abstinence, restraint, &c.* whether expressed by nouns or verbs, admit of this sign prefixed to the name of the objects whence these states are conceived to remove or withhold ; as *freedom FROM labour—exemption FROM tribute—free FROM labour—exempt FROM tribute—to free men FROM labour—to exempt them FROM tribute ;* and so,

He

He that is dead, is freed FROM SIN. New Testament.

Deliver us FROM EVIL. *ibid.*

No man is exempt FROM THE CHANGES of human life. Atterbury.

Abstain FROM ALL APPEARANCE of evil. New Testament.

This they begin to do, and now nothing will be restrained FROM THEM.

Old Testament.

It is manifest, that every state which the mind can consider as forsaking one object and approaching another, may be referred to the object forsaken by *from*, and to the object approached by *to*; as, *a journey FROM such a place TO such a place—a continuance FROM such a time TO such a time—to continue FROM such a time TO such a time, &c.*

By an elliptical construction, this sign is placed before several adverbs and prepositions which chiefly relate to place and time; as, *from above, from afar, from below, &c.* i. e. *from some place above, far distant, below, &c.*

BY.

After verbs passive ablatives in *by*

The correspondent active states supply.

And *by* is likewise us'd with names that show

The means made use of, or the method how.

But *by* to place referring, will appear

To signify *adjoining to* or *near*.

It has already been shewn, that this sign, when placed after a passive verb, gives notice, that the active corresponding state of the same verb is in the object denoted by the name which depends on the sign; as in the expressions, *James heard, seen, injured, extolled by William, by the multitude, by himself; William, the multitude, or James himself, is the object hearing, seeing, injuring, extolling*; and so of other instances.

The sign *by* is likewise used to refer to names expressing *the means, order, course, or method*, by which continued action is regulated; as, *to proceed by stratagem—to live by rule—to build by a plan—to judge by circumstances—to advance by pairs, by companies—to sell, buy by the ell, by the ounce—to take a journey by sea, by land, by night, by day—to sit, stand, live, by one's self, &c. and so.*

By THIS MEANS they would insensibly arrive at proper notions of courage. Spectator, N° 337.

Such a method as this would very much conduce to the public emolument, by MAKING every man living good for something.

Spectator, N° 43.

That prince conveys himself by A BEAUTIFUL STRATAGEM into his mother's apartment. Spectator, N° 44.

They consulted that they might take Jesus by SUBTLETY, and kill him.

New Testament.

Thou shalt drink also water by MEASURE.

Old Testament.

The same substantive is frequently twice repeated for the purposes above-mentioned and *by* placed between the two substantives; as, *to examine a writing line by line, page by page—to search a place house by house—to pay sums year by year, &c.*

When *by* refers to place, it has the signification of *near*; as,

Before Pi-habiroth shall ye encamp, by THE SEA. Old Testam.

The sign of a savage man standing by A BELL. Spectator, N° 28.

And when it refers to time, it signifies that the time which is mentioned will be come when something mentioned will likewise be; as, *we shall be gone by TO-MORROW NIGHT.*

To-morrow by THAT TIME THE SUN BE HOT, ye shall have help.

Old Testament.

In solemn forms of adjuration, or earnest entreaty, *by* refers to the object for which the person adjured, or entreated, is conceived to have the highest regard ; as,

I adjure thee BY the living God. New Testament.
BY THOSE HAPPY SOULS who dwell
In yellow meads of asphodel,
Restore Euridice, &c. Pope.

And so of cursing ; as,
The Philistine cursed David BY HIS GODS. Old Testament.

W I T H.

Of ablatives by *with* 'tis the intent
 Concomitants or adjuncts to present.

The name which depends upon this sign denotes an object which is considered as *the concomitant*, or *adjunct*, in some state.

All verbs active denoting such states as admit of an instrument to be used in effecting what is produced or accomplished by the state, as likewise the passive forms correspondent to such verbs active, take the name of the instrument in dependence upon them by the sign *with* ; as, *to work—to be wrought WITH a tool—to write—to be written WITH a pen.*

They slew Hamor and Shechem his son WITH THE EDGE of the sword. Old Testament.
If he smite WITH AN INSTRUMENT of iron. Old Testament.

Some verbs neuter admit of the sign *with* in the like construction ; as, *to point with a rod—to walk with a cane.*

We labour, working WITH OUR OWN HANDS. New Testament.

But many of the verbs neuter take the sign *by* in this reference ; as, *to fall by the sword*.

By THE BLAST of God they perish.

• Old Testament.

Any circumstance of situation may be applied by *with*, if that circumstance be considered merely as the adjunct of the principal object, or state, concerned in the situation ; as,

One cried, God bless us ! and amen ! the other,

As they had seen me WITH THESE HANGMAN'S HANDS. Shakespeare.

Let go thy hold when a great wheel runs down hill, lest it break thy neck WITH FOLLOWING IT. Shakespeare.

An emperor bid under a crust of dross, after cleansing, has appeared WITH ALL HIS TITLES fresh and beautiful. Addison on Medals.

Rebeckah came forth WITH HER PITCHER on her shoulder. Old Test.

States of *contending, striving, vying, &c.* whether expressed by nouns or verbs, are referred to the object which is the opposite, or antagonist, by the sign *with* ; as, *a struggle, contest with such a man—to struggle, fight, contend with such a man ;* and so,

The younger sons may be placed in such a way of life, as may enable them to vie WITH THE BEST OF THEIR FAMILY. Addison.

Plead my cause, O Lord, WITH THEM that strive WITH ME. *ibid.*

Whether they quarrelled among themselves, or WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS. Spectator, N^o 70.

All situations or states of mutual intercourse, whether expressed by nouns or verbs, are referred by *with*, to the objects which are equally concerned with other objects in such states or situations ; as, *conversation, dealings, trade with such people—to converse, to deal, to trade with such people ;* and so,

—Where the sapient king
Held dalliance WITH HIS FAIR EGYPTIAN SPOUSE.

Milton.

That

*That high all-ſeer, WHICH I dallied WITH,
Hath turn'd my feigned prayer on my head.*

Shakeſpeare.

States of *partaking, ſharing, dividing, mixing, compounding*, &c. take the ſign *with* to refer to the name of any object that is equally concerned with others in ſuch ſtates; as, *to partake of, ſhare, divide ſuch things with a partner. To mix wine with water—to compound one thing with another, &c. and ſo,*

Thou haſt been partaker WITH ADULTERERS. Old Teſtament.
He ſhall divide the ſpoil WITH THE STRONG. . ibid.

The ſtates of *being pleaſed, diſpleaſed, ſatisfied, diſſatisfied, contented, diſcontented, wearied, reſreſhed, loaded, beſet*, and ſeveral others, require the ſign *with* before the name of the object which occasions *the pleaſure, diſpleaſure, &c.* as, *pleaſed with trifles—ſatisfied with a little—beſet with dangers, &c. and ſo,*

*I was very much awed and delighted WITH THE APPEARANCE of the
god of wit.* Addiſon, Spectat. N° 64.

*A fault in the ordinary method of education, is the charging of
children's memories WITH RULES AND PRECEPTS.* Locke.

The native hue of reſolution

Is ſicklied o'er WITH THE PALE CAST OF THOUGHT. Shakeſpeare.

Qualities or circumſtances conſidered as *concomitants of ſome ſtate*, take the ſign *with* before their names, when in dependence on ſuch ſtate; as, *to go with ſpeed—to ſtrive with eagernels—to advance with reſolution—to act with vigour, &c. and ſo,*

*Did not Paul and Barnabas diſpute WITH VEHEMENCE about a
very little point of conveniency?* Atterbury.

The adverbs in *ly* uſually expreſs qualities or circumſtances under the ſame connexion as that denoted by *with*; for the expreſſions above are of the ſame import; as, *to go ſpeedily—to ſtrive eagerly*

eagerly—to advance resolutely—to act vigorously; and so of other instances.

With likewise refers to the name of any object, *upon* or *amongst* which some other object has an influence; as, *to have interest; credit, authority with such a man, with such a company, &c.*

But interest is her name WITH MEN below.

Dryden.

i. e. amongst men below.

With is sometimes used to express a state as proceeding in its duration, and continuing the same time that some other object continues; as,

WITH HER they flourish'd, and WITH HER they die.

Pope.

Sometimes *with* gives notice, that as soon as one thing came to pass, another also happened; as,

WITH THIS he pointed to his face.

Dryden.

i. e. as soon as this was said or done, he pointed, &c.

IN.

Containing objects, when dependent seen
On nouns or verbs, claim ablatives by *in*.
Likewise the objects of our care, or pains,
Or those by which its views the mind restrains.

This sign directs to the name of any object which determines either place or time that may be conceived as *comprehending* or *containing* other objects or states.

As, *a man in a house—a horse in a field—to be in a house, in a field—this was in such a month—this came to pass in such a year—in the reign of such a king, &c.* and so,

There were IN THE SAME COUNTRY Joseph's abiding IN THE FIELD.

New Testament.

It

*It came to pass IN THOSE DAYS, that there went out a decree from
Cæsar Augustus.* New Testament.

*When the wife of Hector, IN HOMER'S ILLIADS, discourses with
her husband about the battle, IN WHICH he was going to engage.*

Addison, Spect. N° 57.

*What would it work, trimmed IN THE GORGEOUS ELOQUENCE of
Pindar ?* Sidney.

*Such a one does not behold his life, as a short, transient, perplexing
state; but sees it IN QUITE ANOTHER LIGHT.* Spect. N° 75.

But we say on such a day—at such a time.

All sorts of states which are supposed to continue for a time, may have their names united by *in* with any object or state which is represented as under the influence of those states; as, *a man in sorrow, transport, fear, hope, love, &c. to be, to have been in sorrow, transport, fear, hope, love, &c.*

This is the situation in which verbs denoting the condition of the mind, when depending upon substantives, represent the objects denoted by these substantives; for, *a man sorrowing, transported, fearing, hoping, loving*, are expressions equivalent to *a man in sorrow, transport, &c.*

And so, *to be in a confederacy, a conspiracy, a plot, in arms, in trade, &c.* denote situations analogous to the verbal states *to be confederated, conspiring, plotting, &c.*

Any object contained may be referred to the object containing by the sign *in*, as well as by the sign *of*. Hence, *a chapter in a book, or of a book—the parts in such a whole, or of such a whole*, are equivalent expressions; and so of many other instances.

The materials upon which any art or performance is exerted, may be considered as containing or comprehending the effect of
such

such performance. Hence the expressions, *to work in wood, stone, silver, &c.*

And the subject upon which any kind of pains is employed may be considered in the same manner. Hence the expressions, *to take pains in the languages—in the mathematics; to be diligent in business—to be assiduous in attending, &c.* and so,

They divide the whole twenty-four hours among them IN SUCH A MANNER, that the club sits day and night. Spect. N° 72.
Lord Clifford vows to fight IN THE DEFENCE. Shakespeare.

Any rate or proportion which is considered as analogous to some less sum or quantity contained by a larger, may be expressed by *in*; as, *five in the hundred—twelve pence in the pound—four in every five, &c.* and so,

Ten IN THE HUNDRED lies here engraved. Shakespeare.

Solemn forms of denunciation are frequently expressed by *in*; as, *in the name of God let this be done.*

—*IN THE POWER of us, the tribunes,*
We banish him. Shakespeare.

Several adverbial expressions are formed by *in*; as, *in all probability, in reason, in justice, &c.* These are restrictive expressions, and shew that things must be considered no farther than probability, reason or justice, allows.

FOR.

In ablatives by *for* we names descry,
That shew the reason, cause, account, or purpose why.

This sign directs to the name of the *final cause*, i. e. to the name which expresses the motive that influences rational agents to proceed in some particular manner; as, *to work for hire—to fight for honour—to write for bread, &c.* It

It likewise refers to whatsoever expresses *that upon account of which* things appear so or so, or are considered or treated so or so; as,

Convenient, inconvenient for the summer, for the winter, for the sea, &c. condemned, detested, for cruelty, &c. remembered, remarked for singularity, &c. and so, I took you for such a person; let him go for a rogue.

He dies for a deserter.

Gay.

It is an argument of a light mind, to think the worse of ourselves

FOR THE IMPERFECTIONS OF OUR PERSONS. Spectator, N° 33.

There is nothing so bad FOR THE FACE, *as party-zeal.* N° 57.

The ax methinks would have been a good figure FOR A LAMPOON.

Addison, Spectator, N° 58.

The account for which we exert our powers and faculties, is frequently that others may be excused from doing what we do. When we proceed in this manner, we supply the place, or stand instead of those *for whom* we exert ourselves. Hence *a substitute for another, to appear, plead, serve, project, plan, contrive, &c. for such a one; i. e. in his stead or behalf.*

In buying, selling, making wagers, &c. *for* refers to the name of whatsoever is received, paid, or hazarded; as, *to sell, buy such goods for so much; a wager for such a sum; I cannot do it for my life; i. e. if my life were at stake.*

A paltry ring, whose poesy was

FOR ALL THE WORLD like Cutler's poetry.

Shakespeare.

i. e. as like Cutler's poetry, as if all the world had been at stake on the exactness of the likeness.

Whatsoever is considered as *that towards which* any disposition, preparation, intention, &c. is directed, admits of the sign *for* before the name or expression of it; as, *Aristotle is for poetic justice; Jove was for Venice; he is all for such a thing, i. e. disposed*

posed in favour or inclination towards poetic justice, towards Venus, towards such a thing. *I am for you*; i. e. ready or prepared to receive you.

We sailed FOR GENOA.

Addison.

i. e. with intention to arrive at Genoa.

The words *fit, right, proper*, or other words of like import, are often omitted; and *for* corresponds with what is omitted or understood; as, *it is for kings to consult the public good*; i. e. to consult the public good is fit, right, proper for kings.

—— *It were FOR ME*

To throw my sceptre at the injurious Gods.

Shakespeare.

i. e. it were fit, proper, for me to throw, &c.

With names of periods of time, *for* frequently gives notice that some state continues quite through the period; as,

Hired FOR LIFE. Prior. i. e. during or quite through life.

To guide the sun's chariot FOR A DAY.

Garth.

i. e. during one day, &c.

I never knew a party-woman that kept her beauty FOR A TWELVE-MONTH.

Addison, Spectator, N° 57.

THAN.

Than is a sign by which the mind refers
To that wherewith it any thing compares.

I have already observed, that this particle is (in its general application) not properly a preposition, but a conjunction, directing to that part of a series of words, which is united to the rest by containing that with which a comparison is made, and by which some excess or defect is estimated. Therefore an adjective or adverb of the comparative degree appears in the series of words with *than*, to shew the quality or property that is compared;

pared; as, *a man wiser, richer, less wise, less rich than another; a thing done more or less prudently than was expected; and so,*

Thou art fairer THAN the children of men. Old Testament.

The glory of this latter house shall be GREATER THAN of the former.

Old Testament.

I have no greater joy THAN TO HEAR THAT MY CHILDREN WALK IN TRUTH.

New Testament.

Many of the expressions in which *than* is concerned, although they have not the form of two full sentences depending the one upon the other, may nevertheless be easily compleated into such sentences, by supplying what is left to be understood. Thus, *thou art wiser than I*, is equivalent to, *thou art wiser than I AM*; *you love him more than me*, to, *you love him more than you LOVE me*, &c.

In expressions of this nature in Latin, it is usual to put the substantive, that denotes the object with which the comparison is made, in the ablative case; as, *me sapientior es*, which (if *than* be considered as a sign of the ablative case) may be translated, *thou art wiser than me*. The best English writers have considered *than* as such a sign; as,

You are a much greater loser than ME. Swift.

She suffers more than ME. Swift.

A stone is weighty and sand heavy, but a fool's wrath is heavier than THEM both. Old Testament.

Thou art a girl as much brighter than HER,

As he was a poet sublimer than ME. Prior.

If these expressions are compleated into full sentences, they will become, *you are a much greater loser than I AM—she suffers more than I SUFFER—a fool's wrath is heavier than THEY both ARE—thou art a girl as much brighter than SHE WAS, as he was a poet sublimer than I AM.* But if the expressions are turned into rela-

tive clauses, by substituting the relative instead of the personal pronouns, the clauses will be, *I than whom you are a much greater loser*—*I than whom she suffers more*—*sand and stone than both which a fool's wrath is heavier*—*she than whom thou art a girl as much brighter*—*I than whom he was a sublimer poet*; and in all these instances it is evident, that the relative is in an oblique case by the force of the sign *than*. Therefore it seems to me that the expressions, *you are a much greater loser than me*, and the rest of that form, must be allowed of in grammar; and if so, *than*, which is most usually a conjunction, must on some occasions be allowed likewise to be a preposition or sign of an oblique case; just as *for* must likewise be allowed to be. For whether the sentences are supplied, in which *than* is concerned, or the oblique cases, *me*, *them*, *her*, are used, and the sentences are not directly made up, the result will amount either way to the same thing; only if the sentences are supplied, the mode of estimation is conceived to be of one kind; and if the oblique cases are used, the mode is conceived to be of another kind; and therefore the form of expression varies when the mode of estimation does so, although the result of either form amounts to the same thing. The reason why one and the same complex object or state may be expressed by different modes of estimation, is shewn at large, Book I, Section XIV; and Book V, Section III, of the Speculative Grammar.

Of the construction of substantives in like cases.

NAMES to intitle or describe design'd
 Conceptions rais'd already in the mind
 By other names, must the same cases bear
 In which the names that first are us'd appear.

Sometimes no verb like cases comes between;
 But the verb substantive may intervene:
 Likewise such passive verbs, as *nam'd*, *esteem'd*,
Accounted, *made*, *intitled*, *call'd* or *deem'd*.

When

When several names, each of which equally denotes one and the same object, are applied together in order to describe or intitle such object more fully, these names are in the same case; as,

THE LORD JEHOVAH—MOSES THE SERVANT of the Lord. Old Testament.
JESUS of Nazareth THE KING of the Jews. New Testament.
SIMON PETER, A SERVANT and AN APOSTLE of Jesus Christ. *ibid.*
To possess NATIONS greater and mightier than thyself, A PEOPLE great and tall, THE CHILDREN of the Anakims. Old Testament.

This manner of construction is usually called apposition in grammar.

The forms of the verb substantive, *i. e.* of the verb *to be*, may connect any two names of one and the same object in the same case; as,

GODLINESS IS GREAT RICHES, if a man be content with that he hath. New Testament.
TRUTH WAS THE FOUNDER of the family. Spectator, N° 35.
Menippus knew IT to be THE PRAYER of his friend Licander. Spectator, N° 391.

In this last example, *it* and *the prayer* are both of the accusative case, as denoting *the thing which was known*.

The expression, *it to be the prayer*, is equivalent to, *that it was the prayer*. The reason of this coincidence of the two forms, is given at Book VI, Section II, page 282, of the Speculative Grammar; and so,

The Lord sent me to anoint THEE TO BE KING over Israel, Old Test. is equivalent to, *The Lord sent me to anoint thee, THAT THOU SHOULDEST BE KING over Israel.*

Likewise the passive verbs, *named*, *accounted*, &c. may connect two names of the same object in the same case; as, *a child named*

named John—such a one is made a judge—is appointed ambassador to such a court ; and so,

MAN is said to be A SOCIABLE ANIMAL.

Spectator, N° 9.

I am ONE OF THOSE DESPICABLE CREATURES CALLED A CHAMBERMAID.

Spectator, N° 366.

I and my SON SOLOMON shall be accounted OFFENDERS. Old Test.

The active forms of the verbs above-mentioned admit of the two names of the same object in the accusative case ; as, *to name a child John—to make such a man a judge ; and so,*

I ever thought IT A MOST IMPIOUS BLASPHEMY against that holy religion, to father any thing upon it that easily tended to MAKE A FREE AND HAPPY PEOPLE SLAVES.

Fleetwood.

The Lord which chose me before thy father, TO APPOINT ME RULER over the people of the Lord.

Old Testament.

The Lord hath established HIM KING.

ibid.

Of the construction of single words, or of serieses of words, so as to have the effect of one noun substantive in some case, although without any sign or preposition.

TH' infinitive, and what on it depends,
Oft as a name on nouns and verbs attends.

This form may names of any case supply ;

But chiefly shews *the cause* or *purpose why*.

And with the verb *to be* it ascertains

Appointed states, or those which any rule ordains.

The verb in the infinitive mood, either without or with other words in dependence upon it, may stand in any connexion with other words in which a noun substantive may stand. Thus in,

To BE or NOT TO BE ; that is the question.

Shakespeare.

To

To be or not to be, is in effect a substantive in the nominative case. And in,

I had the misfortune TO BE AN UNCLE before I knew my nephews from my nieces. Spectator, N° 402.

The misfortune to be an uncle, is equivalent to, *the misfortune of being an uncle*; so that *to be an uncle* is here of the same effect as a substantive in the genitive case; and so in,

Fond TO SPREAD FRIENDSHIPS. Pope.

To spread friendships is *that of which* the person is fond; and in, *They were desirous TO ASK HIM: to ask him* denotes *that of which* they were desirous; and so of many other instances.

In, *I have known one of these gentlemen think himself obliged to FORGET THE DAY of an appointment.* Spectator, N° 473.

To forget, &c. is equivalent to a dative case; for it expresses *that to which* the gentleman thought himself obliged.

As to the force of an accusative case, the verb of the infinitive mood has such force whensoever it depends upon a transitive verb. Thus in,

I attempt TO BRING INTO the service of honour and virtue every thing in nature. Spectator, N° 466.

To bring into the service of virtue, &c. is, *that which is attempted*, and therefore is equivalent to a substantive in the accusative case; and so of other instances which occur continually.

But the use of the infinitive verb in dependent construction is chiefly to shew *the purpose why* some verbal state is enjoined, or otherwise affected; as,

Strive TO ENTER IN at the strait gate. New Testament.

Where, *to enter into at the strait gate*, expresses, *that for which*, or *on account of which*, we are enjoined to strive; and so of many other

other instances. The preposition *for* appears, in the older English writers, before the infinitive mood in this kind of construction ; as,

All their works they do FOR TO BE SEEN of men. New Testament.
But this construction is not now in use.

The infinitive mood, in dependence upon the forms of the verb *to be*, is frequently used to represent some state that is appointed, or proposed, or which is the consequence of any rule laid down or supposed ; as,

The tent of Darius IS TO BE PEOPLED by the ingenious Mrs. Salmon, where Alexander IS TO FALL IN LOVE with a piece of wax-work.

Addison, Spectator, N^o 31.

And, *There IS TO BE a scene of Hockly in the Hole, in which IS TO BE REPRESENTED all the diversions of the place.* *ibid.* edit. 1744.

Here the expression *is to be represented* is of a wrong number ; it should be *are to be*, because *diversions* are of the plural number. But perhaps this is an error of the press.

If all political power be derived from Adam, and BE TO DESCEND only to his successive heirs. Locke.

Of whole sentences used as substantives.

THE casual *that* whole sentences may place
As a noun substantive in any case.

The sentential or casual demonstrative *that*, when prefixed to sentence, is a notice that the sentence is to be considered all of it together as one substantive in some case. Thus in,

It came to pass at the end of forty days, THAT NOAH OPENED THE WINDOW OF THE ARK. Old Testament

That Noah opened the window of the ark, denotes *that which came to pass*, and therefore is a kind of nominative case ; and in,

I know

I know THAT MY REDEEMER LIVETH.

Liturgy.

That my Redeemer liveth, denotes *that which is known*, and therefore is a kind of accusative case ; and in,

I am credibly informed, THAT ALL THE INSINUATIONS ARE FALSE.

Spectator, N° 372.

That all the insinuations are false, is *that of which I am informed*, and is therefore equivalent to a genitive case ; and so of other instances.

Or if what should be nom'native becomes
Accusative, and to itself assumes
A verb infinitive ; the whole will give
What answers to a noun in the accusative.

A substantive in the accusative case, with a verb in the infinitive mood depending upon it, frequently supplies the place of a sentence depending on *that* ; so as to answer the effect of one noun substantive in the accusative case. Thus,

*The king commanded HIS SON, ON FOOT, TO LAY HIS RIGHT HAND
ON THE GENTLEMAN'S STIRRUP.*

Spectator, N° 382.

is equivalent to, *the king commanded that his son, on foot, should lay his right hand on the gentleman's stirrup* ; and *that his son on foot, &c.* is manifestly *that which is commanded*, and is therefore equivalent to an accusative case ; and so in,

*My landlady has forbidden ANY SUCH CEREMONY TO BE USED IN
THE HOUSE.*

Spectator, N° 12.

Any such ceremony to be used, is equivalent to, *that any such ceremony should be used* ; and as this expresses *that which has been forbidden*, it is equivalent to an accusative case.

With casual *that* we often may dispense,
Or with a relative, and yet preserve the sense.

As *that*, when used in the capacity of a sentential demonstrative, or casual particle, is only a notice concerning words themselves; *i. e.* a notice that a whole series of them which bears the form of a compleat sentence is to be considered as one noun substantive in some case; it is frequently unnecessary to apply it, because the nature of what is said shews how the dependent sentence is to be considered, without any particular direction. Thus in the following instances;

It is often said, after a man has heard a story with extraordinary circumstances, it is a very good one, if it be true.

Spectator, N^o 322.

I fear it comes too much from the heart.

ibid.

That is omitted before *it is a very good one*; and likewise before *it comes too much*, &c. For it is manifest, that *it is a very good one*, &c. is *that which is said*, and is therefore a kind of nominative case depending on the passive verb, *it is said*; and, that *it comes too much from the heart*, expresses *that which is feared*, and therefore is a kind of accusative case depending on the verb transitive *I fear*; and in,

I remember last winter there were several young girls sitting about the fire.

Spectator, N^o 12.

that is omitted before *last winter*; and so of very many instances in any English book.

The relative pronoun may also frequently be omitted without ambiguity; for it only denotes its antecedent as concerned in a sentence, which is to be made a dependent member of another sentence, in which the antecedent is also concerned. Thus in,

I have now gained the faculty, I have been so long endeavouring after.

Spectator, N^o 356.

The relative *which* is omitted before *I have been so long*, &c. and in,

There

There are none can properly be called rich, who have not more than they want. Spectator, N° 574.

The relative *that* or *who* is omitted before *can be properly*; and in,

The aversion I for some years have had to clubs in general, gave me a perfect relish for your speculation on that subject. Spect. N° 24.

The relative *which* or *that* is omitted before *I*; and so of very many other instances which occur in almost any English book.

Of the construction of verbs impersonal.

THE English verbs impersonal appear
Placed in dependence or on *it* or *there*.
Impersonals, if form'd by *there*, receive
The number of a following nom'native:
Those form'd by *it*, to singulars confin'd,
A sentence often take by *that* subjoin'd,
Or verb infinitive, or any train
Of words, which, in effect, a nom'native contain.

I have already shewed, that every verb definitive has relation to some subject, and that the grammatic form of such verb, independently of the rest of its signification, is a notice that the expression of the subject on which the verb depends, is sufficiently compleated for the speaker's purpose. Nevertheless, it is not convenient, in all instances, to express this subject at large, before the definitive verb is mentioned; for in some instances, the subject is conceived to be known of course; and in other instances, the subject is better expressed at large in that part of the sentence which follows the definitive verb, than in that part which precedes it. In instances of the kinds above-mentioned, ~~it~~ may either be used to represent any singular object which is conceived to be known of course; as, *it rains, it is fair, it thunders, &c.* i. e. the air, or the sky, rains, is fair, thunders, &c.

Or any object which is to be mentioned more fully in the following part of the sentence, especially an object denoted by a verb of the infinitive mood, either without or with other words; as, *it is necessary to consider—to consider this point attentively*; i. e. *to consider—to consider this point attentively, is necessary*; so that in effect, *to consider—to consider this point attentively*, are expressions equivalent each to one noun substantive in the nominative case, either of which is represented by *it*, on which the definitive verb *is* depends; and so,

It is highly laudable to pay respect to men descended from worthy ancestors. Spectator, N^o 612.

i. e. *to pay respect to, &c. is highly laudable.*

It is likewise used to represent what is denoted by a full sentence depending on *that* in the following part of the sentence; as, *it was told Laban, that Jacob was fled*; i. e. that Jacob was fled was told Laban.

Let it not displease my Lord that I cannot rise up before thee.
Old Testament.

i. e. let not the behaviour expressed by, *I cannot rise up before thee*, displease my Lord; and so of other instances.

Sometimes a whole narration is introduced by *it*, so that all which follows is shewn to have come to pass in the situation, or at the time, expressed by the clause to which this article is prefixed; as,

*'Twas at the royal feast from Persia won
By Philip's warlike son.
Aloft in awful state
The godlike hero sat, &c.*

Dryden.

i. e. it was at the royal feast, &c. that the godlike hero sat, &c.

'Twas

*'Twas when the seas were roaring
With hollow blasts of wind,
A damsel lay deploring, &c.*

Gay.

i. e. it was when the seas were, &c. that a damsel, &c.

It is frequently used to denote the subject of enquiry, of whatsoever person that subject may be; as, *Lord, is it I?*
New Testament.

Or the subject of any verbal state which is to be fully declared by a relative clause, of whatsoever person that subject may be; as,
'Twas I that kill'd her. Shakespeare.
And so it might be said, *'twas thou that killedst her.*

As *it* is made, in these instances, to represent a subject, which, when it comes to be expressed particularly, is of the first or second persons singular, some authors have used *it* to represent a plural subject, till it is expressed particularly; as,

—— *Who was't came by?*

'Tis two or three, my Lord, that bring you word, &c. Shakesp.
'Tis these that early taint the female soul. Pope.

The propriety of this form of expression is disputed; but it occasions no ambiguity, and therefore may be tolerated, if it appear much more convenient on any occasion than a more regular form.

There is only used to give notice that the nominative case stands behind the verb, and therefore is no more than a notice concerning the structure of words themselves; as,

~~THERE~~ *were that thought it a part of Christian charity to instruct them.* Hooker.

i. e. some persons were that thought, &c.

Wherever

Wherever THERE is sense or perception.

Locke.

i. e. wherever sense or perception is.

THERE are tenebrificous and dark stars.

Spectator, N^o 582.

i. e. tenebrificous and dark stars are; and so of other instances.

I have called this kind of construction *impersonal*, in compliance with the received terms of grammar. But in reality, every definitive verb must have a subject, and that subject must be fully expressed, or supposed to be fully known to the hearer; for otherwise, the definitive grammatic form of the verb could not be consistently used.

Of the construction of participles.

PARTICIPLES may either be used in an objective or coalescent capacity; when used objectively, they supply the office of substantives, and admit of every sign which a substantive admits of; as, *of, in, by, with calling, &c.* and,

IN YOUR DRESSING, let there be ejaculations fitted to the several actions OF DRESSING; as, AT WASHING YOUR HANDS, pray to God to cleanse, &c.

Taylor.

'When used in coalescence, they unite with some name, and shew the object denoted by that name, as in some occasional state of being; as, *a man calling—having called, &c.*

The name upon which a coalescent participle depends, may be in any kind of connexion with, or dependence upon, other words; as, *the voice of a man calling—attention to a man calling, &c.*

Whate'er dependent case a verb may claim,
Its participle may command the same.

Participles,

Participles, whether used objectively, or in coalescence, admit of substantives in dependence upon them, by the same modes of connexion as the verbs do from which the participles are derived. If therefore the verb be *transitive*, its active participles are also *transitive*, and admit of an accusative case in immediate dependence upon them; as, *a man calling us—having called them*, &c. and substantives in dependence on all the prepositions may follow a participle as they follow the verb to which the participle belongs; as,

Satan's TRAVERSING THE GLOBE, and still KEEPING WITHIN THE SHADOW of the night, as fearing TO BE DISCOVERED BY THE ANGEL of the sun. Addison, Spectator, N° 351.

She is represented as APPROACHING ADAM. Spectator, N° 357.

She is described as RENEWING her addresses TO HIM. *ibid.*

My old friend started, and RECOVERING OUT OF HIS BROWN STUDY, told Sir Andrew, &c. Spectator, N° 359.

Of nouns used adverbially.

THE names of *parts of time or any size*
By measure ascertain'd, our speech applies
As adverbs; yet these sorts of names appear
Without the usual forms which adverbs bear.

The names of parts or periods of time, of distance, and of measure, are usually applied in English without any sign or additional termination, although these names, when thus applied, are of the nature of adverbs, or of substantives in some oblique case; as,

It has indeed been, TIME OUT OF MIND, generally remarked, that this family of starers have infected public assemblies.

Spectator, N° 20.

i. e. during, or quite through, a length of time beyond the memory of man.

The foot and artillery was FOUR MILES behind. Clarendon.

And so, a road FIVE YARDS broad; a well TEN FATHOM deep, &c.

Of conjunctions as joining words.

THE copulative conjunctions may connect
 Like cases, moods, and tenses, which respect
 Some common word; or may, to suit the sense,
 Attend a different case, or mood, or tense.
 And in the like construction, you'll perceive
 Both the disjunctive, and the discrepative.

The copulative conjunctions most frequently connect like cases, moods, and tenses; because they most frequently connect objects and states under similar situations and circumstances. But they may be used to connect different cases, moods, and tenses, when those processes of the mind which are denoted by these conjunctions, are applied to objects or verbal states in different situations and circumstances. Thus they join like cases and tenses in,

HOMER AND HESIOD INTIMATE to us how this art should be applied, when they represent the muses as SURROUNDING Jupiter, AND WARBLING HYMNS about his throne. Spectator, N° 406.

But in,

True happiness is of a retired NATURE, and AN ENEMY to pomp and noise. Spectator, N° 15.

And refers *an enemy*, which is of the nominative case, to *is*; although *of a nature* which is of the genitive, depends upon the same verb in the preceding clause: and in,

I am desired by the company to inform you, that THEY SUBMIT it to your censures, AND SHALL HAVE YOU in greater veneration than Hercules was in of old. Spectator, N° 36.

Shall have of the future tense is referred to *they* by the conjunction *and*, after *submit* of the present tense is united with the same word *they*; and so of many other instances.

*Of the conjunctions and indefinites which require a verb
of the subjunctive mood.*

TO express uncertain states, *except, lest, so, Before, ere, till, if, howsoever, though, Although, unless, with who and what-soe'er And whether*, the subjunctive mood prefer.

As all these words imply something of contingency or uncertainty, and the subjunctive mood is peculiarly adapted to express contingent states, it is usually found in dependence upon these words; as,

I will not let thee go, EXCEPT THOU BLESS me. Old Testament.

EXCEPT I BE by Silvia in the night,

There is no musick in the nightingale.

Shakespeare.

Let us go and sacrifice to the Lord our God, LEST HE FALL upon us with pestilence. Old Testament.

—This let him know,

LEST, wilfully transgressing, HE PRETEND Surprisal.

Milton.

—Revenge back on itself recoils.

Let it. I reckon not, so IT LIGHT well aim'd.

Milton.

So, in this construction, is used for, *if so be that*.

Let there be some more test made of my metal,

BEFORE so noble and so great a figure

BE STAMPT upon it.

Shakespeare.

How long will it be ERE THOU BE quiet?

Old Testament.

—There mingle broils,

ERE this avenging sword BEGIN thy doom.

Milton.

Seek out his wickedness TILL THOU FIND none.

Old Testament.

*To boundless vengeance the wide realm be giv'n,
TILL vast destruction GLUT the queen of heav'n.* Pope.
If thou LET this man go, thou art not Cæsars friend. New Test.
If Oedipus DESERVE thy care. Pope.
HOWEVER it BE. Pope.
THOUGH our outward man PERISH. New Testament.

——— *Though heav'n's king
RIDE on thy wings.* Milton.
ALTHOUGH my house BE not so with God. Old Testament.
*He shall not eat of the holy things, UNLESS HE WASH his flesh with
water.* Old Testament.

*UNLESS an age too late, or cold
Climate, or years, DAMP my intended wing.* Milton.
He that troubleth you shall bear his judgment, WHOSOEVER HE BE. New Testament.

WHATEVER BE our fate, yet let us try. Pope.
WHETHER IT WERE I or they, so we preach. New Testament.
*WHETHER IT BE that the richest of these discoveries fall into the
pope's hands.* Addison.

It is likewise to be observed, that, if the subject of a command is expressed by a sentence depending on *that*, the verb of this sentence must be of the subjunctive mood; as,

Beware THAT thou BRING not my son thither. Old Testament.
Or if *that* be understood in such command; as,
See THOU TELL no man. New Testament.

Of the construction of prepositions.

TO prepositions, not themselves the signs
Of cases, use th' accusative subjoins.

As no words in English, except some of the pronouns, have
an accusative form different from the nominative, the appli-
cation

cation of prepositions, so far as grammatic form is concerned, is very easy in English.

But one and the same preposition is frequently applied to express relations or connexions of so very different kinds, that the proper application of the prepositions is undoubtedly one of the greatest difficulties which a stranger will find in the language; because mere arbitrary custom has prevailed in many instances so far, as to reduce even contrary relations to expressions formed by the same preposition. Thus we usually say, *an aversion to such a thing—averse to such measures*, although the sign *from* should seem to be here required; because the word *aversion* signifies a state of disjunction, and *from* is usually applied in references where such states are concerned. Many other instances may easily be given of the application of the same preposition, with little regard to the nature of the connexion which is denoted by it. This creates no difficulty to those who are brought up where the language is constantly spoken, and therefore directions on this head are not necessary for them. But to persons who attempt to learn the language, after they have been brought up in another, directions are necessary; and although no directions can be given which extend to every particular, yet such accounts of the principal instances of the application of each preposition may be given, as will make this intricate subject much easier to a foreigner; and for this reason, I have considered all the prepositions in what follows, as those which are equivalent to signs of cases have been already considered.

AFORE, BEFORE.

The names which have these prepositions before them, denote objects which are considered as *not so far onward in place*, or as *preceded in time*, or *the object to which any thing is considered as prior or superior or preferred*, or *that which any thing is considered as fronting or facing*, or as *in the presence, sight, or under the cognizance of*; as,

Who shall go BEFORE THEM in a cloud.

Milton.

Do thy diligence to come BEFORE WINTER.

New Testament.

The eldest son is BEFORE THE YOUNGER in succession.

S. Johnson.

The Lord which chose me BEFORE THY FATHER and BEFORE ALL HIS HOUSE.

Old Testament.

To stand—sit BEFORE THE FIRE ; i. e. so as to front or face it.

They could not take hold of his words BEFORE THE PEOPLE.

New Testament.

Both parties shall come BEFORE THE JUDGES.

Old Testament.

The Alps and Pyreneans sing BEFORE HIM.

Addison.

To bring a cause BEFORE THE HOUSE OF LORDS, &c.

Before is much more frequently used as an adverb, than as a preposition ; because some sentence expressed, or something understood, more usually determines that by which *priority*, or the other relations denoted by it, are estimated, than single substantives do ; as in such expressions as the following, *BEFORE I HAD DONE SPEAKING IN MY HEART, behold Rebekah came forth. —BEFORE THEY CALL, I will answer—I tell you BEFORE IT COME.*

The battle was BEFORE and BEHIND ; i. e. before and behind the army of Judah.

Who was BEFORE a blasphemer ; i. e. I Paul, before I was put into the ministry.

1st Tim. ch. i. ver. 13.

AGAINST.

The substantives which depend on this preposition, denote something considered as *opposed*, or *for the coming whereof provision is made before-hand* ; as,

AGAINST WHOM hast thou exalted thyself.

Old Testament.

These things cannot be spoken AGAINST.

New Testament.

Trouts and salmons swim AGAINST THE STREAM.

Bacon.

AGAINST THE PROMIS'D TIME provides with care.

Dryden.

Thou

Thou shalt stand by the river's brink AGAINST HE COME.

Exodus, chap. vii. ver. 15.

Where it is observable, that *he come* is of the subjunctive mood.

BESIDE, BESIDES.

These denote, that whatsoever depends upon them, if it relates to place, is that *by or near the side of which* something is represented; as,

Blessed are those that sow BESIDE ALL WATERS. Old Testament.

BESIDE HIM hung his bow. Milton.

These prepositions likewise refer whatsoever is considered as *over and above*, or *not quite according to*, or *someways deviating*, to other names; as,

BESIDES ALL THIS, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed.

New Testament.

It is BESIDES MY PRESENT BUSINESS to enlarge upon this speculation.

Locke.

Paul, thou art BESIDE THY SELF.

New Testament.

NEAR, NIGH.

These prepositions direct to the name of some object or state, from which something is considered as not far distant; as,

Passing through the street NEAR HER CORNER. Old Testament.

This child was VERY NEAR BEING EXCLUDED OUT OF THE SPECIES OF MAN, barely by his shape.

Locke.

Salvation is NIGH THEM that fear him.

Old Testament.

In the translation of the Old and New Testament, *to* or *unto* is very frequently used after *near* and *nigh*; as,

Jacob went NEAR TO Isaac—Give me thy vineyard, because it is NEAR UNTO my house—A virgin NIGH TO him may be defiled.

The

The Lord is NIGH UNTO them that are of a broken heart.

Pſalm xxxiv. verſe 18. New Tranſlation.

This conſtruction is not uſed at preſent, unleſs in ſuch ſtile as is very ſolemn.

Near hand, nigh hand, near at hand, are adverbial expreſſions of vicinity.

By has frequently the ſignification of *near* ; as,

Stand here by thy burnt offering.

Old Teſtament.

By and by is an adverbial expreſſion of time conſidered as near the time of ſpeaking.

TOWARD, TOWARDS.

Theſe refer to expreſſions which denote the objects by which ſome *direction* or *tendency of approach* is aſcertained ; as,

I will look again TOWARDS THY HOLY temple.

Old Teſtament.

His heart relented TOWARDS HER.

Milton.

It is TOWARDS EVENING.

New Teſtament.

UNTO.

Of the ſame meaning as *to* ; but is now little uſed.

INTO.

This prepoſition refers to any name which aſcertains place that is conſidered as *entered*, or any thing beyond the outer parts whereof the attention is carried, or any ſtate to which things are brought by ſome cauſe or means ; as,

The children of Iſrael went INTO THE MIDST OF THE SEA. Old Teſt.

The younger son took his journey INTO A FAR COUNTRY. New Test.
To look INTO LETTERS. To examine *into things*, &c.

*Compound bodies may be resolved INTO OTHER SUBSTANCES than those
 WHICH they are INTO by fire.* Boyle.

*A man may whore and drink himself INTO ATHEISM, but it is im-
 possible he should think himself INTO IT.* Bentley.

A T.

This preposition shews, that what depends upon it denotes a circumstance considered as *merely present*, or *coexistent* with some object or state.

If this circumstance be place, or any object that ascertains place, *at* shews that this place is so present with the object or state on which it depends, as to determine the place or direction of such object or state; as,

A friend AT LONDON—AT SEA—AT LAND.

To be AT LONDON—AT SEA—AT LAND.

All the city was gathered together AT THE DOOR. New Testam.

So, *to look, strike, push, run, aim AT A MAN*, or other object.

Tbou hast thrust sore AT ME. Old Testament.

Peter knocked AT THE DOOR. New Testament.

If the circumstance be time, or what determines time, *at* shews the time to be coexistent with that state of things to which the circumstance is applied; as,

*Things were so and so AT such A TIME—We must march AT THE
 FIRST SIGNAL—A bill payable AT SIGHT.*

AT HIS TOUCH, they presently amend.

Shakespeare.

It shakes AT EVERY BLAST.

Dryden.

Deserted AT HIS UTMOST NEED.

ibid.

It follows from hence, that the beginning, ending, middle, or any period of continued state, may be ascertained by representing it as *at* any circumstance which determines *the place where*, or *time when*, or *any mark of distinction coexistent therewith*; as,

To begin, end, live, die, AT such a place, AT Rome, &c.

But if the place be a country, *in* is used; as,

To begin, end, live, die, IN Italy, France, England, &c.

To begin, end, live, die, AT such a time, AT the birth of our Saviour, &c.

So, *AT the most—AT the least—AT best*; i. e. at the situation in which, or the time when *the most, least, best*, of such things or states appear, or are supposed.

Any states denoted by substantives, and which only continue for a time, may be represented as coexistent with verbal states by *at*; as,

To be AT peace, war, variance, AT work, AT play.

So, *to be, or to play, AT cards, dice, bowls*, or any other game. Likewise,

To do a thing AT such a one's cost, AT the instigation, AT the suit, command, entreaty of such a one.

And, *to be AT command—to have one AT command*; i. e. ready whensoever a command is given.

To deserve well, ill, something, nothing, AT a man's hands, are peculiar expressions; for we say, *to deserve well, ill, something, nothing, OF a man.*

WITHIN.

This preposition refers to place or time, which are considered as *extending farther* than the place or time in which that exists which is referred by the preposition; as, *The*

The river is afterwards wholly lost WITHIN the waters of the lake, and one discovers nothing like a stream till WITHIN about a quarter of a mile from Geneva. Addison.

—*WITHIN these three hours, Tullus, Alone I fought in your Corioli walls.* Shakespeare.
There was a little city, and a few men WITHIN it. Old Testament.
He may redeem it WITHIN a whole year after it is sold. ibid.

Hence whatsoever is considered as *not being or going beyond* the efficacy, influence, extent, reach, &c. of that which is denoted by a substantive, may be referred to the substantive by *within*; as,

This latter which is more WITHIN our comprehension. Locke.
The desp'rate savage rush'd WITHIN my force. Otway.
Both he and she are still WITHIN my power. Dryden.
Be informed how much your husband's revenue amounts to, and be so good a computer as to keep WITHIN it. Swift.

WITHIN DOORS—WITHINDOOR ARTS. Bacon.

These are peculiar expressions, signifying relation to the inside of a house, in opposition to the open air.

BETWEEN, BETWIXT.

Whatsoever is considered as so related to two objects, as that it equally affects both, whether by *situation, duration, intercourse, partnership, separation, or distinction*, may be referred to the names of the objects by *between* or *betwixt*.

If the objects referred to are both of the same species, they may be both denoted by one plural name; as, *the distance BETWEEN the towns, places, &c. the time BETWEEN these payments, &c.* If the objects referred to are not of the same species, two names are joined by the conjunction *and*; as, *the distance BETWEEN England and France; the interval BETWEEN the creation of the world and the flood.*

Zacharias whom ye slew BETWEEN the temple and the altar.

New Testament.

He should think himself unhappy if things should go so BETWEEN THEM.

Bacon.

Castor and Pollux with only one soul BETWEEN THEM.

Locke.

I will put a division BETWEEN MY PEOPLE AND EGYPT.

Old Testament.

I am this day fourscore years old, and can I discern BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL?

Old Testament.

Children quickly distinguish BETWEEN what is required of them, and what not.

Locke.

I am in a strait BETWIXT TWO.

New Testament.

AMONG, AMONGST.

Whatsoever is considered as so related to more than two objects, as to be affected equally by all, whether by *mingling with them*, or *uniting with them so as to make part of their number*, may be referred by *among* or *amongst* to the names of the objects, as,

—*They heard,*

*And from his presence hid themselves AMONG
The thickest trees.*

Milton.

Blessed art thou AMONG WOMEN.

New Testament.

*He had disposed all the remarkable shows about town, AMONG THE
SCENES and decorations of his piece.* Addison, Spectator, N° 31.

AMIDST OR AMID.

These words have sometimes the same signification as *in the middle of*, and sometimes that of *amongst*; as,

But of the fruit of this fair tree AMIDST

THE GARDEN, God hath said, ye shall not eat.

Milton.

The boar AMIDST MY CHRYSAL STREAMS I bring.

Dryden.

What

*What tho' no real voice nor sound
AMID THEIR RADIANT ORBS be found?*

Addison.

ABOUT.

This preposition, when applied to determine local situation, is equivalent to *surrounding*, *encircling*, or to *near to*; as,

Hast thou not made a bedge ABOUT HIM? Old Testament.
ABOUT HIS NECK she cast her trembling hands. Dryden.
There was no room to receive them, no not so much as ABOUT THE DOOR. New Testament.

In the sense of *near to*, *about* is frequently applied to periods of time, and names of quantity; as,

When he was ABOUT AN HUNDRED YEARS old. New Testament.
He went out ABOUT THE THIRD HOUR. ibid.
It was ABOUT AN EPHAH OF BARLY. Old Testament.

Perhaps *about* may be considered as an adverb in this use of it; but a sense in which it is used as a preposition is derived from the above-mentioned, when it is applied to signify *appendant to*, or *officiating near the person of*; as,

*If you have this ABOUT YOU, you may
Boldly assault the necromancer's hall.* Milton.
She hath no body to do any thing ABOUT HER when I am gone. Shakespeare.

And hence the most general sense seems to be taken in which *about* is used, when it signifies *concerning*, and refers to the subject upon which the attention or discursive powers are employed; as,

I must be ABOUT my Father's BUSINESS. New Testament.
The shekels of silver ABOUT WHICH thou cursedst. Old Testament.
S f f 2 *They*

They signify either a speculative knowledge of things, or a practical skill ABOUT THEM. Tillotson.

To let us know in our mother-tongue, WHAT it is our brave countrymen ARE ABOUT. Spectator.

Here *which* or *that* is understood after *is*, and *about* refers to the relative understood; i. e. *what it is THAT our brave countrymen are ABOUT*; or, *ABOUT WHICH our brave countrymen are employed.*

AROUND.

The same as *about* when applied to place; i. e. *surrounding, or encircling.*

THROUGH or THOROUGH.

From one extremity to the other; as,

There is one God and Father of all; who is above all, and THROUGH ALL, and in you all. New Testament.

A simplicity shines THROUGH ALL he writes. Dryden.

Hence *through* is often applied with states of *piercing* or *passage*, to denote the object that is compleatly pierced or perforated or passed from one extremity to the other; as,

*Where in a plain defended by the wood,
Crept THROUGH THE MATTED GRASS a chrystal flood.* Dryden.

Through is likewise applied in reference to the object which is considered as *the means* or *motive* by which any thing is effected; as,

Ye are clean THROUGH THE WORD which I have spoken unto you. New Testament.

*Some THROUGH AMBITION, OR THROUGH THIRST OF GOLD
Have slain their brothers.* Dryden.

• THROUGH-

THROUGHOUT.

Quite through ; or in every part of ; as,

This gospel shall be preached THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE WORLD.
New Testament.

OUT OF.

Of in the sense of *from* is the preposition, and *out* is an adverb in composition with it in order to modify its signification.

When it refers to place, or any object which determines place, it signifies *from within* ; as,

OUT OF THE HEART proceed evil thoughts. New Testament.
To grow OUT OF CLEFTS. Bacon.

And hence it is applied to refer to whatsoever is considered as that from the substance, capacity, content, whereof any thing proceeds, is formed, derived, &c. as,

In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return into the ground; for OUT OF IT *wast thou taken.* Old Testam.
He performs all OUT OF HIS OWN FUND. Dryden.
All the fruits OUT OF WHICH *drink is pressed.* Bacon.
There were dwelling at Jerusalem, Jews, devout men, OUT OF EVERY NATION *under heaven.* New Testament.

Or to refer to any situation in which objects are not when the reference is made, although they have been in such situation, or are perhaps usually in it ; as,

One born OUT OF DUE TIME. New Testament.
Chiefs OUT OF WAR, *and statesmen* OUT OF PLACE. Pope.
To fright, persuade a man OUT OF HIS SENSES.
Be instant OUT OF SEASON. New Testament.
When

When the mouth is OUT OF TASTE.

Bells OUT OF TUNE.

Darts OUT OF ORDER thrown.

Both OUT OF HEART, and OUT OF WIND.

They are OUT OF THEIR ELEMENT.

To be OUT OF LOVE with any thing ; OUT OF herearing, reach, distance, proportion, &c.

Bacon.

Shakespeare.

Dryden.

Hudibras.

Baker.

Out of is likewise used to refer to the means, motive, or reason whence things become so or so ; as,

Trade and commerce might doubtless be still varied a thousand ways, OUT OF WHICH would arise such branches as have not yet been touched.

Spectator, N^o 283.

A war in which we engaged, not OUT OF AMBITION, but for the defence of all that was dear to us.

Atterbury.

And so, To do so or so OUT OF cowardice, laziness, ignorance, pride, fear, conscience, &c.

WITHOUT.

When this preposition refers to place, it is equivalent to *at the outside of* ; as,

Jesus also suffered WITHOUT THE GATE.

New Testament.

Therefore, in this use of it, it is the negative of *within*.

On other occasions it is the negative of *with*, and therefore as *with* may be applied to all sorts of concomitance, *without* may be used to deny concomitance of all sorts, and may imply *not having—not taking—not in company with—not within the sphere or limits of—not by the direction or help of*, &c. &c. as,

Israel hath been WITHOUT THE TRUE GOD.

Old Testament.

The labourers are gone WITHOUT THEIR WAGES.

There is no living with thee nor WITHOUT THEE.

Addison.

Eternity

Eternity is WITHOUT OUR REACH.

Burnet.

Wise men will do it WITHOUT LAW.

Bacon.

To make bricks WITHOUT STRAW.

AFTER.

Whatsoever is considered as *following*, whether in time, or by successive position, motion, imitation, or any discursive operation, may be referred by this preposition to *the object followed*; as,

Ye know that AFTER TWO DAYS is the feast of the passover.

New Testament.

Sometimes I placed a third prism AFTER A SECOND.

Newton.

The army of the Chaldeans pursued AFTER THE KING.

Old Test.

There are many particular figures of her, made AFTER THE SAME DESIGN.

Addison.

This allusion is AFTER THE ORIENTAL MANNER.

Pope.

He takes greatness of kingdoms according to bulk and currency, and not AFTER THEIR INTRINSICK VALUE.

Bacon.

BEHIND.

This preposition is not applied with names of time; yet it is often used to refer to such objects as remain after some other is gone; as,

He left BEHIND HIM myself and a sister.

Shakespeare.

i. e. he left at his going away myself and a sister.

And so, *He has left his gloves, whip, cane BEHIND HIM;*

i. e. at his departure.

And so with regard to death; as,

What he gave me to publish, was but a small part of what he left BEHIND HIM.

Pope. *i. e.* at his death.

As

As to place, this preposition refers to the hinder part of any thing, or that which is on the contrary side to the front or face of it; as,

To sit, stand, ride BEHIND *a person.*

Thou hast cast me BEHIND *THY BACK.*

Old Testament.

And so, *to stand behind a screen, curtain, bed, &c.*

When *behind* is joined with states of motion, it is equivalent to *following*, as *to walk behind* is *to follow*.

And hence it frequently refers to an object which is considered as excelling or preceding some other; as,

They wept which beheld how much this latter (house of God) came
BEHIND *IT; i. e. the first house.* Hooker.

BEYOND.

On the contrary side of, farther in distance than, more advanced than, exceeding; as,

The good land that is BEYOND *JORDAN.*

Old Testament.

The arrows are BEYOND *THEE.*

ibid.

What's fame? a fancy'd life in others breath,

A thing BEYOND *US, ev'n before our death.*

Pope.

They were sore amazed in themselves BEYOND *MEASURE.*

New Testament.

And so, *beyond thought, conception, dispute, &c.*

Beyond their power, income, ability, capacity, &c.

OFF.

This preposition is the negative to *on* or *upon*; as,

I was never OFF *MY LEGS.*

Temple.

i. e. never otherwise than on or upon my legs.

It likewise signifies *distant from* ; as,

Cicero's Tusculum was at a place called Grotto Ferrate, about two miles OFF THIS TOWN. Addison.

A B O V E.

Higher than, more than ; as,

The mountain of the Lord's house shall be exalted ABOVE THE hills. Old Testament.

The disciple is not ABOVE HIS MASTER. New Testament.

The man was ABOVE FORTY YEARS OLD. ibid.

Hence states of *excelling* or *exceeding* of any kind are often referred by *above* to that which is considered as excelled or exceeded, postponed or disdained ; as,

There is one God who is ABOVE ALL. New Testament.

Things may be ABOVE OUR REASON, without being contrary to it. Swift.

ABOVE ALL THINGS, my brethren, swear not. New Testament.

And hence, *above* sometimes signifies *too high spirited for* ; as,

He is ABOVE SO MEAN AN ACTION.

Kings and princes, in the earliest ages of the world, were ABOVE NOTHING that tended to promote the conveniencies of life. Pope.

O N, U P O N.

When these prepositions are applied to *place*, they refer to the object, to the upper surface whereof, or close to the side whereof, the attention is carried ; as,

To be ON A HILL—ON HORSEBACK—ON THE SEA—ON SHORE, &c.

Berwick UPON TWEED—Stratford UPON AVON, &c.

In ~~ten~~ Villages UPON THE RIVER KENNET. Clarendon.

—ON EACH SIDE of her

Stood pretty dimpled boys.

Shakespeare.

The Rhodians ON THE OTHER SIDE valiantly repulsed the enemy.

Knolles.

Whatsoever is applied to the upper side, or part, of any thing, may be referred by *on* or *upon*; as, *to place, throw things ON or UPON the table, floor—liquor spilled ON or UPON the ground, &c.*; and so,

Perch'd ON THE TREE.

Dryden.

As I did stand my watch UPON THE HILL.

Shakespeare.

And in imprecations, the name of whatsoever is to cover or overwhelm the object prayed against, has *on* or *upon* before it; as,

Sorrow ON THEE, and all the pack of you.

Shakespeare.

And in accumulations, *on* or *upon* is used to refer one object to another; as,

HORROR ON HORROR! Theseus is return'd.

Smith.

Hence these prepositions are used to refer to that which is considered as the foundation by which any thing is supported; as,

A wise man which built his house UPON A ROCK.

A foolish man which built his house UPON THE SAND. New Test.

And hence they are used to refer to whatsoever is the object of reliance, rest, dependence, &c.; for such object is considered as a kind of foundation thereof; as,

God commands us, by our dependance UPON HIS TRUTH, to believe a fact that we do not understand.

Swift.

Saul leaned ON HIS SPEAR.

Old Testament.

*We now may boldly spend, UPON THE HOPE
Of what is to come in.*

Shakespeare.

But the states, trust, confidence, to trust, to confide, take *in*
when thus referred ; as,

~~Trust~~ *IN THE LORD. Charge them that are rich in this world, that
they be not highminded, nor TRUST IN UNCERTAIN RICHES,
but IN THE LIVING GOD.*

New Testament.

Having confidence IN YOU ALL.

ibid.

A reference is frequently made by *on* or *upon* to that which is
the foundation of a charge or protestation or threat ; as,

*We charge you, ON ALLEGIANCE TO OURSELVES,
To hold your slaughtering hands.*

Shakespeare.

And so when a person says, *UPON MY HONOUR things are so or so.*

Hence, *ON THY LIFE ; the captive maid is mine.*

Dryden.

And the subject which detains the thought or speech has *on*
or *upon* before it ; as, *to think, speak, deliberate ON or UPON this
or that subject ;* and so,

*But while he thought ON THESE THINGS, behold an angel of the Lord
appeared to him.*

New Testament.

Bear Worcester to death, and Vernon too,

OTHER OFFENDERS we shall pause UPON.

Shakespeare.

And to call *on* or call *upon* a person.

In like manner, musical instruments, as being objects which
detain the thought and skill of the practitioner, have *on* or *upon*
before their names ; as, *to play ON or UPON the harp, violin,
flute, &c.*

*Th' unbappy husband, husband now no more,
Did on HIS TUNEFUL HARP his loss deplore.*

Dryden.

To the chief finger ON MY STRINGED INSTRUMENTS.

Old Test.

Habakkuk, chap. iii. verse 19.

Unless it be from touching the upper part of some ~~instru-~~
ments of musick in using them, that the reference by *on* or *upon*
has been introduced with regard to these, and thence extended
to all other instruments.

The time or occasion when, and the consideration or account
why, things happen or are done, frequently admit of the reference
by *on* or *upon*; as,

Because Jesus had healed ON THE SABBATH-DAY. New Testam.

But *on* is used with no name of time, except *day*; and some-
times *hour* in the Scriptures.

The best way to be taken ON ANY OCCASION.

Locke.

*The exstasy of a Harlequin ON THE RECEIPT OF A LETTER from his
mistress.*

Dryden.

Syllogism is made use of, ON OCCASION, to discover a fallacy. Locke.

B E L O W.

This preposition refers whatsoever is considered as *not so high*,
or *inferior*, either in place, dignity, worth, or desert, to that
by which the degree of height is estimated; as,

*His Idylliums of Theocritus are as much BELOW HIS MANILIUS, as
the fields are BELOW THE STARS.*

Felton.

*This method is not only dangerous, but BELOW THE PRACTICE of a
reasonable creature.*

Speſtator, N^o 25.

BENEATH.

When this preposition is applied to place, it has the signification of *directly below*, i. e. of *underneath*; as,

Their woolly fleeces, he laid BENEATH HIM. Dryden.
And palms for thee BENEATH HIS LAURELS grow. Prior.

And in expressions of pressure; as,

And sink BENEATH THE BURDENS which they bear. Dryden.

In other instances, *beneath* is equivalent to *below*; as,

He will do nothing BENEATH HIS HIGH STATION. Atterbury.

UNDER.

This preposition refers to that which is so much below, as to be in subjection, covered, sheltered, or concealed, to the object that keeps in subjection, or affords the cover, shelter, or concealment; as,

We are not UNDER THE LAW. New Testament.

We are no longer UNDER A SCHOOLMASTER. ibid.

The world was UNDER JOVE. Dryden.

To be UNDER WATER—to work UNDER GROUND.

Many a good poetic vein is buried UNDER A TRADE. Locke.

The Lord God of Israel, UNDER whose WINGS thou art come to trust. Old Testament.

UNDER COVERT of the wind. Dryden.

The false Trojan UNDER SAIL was seen. Dryden.

He does it UNDER NAME of perfect love. Shakespeare.

Morpheus is represented UNDER THE FIGURE of a boy asleep. Addison.

This faction, UNDER THE NAME of Puritan, became very turbulent. Swift.

The

The notion of *bearing* fail, or such a name or figure, is manifestly implied in the four last examples; and hence states of being loaded, oppressed, restrained, dejected, may be referred to that which is considered as born or supported, by *under*; thus,

As many servants as are UNDER THE YOKE.

New Testament.

I am carnal, sold UNDER SIN.

~~ibid.~~

To groan and sweat UNDER THE BUSINESS.

Shakespeare.

The laws and conditions UNDER WHICH they enter upon their authority.

Locke.

And so, *under a necessity, disadvantage, penalty, &c.*

Whosoever is lower in situation, is commonly full in view of those who are in a higher situation. Hence, *under* is applied in references of view, proof, consideration, correction; as,

To present them all UNDER ONE VIEW.

Burnet.

The thing UNDER PROOF is not capable of demonstration.

Locke.

The subject UNDER CONSIDERATION.

Locke.

A poem which lay so long UNDER VIRGIL'S CORRECTION.

Addison.

Whatsoever is lower, is deficient in height or degree; therefore *under* is often used to refer to that by which the defect is estimated; as,

If you write UNDER YOUR OWN STRENGTH.

Dryden.

There are several hundred parishes in England UNDER TWENTY POUNDS a year.

Swift.

He will take nothing UNDER SUCH A SUM, QUANTITY, NUMBER, &c.

To give UNDER ONE'S HAND, OR to leave UNDER ONE'S HAND, are particular phrases, signifying to *give*, or *leave* attested in writing.

UNDERNEATH.

Directly under, or quite under; as,

UNDERNEATH THIS STONE doth lie.

As much beauty as could die.

B. Johnson.

UP, DOWN.

These words, when used as prepositions, are only applied with states of motion, to shew the direction of such states; *up*, conveys the mind to place continually higher and higher; *down*, to place continually lower and lower; as,

To go UP A HILL, to climb UP A TREE; to go DOWN A HILL, to fall DOWN A PRECIPICE.

Of the construction of interjections.

AS these are not connective parts of speech, they have little or no effect on the form of construction of the other words which may be mentioned together with them. Only *ah me!*—*wo is me!* and some few other expressions of the passions, may be considered as a kind of interjections compounded out of several words; and in these two instances the oblique case *me* is made use of.

Of absolute construction.

THIS kind of construction appears, when a series of words is united with another series, without directly mentioning the conjunction, or relative adverb, or other word which is used in the common course of construction, to shew the connexion, but by leaving the form of construction itself to supply what is omitted.

In

In absolute construction you'll perceive
 Sometimes the verb plac'd in th' infinitive.
 And nom'natives with participles join'd
 In absolute construction, oft you'll find.

The verb in the infinitive mood is sometimes found in a kind of construction which may be considered as absolute; as,

I shall consider this book under four heads, in relation to the celestial, the infernal, the human, and the imaginary persons, who have their respective parts allotted in it.

To BEGIN WITH THE CELESTIAL PERSONS, &c.

Addison, Spectator, N° 357.

Here, *To begin with the celestial persons*, signifies in effect, *I think proper to begin with*, or something of the like import.

To RESUME ONE OF THE MORALS OF MY FIRST PAPER, and to confirm Clarinda in her good inclinations, I would have her to consider what a pretty figure she would make, &c.

Addison, Spectator, N° 323.

i. e. *It is not improper to resume one of the morals of my first paper, and therefore in order to confirm Clarinda, &c.*

And so in, *but to proceed*.

To say THE TRUTH, I have been mistaken.—To SUPPOSE THE WORST, we shall only lose our labour.

With many other instances of the like kind of expression.

But the most common use of absolute construction, is when a series of words which are equivalent to a whole sentence depending on a relative adverb or a conjunction, is expressed by a participle depending on a substantive in the nominative case, and the mode of dependence is left to be understood, or supplied, by the mind itself; as,

THE

THE COOL OF THE EVENING BEING A CIRCUMSTANCE with which Holy Writ introduces this great scene; it is poetically described by our author. • Addison, Spectator, N° 357.

i. e. *Forasmuch as the cool of the evening is a circumstance with which, &c.*

This cacoethes is as epidemical as the small-pox; THERE BEING VERY FEW who are not seized with it, some time or other in their lives. Spectator, N° 582.

i. e. *Seeing there are very few, &c.*

YOU HAVING, in your two last Spectators, GIVEN the town a couple of remarkable letters in very different styles: I take this opportunity to offer you some remarks, &c. Spectator, N° 618.

i. e. *As you have given, &c.*

I BEING IN THE WAY, the Lord led me to the house of my master's brethren. Old Testament.

i. e. *Whilst I was in the way.*

If a man borrow ought of his neighbour, and it be hurt or die, THE OWNER THEREOF NOT BEING WITH IT; he shall surely make it good. Old Testament.

i. e. *If the owner thereof be not with it.*

Instances may be found in which this kind of construction supplies the place of a sentence in dependence upon almost any relative adverb or conjunction.

Of figurative construction.

THE forms of construction which have hitherto been considered, and for which rules have been given, are usually considered as regular forms; but it is often convenient to depart from them, either for the sake of dispatch; or of variety; and

U u u . if

if this be done with judgment, the stile is often improved by it; for in the application of all sorts of instruments or means in a great variety of practice, it is often convenient, and sometimes necessary, to depart from general rules. When this appears in language, it is called figurative construction, and the grammarians have reduced this construction under four general heads, which they have called ELLIPSIS, PLEONASM, ENALLAGE, and HYPERBATON.

Of the figure ELLIPSIS.

WHEN words are constructed according to this figure, something is omitted, or left to be supplied by the mind from the nature of what is expressed.

One or more words of any part of speech may be omitted in a series of words, when either previous knowledge supposed in the hearer or reader, or demonstrative circumstances attending the words when spoke, may supply the omission. Thus in these words of St. Paul, *While one saith, I am of Paul, and another, I am of Apollos*, it is taken for granted, that the nature of the subject must enable every reader to supply *the convert*, or some words equivalent to them, before *of Paul—of Apollos*. And in the expression of the grave-digger in Shakespeare, *come, my spade*; the words *give me*, or others of the same import, are supplied by the situation, or by some action of the speaker; and so of innumerable instances. In Proverbs also many words are usually left to be supplied from the trite obvious nature of what is denoted by them; as, *out of sight, out of mind*; *like master, like man*; and many others. In passionate speeches also, much is usually left to be supplied from the situation and circumstances of the speaker. Thus in the celebrated scene of Lear in Shakespeare,

Deny to speak with me ! they're sick ; they're weary, &c.

and

and in many others of that passionate character, there are continual ellipses; but it is sufficient in a work of grammar just to touch on instances of this kind, which properly belong to the art of rhetorick.

But there are three instances of ellipsis that appear in the construction of the English, which must be particularly taken notice of in grammar, because these instances are the result of mere custom.

Infinitives without their sign, succeed
The verbs, *see, bear, feel, bid, dare, let, have, need.*

The active forms of the verbs, *to see, bear, feel,* and the rest which are mentioned in the rule, if they have a verb in the infinitive mood in dependence upon them, usually require the verb without the sign *to*; as,

*Thou shalt not SEE thy brother's ox or his ass FALL down by the way,
and hide thyself from them.* Old Testament.

We HEARD him SAY, I will destroy this temple. New Testament.

I FEEL the pain ABATE.

He BID her ALIGHT.

Shakespeare.

One who DURST his destiny CONTRÖUL.

Dryden.

Dare only admits of this construction, when it is used as a verb neuter; for when it is used as a verb active, signifying *to defy* or challenge, it requires the sign *to* before an infinitive dependent verb; as, *I DARE thee but TO BREATHE upon my love.*

Shakespeare.

Moses LET his father DEPART.

Old Testament.

If thou LET this man GO, thou art not Cesar's friend. New Test.

*I would fain HAVE any one NAME to me that tongue, that any one
can speak as he should do by the rules of grammar.* Locke.

Let and *have*, in this application of them, are not auxiliar verbs, but verbs active, *let* signifying *to suffer*, and *have*, *to procure* or *prevail upon*.

He that would discourse of things as they agreed in the complex idea of extension and solidity, NEEDED but use the word body. Locke.

The verb *to need*, in the English of the Scriptures, has the regular infinitive after it; as,

A workman that NEEDETH not to be ashamed. New Testam.
But we should now say, *a workman that needs not be ashamed.*

Some other verbs may be found in this kind of construction; as, *perceive* in the expression, *I perceived it rise*; and in, *you ought not walk*, in Shakespeare; but these are not authorized by the general construction of the language.

With casual *that* we often may dispense,
Or with a relative, and yet preserve the sense.

This being a kind of ellipsis that very frequently occurs, is taken notice of already among the ordinary forms of construction.

Do and *did* are often used to save the repetition of some verb; as,

They promised to come, but if they do not, we must proceed without them; i. e. if they do not come.

For by the nature of the English language, the repetition of any verb may be spared, by mentioning its sign; as,

They must and shall be punished—you may go, but I cannot;
i. e. they must be punished—I cannot go.

This construction therefore by *do* and *did*, although it be elliptical, is only one instance of the general ellipsis which runs through the language, when words, and not full sentences, are united by conjunctions.

Of

Of PLEONASM.

• THE construction which falls under this figure seldom occurs in English, and when it does occur, is usually considered as a fault. Thus, *God HE knows.*

*Now will I write letters to Angelo,
The provost HE shall bear them;*

and other expressions of like construction in Shakespeare, are not now in use; and the use of *do* or *did* merely to fill up a verse, which sometimes appears in poets so late as the beginning of the present century, and often in those of earlier times, is now disused, and has been ridiculed by Mr. Pope in,

Expletives their feeble aim do join.

Of ENALLAGE.

THE kind of construction which may be reduced to this figure principally appears, in English, when one part of speech is used with the power and effect of another.

Thus a substantive often has the force of an adjective by being prefixed to another substantive, and linked to it; as, *a land-animal, sea-water, a pen-knife, iron-wedges, &c.*

Any sort of word, or series of words, when used to signify the sound, or written appearance only, may be a substantive; as, *Her innocent FORSOOTHS, YES'S, AND'T PLEASE YOU'S, moved the good old lady.* Spectator, N° 266.

On the other hand, adjectives are often applied as substantives; as,

Abstain from all appearance OF EVIL. New Testament.
In poetry, as in architecture, not only THE WHOLE, but the principal members, should be great. Addison, Spectator, N° 267.
• *I have*

I have heard, BY MAN, of this man.

New Testament.

And so, *the righteous—the wicked.*

There shall be a resurrection of THE DEAD, both of THE JUST and UNJUST.

New Testament.

You are in THE WRONG.

Shakespeare.

Adjectives likewise are sometimes used as adverbs. Thus, *sure*, for *surely*; *in short*, for *in a few words*; *at least*, *at the worst*, for *taking things in the lowest degree*, *in the worst situation*; and so of many other instances.

The participles are continually assuming the nature of adjectives, by being applied to signify, not occasional or revocable states, but permanent qualities or situations; as, *a running stream*; *a striped, flowered, fringed garment*; *a learned man*; *a thorough-paced villain*, &c.

The particle *that* appears in so many characters, that it may not be improper to give rules to distinguish when it belongs to one part of speech, and when to another.

Whenever *that* may in its place receive
Or *who* or *which*, it is a relative;
But to a sentence when it gives a case,
Of a conjunction it supplies the place:
Or when applied with sentences to show
Them as dependent or on *such* or *so*:
With names united, or instead of names
When plac'd, to be demonstrative it claims.

Thus in,

Every one THAT has read the critics.

Spectator, N° 321.

That is a relative pronoun, for *who* may be used instead of it.

And

And in,

The only objection THAT she seems to insinuate. Spect. N° 605.

That is a relative, for *which* may be used instead of it. But in,

It happened THAT the king himself passed through the gallery during this debate. Spectator, N° 289.

That is a casual or sentential particle of the nature of a conjunction; for it gives notice that the whole sentence, *the king himself passed, &c.* is to be considered as a kind of nominative case answering to *it*. Likewise in,

I applied myself with so much diligence to my studies, THAT there are very few celebrated books which I am not acquainted with.

Spectator, N° 1.

To SUCH A DEGREE was my curiosity raised, THAT I made a voyage to Grand Cairo on purpose to take the measure of a pyramid.

ibid.

For in these examples, *that* is a kind of redditive to *so* and *such*.

Whereas when it is said, *THAT is a Latin book*, or *THAT book is a Latin book*, it is a demonstrative pronoun; and so of other instances.

This figure of enallage might be much enlarged upon; but in a treatise of this kind it is sufficient to mention some few of the principal instances to which it extends.

Of the HYPERBATON.

THIS figure relates to the order of words in a sentence; for when the simplest order is not observed, the figure takes place. This order consists in placing the subject of a sentence before the definitive verb; and, if the subject consists of several words, in placing the words which immediately affect each other as near together as possible; and if the predicate consists of several words,

in placing them in the same manner ; but it is often convenient to depart from this order, even in prose. Thus the sentence,

For the moving of pity, our principal machine is the handkerchief.

Addison, Spectator, N^o 44.

if reduced to the simplest order, would be, *our principal machine for the moving of pity is the handkerchief.* And,

Having pursued the history of a pun, from its original to its downfall, I shall here define it.

Addison, Spectator, N^o 62.

would be, *I having pursued the history of a pun, from its original to its downfall, shall here define it.*

There is no end of giving instances of the different ways in which we may depart safely from the most simple order of construction. But this we may observe, that, in general, the most simple order is the most perspicuous and easy, and the least liable to ambiguity.

We ought to be particularly careful when we place two substantives of the same number, the one in the nominative, and the other in the accusative, both before the active transitive verb ; for if the verbal state be such as either of the objects denoted by the substantives may be in, it always requires some little additional observation to determine which object is in the active, and which in the passive state. Thus if this line of Pope in the Dunciad stood single,

Blockheads with reason wicked wits abhor,

it would not be easy to determine, whether *blockheads*, or *wicked wits*, are *the objects abhorring*, or which are *the objects abhorred* ; but when the following line is read,

But fool with fool is barbarous civil war,

we perceive that the poet represents *blockheads* as *abhorring*, and *wicked wits* as *abhorred* by *blockheads*.

And

And even when the verbal state is not such as both the objects can be in which are denoted by the substantives, it still occasions some perplexity if we place the accusative case before the verb. Thus in Shakespeare's *Tempest*; in,

*You are three men of sin, whom destiny
(That bath to instrument, this lower world
And what is in't) the never-surfeited sea
Hath caused to belch up.*

we perceive an obscurity; because the words should be placed, *whom destiny hath caused the never-surfeited sea to belch up.*

But the order of position is best regulated, both in poetry and oratory, by the ear, which ought to be consulted, so that perspicuity be not hurt by a regard to sound. Whatsoever is difficult to pronounce, is harsh to the ear when pronounced; for the organs of utterance, and the organs of hearing are so formed, that ease in articulating creates a pleasure in hearing, independent of the sense of what is spoken. But pleasure in hearing, independent of the sense of what is spoken, is of very short duration; and if left unsupported by strong sense conveyed together with it, we are quickly cloyed, and even disgusted with the absurdity of the proceeding; whereas, if clear strong sense be conveyed in words somewhat harsh to the ear, we are apt to overlook the defect in the conveyance, out of regard to the excellence of that which is conveyed.

Practical Grammar

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

BOOK III.

OF PROSODY.

THIS part of grammar treats of syllables considered as long or short, and of the order of succession in which these syllables are placed in poetry so as to constitute harmony.

The distinction of syllables, with regard to length and shortness, is called *quantity* in grammar; and certain numbers of these syllables taken together in certain laws of quantity, are called *feet*; and certain numbers of feet placed in certain orders, constitute verses of different kinds, not only with regard to length; but likewise with regard to *rhythm* or successive modulation.

Of the quantity of syllables in English words.

SYLLABLES, when considered with regard to quantity, are either *long* or *short*. Every long syllable is supposed to take up twice as much time in pronouncing as a short syllable

X x x 2 •

does,

does. This proportion is not indeed observed very exactly between every long syllable and every short one; but it is observed with sufficient exactness to distinguish the sorts of feet whereof different kinds of verses consist, which is all that is required in technical prosody.

A long syllable has this mark (¯), or the accent (') over it: a short syllable has this mark (ˇ) over it, or is without any mark.

In the pronunciation of the English, a discernable stress of the voice is laid upon some one syllable of every word which has more than one syllable in it, and several words which consist of more than two syllables require this stress of voice on more than one of their syllables. Our grammarians have agreed to call this stress of the voice, *accent*; although it is frequently laid upon a syllable without altering the tone as to height. But the stress gives a strength to the utterance of the syllable, and this either by dwelling upon some vowel or diphthong; as in, *amiable*, *omen*, *túmult*, *capácious*, *jóyous*; or by running some vowel or diphthong upon one or more consonants which follow it, and dwelling upon them; as in, *amicable*, *óminous*, *túmbles*, *capácity*, *boáster*; so that *accent*, or strong articulation, and *long quantity*, coincide in English.

I. All monosyllables take or omit

The accent, as the writer sees most fit.

All monosyllables may be pronounced either without or with the accent, and are therefore what the grammarians call *common*, i. e. either long or short, as occasion requires. Indeed the articles *a*, *an*, *the*, the signs of the tenses *have*, *had*, *shall*, *will*, *may*, &c. and the conjunctions and prepositions of one syllable, are usually pronounced without much stress of the voice, and therefore are usually short; but if they are at any time emphatical, the stress may be given to them, and if so, they become long syllables. The

The sign of a tense is always emphatical when it is placed without its verb, *i. e.* when its verb is left to be understood or supplied by the mind; as in,

But those who cannot write, and those who can. Pope.

The prepositions are often emphatical when they follow verbs; as in,

Bows and votes on, in court and parliament. Pope.

Full many a beast goes in, but none come out. Pope.

And so of other like instances, which occur continually.

- II. Short syllables to words subjoin'd we place,
As marks of number, person, tense or case.
And in comparison you likewise find
Short syllables to adjectives subjoin'd.
And *ly*, which to so many adverbs stands
Subjoin'd, no length'ned utterance demands.

Syllables are short which are acquired at the end of some substantives by declension and variation of number; and those which are acquired at the end of some forms of the verb by conjugation, are likewise short.

The syllable *es* is, in effect, acquired in the genitive case singular by some substantives which end in silent *e*, such as *judge*; and by others which are of the first or third variety. Thus,

The marshal's trancheon nor the judge's robe. Shakespeare.

But for the wits of either Charles's days. Pope.

This syllable is always short.

es short, is likewise subjoined in the plural of all substantives of the first and third variety; as, *faces, cages, churches, losses, foxes, &c.*

The

The same syllable, viz. *ēs* short, is likewise subjoined in the third person present of the indicative mood of verbs that end as the substantives do which form the plural by *ēs* short; as, *be placēs, easēs, fixēs, dashēs, &c.*

est, the termination of the second person singular of the same tense, is likewise short; as, *thou bearēst, grantēst, standēst, &c.* But this syllable is usually contracted; as, *thou bearst.*

The syllables *ing* and *ed*, which are affixed to the root of the verb in order to form either the definitive tenses, or those of the infinitive mood, or the participles, are short; as, *calling, I have callēd, a man callēd*; but *ed* is very often contracted; as, *call'd.*

The syllables *er* and *est*, which are affixed to adjectives in order to form the degrees of comparison, are short; as, *fairer, fairēst, &c.*

The syllable *ly*, subjoined to adverbs, is short; as, *fairly, deservedly, &c.*

These rules admit of few or no exceptions.

Of the quantity of words of two syllables.

THERE are few or no words in English which have two long syllables succeeding each other, and as some one syllable of every word of more than one syllable has a stress of the voice upon it, it is manifest that English dissyllable words must either consist of a long syllable followed by a short one, or of a short syllable followed by a long one.

Dissyllables are either original words, or derivatives from monosyllables, or compounds from monosyllables: and whether they become dissyllables by derivation or composition, it is manifest

nifest that only one syllable can be added to the original monosyllable; for if more syllables were added, the result would be a word of three or more syllables.

The English words have been borrowed from so many languages, that it is very difficult to determine what dissyllables are to be considered as original words, and what as not so. And as both derivative and compound words are formed sometimes by subjoining a syllable, and sometimes by prefixing a syllable to an original word, it is equally difficult to determine what words are to be considered as derivatives, and what as compounds; and when derivatives or compounds are made by particles prefix'd, the same particle is long in some words and short in others.

Thus *ex* is long in, *exit, extant*; but is short in *express, extent, extol*, and many other words. This has come to pass from our retaining many of the letters of those languages whence so many of our words are taken, without retaining the pronunciation of the languages.

III. Dissyllables in *age, en, et, ish, ow,*
Our, y, le, ter, c-k, seldom allow
 Of accent on the last; except in words
 Which composition frequently affords
 With monosyllables, when they are found
 Following a preposition short in sound.

Words of two syllables of every part of speech which end in *age, en, et, ish, ow, our, y, le, ter, ck,* have usually the last syllable short; as, *bondage, maiden, quiet, selfish, fellow, outpour, folly, subtle, sister, mystick, frolick, &c. to manage, to open, to pocket, to lavish, to follow, (except allow) to labour, to sully, to puzzle, to flatter, to frolick; &c.*

But

But a short preposition is frequently found placed before monosyllables of these terminations; so as to form dissyllables with the accent on the original word, which is now the last syllable of the compound word; as in, *engage*, *affwage*, *beset*, *unwish*, *forestow*, *contour*, *comply*, *reply*, *deny*, *inter*, *refer*, *confess*, *unlock*, &c.

IV. The nouns dissyllable which end in *er*

Upon the first a length'ned accent bear.

Nouns of two syllables which end in *er* have the accent upon the first syllable; as, *thunder*, *wonder*, *winter*, *splinter*, *speaker*, *bearer*, *reader*, &c.

V. But nouns dissyllable, if they contain

A diphthong in the last (save *ous*, *eign*, *ain*)

Require that on the last the voice shall long remain. }

Nouns of two syllables, if they have a diphthong in the last syllable, have the accent on the last; as in a *retreat*, a *survey*, a *delay*, *applause*, &c.

But nouns which end in *ain* must be excepted; as, *certain*, *mountain*, *fountain*, *chieftain*, &c. And in *eign*; as, *foreign*, *sou'reign*, and some others.

And several adjectives in *ous*; as, *famous*, *jealous*, *zealous*, &c.

Nouns in *ow* and *our*, although they have a diphthong in the last syllable, have that syllable short; by the first rule concerning words of two syllables; as, a *swallow*, a *fellow*, a *billow*, &c. *favour*, *labour*, &c.

- VI. In verbs disyllable, if on their end
 Diphthongs or sev'ral consonants attend,
 Or silent *e* following a consonant,
 A length'ned accent to the last we grant;

(Verbs of two syllables which have a diphthong in the last syllable, or end with two consonants, or in silent *e* following a consonant, have the accent on the latter syllable; as, *to repair*, *to enjoy*, *to destroy*, *to appear*, *to betray*, *to allay*, &c.; *to distress*, *to command*, *to depart*, *to regard*, *to desert*, &c.; *to behave*, *to atone*, *to abate*, *to arise*, *to conclude*, &c.

- VII. In sev'ral words disyllable which bear
 At once of noun and verb the character,
 The noun has on the first its accent plac'd,
 But by the verb 'tis taken on the last.

In several words of two syllables which are used both as nouns and verbs, the noun has the accent upon the former syllable, and the verb on the latter; as, *absent*, *to absent*; *abstract*, *to abstract*; *cement*, *to cement*; *a consort*, *to consort*; *a contest*, *to contest*; &c.

But this rule admits of many exceptions; for there are very many disyllable nouns which do not end either in *age*, *en*, *et*, *ish*, *our*, *y*, *le*, *ter*, or *ck*, and which of consequence have the accent on the latter syllable: and yet there are verbs of the same form with these nouns; as, *an express*, *to express*; *an eclipse*, *to eclipse*; *a divine*, *to divine*; *distrust*, *to distrust*; *a disguise*, *to disguise*; *a regard*, *to regard*; *repose*, *to repose*; *a report*, *to report*; &c.

And there are many disyllable verbs which end in *age*, *en*, *et*, *ish*, *our*, *y*, *le*, *ter*, or *ck*, and which of consequence have the accent on the former syllable, and yet there are nouns of the

same form with these verbs ; as, *fórrage*, to *fórrage* ; a *hóiden*, to *hóiden* ; a *gárden*, to *gárden* ; a *billet*, to *billet* ; a *rélisht*, to *rélisht* ; a *lábour*, to *lábour* ; a *fávour*, to *fávour* ; a *sállly*, to *sállly* ; a *fáble*, to *fáble* ; a *strúggel*, to *strúggel* ; a *clátter*, to *clátter* ; *búttter*, to *búttter* ; a *frólick*, to *frólick* ; &c.

Of the quantity of words of three syllables.

VIII. **I**F to dissyllables prefix'd you find
 One only syllable, or one subjoin'd ;
 The accent still continues as it fell
 Upon th'original dissyllable.

If a single syllable is either placed before or behind a word of two syllables, the compound or derivative word of three syllables usually retains the accent upon the same syllable on which it was placed upon the original word of two syllables before the added syllable was prefixed or subjoined to it. Thus from *légal*, *illégal* ; from *écho*, *reécho* ; from *vénom*, *invénom* ; from *rúly*, *unrúly* ; and so of very many other trisyllables which have the accent on the first, by prefixing a syllable to the original words. But from *ómen*, we have *óminous* ; from *óffice*, *ófficer* ; from *ódour*, *ódorous* ; from *niggard*, *niggardly* ; from *nimble*, *nimbleness* ; and so of very many other trisyllables formed from dissyllables which have the accent on the first, by subjoining a syllable to the original words.

Likewise from *instáte*, we have *reinstáte* ; from *assign*, *reassign* ; from *suppóse*, *presuppóse* ; from *matúre*, *immatúre* ; *decéive*, *undecéive* ; *compóse*, *discompóse* ; *engáge*, *disengáge* ; and many others with the accent still on the last syllable, though a syllable is prefixed. And from *invent*, *inventive* ; *repént*, *repéntance* ; *delight*, *delightful* ; *respéct*, *respéctive* ; *condóler*, *condólerice* ; and many others with the accent on the last syllable but one, though

a syllable is subjoined. So that the accent remains as it stood on the original disyllable, before a syllable was subjoined to it.

IX. Trisyllables in *al, ate, ent, ous, y,*
Ude, ion, ce, le, re, long sounds deny
 On both their latter syllables, and hence
 Must each with a long syllable commence.

Trisyllables ending in *al, ate, ent, ous, y, ude, ion, ce, le, re,* have their accent upon the first; as, *capital, tolerate, adequate, continent, orient, captious, factious, vanity, quantity, gratitude, interlude, nation, suction, variance, eminence, portable, tangible, theatre, furniture, &c.*

But observe that trisyllables in *ate, ent,* and *ce,* have the accent upon the second, if they are formed by subjoining a syllable to disyllables which have an accent upon the last; as, *compensate, absorbent, connivance, &c.*

Or if they have a vowel in the second syllable before two consonants; as, *intestate, incumbent, reluctance, &c.*

And several trisyllables in *le,* have their accent on the middle syllable, in consequence of several consonants placed after a vowel which is in that syllable; as, *apostle, epistle, disciple, quadruple, &c.*

X. The middle of trisyllables in sound
 Is long, if with a diphthong it be found,
 Or following consonants in it attend
 A vowel, or the word in *atour, ator, end.*

If the middle syllable of a word of three syllables have a diphthong in it, or if this syllable be formed by two or
 Y y 2 • more

more consonants following a vowel, or if the word end in *atour*, or *ator*, the accent is upon the middle syllable; as, *endeavour*, *encounter*, *accoutre*, *imbróider*, &c.; *delinquent*, *windictive*, *domestic*, *resplendent*, *paternal*, *apprentice*; *créatour*, *translátor*.

Most of the trisyllables in *atour* and *ator* are derived from dissyllables in *áte*, which have the accent upon the last, and therefore are included in the eighth rule.

- XI. Some French trisyllables long found admit
Upon the last; on which 'tis likewise fit
When two preceding syllables are plac'd
Merely to modify the meaning of the last.

Several words of three syllables, which together with the manner of accenting them have been borrowed from the French, have the last syllable long; as, *magazine*, *barlequin*, *repartée*, *dishabille*.

And monosyllables modified by prepositions of two syllables prefixed, often retain the accent in the compound word of three syllables; as, *overcome*, *understand*, *intermix*.

Of the quantity of words of more than three syllables.

- XII. **I**F polysyllables from words compos'd
By single added syllables are clos'd;
Or have one syllable prefix'd; the sound
Remains as on the simple word 'tis found.

In words of more than three syllables which are formed from other words, either by subjoining or prefixing one syllable, the

the accent remains upon the same syllable of the compound or derivative word, on which it was placed in the simple word; as, from *perfidious*, *perfidiousness*; *professor*, *professorship*; *venturesome*, *venturesomeness*; *reconcile*, *reconcilement*; *significant*, *significancy*; *surviveur*, *surviveurship*; &c. and from *amiable*, *amiable*; *continent*, *incontinent*; *union*, *reunion*; *assumption*, *reassumption*; *assemble*, *reassemble*; *defeasible*, *indefeasible*; &c.

This rule admits of several exceptions; as, from *accident*, *accidental*; *parent*, *parental*; *abstain*, *abstinence*; *adamant*, *adamantine*; &c.

XIII. If polysyllables in *ion* close,
Upon the last but two the accent must repose.
And those in *ian*, *iate*, *ical*, claim
ity and *ous*, their accent on the same.
But those in *ator*, *atour*, which appear
Upon the last but one, an accent bear.
On all the rest, such accent must attend,
As rests upon the words, from which these words descend.

Polysyllables which end in *ion*, *ian*, *iate*, *ical*, *ity*, *ous* and *le*, have an accent on the last syllable but two; as, *accommodation*, *admonition*, *absolution*, *retorician*, *physician*; *licentiate*, *appropriate*, *exhorte*, *associate*; *geographical*, *hypothetical*, *analogical*; *declivity*, *rotundity*, *acidity*, *activity*, *ability*; *advantageous*, *courageous*, *acrimonious*, *contemptuous*.

Polysyllables which end in *atour* or *ator* have an accent upon the last syllable but one; as, *administrator*, *dictator*, *moderator*, *dedicator*.

Polysyllables which do not fall under these rules usually preserve the accent of the words from whence they are derived; as,
from

from *tólerate*, *tólerable*; *accóunt*, *accountable*; *contémpť*, *contémpťible*; *accúse*, *accúsfative*; *compúlfion*, *compúlfory*; *provóke*, *provócatíve*; *decláim*, *declámatory*; &c.

The thirteen rules laid down above, contain the best directions which I could find or give for the quantity of the syllables of English words. Many of them admit of exceptions, for which the reader or learner is referred to use and the observation of the poets, which in any language is the surest of all rules.

Of the composition of English verses.

I HAVE already observed, that certain numbers of syllables, taken in certain laws of quantity, constitute what are called *feet* in poetry; and that certain numbers of feet, placed in certain orders, constitute verses.

The feet which are to be principally attended to in composing English verses, are the *iambic* foot, which consists of a short syllable before a long one; as, *rēpóse*, *cōnfide*, *dístrēs*: the *trochee*, which consists of a long syllable before a short one; as, *lāboúr*, *vírtue*, *ēvēr*: the *daćtyl*, which consists of one long syllable before two short ones; as, *wōnděríng*, *lāboúrěr*, *tīmōrōus*: and the *anapæst*, which consists of two short syllables before a long one; as, *ūnāwāres*.

It is not easy to find anapæsts consisting of single words in English; although the foot frequently occurs in our verses, by placing a short syllable before a word, the first syllable of which is short, and the second long; as, *tō āvōid*; or two short monosyllables before a third, which is pronounced long; as, *bý thē nymphs*.

Our verses are usually composed of iambic or trochaic feet, and therefore have been often represented as each kind of verse consisting of a certain number of syllables, and not of a certain
number

number of feet ; for as an iambic or trochaic foot, each consists of two syllables ; if any number of the one or the other, or of both intermixed, are placed in a verse, the verse must contain twice as many syllables as it contains feet ; yet a dactyl is often in effect placed instead of one of these feet ; but when it is so, one of its short syllables is considered as taken from it, and a mark of elision is sometimes placed over the syllable that is considered as taken away. Thus, *gathering, every, ponderous,* and many other words, are considered as disyllables with the second short, and are often spelled in verse, *gath'ring, ev'ry, pond'rous* ; but a good reader pronounces them as dactyls, and a good ear perceives that they ought to be so pronounced. And *violent, watery,* and several others, are considered as contracted in the second syllable ; and *sumptuous, christian, vexation, officious, advantageous,* and several other words ending in *an, on, ous,* preceded by a vowel, are considered as if that vowel were cut out, and the words contained one syllable less than they really do. Yet a good reader pronounces the syllable with a smooth flow of the breath, so as to make it somewhat liquid, and unite gently with the following syllable.

But far the greatest number of the feet of our verses are either iambic or trochaic, and therefore it is the most convenient to measure by these feet ; and if so, each verse may be considered as containing a certain number of syllables. But the learner must be told, that to put the number of syllables together without regard to quantity, is not sufficient for the proper succession of modulation which the verse requires. Thus our heroic verse usually consists of ten syllables ; but these syllables must be alternately short and long, *i. e.* the verse must consist of five iambic feet ; or the first syllable must be long, the second and third short, and the fourth long, and the rest alternately short and long, *i. e.* the verse must consist of a trochee followed by four iambic feet ; or if not thus, such verse will in most instances be harsh, and in some instances utterly unmusical. Thus the following line of Dr. Donne,

Better

Better pictures of vice, teach me virtue. Sat. 4. line. 72.

has exactly ten syllables, but has not the rhythmus or modulation of an heroic verse; for to give it such modulation the quantities should be,

Bëttër pīctŭres ōf vīce, teāch mē vīrtŭe;

whereas the quantities are,

Bëttër pīctŭres ōf vīce teāch mē vīrtŭe.

Many of the lines of this author are equally faulty in the disposition of the long and short syllables, and therefore these lines cannot be considered as verses, although they have a just number of syllables.

Of the iambic measure.

OUR verses of iambic measure consist of four, six, eight, ten or twelve syllables.

Of F O U R.

With rāvish'd éars
The mónarch héars,
Assúmes the Gód,
Affécts to nód.

Dryden.

At déad of níght
A gláring spríght
With hídeous screáms
I'll haúnt thy dreáms.

Addison.

Unheárd, unknowñ,
He mákes his móan.

Pope.

Of

Of SIX.

Blow, blów, thou wínter-wínd,
Thou árt not só unkínd
As mán's ingrátítúde;
Thy tooth is nóť so keén,
Becáúse thou árt not feén,
Althóugh thy bréath be rúde.

Shakespeare.

In peáce, at ónce will I'
Both láy me dówn, and sleép;
For thóu alóne dost keép
Me sáfe, wher'éer I lie.

Milton.

The two kinds of measures, of which the specimens above are given, are seldom used, except in odes, and in songs; and even in these, they are usually intermixed with other measures.

Of EIGHT.

And máy at lást my weáry áge
Find out the peáceful hérmítáge,
The háiry gówn, the móssy cèll,
Where I' may sít and ríghtly spèll
Of év'ry stár that heáv'n doth shéw,
And év'ry hérb that síps the déw:

Milton's Il Penseroso.

Quoth she, some say the soul's secure
Against *distress* and *forfeiture*;
Is free from *action*, and exempt
From *execution* and *contempt*;
And to be summon'd to appear
In th'other world, 's illegal here,
And therefore few make any account
Into what incumbrances they run't;
For most men carry things so even
Between this world, and hell, and heaven,

Z z z •

Without

Without the least offence to either,
 They freely deal in all together ;
 And equally abhor to quit
 This world for both, or both for it. *Butler's Hudibras.*

If the good Pope remains at home,
 He's the first prince in Christendom.
 Choose then, good Pope, at home to stay,
 Nor westward curious take thy way.
 Thy way unhappy shouldst thou take
 From Tiber's bank to Leman lake,
 Thou art an aged priest no more,
 But a young flaring painted whore ;
 Thy sex is lost ; thy town is gone ;
 No longer Rome, but Babylon.
 That some few leagues should make this change,
 To men unlearn'd seems mighty strange. *Prior's Alma.*

This measure is chiefly used in tales and fables.

Of T E N.

This is the principal measure in the English language, being used in heroic poetry, tragedy, satyr, and in poems of any considerable extent on all kinds of subjects, and that whether these poems are in rhyme or not.

The Saviour comes ! by ancient bards foretold :
 Hear him ye deaf, and, all ye blind, behold !
 He from thick films shall purge the visual ray,
 And on the sightless eye-ball pour the day.
 'Tis he th'obstructed paths of sound shall clear,
 And bid new music charm th'unfolding ear :
 The dumb shall sing, the lame his crutch forego,
 And leap exulting like the bounding roe.
 No sigh, no murmur the wide world shall hear ;
 From ev'ry face he wipes off ev'ry tear.

In adamantine chains shall death be bound,
And hell's grim tyrant feel th'eternal wound. *Pope's Mess.*

I through the ample air in triumph high
Shall lead hell captive, maugre hell! and show
The powers of darkness bound. Thou at the sight
Pleas'd out of heaven shalt look down, and smile;
While by thee rais'd I ruin all my foes,
Death last, and with his carcass glut the grave:
Then, with the multitude of my redeem'd
Shall enter heav'n long absent, and return,
Father! to see thy face, wherein no cloud
Of anger shall remain; but peace assur'd
And reconciliation: wrath shall be no more
Thenceforth, but in thy presence joy entire. *Milt. Par. lost.*

A verse of twelve syllables, called an Alexandrine, is sometimes used amongst the verses of ten syllables, if the verses are in rhyme; as,

He ceas'd: and ceasing, with respect he bow'd,
And with his hand, at once, the fatal statue show'd. *Dryd.*

Waller was smooth; but Dryden taught to join
The varying verse, the full resounding line,
The long majestic march, and energy divine. *Pope.* }

The pause in the Alexandrine verse must be after the sixth syllable.

The modern English poets make no use of verses of more than twelve syllables, and of those of twelve only occasionally, and not two of them following each other. Some whole poems were formerly made altogether of Alexandrines, as by Drayton and some others; and Chapman translated Homer in verses of fourteen syllables: but these long measures have been found unsuitable to the rapidity of the language.

Of the trochaic measure.

OUR verses of this measure consist of three, five, or seven syllables; for although a trochaic foot consists but of two syllables, the first long, and the second short; a trochaic verse has usually an additional syllable subjoined at the end of the verse after a full foot, for the sake of resting the voice upon it.

Chíll'd with téars,
Kíll'd with féars. *Addison's Rosamond.*

Dréadful gleáms,
Dísmal scréáms,
Fíres that glów,
Shríeks of wóe,
Súllen móans,
Hóllow gróans. *Pope's ode on St. Cecilia's day.*

OF FIVE.

Gíve the véngeance dúe
Tó the váliant créw. *Dryden's ode on the same.*

OF SEVEN.

Mélanchóly lífts her héad,
Mórpheus róuses fróm his béd;
Slóth unfólds her árms and wákes,
Líst'ning E'nvý dróps her snákes. *Pope.*

Of the dactylic measure.

THIS measure consists of one or more dactyls with a syllable prefixed to the verse, and one subjoined for the pause.

One dactyl, with a syllable prefixed, and one subjoined.

No, nó, 'tis decreéd
The tráytrefs shall bléed;
No féar shall alárm,
No píty dífárm. *Addison.*

Two dactyls, with a syllable prefixed, and one subjoined.

Diógenes, fúrlý and próud,
Who snárl'd at the Macedon yóuth,
Delíghted in wíne that was góod,
Becáuse in good wíne there was trúth.

Three dactyls, with a syllable prefixed, and one subjoined.

My tíme, O ye múses, was háppily spént,
When Phoébe went with me whereéver I wént.

Many parts of Tuffer's book on husbandry are in this measure.

Of the anapæstic measure.

IF one short syllable be prefixed to the dactylic measures, above described, they will become anapæstic measures.

In my ráge shall be séen
The revéngé of a quéen. *Addison.*

Amidst Rhódope's snóws. *Pope.*

See

See the Fúries aríse !
 See the fnákes that they réar ;
 How they hífs in their háir,
 And the spárkles that flásh from their ey'es! *Dryden.*
 And the Kíng seiz'd a flámbeau with zéal to destróy. *ibid..*

All these measures, of which I have treated and given examples, are varied by many combinations, and sometimes by double endings, either with or without rhyme, as in the heroic.

To be, or not to be ; that is the question.
 Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
 The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune ;
 Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
 And by opposing, end them. *Shakespeare.*

Nor suffers Horace more in wrong translations
 By wits, than critics in as wrong quotations. *Pope.*

And in the iambic measure of eight syllables.

She made it plain, that human passion
 Was order'd by predestination. *Prior.*

And in that of six.

'Twas when the seas were roaring
 With hollow blasts of wind,
 A damsel lay deploring
 All on a rock reclin'd. *Gay.*

When the trochaic measures are formed by double endings, the last syllable of the usual measure, which served as a rest for the voice, is supplied by a full trochaic foot, and this makes the measure exceedingly soft.

Rích the tréasure,
 Swéet the pléasure. *Dryden.*
 Pleasure

Pleasure courting !
 Charms transporting !
 Fancy viewing,
 Joys ensuing.

Addison.

O the pleasing pleasing anguish,
 When we love, and when we languish.

Addison.

Softly sweet in Ly'dian measures,
 Soon he sooth'd his soul to pleasures.
 War, he sung, is toil and trouble ;
 Honour but an empty bubble,
 Never ending, still beginning,
 Fighting still, and still destroying ;
 If the world be worth thy winning,
 Think, O think it worth enjoying.
 Lovely Thais sits beside thee,
 Take the good the gods provide thee.

Dryden.

The dactylic and anapaestic measures are likewise frequently softened by a double ending.

For of us pretty fellows,
 Our wives are so jealous,
 They ne'er have enough of our duty.

Addison.

Now with furies surrounded,
 Despairing, confounded.

Pope.

The rules and examples laid down above, may be sufficient to direct a learner how to place the words in every kind of English verse, so as to preserve true quantity. But it is to be observed, that the iambic measures, especially the heroic, or verse of ten syllables, and the verse of eight, admit of other feet besides iambic feet in several places, in order to diversify the modulation, or to adapt the sound to the sense on some occasions.

A tro-

A trochee is often used instead of an iambic foot at the beginning of a verse; as,

Dāphnĕ, farewell, and all the world adieu. *Pope.*

And a spondee (or two long syllables succeeding each other) is used to express slowness of motion, or difficulty of execution; as,

When Ajax strives some rock's vast weight to throw,
The line too labours, and the words move slow. *Pope.*

And other changes of one foot for another, on particular occasions, may be observed in Milton, and indeed in every other poet who has used the iambic measure with success. But a particular consideration of this subject is the province of criticism, and not of grammar. The reader will find it considered with much judgment by Mr. Foster in his treatise lately published on the Greek accents, Chap. III. and more largely, and with great elegance of ear and taste, by Lord Kayme, in his Elements of Criticism, Chap. XVIII. Sect. IV.

As to the licences of English poetry, the great licence of making almost every word of one syllable either short or long upon occasion, makes it almost needless to admit of others.

I have already observed, that we contract many words by the expulsion of a short vowel. This frequently happens when the vowel precedes a liquid consonant; as, *temp'rance*, *violence*, pronounced as, *vi'lence*, &c. or when two short vowels coalesce into one syllable; as *variance*, *fustian*, *resolution*, &c.

The final *e* of *the* is often cut off, by synalæpha or the figure *elision*, before a vowel; as, *th'advent'rous baron*. And the *o* in *to* is sometimes cut off in the same position; as,

But when t'examine ev'ry part he came. *Pope.*

And *e'er* is used for *ever*, and *o'er* for *over*, and *'em* for *them*; as,
 ———and *you'll forget 'em all.* *Pope.

And some few other elisions are made in poetry, which will easily appear to any observer.

Butler, in his *Hudibras*, sometimes uses elisions which are not found in other poets; as in the passage quoted above, in *any account*, *any* is to be read as if it were of one syllable, and the *y* were prefixed to *account*; and *into what* is to be read, as if it were *int' what*; and so of many other instances which may be found in that most excellent performance. But these contractions are often harsh, and therefore have seldom been followed, even by Prior in his *Tales*, or Gay in his *Fables*, who are the principal authors that have written in the iambic measure of eight syllables since Butler's time.

Lord Kayme, in the section referred to above, has fully shewn the great variety of modulation which the English heroic verse is capable of, especially when without rhyme; all the other measures are usually with rhyme, and the iambic measures of four and six syllables, and the trochaic, dactylic, and anapæstic measures, are seldom used but in lyric poetry, and in songs. Dryden's and Pope's *Odes on St. Cecilia's Day*, will satisfy any one who shall examine them, of how great extent and variety of harmony the English language is capable.

I have made no particular observations on rhyme; for to treat of this point effectually, it would be necessary to make a kind of dictionary, in order to shew what words rhyme to each other in this language, and this would exceed the limits of a grammar. But, indeed, use and trial are the most effectual methods of arriving at the ready faculty of writing in rhyme, and to that the learner must be referred in this, as in many other instances of the proper application of language, both in poetry and prose. It

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easily appears from what is said at the close of the Speculative Grammar, why the Latin and Greek verses do not admit of rhyme, viz. because these languages are overloaded, even in prose, with correspondences of termination ; so that to affect such correspondences still farther in these languages, must occasion disgust. Whensoever rhyme has been attempted in Latin, it has always been double rhyme ; as,

*Et nunc dilectum speculum pro more reiectum
Pulvis suavis odore, et epistola suavis amore.*

For single terminations, which rhyme to each other, occur too frequently, in this language, without study ; and therefore should be avoided as much as possible ; and much more the double rhimes, which were only used in times of barbarism. But this is no reason why rhyme should not be admitted in a language, the plan of construction whereof is not formed on correspondence of termination, which is the case of the English. Indeed, in long poems of a serious nature, rhyme seems to be less proper, because the same sounds, or nearly the same, must recur too frequently ; but on gay or ludicrous subjects, rhyme seems to be very proper ; and in lyric poetry, on any subject whatsoever.

F I N I S.





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